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Reginald C. Davenport

A MANUAL

OF THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

TALBOYS AND BROWNE, PRINTERS, OXFORD.

A MANUAL

OF THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

TENNEMANN.

BY THE

REV. ARTHUR JOHNSON, M.A.

LATE FELLOW OF WADHAM COLLEGE, ETC.

DIFFICILE EST IN PHILOSOPHIÂ PAUCA ESSE EI NOTA CUI NON SINT AUT PLERAQUE AUT OMNIA. CIC. TUSC. II, 1.

OXFORD:

D. A. TALBOYS.

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TO

B. P. SYMONS, D. D.

WARDEN OF WADHAM COLLEGE,

THE FOLLOWING TRANSLATION

IS INSCRIBED,

AS A RECORD OF LONG FRIENDSHIP,

BY

THE AUTHOR.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

The well-established reputation of Tennemann's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*[a], may absolve its translator from any longer preface than is necessary to explain the principles by which he has been guided in the prosecution of his undertaking.

In consequence of the extreme conciseness, in places, and the pregnant brevity of the original, I have been sometimes obliged to employ expressions of my own to convey the sense of my author; which would have been misrepresented by a literal version. Occasionally this has been made necessary by the phraseology of Tennemann, borrowed from the school of Kant to which he belonged; and which if presented to the English reader in all its native peculiarity might have been understood by none but those who were the least likely to consult the translation. As far, however, as it appeared possible, I have preserved the technical expressions of my author, subjoining for the most part an explanation of their meaning for the benefit of those English readers who may not have plunged into the profound abyss of German metaphysics. As a Manual of the present description ought to be calculated for general use, I have in general made

[a] I have entitled the present work a *Manual* of the History of Philosophy, in preference to a literal translation of the German title, for the same reasons which probably led the French translator (M. Cousin), to a similar choice. It is needless to remark, that the original is an abridgment, by Tennemann himself, of his History of Philosophy, in eleven volumes, and was first published by him in 1812; since which time it has been frequently reprinted, with considerable improvements and additions, principally from the pen of professor Wendt, of Göttingen. The present translation has been made from the Leipsic edition of 1829.

The term *Philosophy*, it will be observed, implies throughout *Moral Philosophy*, or *Metaphysics* in general.

it my object to remove from my work all those peculiarities which would have had the effect of embarrassing without instructing the private student, and whenever it has appeared to me that an observation of my author was of a nature impossible to be apprehended by any but a scholar long familiar with the disputes of the German lecture rooms, I have endeavoured to express the sense of it in other words, or, in a very few instances, have preferred to omit it altogether. It is hoped that every thing which is really valuable in the original, on many accounts so admirable, will be found to have been retained. If it be thought that in some instances I have departed too far from the expressions of my author, let it be remembered that the most *literal* is not always the most *faithful* translator; and that he who shall render *verbum verbo* the composition of a German metaphysician or historian, runs the risk of being intelligible only by a reference to his author, or by having his own work *done into English*. There are parts of Tennemann which on this account I had much rather have composed anew than translated, particularly the Introduction.

The history of German metaphysicians subsequent to Bardili, I have found it necessary to abbreviate more considerably. The articles alluded to were principally compiled by M. Wendt, in order to supply what Tennemann did not live to complete—an account of the living philosophers of his own country: but these sketches are so extremely concise and the language so technical that, (added to the unspeakable absurdity of many of the systems reviewed), it would have been impossible to have made them intelligible to an English reader without enlarging them to a disproportionate extent. M. Cousin who felt the same difficulty has, in his translation, omitted them altogether; preserving however the catalogues of each author's works. I have preferred giving, for the most part in the author's words, some general idea of each system, and have preserved as much of the bibliographical part as appeared in any degree necessary for the uses of the English reader. Another reason seems to have

contributed to induce M. Cousin to suppress these articles, namely, that the metaphysicians in question are so perpetually in the habit of changing and modifying their views, that before a statement of their sentiments could have been printed at Paris or Oxford, they may very probably have displaced every fragment of their own theories, and promulgated a new set of opinions to their pupils of Jena or Göttingen.

For similar reasons I have slightly modified the concluding articles on the present philosophical systems of other countries; preserving, however, all the information they contain.

It must be borne in mind that Tennemann was a German and a Kantist, with all the erudition which characterises his learned countrymen, and with a much larger proportion of judgment and discrimination than they are sometimes found to evince. Still, his criticisms are necessarily cast in the mould of his school; and although greatly too well informed and too acute to be a slave to its prejudices, he is apt to be encumbered by its technicalities, and is almost necessarily possessed with a high idea of its exclusive importance. It is through the medium of such prepossessions that he surveys the Systems of every other School, and by them he has been induced to allow rather more than a patriotic space to the labours of his countrymen, with whom he evidently thinks that the only chance of philosophical regeneration resides. It is necessary to bear this in mind whenever the opinions of the writer under consideration elicit those of the Critic; who nevertheless has exercised considerable forbearance in withholding as much as possible his private judgment.

One of the greatest advantages possessed by this excellent Manual is its copious Bibliography; indicating all that is worth reading, (and much that is not), on every subject it embraces; and presenting us with a catalogue of each author's works, and those of his commentators and opponents. In this department it will be found that the titles of works in German which relate to the Classics

or to writers of the Middle Ages, have been generally translated by me, in order to point out to the reader the large mine of various information contained in the libraries of Germany. But when arrived at the metaphysicians of that country, I have judged it better to retain the actual titles of their works and those of their commentators, as the books may be thus more easily procured than if their titles had been translated; and because no one was likely to attack in their own language the metaphysical works of Kant or of Schelling, who was not competent to peruse their titles at least in the original.

I could have wished indeed that circumstances had permitted me to enlarge the catalogue of English and Scottish writers at the expense of those of Germany, but in the mean time, while I have preserved in the text the names of all the metaphysicians of every German school, I have occasionally forborne to particularise *all* the compositions of some among them who are known to us only as obscure commentators on exploded systems. A few treatises on *other* subjects I have struck out from the Bibliography, as not likely to be useful, or because they were not readily procurable by the English reader. In the place of those omitted, others have been added, and more would have been, had not the *supellex* already furnished been more than ample for all the purposes of the student, to whatever extent he may desire to push his inquiries.

The reader will observe, that the numeration of the sections in the present translation, after § 252, does not always correspond with that of the German. This has been occasioned by my subdividing some sections which originally formed one, and simplifying in one or two instances the numeration observed in the original; but principally in consequence of my abridging the introductory sections from 306 to 316, which it appeared advisable to do, on account of the obscurity, as well as the repetition, which there encumbers the original. The *running-titles* and the *names* of the philosophers, will sufficiently guide any one who may wish to compare the translation with the original, and obviate all difficulty which might

result from such a change. The references to the sections have been uniformly corrected according to the numeration thus established; and it is hoped that many errors will not be discovered in the voluminous and minute bibliography which has cost the translator so much care.

To these trivial alterations I am compelled to add that I have judged it better to omit altogether a few passages which appeared to militate against Revealed Religion, rather than to alter or to soften them. These instances, however, are exceedingly rare.

In this task, (the difficulty of which will be appreciated by few), I have been materially assisted by the excellent French translation of M. Victor Cousin[b], well known in the philosophical and literary world for many important publications. His thorough acquaintance with the subject, no less than his knowledge of German, admirably qualified him for the undertaking he has so well executed; and if it be sometimes the case that the "Interpreter is the harder of the two," the fault is not that of M. Cousin, but of the French language, which, at least to English apprehensions, often fails to convey as accurate a sense of metaphysical distinctions as that presented by the homespun compounds of the corresponding German. I have followed M. Cousin in placing the references at the bottom of the page, instead of incorporating them with the text, as the German typographers delight in doing; to the great embarrassment of the English reader, and to the visible disfigurement of the page. A very few references have been occasionally omitted, as belonging to points which did not appear to me necessary to be substantiated by a quotation.

Occasionally, when an expression in M. Cousin's translation has seemed to me more felicitous than the original it represents, I have endeavoured to give the spirit of the former: in one or two particulars also I have preferred his subdivisions, as being more simple than those of

[b] Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, traduit de l'Allemand de Tennemann, par V. Cousin, *Paris et Bruxelles*, 1829, 2 vols. 8vo.

M. Wendt, and recommended by his perfect acquaintance with philosophical history.

If I were to step for a moment out of the humble path of a translator, and offer a remark on the *matter* which has of late occupied so large a portion of my time, I should be inclined to suggest a conclusion very different from that with which Tennemann has summed up his great undertaking. He confidently anticipates that the disputes which, from the days of Thales, have continued to agitate the philosophical world, will all eventually conduct mankind to the discovery of true philosophy; and that all the deviations of Human Reason from the right path will prove to have been only so many avenues to the desired object. Far different is the sentiment his translator is tempted to express! Of these everlasting disputes what has been the result? How little has been gained by endless controversy? System has expelled system only to succeed one another, like the phantasmagoria with which children are amused: one gaudy and disproportioned figure making way for another,—equally motley and equally unsubstantial!

When the learned Casaubon visited for the first time the Sorbonne, his pompous Cicerone exclaimed, "Here, sir, is a court which for five hundred years has been the scene of incessant disputations!" "Eh bien! et qu'-a-t-on donc *prouvé?*" demanded the acute Genevese.

These endless disputes, however, and ineffectual efforts will not have been without their use, nor will the record of them have proved an unprofitable task, if they should lead the student to a conclusion widely different from that adopted by Tennemann, but resting on a much surer foundation. The inadequacy of Human Reason to satisfy its own requirements, ought to incline the learned and the wise a little to mistrust the guide to which they are apt to commit themselves without hesitation; and the monstrous absurdities which have been embraced by many who had rejected the plain evidences of Revelation may convince us of the fallibility of the most acute understandings, when they surrender themselves to their own

unlimited control. The most fantastical dreams of the wildest religious enthusiast were never more repugnant to common sense than the Neoplatonism of Proclus, the Absolute Identity of Schelling, or the *Ego* and *Non-Ego* ravings of Fichte.

It is pleasing to reflect that those philosophers whose views in Science were the most profound and wise, were among the firmest friends of Revealed Religion.

I regret that notwithstanding the pains that have been taken, some typographical errata occur, for which my absence from Oxford may not be thought a sufficient excuse. Some of these are noticed at the end, and it is hoped there are not many more,—the nature and extent of the work considered.

I am fully sensible of *other* imperfections for which I alone am responsible, and for which my regret that they exist is no apology.

Cheltenham,
February 1*st*, 1832.

A MANUAL

OF THE

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

SECTION I.

A HISTORY of philosophy, to be complete, demands a preliminary inquiry respecting the character of this science, as well as respecting its subject-matter, its form, and object; and also its extent or comprehensiveness, its method, its importance, and the different ways in which it may be treated. All these particulars, with the bibliography belonging to it, will form, together with some previous observations on the progress of philosophic research, the subject of a *general* introduction. The *particular* introduction will carry us on to the first period of this history, through a rapid survey of the religious and philosophical opinions of the Orientals, as well as the first attempts of the Greeks.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

CHARACTER, EXTENT, METHOD, IMPORTANCE, DIVISION, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

I. *Character of the History of Philosophy.*

† Ch. Leonh. Reinhold, On the Character of the History of Philosophy, in the collection of Fülleborn; Fasc. I.

† Geo. Fred. Dan. Goess, Essay on the Character of the History of Philosophy, and on the System of Thales, *Erlangen*, 1794, 8vo. with a sketch of the proper limits of the History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1798, 8vo.

† J. Christ. Aug. Grohmann, On the Character of the History of Philosophy, *Wittenberg*, 1797, 8vo.

† W. Gottl. Tennemann, History of Philosophy, vol. i, *Leips.* 1798, 8vo.

Dan. Boethius, De ideâ Historiæ Philosophiæ rite formandâ, *Upsal*, 1800, 4to.

† Fred. Aug. Carus, Observations towards a History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1809.

† Ch. Fred. Bachmann, On Philosophy and its History; three Academic lectures; *Jena*, 1811, 8vo. On the History of Philosophy, second edition, remodeled, with a dedication to Reinhold, *Jena*, 1820, 8vo.

† Christ. Aug. Brandis, On the Character of the History of Philosophy, *Copenhagen*, 1815, 8vo.

2. The human mind has a tendency to attempt to enlarge the bounds of its knowledge, and gradually to

aspire to a clear development of the laws and relations of nature, and of its own operations. At first it does nothing more than obey a blind desire, without accounting to itself sufficiently for this instinctive impulse of the understanding, and without knowing the appropriate means to be employed, or the distance by which it is removed from its object. Insensibly, this impulse becomes more deliberate, and regulates itself in proportion to the progress of the understanding, which gradually becomes better acquainted with itself. Such a deliberate impulse, is what we call Philosophy.

3. Thereupon arise various attempts to approximate this mental object of the understanding[a]: attempts more or less differing in respect of their principles, their methods, their consequences, their extent, and, in general, their peculiar objects. In all these attempts, (which take the name of *Philosophic Systems*, when they present themselves in a scientific form, and the value of which is proportionate to the degree of intelligence manifested by each particular philosopher;) we trace the gradual development of the human understanding, according to its peculiar laws.

4. But the development of human reason is itself subject to external conditions, and is sometimes seconded, sometimes retarded, or suspended, according to the different impressions it receives from without.

5. To give an account of the different works produced by the understanding, thus in the progress of improvement, and favoured or impeded by external circumstances is, in fact, to compose a history of philosophy.

6. The subject-matter of the history of philosophy, is both external and internal. The internal or immediate

[a] WEILLER, Kajet., über das Verhältniss der philos. Versuche zur Philos. (Schulschrift, 1812) in dem zweit. Bd. der akad. Reden und Abhandlungen, 1822, 8vo.

embraces, 1st. The efforts continually made by the understanding to attain to a perception of the first principles of the great objects of its pursuit (§ 2), with many incidental details relating to the subject of investigation, the degree of ardour or remissness which from time to time have prevailed; with the influence of external causes to interest men in such pursuits, or the absence of them. 2dly. The *effects* of philosophy, or the views, methods, and systems it has originated; effects varying with the energies out of which they sprang. In these we see the understanding avail itself of *materials*, perpetually accumulating towards constituting philosophy a science, or *rules* and *principles* for collecting materials to form a scientific whole; or, finally, *maxims* relating to the method to be pursued in such researches. 3dly and lastly: We observe the development of the understanding as an instrument of philosophy, that is to say, the progress of the understanding towards researches in which it depends solely on itself; in other words its gradual progress towards the highest degree of independence: a progress which may be observed in individuals, in nations, and in the whole race of man.

Observation. The history of *systems of philosophy* is not to be confounded with the *history of philosophy*.

7. The *external matter* consists in the causes, events, and circumstances which have influenced the development of philosophic reason, and the nature of its productions. To this order of facts belong: 1st. The individual history of philosophers, that is to say, the degree, the proportion, and the direction of their intellectual powers; the sphere of their studies and their lives, the interests which swayed them, and even their moral characters. 2dly. The influence of external causes, that is to say, the character and the degree of mental cultivation prevalent in the countries to which they belonged; the prevailing spirit of the times; and, to ascend still farther, the climate and the properties of the country; its institutions, religion, and language. 3dly. The influence of

individuals in consequence of the admiration and imitation they have excited, by their doctrines or example; an influence which betrays itself in the matter as well as in the manner of their several schools. (Bacon, Locke, Leibnitz.)

8. The *form* of the history of philosophy consists in the suitable arrangement of these two classes of materials, so as to make one scientific whole. Nevertheless, the result is modified, partly by the end of history in general, and partly by the special end of the history of philosophy.

9. History in general is distinguished, when properly so called, from Annals, Memoirs, etc. by its form: i. e. by the combination of its incidents, and their circumstantial development.

10. To enable the history of philosophy to satisfy an enlightened curiosity, not merely a vain and idle one, its object ought to be thoroughly to explore, through its continual alternations of improvement and declension, the progress of a philosophic spirit, and the gradual development of philosophy as a science. This end cannot be attained by a mere acquaintance with historic facts, but rather by contemplating their mutual dependence, and connecting their causes and effects.

11. The efforts of philosophic reason are internal to the mind; but by their publication, and the influence they exert on the world without, they assume the character and enter into the combinations of *external* facts. The facts therefore which form a groundwork for the history of philosophy may be regarded as both external and internal; because, 1st. They stand in connection with chronology, as successive or contemporaneous events. 2dly. They have their external effects and causes. 3dly. They have their origin in the constitution of the human understanding, developing themselves

in a variety of combinations and mutual relations. 4thly. They have reference to a mental object.

12. The *formal* character, therefore, of a history of philosophy will be modified according to the above fourfold relation, and by its proper end, which is to demonstrate at once circumstantially and with a scientific view, the causes of every revolution, and its consequences.

Observation. The circumstantial account does not consist merely in a chronological statement of a series of facts, but assumes such a series as its text and groundwork. It is very compatible with a scientific character in the history of philosophy; at the same time that it must be borne in mind, that a history of philosophy is not philosophy itself. See the work of Grohmann cited above, at the head of § 2.

13. Consequently, the history of philosophy is the science which details the efforts of the human understanding to realise the idea of philosophy, by exhibiting them in their mutual dependency: it is a systematic arrangement of facts illustrating the continual development of philosophy, as a science.

Observation. There is a difference to be observed between the history of philosophy, and the history of mankind,—the history of the cultivation of the human understanding, and the history of the sciences. The biography of philosophers, the examination of their writings, the statement of their opinions, and the bibliographical history of philosophy in general, are either preliminary lights and aids, or constituent parts, of the history of philosophy.

II. *Comprehensiveness and Commencement of the History of Philosophy.*

See in addition to the works cited above, at the head of § 2, † BÆRGE RIISBRIGH, on the Antiquity of Philosophy, and the Character of this Science, translated from the Danish into German by J. AMB. MARKUSSEN, *Copenh.* 1803, 8vo.

14. The history of philosophy does not affect to comprehend all the ideas, hypotheses, and caprices which have found a place in minds addicted to philosophic researches; such an attempt would be equally impracticable

and unprofitable. The only philosophic opinions which deserve to be recorded, are those which may claim to be so for their originality, their intrinsic worth, or their influence in their own and subsequent epochs.

15. It must be granted that philosophy has had a *beginning*, because it is nothing else than a superior degree of energy and activity in the exercise of reason, which must have been preceded by an inferior. But it is not necessary that the history of philosophy should embrace all its first efforts, or ascend up to the very cradle of our species.

16. No sufficient reason has been alleged to induce a belief in the existence of a Primitive Philosophic People, with whom philosophy might be supposed to have commenced, and from whom all philosophic knowledge might have emanated; for an aptness to philosophise is natural to the human mind, and has not been reserved exclusively for any one people. The very hypothesis of such a people would remove only one step farther the question of the origin of philosophy. Nor must we dignify with the name of science the symbolical notions of some of the earlier races, which did not as yet clearly apprehend and grapple with their objects.

Observation. The idea of a Primitive Philosophic People is founded; 1st. On the hypothesis that all instruction came by revelation. 2dly. In the tendency of the understanding to refer correspondent facts to the same origin. 3dly. In the attempt to render certain doctrines more venerable by their high antiquity. The general cause is to be sought in the indolence natural to human nature, and the habit of confounding opinions which have a semblance of philosophy with philosophy itself. The writers who have devoted themselves to the critical examination of history with a theological view, have declared the Hebrews to be the primitive race; others (like Plessing) the Egyptians; and these last have recently (since the writings of Fred. Schlegel), been displaced by the Hindoos.

17. Although we discover in every people the traces of a spirit of scientific inquiry, nevertheless this general

disposition does not appear to have developed itself in all in an equal degree: nor has philosophy among all attained to the character of a science. In general, it seems as if nature employed the civilization of one nation as the means of civilizing others, and accorded only to a *few* the distinction of originality in intellectual discovery. Consequently, all nations have not an equal claim to a place in the history of this science. The first belongs to those among whom the spirit of philosophy, originally aided by a slight external impulse, has felt itself sufficiently strong to advance to independent researches, and to gain ground in the paths of science; the second belongs to such as, without possessing so much originality and spontaneous exertion, have adopted philosophic ideas from others,—have made them their own, and thereby exerted an influence over the destinies of philosophy.

18. The Greeks are the nation whose originality of genius has created an era in the history of this science. In fact, although they were dependent for part of their first civilization on other nations, and have received from foreigners certain materials and incitements to the study of philosophy, we can perceive that they evinced themselves a lively and sincere interest in such investigations, and among them this curiosity assumed a scientific character, and imparted the same to the language itself. It is among the Greeks, then, that we find for the first time a truly philosophic spirit, united to literature and good taste, and a scientific spirit of investigation which centered in the contemplation of the Nature of Man: to this succeeded the desire of investigating to the end and consolidating these first bases of study (the origin this of *scepticism);* and at length ensued the formation of a philosophic language and method. We have moreover positive and certain testimonies to enable us to follow, on grounds altogether historical, the origin and development of the philosophic literature of this nation. We may add that the philosophy and, in general, the science

of the Greeks naturally combine and form a whole with those of more recent nations.

19. The Orientals, prior to the Greeks in point of antiquity and the date of their civilization, never attained to the same eminence, at least as far as we are enabled to judge. Their doctrines were constantly invested with the character of *Revelation*, diversified by the imagination under a thousand different aspects. Even among the Hindoos they wear a form altogether mystical and symbolical. It was the genius of these nations to clothe in the colours of the fancy the opinions of the understanding, and a certain number of speculative notions, more or less capriciously conceived, in order to render them more evident; without troubling themselves to examine the operations of mind and their principles; with its movements progressive and retrograde. The notions respecting the Deity, the world, and mankind, which these nations incontestably entertained, were not, with them, the causes nor the consequences of any true philosophy. Their climate, their political constitution, and despotic governments, with the institution of castes, were often obstacles to the free development of the mind. Besides, the history of these nations continues still to be involved in obscurity; there is a want of positive and certain information; and the relation their intellectual progress bears to the history of philosophy cannot as yet be sufficiently ascertained.

Observation. There are some interesting remarks on the Greek and Oriental characters, and on the causes of their diversity in the work of † J. Aug. Eberhart, entitled the Spirit ofPrimitive Christianity, vol. i, p. 63, sqq. What is generally understood by the Barbaric philosophy? See Diog. Laert. I, 1, sqq.

20. The true commencement, therefore, of the history of philosophy must be sought among the Greeks, and particularly at that epoch when, by the progress of imagination and intellect, the activity of the understanding had attained a high degree of development: an

epoch when the minds of men become more independent of religion, poetry, and politics, applied themselves to the investigation of truth, and devoted themselves to regular studies. This state of things may be referred to the epoch of Thales. The different directions and forms which, in the course of ages, this spirit of philosophic research assumed; and the effects, of every kind, which it produced, derived, through different channels, from the Greeks to the moderns, constitute the province of the history of philosophy.

Observation. The definition of the true limits of the history of philosophy has only of late become an object of inquiry: (the system of ethnography, or partial histories of particular nations) opposing itself to anything like a precise limitation, and even yet there is nothing satisfactorily determined on this point; only Tiedemann would exclude the Orientals. The reasons assigned on the other hand by † CARUS, Thoughts on the History of Philosophy, p. 143, and † BACHMANN, On Philosophy and its History, and the same author, Dissert. Philos. de peccatis Tennemanni in historiâ Philosophiæ, *Jen.* 1814, 4to., fail to prove that they necessarily belong to philosophy. It is true that a great interest attaches to the investigation of their doctrines, but we must distinguish well between this and the proper interest of the history of philosophy. On the whole, it may not be useless to preface the statement of Greek philosophy, by a brief review of the philosophic and religious opinions of the principal nations who, in a greater or less degree, have had relations with the Greeks.

III. *Method.*

Consult, besides the works cited before (§ 2) † CHRIST. GARVE, De ratione scribendi historiam Philosophiæ, *Lips.* 1768, 4to. and Legendorum veterum præcepta nonnulla et exemplum, *Lips.* 1770, 4to. both contained in FULLEBORN's Collection, etc. Fasciculi xi, xii.

† GEO. GUST. FULLEBORN, Plan of a History of Philosophy, in the iv. Fasc. of his Collection; and, † What is meant by a representation of the Spirit of Philosophy? Fasc. v.

† CHRIST. WEISS, On the Method of treating the History of Philosophy in the Universities, *Leips.* 1800.

21. The *Method*, determined by the end of the sci-

ence (§ 10), consists in the rules agreeably to which the materials ought to be investigated, collected, prepared, and combined to form a whole.

22. The materials for the history of philosophy may be either accidentally met with, or methodically investigated. In the latter case we ought to inquire especially what are the authorities and what should be the procedure of a well-directed research. The sources to which we may have recourse are of two sorts; the works themselves of philosophers which have descended to us; and the notices afforded by other writers concerning the lives and the doctrines of these philosophers; testimonies, the authenticity and probability of which should be critically examined. The less that any philosopher has written, or the less his writings have been preserved, the more we should seek to collect information from other authors; but, at the same time, the more necessary it becomes to be cautious in our adoption of such information [b]. When only fragments remain, it is well to consider them not only philosophically but critically.

23. Besides collecting the propositions of philosophers, it becomes necessary to study their true sense, their extent, their origin, and their mutual connection [c], in order to be enabled to assume the true point of view in which the philosopher himself stood, and to appreciate the merit of his labours, without exaggeration, and without injustice. The means to this end are a perfect acquaintance with his contemporaries, with the idioms of the language, and the course of men's ideas at that time; as well as a comparison of different authorities and testimonies with a view to ascertaining their credibility. In order to attain to a faithful and true representation of the meaning and the merit of different philosophical systems, it is indispensably neces-

[b] See H. Kuhnhardt, De fide historicorum recte æstimandâ in Hist. Philosophiæ. *Helmst.* 1796, 4to.

[c] Apply this, for example, to the *naturæ convenienter vivere* of the Stoics, and their ακαταληψία.

sary that we should compare one philosophical doctrine with analogous ones, whether contemporary or posterior; that we should determine with care its points of approximation and divergency; that we should investigate its place in the general system of its author, and the manner in which he appears to have been led to this doctrine; in which particular, care must be taken to distinguish between internal principles and external causes.

24. The management of the materials thus critically analyzed, demands a particular care in the choice of expression; particularly in the case of technical terms, which it is necessary to render with perspicuity; without, however, giving them too foreign an air and character, e. g. the ἕξις, *habitus*, of Chrysippus. For the *connection* of these materials, it will result from that chronological and systematic dependency of which we have spoken (§ 2), and especially from their joint relation to the final object and end of the understanding (§ 3).

Observation. The particular ends contemplated in such a work may justify a certain diversity in the manner and method of it: and may help to resolve the question (according to circumstances), whether it should be accompanied or not by criticism.

25. In combining these materials into a whole it is necessary to direct an earnest and constant attention to the development of reason, and to the progressive advancement of science. With this view we should establish points of repose, consisting in divisions and subdivisions, which ought, not merely to enable the reader the better to glance over the work, but should offer a clearer view of the whole, and of the mutual relation of its parts.

Observation. The ethnographical method, which prevailed up to the time of Tiedemann, is useful for a collection of the materials proper for a general or special history of philosophy; but will not form such a history itself.

26. Assuming the above principle, it is required to

constitute distinct epochs: 1st. That a sensible progress should have taken place in the improvement of reason, and that new lights and new principles should have been introduced into philosophy itself, influencing the scientific combination of acquired knowledge. 2dly. That great external events should have had a powerful and lasting influence over philosophy [d].

27. Three principal periods may be defined in the history of philosophy. First period: Comprising an account of the efforts of the understanding to acquire a knowledge of first principles, and the laws of nature, and freedom of will and action; without a clear consciousness of the method most conducive to such knowledge:—*Greek and Roman philosophy.* Second period: Efforts of the understanding towards the same end, but under the influence of a principle superior to itself, derived from Revelation; subsequently an impulse to free itself from any imposed restraint; followed by a fresh subjugation to another arbitrary formulary; a spirit exclusively dialectic:—*Philosophy of the Middle Ages.* Third period: Fresh and independent exertions towards the discovery of first principles; with the purpose of arranging all human knowledge in a more complete and systematic form; an epoch remarkable for the manner in which it has contributed to investigate, found, and define the principles of philosophy as a science.—*Modern Philosophy.*

Krug, in his History of Ancient Philosophy, p. 28, admits only two divisions, that of ancient and modern philosophy. He assumes as the line of demarcation the decline of government, manners, arts, and sciences, during the first five or six centuries of the Christian era.

IV. *Importance of this History.*

† Fr. Ant. Zimmermann, Dissertation on the Utility of the History of Philosophy, *Heidelb.* 1785, 4to.

[d] Dan. Borthius, De præcipuis Philosophiæ epochis. *Lond.* 1800, 4to.

† GEO. GUST. FULLEBORN, Some general Deductions from the Hist. of Philosophy in his Collection, Fasc. iv, and, On certain Advantages resulting from the History of Ancient Philosophy, Fasc xi.

† H. RITTER, On the Advancement of Philosophy through the History of Philosophy (a supplement to his work, On the Influence of Descartes), *Leips.* 1816, 8vo.

28. If philosophy may claim the highest interest, as the most elevated of human sciences, its history, for the same reason, ought to possess a great importance. Whoever is interested in philosophy ought not to be ignorant of its history, and progress.

29. The history of philosophy, besides, possesses a scientific merit peculiar to itself; it disposes the mind to a free employment of its powers, furnishes it with useful results, respecting the proper method to be followed, renders it more sensible to its aberrations, with their causes and consequences, and thereby furnishes a valuable assistance towards establishing rules for a right conduct of the understanding, in order to the attainment of new lights, and discovery of fresh paths: sources of information indispensable to philosophy, so long as it must be considered as in a progressive state, and not yet fully matured.

30. The history of philosophy has a connection with all the other sciences and their history; more especially with the history of Religion and of Mankind, because Reason is the basis of all knowledge, and embraces the ultimate end of all theoretical and all practical employment of our faculties.

31. As a department of study, such history may materially improve the understanding, all the powers of which it exercises in the research and exposition of the different systems. Nor is it less calculated to influence the *habits* of the mind, inasmuch as it teaches the renunciation of prejudices, modesty in forming an opinion, and tolerance of the opinions of others: its

tendency is to secure the mind from exaggerated admiration, and to moderate attachment to opinions received on the faith of authority.

Observation. On the other hand, has not the study of the history of philosophy its disadvantages? What are they, and how do they present themselves?—Indecision, and hesitation of judgment, indifference to the truth and the value of every rational research, can only be effects of a light and superficial study, where the diversity of opinions is the only thing contemplated, without regard had to their principles: where the difference of doctrines is the only thing attended to, without ascending to the points of union which they have in common. Here may be applied what Bacon says of philosophy.

V. *Different ways in which the History of Philosophy may be treated.*

32. The history of philosophy divides itself into universal and particular, according to the extent of the objects which it may be the author's design to embrace. The first is the statement, by facts, of the progress of philosophy, considered as Science in general, in its principal directions, and its most conspicuous results. This sort of history embraces a consideration of the principles of all philosophy; the most distinguished systems of philosophers; and the progress which they have enabled the philosophical sciences to make in their several departments. The second is employed about instances of the progress of the understanding confined within certain limits of time and place; and limited to certain particular directions, or certain special objects of philosophy.

Observation. † Carus, Thoughts on the History of Philosophy, p. 106, defines the universal history of philosophy as, "the natural history of human reason, its pursuits and productions." But he takes this definition in so loose a sense, that he gives us, instead of historic facts, nothing but a meagre and barren abstract of general conclusions. This way of viewing the matter does not answer the true end of a history of philosophy; the second chapter of this general introduction contains the substance of it.

33. The universal history of philosophy, may be presented in an abridged or a detailed form. The principle of a good abridgment is to present a review, as complete as possible, of all the essential subjects of discussion, with a due regard to perspicuity and brevity. Truth, impartiality, and conciseness are of course requisite.

34. Agreeably to what has been laid down (§ 32) we may define many kinds of *particular histories* of philosophy; such as, 1st. (From a relation to certain times or places;) histories of the philosophy of particular epochs; e. g.—of the ancients, of the middle ages, or of the moderns; with numerous subdivisions, embracing histories of the philosophy of this or that particular nation. 2dly. (From a relation to certain particular pursuits or special objects of philosophy;) histories of systems or schools, or literary questions, taken separately; of different philosophical *methods;* of the technical language of philosophy; histories of certain branches of philosophy; histories of certain philosophical notions, principles, or theories. If a particular philosophical history be limited to one single object, we have then a special history—a monography.

35. There is an intimate relation between particular and universal history. The first supplies the other with useful and various materials; but the latter, in its turn, develops general views, and affords lights for the examination and exposition of the particular details. Consequently they can only become perfect when united.

VI. *Various Histories of Philosophy.*

36. The history of philosophy has not been separately treated, as a distinct science, by the ancient philosophers. They have touched upon the subject only while occupied with the statement of their own doctrines, and only so far as the points they adverted to bore a relation to what

they taught themselves, in which respect the critical judgment of Aristotle threw a light upon the opinions of his predecessors. A collection of historic documents illustrative of the gradual development of philosophy, was the first step towards a history of the science. Even in modern times the earliest attempt at this sort of history was made in the form of a compilation, and the model assumed was the work of Diogenes Laertius. The prevailing notion of the time was that of a primitive philosophic race (§ 16), and that all philosophy was derived from revelation; the *ethnographical* method being adopted in the execution (cf. § 25, *obs.*). First period. *Bayle* awakened a spirit of criticism in this kind of undertaking; *Jac. Thomasius* extended the circle of study necessary to the same; and *Leibnitz* indicated what the history of philosophy ought to be. Second period. from *Brucker* to *Tennemann:* philology and criticism improved the materials collected; some imperfections in the works of the preceding age were corrected, and the science assumed more elevated pretensions. *Brucker* published the most complete work yet known, which, by a laborious assemblage of documents, by the judiciousness of his remarks, and particularly by what it contains on the biography of the philosophers, continues to be useful: but is deficient in a philosophic spirit. *Gurlett* and *Tiedemann* pursued a better method, and rendered great services to its special history.—From *Kant* to our own time; a zealous industry has been applied to its improvement in respect of *theory* and *method;* and, in consequence of the inquiries which this new sort of study has suggested, examination has been made of its proper sources and principles; documents have been revised, and their contents more ably stated; under the influence, more or less sensible, of a philosophical spirit and system[e]. The German nation has done

[e] See a review of the principal services rendered to the history of philosophy since 1780, in the Philosophical Journal of NIETHAMMER, 1795, Nos. viii. and ix. TENNEMANN's Review of the Labours of the History of Philosophy in the last fifteen years of the eighteenth Century, in the *Ergänzbl. der Allg.*

the most for this description of history, as regards both its manner and its matter; but there is still occasion for much labour in this extensive field.

VII. *Bibliography of the History of Philosophy.*

37. Under this head are comprehended the works relative to the history of philosophy in general and in particular. We shall particularise the writings on individual subjects, as they shall come under consideration. The works on the universal history of philosophy may be arranged under five heads: *(a)* Treatises on its Literature and Method. *(b)* Collections. *(c)* Miscellanies. *(d)* Detailed histories. *(e)* Outlines.

(a) Bibliographical Treatises.

J. JONSIUS, De scriptoribus Hist. Philosophicæ libri iv, *Francof.* 1659.—Recogniti et ad præsentem ætatem usque perducti, cura J. CHR. DORN, *Jen.* 1716, 8vo.

† J. ANDR. ORTLOFF, Bibliographical Manual of the History of Philosophy, *Erlangen*, 1798, 8vo. part i, never completed.

N.B. The *Treatises on Method* have been cited under the preceding sections.

(b) Collections.

JAC. THOMASII, Schediasma historicum, quo varia discutiuntur ad historiam tum philosophicam tum ecclesiasticam pertinentia. *Lips.* 1665, 4to. The same work under this title: Origines historiæ philos. et ecclesiast., cura CHR. THOMASII, *Hal.* 1699, 8vo.

J. FRANC. BUDDEI, Analecta Historiæ Philosophiæ, *Hal.* 1706, 8vo. second edition, 1724, 8vo.

† Acta Philosophorum: by CHR. AUG. HEUMANN, 3 vols. 8vo. *Hal.* 1715-23.

JAC. BRUCKERI, Otium Vindelicum, sive meletematum Historico-philosophicorum triga, *Aug. Vind.* 1729, 8vo. Miscellanea historiæ philosophicæ, litterariæ, criticæ, olim sparsim edita, etc. *Aug. Vind.* 1748, 8vo.

Lit. Z. 1801, s. 81—147, and CARUS, Hints on the History of Philosophy *Leips.* 1809, s. 21—90.

Chr. Ern. de Windheim, Fragmenta historiæ philosophicæ, etc. *Erl.* 1753, 8vo. With essays of various other authors.

† Mich. Hismann, Magazine of Philosophy and its History, *Goetting. et Leips.* 1778-83, 6 vols. 8vo. In this work are many essays translated from the Académie Royale des Inscriptions, etc.

† Geo. Gust. Fuelleborn, Collection of Pieces towards a History of Philosophy, *Züllichau*, 1791-99, Fasc. xii, 8vo.

Guill. Traugott Krug, Symbolæ ad Histor. Philosophiæ, *Leips.* 1813, 4to. Part first.

† J. Fred. Fries, Pieces towards a History of Philosophy, *Heidelberg*, Fasc. i.

(c) Miscellanies, containing researches and remarks on the History of Philosophy.

The true Intellectual System of the Universe, by Ralph Cudworth, etc. *Lond.* 1678, folio, second edition, by Birch, 1743, 2 vols. 4to. and 8vo. *Lond.* 1820, and *Oxford*, 1829.

Cudworthi Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, seu de veris naturæ rerum originibus commentarii, quibus omnis eorum philosophia qui Deum esse negant, funditus evertitur: accedunt reliqua ejus opuscula, *Jen.* 1733, folio; second edition, *Leyd.* 1773, 2 vols. 4to. translated by Mosheim [with the addition of many learned notes and dissertations by the translator.].

Huetii, Demonstratio Evangelica, *Paris*, 1679, folio, often republished.

Dictionnaire historique et critique, par J. Bayle, *Rotterd.* 1697, 2 vols. folio. The best edition is the fourth, reviewed and augmented by Desmaizeaux, *Amst. et Leid.* 1740, 4 vols. folio. Various translations and extracts. [A continuation has been published by J. G. Chauffpie, *Amst.* 1750, likewise in 4 vols. folio.]

† Ern. Platner, Philosophical Aphorisms, with some Principles for a History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1782, 2 vols. 8vo. a second edition, 1793-1800, 8vo.

(d) Detailed Histories.

The History of Philosophy by Thomas Stanley, *Lond.* 1655, folio, third edition, 1701, 4to. Latin translation with corrections by Godefr. Olearius, Historia Philos. *Lips.* 1711, 4to. et *Ven.* 1733, 4to.

Histoire critique de la Philosophie, où l'on traite de son Origine, de ses Progrès et des diverses Révolutions qui lui sont arrivées jusqu'à notre temps, par M. D*** (Andr. Fr. Boureau Des-

LANDES), *Paris*, 1730-36, 3 vols. Another edition, *Amsterd.* 3 vols. 8vo.

† J. J. BRUCKER, Questions on the History of Philosophy, *Ulm*, 1731-36, 7 vols. 12mo. with a Supplement, 1737, 12mo.

J. BRUCKERI, Historia critica Philosophiæ a Mundi incunabulis, etc. *Lips.* 1742-44, 5 vols. 4to. a new edition without alterations, but augmented by a Supplement, 1766-67, 6 vols. 4to. An English Abridgment by W. ENFIELD, History of Philosophy from the earliest times, etc. *Lond.* 1791, 2 vols. 4to. again in 8vo. 2 vols.

AGATOPISTO CROMAZIANO (APPIANO BUONAFEDE), Della Istoria e della indole di ogni Filosofia, *Lucca*, 1766-71, 5 vols. 8vo. Again *Venice*, 1782-83, 6 vols. 8vo. For the continuation of this work see § 38 *(a)*.

† History of Philosophy for Amateurs, by J. CHRIST. ADELUNG, *Leips.* 1786-87, second edition, 1809, 3 vols. 8vo.

† J. GLIEB BUHLE, History of Philosophical Reason, *Lemgo*, 1793, 8vo. vol. I. Instead of this work, which he did not continue, Buhle published † A Compendium of the History of Philosophy, and a critical Bibliography of this Science, *Goetting.* 1796-1804, 8 vols. 8vo. We may here add the work cited in § 38. on Modern Philosophy, which is preceded by a Review of the Ancient Systems of Philosophy up to the fifteenth century.

† G. GOTTLIEB TENNEMANN, History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1798-1819, 11 vols. 8vo. One vol. of second edition published by A. WENDT, 1828.

DEGERANDO, Histoire comparée des Systèmes de la Philosophie, 1804, 3 vols. 8vo. second edition, augmentée, 4 vols. 8vo. *Paris*, 1822. A German translation by TENNEMANN, *Marburg*, 1806-7, 2 vols. 8vo.

† J. HENR. MART. ERNESTI, An Encyclopedic Manual of General Hist. of Philos. and its Bibliography, *Lemgo*, 1807, 8vo.

† FRED. AUG. CARUS, Hints for a Hist. of Philos. *Leips.* 1809, 2 vols. 8vo. (in the fourth volume of his posthumous works).

† E. G. STECK, the History of Philosophy, vol. I, *Riga*, 1805, 8vo.

† C. J. H. WINDISCHMANN, Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte, *Bonn*, 1827, 8vo.

(e) Outlines.

Omitting the sketches of the History of Philosophy, which, since the time of Buddeus, may be found at the head of many Manuals of Philosophy, we shall merely notice the following abstracts:

Geo. Hornii, Historia Philosophica, *Lugd. Bat.* 1655, 4to.

Laur. Reinharti, Compend. Hist. Philosoph. *Lips.* 1724, 8vo.

Jo. Gottl. Heineccii, Element Hist. Philosophicæ, *Berolin.* 1743, 8vo.

† J. Brucker, Abridgment of his Questions on the History of Philosophy, *Ulm*, 1736, 12mo. with additions, 1737; under the title of Elements of the Hist. of Philos. *Ulm*, 1751, 8vo.

† J. Bruckeri, Institutiones Hist. Philosophicæ, *Lips.* 1747, 8vo. second edition, 1756, third edition, by Fr. Gottl Born, *Leips.* 1790, 8vo.

† C. G. W. Lodtmann, Brief Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Helmst.* 1754, 8vo.

Formey, Abrégé de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, *Amstd.* 1760, 8vo.

† Fr. Ant. Buesching, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Berlin*, 1772-74, 2 vols. 8vo.

† Christ. Meiners, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Lemgo*, 1786, 8vo. second edition, 1789.

† Jo. Gurlitt, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1786, 8vo.

† Fr. Xav. Gmeiner's, Literary History of the Origin and Progress of Philosophy, and of its Sects and Systems, *Greiz.* 1788-89, 11 vols. 8vo.

† J. Aug. Eberhard, General History of Philosophy, *Halle*, 1788, second edition, 1796, 8vo. Abstract of a general History, *Halle*, 1794, 8vo.

† Geo. Socher, Historical Sketch of the Systems of Philosophy from the Greeks to Kant, *Munich*, 1802, 8vo.

† Fred. Ast, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Landshut*, 1807, 8vo.

† Ch. Aug. Schaller, Manual of the History of Philosophical Discoveries, etc. forming the second part of the Magaz. für Verstandesübungen, *Halle*, 1809, 8vo.

† Ph. L. Snell, Brief Sketch of the History of Philosophy: Part first, History of Ancient Philosophy, *Geissen*, 1813, 8vo. Part second, History of the Philosophy of the Middle ages, *Ibid.* 1819, 8vo.

† Gaeten Weiller, Sketch of the History of Philosophy, *Munich*, 1813, 8vo.

† Jos. Hillebrand, History and Methodical Systems of Philosophy, forming the second part of his Introduction to Philosophy, *Heidelberg*, 1819, 8vo.

† A. T. Rixner, Manual of the History of Philosophy, 3 vols. *Salz.* 1822-23, 8vo.

† L. Hamerskold, Outlines of the History of Philosophy from the earliest times to the present, *Stockholm*, 1822, 8vo.

38. Works on the history of philosophy in detail: classed according to the distinctions given in § 34.

I. *(a) Histories of particular epochs.*

† W. Traug. Krug, History of Ancient Philosophy particularly among the Greeks and Romans, *Leips.* 1827, 8vo. second edition.

† Christoph. Meiners, Memoirs towards a History of the Opinions prevalent during the first centuries after the birth of Jesus Christ, *Leips.* 1782, 8vo.

Agatopisto Cromaziano (Appiano Buonafede), Della ristaurazione di ogni Filosofia nei secoli xv, xvi, xvii. This work may be considered as a sequel of one by the same author, mentioned in the preceding §. *Venice*, 1789, 3 vols. 8vo. † A German translation, with corrections and additions, by Ch. Heydenreich, *Leips.* 1791-92, 2 vols. 8vo.

† J. Gottl. Buhle, History of Modern Philosophy from the revival of Letters, *Goetting.* 1800-5, 6 vols. 8vo. Cf. § 37 *(d)*.

† A. Kayssler, Memoirs towards a Critical History of Modern Philosophy, *Halle*, 1804, large 8vo.

† Ch. Fred. Bachmann, On the Philosophy of our own Times, *Jena*, 1816, 8vo.

† K. J. H. Windischmann, Critical Reflections upon the fate of Philosophy in modern times, and the commencement of a new era, *Francof.* 1825, 8vo.

(b) Histories of the Philosophy of particular nations.

(For writings on the philosophy of the most ancient nations, see below § 68, and following.)

Ciceronis, Historia Philosophiæ antiquæ; ex omnibus illius scriptis collegit, etc. Frid. Gedike, *Berl.* 1782; second edition, 1801, 8vo.

† Fr. Vict. Lebrecht Plessing, Historical and Philosophical Researches on the Opinions, the Theology, and Philosophy of the most Ancient Nations, and particularly of the

Greeks up to the time of Aristotle, *Elbing*, 1785, part the first, 8vo.

† Fr. Vict. Lebrecht Plessing, Memnonium, or Researches to elucidate the Mysteries of Antiquity, *Leips.* 1787, 2 vols. 8vo.

† Fr. Vict. Lebrecht Plessing, Researches to illustrate the Philosophy of the most remote Antiquity, *Leips.* 1788, 2 vols. 8vo.

Berchetti, Filosofia degli antichi popoli, *Perugia*, 1812, 8vo.

† Chr. Meiners, History of the Origin, the Progress, and the Decline of the Sciences in Greece and Rome, *Lemgo*, 1781-82, 2 vols. 8vo. incomplete.

The Philosophy of Ancient Greece investigated by W. Anderson, *Lond.* 1791, 4to.

(Fr. de Salignac de la Mothe Fenelon,) Abrégé des Vies des Anciens Philosophes, etc. *Paris*, 1795, 8vo. 1796, 12mo.

Deffendente Sacchi, Storia della Filosofia Greca, *Pavia*, 1818-20, 4 vols. 8vo. (Brought down to the times of the Sophists.)

† G. Fred. Dan. Goess, The Science of Education on the Principles of the Greeks and Romans, *Anspach.* 1801, 8vo.

Paganinus Gaudentius, De Philosophiæ apud Romanos origine et progressu, *Pisa*, 1643, 4to. Reprinted in the Collection, Nova rariorum Collectio, Fasc. ii, iii, *Halæ*, 1717.

J. L. Blessig, Diss. de Origine Philosophicæ apud Romanos, *Strasburg*, 1770, 4to.

II. *(a) Histories of different Philosophical Methods, Systems, and Schools.*

J. Gerh. Vossii, De Philosophiæ et Philosophorum sectis lib. ii, *Hag. Com.* 1658, 4to. contin. atque supplementa adjecit. Jo. Jac. a Ryssel, *Lips.* 1690, 4to. again *Jenæ*, 1705, 4to.

† C. Fr. Stæudlin, History and Spirit of Scepticism, principally in relation to Morals and Religion, *Leips.* 1794-95, 2 vols. 8vo.

Imman. Zeender, De notione et generibus Scepticismi et hodierna præsertim ejus ratione, *Bern.* 1795, 8vo.

For writings relative to particular schools of philosophy, see the places wherein these schools are mentioned.

(b) History of the Philosophical Sciences in detail.

B. T. (Bas. Terzi) Storia critica delle Opinioni Filosofiche, etc. intorno all' anima. *Padova*, 1776-78, 8vo.

† Fr. Aug. Carus, History of Philosophy, *Leips.* 1808 (third vol. of his posthumous works).

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Pet. Gassendi, De Origine et varietate Logicæ, opp. tom. I.

Ger. Jo. Vossii, De Natura et Constitutione Logicæ, etc. *Hag. Com.* 1658.

Jo. Alb. Fabricii, Specimen elenchticum Historiæ Logicæ, *Hamb.* 1699, 4to.

Joh. Ge. Walch, Historia Logicæ, in his, Parerga Academica, p. 453, sqq. *Leips.* 1721, 8vo.

Joach. Geo. Daries, Meditationes in Logicas veterum. Appendix to his, Via ad Veritatem, *Jena*, 1755, 8vo.

† Fuelleborn, Brief History of Logic among the Greeks, in his Collection, Fasc. iv, No. 4.

J. Gottlieb Buhle, De veterum Philosophorum Græcorum ante Aristotelem conaminibus in arte Logica invenienda et perficienda. In the Commentatt. Soc. Goetting. tom. x.

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† W. L. G. von Eberstein, Attempt at a History of Logic and Metaphysics among the Germans, from the time of Leibnitz to the present day, *Halle*, 1794-99, 2 vols. 8vo.

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Jac. Thomasii, Hist. variæ fortunæ, quam disciplina Metaphysica jam sub Aristotele, jam sub scholasticis, jam sub recentioribus experta est ; at the head of his, Erotemata Metaphysica, *Lips.* 1705, 8vo.

Sam. Fred. Buchner, Historia Metaphysices, *Wittemb.* 1723, 8vo.

Lud. R. Wachlin, Diss. de progressu Philos. Theoreticæ, sec. xviii, *Lund.* 1796, 4to.

B. T. (Bazil. Terzi), Storia critica delle Opinioni Filosof. etc. intorno alla Cosmologia, *Pad.* 1788, 8vo. tom. I.

† Dietrich Tiedemann, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, *Marburg*, 1791-97, with a table, 7 vols. 8vo. brought down to Berkeley.

† Result of Philosophical Researches on the Nature of Human Knowledge, from Plato to Kant, by Th. Aug. Suabedissen. A prize composition. *Marburg*, 1808, 8vo.

† Prize Compositions on the Question: What has been the Progress of Metaphysics in Germany, from the time of Leibnitz and Wolf? by J. Christ. Schwab, Ch. Leonh. Reinhold, J. H. Abicht, *Berlin*, 1798, 8vo.

Fred. Ancillon, Mélanges de Littérature et de Philosophiæ, 2 vols. *Paris*, 1809, 8vo.

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De Burigny, Histoire de la Philosophie payenne, ou Sentimens des Philosophes et des peuples payens, etc. sur Dieu, sur l'âme, et sur les devoirs de l'homme, *La Haye*, 1723, 2 vols. 12mo. The same work, under the title of, La Théologie payenne, etc. *Paris*, 1753, 2 vols. 12mo.

† J. Achates Fel. Bielke, History of Natural Theology, *Leips. et Zelle*, 1742, 8vo. A new History of Human Reason, Part first, 1749, Part second, 1752, 4to. *Zelle.*

† Mich. Fr. Leistikow, Memoir towards a History of Natural Theology, *Jena*, 1750, 4to.

† J. Ge. Alb. Kipping, Essay towards a Philosophical History of Natural Theology, *Brunswick*, 1761, Part first, 8vo.

† Chr. F. Polz, History of Natural Theology (in his, Natural Theology), *Jena*, 1777, 4to.

† Ph. Christ. Reinhard, Sketch of a History of the Origin and Development of Religious Opinions, *Jena*, 1794, 8vo.

† Imman. Berger, History of Religious Philosophy, *Berlin*, 1800, 8vo. and Reflections on the Philosophy of Ecclesiastical History in Stæudlin's Beytr. Book iv, Fasc 5 (1798).

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Chr. Godefr. Ewerbeck, Super doctrinæ de moribus Historia, ejus fontibus, conscribendi ratione et utilitate, *Halle*, 1787, 8vo.

† Geo. Sam. Francke, Answer to the question proposed by the Scientific Society of Copenhagen: Quinam sunt notabiliores gradus per quos philosophia practica, ex quo tempore systematice pertractari cœpit, in eum quem hodie obtinet statum pervenerit? *Altona*, 1801, 8vo.

Nic. Hieron. Gundling, Historia Philos. Moralis, Pars i, *Hal.* 1706, 4to.

† Gottlieb Stolle, History of Heathen Morality, *Jena*, 1714, 4to.

† J. Barbeyrac, Preface to his French translation of the *Jus Natura* of Puffendorf, *Basle*, 1732, 4to. containing a History of Morals and Natural Right.

George England, Inquiry into the Morals of the Ancients, *Lond.* 1757, 4to.

† Christ. Meiners, General and Critical History of Ancient and Modern Ethics, *Goetting*. 1800-1, Part second, 8vo.

† C. Fr. Stæudlin, History of the Philosophy of Hebrew and Christian Morals, *Hanover*, 1805, 8vo. and History of Moral Philosophy, *Hanover*, 1823, 8vo.

† Leop. von Henning, Principles of Ethics, historically developed, *Berl.* 1824, 8vo.

† J. Christ. F. Meister, On the Reasons of the Disagreement among Philosophers with respect to the Fundamental Principles of Moral Philosophy, at the same time that they agree on particular points of the same, 1812, 8vo.

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Jac. Fr. Ludovici, Delineatio Historiæ Juris Divini Naturalis et Positivi Universalis, *Halle*, 1701, second edition, 1714, 8vo.

Jo. Franc. Buddei, Hist. Jur. Naturalis in his Selectis Jur. Nat. et g. *Cal.* 1717, 8vo.

Chr. Thomasii, Paulo plenior Historia Juris Naturalis, *Hal.* 1719, 4to.

† Adr. Fr. Glafey, Complete History of the Rights of Reason, second edition, corrected, *Leips.* 1739, 4to.

† J. J. Schmauss, History of Natural Right (in the first book of his New System), *Goetting*. 1753, 8vo.

Essay on the History of Natural Right, *Lond.* 1757, 8vo.

G. Christ. Gebauer, Nova Juris Naturalis Historia quam auxit Ericus Christ. Cleveshal, *Wetzlar*, 1774, 8vo.

† G. Henrici, Hints to Establish the Doctrine of Right on a Scientific Foundation, *Hanover*, 1809-10, Part second, 8vo. The history is in the first part.

(c) History of Particular Ideas, Principles, and Doctrines.

† Christ. God. Bardili, Epochs of the principal Philosophical Opinions, Part first, *Halle*, 1788, 8vo.

Chr. Fr. Polz, Fasciculus commentationum Metaphysicarum quæ continent historiam, dogmata atque controversias dijudicatas de primis principiis, *Jena*, 1757, 4to.

Ch. Batteux, Histoire des Causes premières, *Paris*, 1769, 2

vols. 8vo. A German translation by J. J. Engel, *Leips.* 1773, 8vo. new edition, *Halberst.* 1792, 8vo.

Historia philosophica Doctrinæ de Ideis (by J. J. Brucker), *Augsb.* 1723, 8vo. Cf. Miscell. Hist. Phil. p. 50, sqq.

Guil. Gotthilf Salzmann, Commentatio in qua historia doctrinæ de fontibus et ortu cognitionis humanæ ita conscripta est, ut illorum potissimum ratio habita sit quæ Plato, Aristoteles, Cartesius, Lockius, Leibnitius, et Kantius de his fontibus probare studuerunt, *Goetting.* 1821, 4to.

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(G. Frid. Creuzer,) Philosophorum veterum loci de providentiâ divinâ, itemque de fato, emendantur, explicantur, *Heidelb.* 1806, 4to.

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Jac. Frid. Reimanni, Historia Universalis Atheismi et Atheorum, etc. *Hildes*, 1725, 8vo.

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* * *

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† J. C. Gunther Werdermann, Attempt at a History of Opinions respecting Fate and Free Will; from the most Ancient Times to the most recent Philosophers, *Leips.* 1793, 8vo.

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Jos. Priestley, History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter. In his Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, *Lond.* 1777, 8vo.

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Joach. Oporini, Historia critica de Immortalitate Mortalium, *Hamb.* 1735, 8vo.

† ADAM W. FRANZEN, Critical History of the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, before the Birth of our Lord, *Lubeck*, 1747, 8vo.

J. FRID. COTTÆ, Historia succincta dogmatis de vita eterna, *Tüb.* 1770, 4to.

† CHR. W. FLUGGE, History of the Belief in the Immortality of Man, and a Resurrection, etc. *Leips.* 1794-95,two parts, 8vo.

† Essay towards an Historical and Critical Examination of the Doctrines and Opinions of the principal Modern Philosophers, respecting the Immortality of the Human Soul, *Altona*, 1796, 8vo.

DAN. WYTTENBACH, de Questione, quæ fuerit veterum Philosophorum Inde a Thalete et Pythagora ad Senecam usque sententia de vitâ et statu animarum post mortem corporis, 1783.

STRUVE, Hist. doctrinæ Græcorum ac Romanorum philosophorum de statu animarum post mortem, *Altona*, 1803.

† C. PHIL. CONZ, History of the Hypothesis of the wandering State of Souls, *Kœnigsb.* 1791, 8vo.

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† CHRIST. GARVE, Treatise on the different Principles of Moral Philosophy from Aristotle to the present time, *Breslau*, 1798, 8vo. And, in continuation of this work, Special Considerations on the most general Principles of Moral Philosophy, *Ibid.* 1798, 8vo.

† G. DREWES, Conclusions of Philosophical Reason on the Principles of Morality, *Leips.* 1797, two parts, 8vo.

† C. C. E. SCHMID, History of the Doctrine of Indifference, in his work entitled *Adiaphora*, *Jena*, 1809, 8vo.

† CAR. FRIED. STÆUDLIN, History of the Doctrine of the Morality of the Drama, *Goett.* 1823.

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† GOTTLIEB HUFELAND, Essay on the Principles of Natural Right, *Leips.* 1785, 8vo.

† J. C. F. MEISTER, On Oaths, according to the Principles of Pure Reason, a prize composition, *Leips. and Züllichau*, 1810, 4to. Another prize composition of the same author, On the Diversity of Opinion among Philosophers with regard to the Fundamental Principles of Morality and Natural Right, *Ibid.* 1812, 4to.

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† Mich. Hissmann, History of the Doctrine of the Association of Ideas, *Goetting.* 1776, 8vo.

† The same subject, at greater length, J. G. E. Maas, Essay on the Imagination, second edition, *Halle*, 1795, 8vo. And in his preceding work; Paralipomena ad historiam Doctrinæ de Associatione Idearum, *Hal.* 1787, 8vo.

For the remainder, see the treatises on the different philosophical sciences in particular.

CHAPTER II.

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHIC REASON.

39. It is from *without* that the first impressions of the human mind are derived; on these it speculates, at first instinctively and without *method*; till having attained to a consciousness of itself and its capabilities, it acquires the power of exercising its faculties with a perfect knowledge of them.

Philosophy is the result of its attempts to satisfy its thirst for knowledge.

40. To know, is to have a perception of a determinate object, or the consciousness of a perception and of its relation to something determinate, and distinct from the perception itself. In all knowledge, the subject and the object are relative terms; implying the percipient and the thing perceived[g].

41.

Note of Translator. I have judged it better to omit altoge-

[g] Throughout the treatise, this is necessary to be borne in mind; and, agreeably to this distinction, what belongs to the subject is called *subjective*; and *objective* that which belongs to the object.

ther the present section (as I have taken the liberty of *altering* others), not perceiving that it could be of any utility to the reader; even if he should be fortunate enough to comprehend it.

42. By reflection and abstraction we distinguish between our perceptions and the matter to which they have a reference, and it is only by reasoning on the former that we can hope to solve the problems which philosophy would investigate. In fact, the *objects* which present themselves to our contemplation are purely contingent, variable, and indeterminable; while philosophy is essentially *positive*, and concerned with the higher principles of knowledge, the reasons of things—their laws—their universal and necessary ends.

44. Philosophy, as a science, pretends to a systematic knowledge of the conditions, reasons, and primary laws of all knowledge. Such a system ought to present a complete development of the principles of the human mind, and a perfect deduction of all that results from them, without *lacuna* or omission. Without this, it must be impossible to establish a theory of human knowledge which may be complete, solid, and connected through all its parts.

45. All knowledge ought to be proved and referred to a system by philosophy. All truths demand proof; that is to say, a deduction from superior principles; except the highest truths of all, which cannot be demonstrated. Philosophy, then, as a science, is founded on something *directly* true and certain, and on the agreement between what is concluded, and that which is self-evident and self-established. Reason is the highest and ultimate source of all moral certainty.

46. But before the Understanding can arrive at a thorough comprehension of itself, it must pass through many intermediate degrees of improvement; and in this transition-state, being as yet ignorant of the ultimate

principle of knowledge, and not seeking it in that direction, in which alone it can be found (viz. in the *mind* instead of *external objects*, in the *subject* instead of the *object*), ends in mistaking for it something inferior and subordinate; pursues certainty beyond the limits of reason; commits innumerable errors in the demonstration of philosophical knowledge; pretends to investigate matters beyond its range; and thus ends in opposition to itself.

49. The enlightened activity of the understanding, which, when properly cultivated, we call Philosophy (§ 2), presupposes in its turn attention, reflection, and abstraction. These are faculties which manifest themselves in various degrees, proportioned to the diversity of intellectual powers.

50. The causes which influence the development of reason are: the constitution of the human understanding; certain desires, doubts, sentiments, and perceptions of the mind; acquired knowledge; curiosity; emulation, resulting from the number and the diversity of persons engaged in the same pursuit; the influence of genius? example; encouragement; and the free communication of thought.

51. Previously to the scientific investigation of the principles, the laws, and the ends of phenomena presented to it, the human mind in some sort imagines, or, as it were, divines them; and this imagination conforms itself to the laws of the fancy; assimilating and personifying. It is thus that man, in a state of nature, conceives of all things as living and resembling himself. There is vaguely presented to his thoughts a world of spirits, at first without laws; afterwards, under the empire of a law foreign and external (Fate). He conceives an idea of unity and harmony, less at first in the internal world than the external; less in the whole than the parts; less by reflection than by a poetic creation (his fancy finding objects for the conceptions of his understanding); and thus advances

from a capricious indulgence of the imagination to the exercise of legitimate thought.

52. The development of the understanding begins with a sentiment of religion. The more that man by reflection extends and enlarges the sphere of his consciousness, the more he elevates himself, with regard to the object of his veneration, from sensation to mental conception, and from opinions to general ideas. The human mind investigates the principle of its religious belief, first of all *without*, in the *object;* subsequently *within*, in the intellectual *subject*.

53. It is thus that man advances, from a state of consciousness, obscure and imperfect, to an enlightened knowledge; from poetry to reason; from a blind to a rational faith; from individual to universal. It is thus that guided by an obscure sentiment of truth, of harmony, of analogy, he prosecutes the pursuit of something *certain* and *necessary;* to which may be referred all the points of belief which have attracted his attention; and which may establish the certainty of them. It is thus that he attempts philosophy, at first to satisfy his own mind; afterwards, with a more general view, for the advancement of Reason itself. In the natural order of her progress, Philosophy apprehends at first the *complex* objects of the world without, which are of a nature to excite in a lively manner its attention; subsequently, it advances by degrees to objects more difficult of apprehension, more obscure, more internal, and more simple.

Observation. This progress may be observed to obtain in a greater or less degree, and with different modifications, among all nations. There is, however, this difference, that only a few have elevated the philosophy of the human mind to the rank of a formal science;—whence proceeds this difference?

54. Philosophy, when it has assumed a scientific character, has a tendency by the investigation of causes, of the laws, and the ultimate ends of things, to constitute

human knowledge as an integral system, independent, and fundamentally established (§ 2 and 44). Such is the task of philosophical reason; but we must also distinguish the differences which exist in its *aim*, *method*, and *results*.

55. As to its *aim*, philosophy may be influenced by a solitary and partial curiosity, confined to one point of view, or stimulated by a more liberal and scientific interest, at once practical and theoretical. As to *method* it proceeds (on general topics) either from principles to consequences (the *synthetic* order); or from consequences to principles (the *analytic* order); and (in special matter), as far as relates to the starting point of its researches, it advances, either, from a complete and profound inquiry into the nature of our faculties for knowledge to the knowledge itself of things; or from the knowledge of things to the theory of knowledge. This last method of proceeding is called, since the time of Kant, the *Dogmatic* method, or *Dogmatism*; the other, the *Critical* method.

56. The *non-critical* philosophy has for its aim to establish certain points of doctrine *(dogmata)*, or to destroy the *dogmatic* opinions of others; in which latter case it has the tendency, as it does not substitute other principles for those which it removes, to establish uncertainty and doubt as most consistent with reason. The first of these two schools ends in dogmatism *positive*; the second in scepticism, or dogmatism *negative*.

57. Dogmatism pretends, either, that human reason is, of itself, capable of attaining to a knowledge of the laws and the nature of things; or, that it cannot attain thereto without a superior instruction and guidance. The first of these doctrines is *Naturalism*, or *Rationalism*, in its most extended signification; the other is *Supernaturalism*.

58. *Rationalism*, in the most extended signification of

the word, proceeds sometimes upon knowledge, sometimes (like that of *Jacobi*), upon belief; and either demonstrates the truth of our impressions and knowledge, by the reality of the objects; or, contrariwise, the reality of the objects, by the certainty of the impressions. In the first of these cases we have *realism*, which takes for its principle the reality of things; in the second case we have *idealism*, which takes for its foundation the certainty of our ideas; while many philosophical systems, on the other hand, pretend that there is an original identity of knowledge with its object.

59. Dogmatism, with reference to the *means* of acquiring knowledge, is either *Sensualism*, or *Rationalism* in a more restricted sense; or compounded of both. As far as relates to the *origin* of knowledge, dogmatism becomes either *Empirism* (otherwise called *Experimentalism*), or *Noologism*; or compounded of both. Lastly, with reference to the *number* of fundamental principles, it becomes *Dualism* or *Monism*; and to this last description belong both *Materialism* and *Spiritualism*, as well as the system of Absolute Identity.

60. Supernaturalism not only asserts that the Deity is the active principle of all that exists, but also that revelation is the source of all truth; thus referring all knowledge to a supernatural source, unattainable by the steps of science. There are diversities in this system according to the manner in which revelation is considered relatively to its subject or its object; as universal or particular; and as superior or subordinate to reason; or co-ordinate with it.

Observation. Supernaturalism has this in common with scepticism, that it lays great stress on the false pretensions and the inefficiency of reason.

61. Scepticism is opposed to dogmatism, inasmuch as it seeks to diminish the confidence of reason in the success of its efforts. It uses as arguments the errors which are

often with justice imputed to dogmatism, or alleges certain formal propositions of its own, relative to the end and the principles of knowledge. It is, therefore, the perpetual antagonist of dogmatism; but in disputing the pretensions to which knowledge lays claim, it proceeds even to deny its existence and destroy it altogether. Scepticism is sometimes universal, sometimes particular, and has been the precursor of the critical method, which leads to the true science of reason.

62. The *result* of philosophic research is a system of philosophy; that is to say, a collection of philosophical information drawn from philosophical principles, and of this there can be only one true system, which is that *ideal* of the science reason perpetually aims at (§ 2). But the various attempts of individual thinkers to attain thereto have given occasion to a number of systems, which approximate this *ideal object* in proportion to the knowledge they evince of the true end and principles of philosophy,—to the extent of information they convey,—the validity of the reasoning they contain, and the accuracy of their technical language (cf. § 3).

Observation. Until a more complete examination of the powers of the understanding shall have been instituted, and a more extensive analysis of the faculty of knowledge, systems of philosophy must inevitably contain a mixture of *universal* and *particular*, of *true* and *false*, of *determinate* and *indeterminate*, of *objective* and *subjective*.

63. These different systems are opposed to each other and to scepticism. The consequence has been a contest which we see carried on with a greater or less degree of ardour, maintained by the love of truth, and too frequently also by private interests and passions; until at last either *indifference*, or a revolution in the spirit of philosophy, or the acuteness of logicians and critics put an end to it, for the time, and introduced a more liberal system of inquiry.

64. More than one system has figured upon the stage in various dresses, and certain philosophical questions have frequently been repeated under different forms. These apparent reiterations do not, however, prove that philosophy has been retarded in its progress; the repetition of old ideas does not render its advance towards new ones more tardy, but only more sure. By this very circumstance analysis is rendered more exact and more complete; and the search after unity, consistency, and perfection, more accurate and profound. The character and the attributes of science are more completely developed, are better understood,—better appreciated;—errors and unfounded theories more cautiously avoided.

65. But, with all these retrogradations and moments of apparent relaxation, advancement is impossible except by the aid of a sustained zeal for philosophical investigation. This science demands a perpetual agitation of doubts and discussions; of controversy between dogmatism and scepticism, between the partizans of ancient systems and of modern ideas.

PARTICULAR INTRODUCTION.

RAPID REVIEW OF THE RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS OF THE ORIENTAL NATIONS, AND OF THE FIRST PERIODS OF GRECIAN CIVILIZATION.

To this head belong the works on the religions and the discoveries of the East at large; some of which, for example those of *Plessing*, have been noticed above, § 38; see, besides, the mythological treatises, such as:

† Fr. Creuzer, Symbolical and Mythological System of the Ancients, etc. 4 vols. *Leips.* and *Darmstadt*, 1810-12, second edition, 1820 (and following years), 5 vols. 8vo.

† J. Görres, History of the Fables of the Asiatic World, 2 vols. *Heidelb.* 1810, 8vo.

† J. J. Wagner, Ideas towards an Universal Mythology of the Ancient World, *Francfort on the M.* 1808, 8vo.

† J. G. Rhode, On the Age and Merit of certain Records of Oriental Antiquity, *Berlin*, 1817-18. And Memoirs towards illustrating the science of Antiquities, No. I, *Berlin*, 1819, No. II, 1820, 8vo.

Particularly a dissertation in No. I, on the most Ancient Religious Systems of the East.

L. C. Baur, Symbolical and Mythological Systems, 2 parts, *Stuttg.* 1825, 8vo.

66. Instruction was in part conveyed by the nations of Asia to the Greeks, and the latter had gone through many gradations of intellectual improvement before the epoch when a philosophical spirit was awakened among them. Accordingly, it may not be foreign to our purpose to give a rapid sketch of the religious and philosophical

opinions of the oriental nations, as well as of the first advances of intellectual improvement among the Greeks, in order to be enabled to estimate, at least *generally*, the influence which the former may have had over Grecian genius in its infancy; and consequently over *philosophy* itself, in its *manner* as well as its *matter*. The Hindoos, the Persians, the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Phœnicians, are the principal nations with whom the Greeks have had any intercourse [a].

Hindostan.

Authorities: The sacred books of the Hindoos, the *Schasters*, and particularly the *Vedams*, whereto belong the *Upanishadas* (fragments of the *Oupnek'hat*), and the *Puranams*, to which belong the ancient national poems; *Ramayana* (*Serampore*, 1806-10, 3 vols. 4to. a new edition by A. W. SCHLEGEL),—*Mahabharata* —and the *Dersanas*.

BHAGUAT-GEETA, or Dialogues of Chrishna and Ardjoon in eighteen lectures, with notes, translated from the original Sanscrit by CH. WILKINS, *Lond.* 1785, 4to.

BAGAVADAM, ou Doctrine Divine; ouvrage Indien Canonique sur l'Etre Suprême, les Dieux, les Géans, les Hommes, les diverses parties de l'Univers (par OPSONVILLE), *Paris*, 1788, 8vo.

L'EZOUR VEDAM, ou ancien Commentaire du Vedam, contenant l'exposition des Opinions religieuses et philosophiques des Indiens, traduit du Samskretan par un Brahme; revu et publié avec des observations préliminaires, des notes, et des éclaircissements, *Yverdun*, 1778, 2 vols. 12mo. (The introduction, On the Wisdom of the Hindoos, is by SAINTE-CROIX [b]).

Theologia et Philosophia Indica s. Oupnek'hat id est secretum tegenedum, stud. et op. ANQUETIL DU PERRON, *Argent*, 1801-2, 2 vols. 4to. (Deutsch im Auszuge von THAD. ANSELM RIXNER, *Nürnberg*, 1808, 8vo.)

† W. VON HUMBOLDT, on the Bhagavad-Gita, *Berlin*, 1826.

AMBERTKEND, a work on the Nature of the Soul; an account of it by DE GUIGNES in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXVI.

MUNAVA DHARMASASTRA (English), with a preface by Sir W. JONES, *Lond.* 1796.

PRABOD'H CHANDRO'DAYA, Or the Moon of Intellect, an alle-

[a] On the general character of thought in the East, see above, § 19.

[b] Consult however † SCHLEGEL's Ind. Biblioth. II, 50.

goric Drama: and Atma Bod'h, or the Knowledge of Spirit, etc.; translated from the Sanscrit and Pracrit by J. Taylor, 1812, 8vo.

† Remmohon-Roy, *Jena*, 1817.

Ctesiæ Indicorum fragmenta; Strabo; Arrianus De Exped. Alexandri; Palladius De gentibus Indiæ et Brachmanibus; Ambrosius De moribus Brachmanum, et alius anonymus de iisdem, junctim editi curâ, Ed. Bissæi, *Lond.* 1668, 4to.

Specimen sapientiæ Indorum veterum, Græcè ex cod. Holst. cum vers. Lat. ed. Seb. Gfr. Stark, *Berol.* 1697, 8vo.

Alex. Dow, History of Hindostan, from the earliest account of time to the death of Akbar, translated from the Persian of Muhammed Casim Ferishta, *Lond.* 1768, 3 vols. 4to. (With a learned Dissertation prefixed, concerning the Language, Manners, and Customs of the Hindoos.)

J. Jac. Holwell, Interesting historical Events relative to the Provinces of Bengal and the Empire of Hindostan, *Lond.* 1766, 3 vols. 8vo.

Sinner, Essai sur les dogmes de la Métempsychose et du Purgatoire, enseignés par les Brahmins de l'Indostan, *Berne*, 1771, 8vo.

Asiatic Researches. *Calcutta;* from 1788; several volumes.

The Dissertations and Miscellanies relative to the History of the Antiquities, Arts, Sciences, and Literature of Asia, by Sir W. Jones and others, have been extracted from the last volumes of the foregoing collection, *Lond.* 1792-8, 4 vols. 8vo.

Systema Brachmanicum liturgicum, mythologicum, civile ex monumentis Indicis musæi Borgiani Velitris dissertationibus historico-criticis illustravit Fr. Paulinus a S. Bartholomæo, *Romæ*, 1791, 4to.

† Various Dissertations in the Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscript. by Thom. Maurice, and Mignot (Memoirs on the ancient Philosophers of India, in vol. XXXI.), and De Guignes, (Inquiry respecting the Philosophers called Samaneans), vol. XXVI.

† J. Ith, Moral Doctrine of the Brahmins, or, The Religion of the Hindoos, *Berl. and Leips.* 1794, 8vo.

† Fr. Schlegel, On the Language and Wisdom of the Hindoos, *Heidelb.* 1808, 8vo.

Polier, Mythologie des Hindous, tom. I. et II, *Paris*, 1809, 8vo.

† Fr. Mayer, Universal Dictionary of Mythology. The first vol. only has appeared. By the same author: Brahma, or the Religion of the Hindoos, *Leips.* 1818, 8vo.

W. Ward, A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos, *Lond.* 1817-20. 4 vols. Particularly vol. IV.

† ARN. HERM. LUDW. HEEREN, On the Indians; (Suppl. to the third edition of his work, *Ideen über die Politic*, etc. s. 444), *Götting.* 1815-27, 8vo.

† NIC. MÜLLER, Opinions, Arts, and Sciences, of the ancient Hindoos, *Mentz*, 1822, 8vo.

LAUNJUINAIS, La Religion des Indous selon les Vedah, ou Analyse de l'Oupnek'hat publié par ANQ. DU PERRON, *Paris*, 1823, 8vo. See also his Memoirs on the Literature, Philosophy, etc. of the Hindoos.

† OTHM. FRANKS, On the Hindoos, and their Literature, etc. *Leips.* 1826, 8vo.

† J. G. RHODE, on the same subject, *Leips.* 1827, 2 vols. 8vo.

67. The Hindoos early distinguished themselves for arts, industry, civilization, and science; but the commencement of their history is, even yet, involved in great obscurity, and lost in the wildest traditions and chronological pretensions. Nothing has, even yet, been positively decided on the question whether their civilization and sciences be indigenous or derived from others; nor yet, whether they may not have blended certain notions either directly or indirectly borrowed from foreign nations, with others which were properly their own. The same uncertainty prevails with respect to the age attributable to their sacred books.

Of the four *castes* into which the nation is divided, the first consists of the priests (Brahmins); subdivided into a great number of sects, and modified by various revolutions. The compulsory emigration of many Brahminical tribes has carried their religious opinions into the adjacent countries of Siam, China, and Tartary.

The supreme being of the Hindoos is Brahma, incomprehensible by any human understanding; pervading and vivifying all things. Originally, he reposed in the contemplation of himself; subsequently, his creative word has caused all things to proceed from him, by a succession of continual emanations. As creator, he is named *Brahma;* as the preserving power, *Vishnou;* as the destroyer and renovator of the forms of matter, *Siva*. These three relations of the divine being constitute the Trinity (*Timourti*) of the Hindoos. The innumerable transform-

ations of Vishnou, or incarnations of the divine being, form the principal subject of their sacred books. Connected with this doctrine of *emanation* is that of the pre-existence of souls; their derivation from the divine nature; their immortality; their fall; and the purification of fallen spirits by successive migrations through the corporeal world.—(Doctrine of the migration of souls, or Metempsychosis).

Subsequently, the religion and philosophy of the Hindoos was split into two sects—of Brahmism and Buddhism. In consequence of this we find, both in their sacred books and among the Brahmins, the greatest discrepancy of opinion to prevail respecting God, the world, and the soul: that is to say, we find both *realism* and *idealism; theism* and *atheism; materialism* and *spiritualism*. These doctrines are for the most part propounded in the form of instruction, delivered by men professing to be enlightened from above[c]. Though obscured by poetic imagery, we detect throughout, the workings of an acute and ingenious spirit, which made some sort of advance towards correct reasoning. After all, the true systematic and scientific genius of philosophy must not be expected in these works. Their books of moral precepts have a character of nobleness and gentleness which belong to the race; and are, in a great measure, framed in accordance with the doctrine of the migration of souls. In the religion of Buddha, to which belong the Siamese, the Talapoins, and the Bonzes, the supreme felicity of God, and of the human soul, is made to consist in a state of absolute indifference and inaction.

Thibet.

Besides some works enumerated § 66, consult Alphabetum Tibetanum, auct. Aug. Ant. Georgio, *Romæ*, 1762, 8vo. Mayer has given an extract from it in his Lexicon.

[c] See, concerning the Gymnosophists, Cic. Tusc. V, 27; concerning Menou-Capila, Buddha, Calanus, Cic. de Div. I, 23; Tusc. II, 22.

† P. S. PALLAS, Collection of Historical details respecting the Mogul nations, *Petersburgh*, 1776-1803, 4to.

† KLAPROTH, Travels in the neighbourhood of Caucasus, 1823, 2 vols. 8vo.

† HÜLLMANN, Critical Researches respecting the Lamaic Religion, *Berlin*, 1796, 8vo.

68. Like the Hindoos, the Thibetians believe in a God who reveals himself in a threefold relation and form; and suppose a great number of transformations of this deity, principally in his *second* character. They have, besides, various traditions respecting the origin of all things; respecting spirits, and their descent into the visible world; also with regard to the different epochs of the world, and the migration of souls.

Chinese.

Sinensis imperii libri classici sex e Sinico idiomate in Lat. trad. a P. FRANC. NOEL, *Prag.* 1711, 4to.

† The Chou-King, one of the sacred books of the Chinese, translated by FATHER GAUBIL, revised and compared with the Chinese by M. DE GUIGNES; with a notice concerning Y-King, another sacred book of the Chinese, *Paris*, 1770, 4to.

† A Treatise on some points of the Chinese Religion, by FATHER LONGOBARD. Furthermore, A Treatise on some important points relative to the Mission to China, by FATHER SAINTE-MARIE; with Letters of M. DE LEIBNITZ on the Chinese Philosophy. These three works are contained in Leibnitzii Epist. ed. KORTHOLT, 2 vols.

CONFUCIUS Sinarum Philosophus sive scientia Sinensis Lat. exposita studio et op. PROSPERI JUONETTA, CHRIST. HERDTRICH, FRANC. ROUGEMONT, PHIL. COUPLET, P. P. Soc. Jesu, *Paris*, 1687, folio.

GEO. BERN. BILFINGERI, Specimen doctrinæ veterum Sinarum moralis et practicæ, *Francof.* 1724. 8vo.

CHR. WOLFII, Oratio de Sinarum philosophiâ practicâ, *Francof.* 1726. Third edition, with notes of LANGIUS, *Hal.* 1736, 4to.

J. BENED. CARPZOVII, Memcius seu Mentius Sinensium post Confucium Philosophus, *Lips.* 1725, 8vo.

DE PAUW, Recherches philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois, *Berlin*, 1775, 2 vols.

Mémoires concernant l'Histoire, les Sciences, les Arts, les Mœurs, les Usages des Chinois, par les Missionnaires de Pékin (Amyot et d'autres), *Paris*, 1776-91, 4 vols.

Cf. the Dissertations of De Guignes and others, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. vol. XXV, XXVII, XXXVI, XXXVIII.

The works of Confucius, containing the original text, with a translation by Marshman, *Serampore*, 1809, 4to.

Historia Philosophiæ Sinensis, etc. *Bruns*. 1727, 4to.

Klaproth, Mémoires Relatifs à l'Asie (Asiat. Magaz. from 1810).

Morrison, On Chinese Literature (in the Asiatic Journal).

Abel Remusat, Journal Asiatique, vol. I, July 1823, p. 3. Consult also Windischmann, in the first vol. of his work, Philosophie im Fortgange der Geschichte.

69. The *popular* religion of the Chinese (which was that of their most remote ancestors), consists in adoration of the heavens, the stars, and the powers of nature personified, with certain superstitious notions, of more recent date, respecting astrology, the demons, and magic. *Lao-Kiun* and *Fo*[d] mixed up these religious opinions (which they did not correct), with some philosophical ones. *Koung-fu-tzée* (*Confucius*), about 550 B.C., collected the traditions belonging to both these personages; new-modelled the laws; and gave excellent moral precepts. It is very remarkable that his writings contain no trace of a recognition of the existence of a Supreme Being, or of the immortality of the soul. *Mung-chee*, or *Meng-dseu* (Memcius) enlarged upon the doctrines of Confucius. A variety of opinions migrated from India and from Thibet into China. The improvement of science among them has for many hundred years been inconsiderable. (For what reason?)—The Japanese entertain similar doctrines.

Persians.

Authorities: The Sacred Scriptures, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Diodorus Siculus, Xenophon Cyrop., Strabo, Plutarch,

[d] According to some, this last is the Buddha of the Hindoos, and the same with the Sommona-Codom of the Siamese. Cf. Bayle, art. Sommona-Codom.

Λόγια τοῦ Ζωροάστρου, or Chaldean Oracles; the same, with additions, by Fr. Patricius, Nova de Universis Philosophia, *Venet.* 1595, fol.; and also published by Stanley, in his, Philosophia Orientalis (cum notis Clerici).

Thomæ Hyde, Historia Religionis veterum Persarum eorumque Magorum, *Oxonii*, 1700-4; new edition, 1760.

Zend-Avesta, Ouvrage de Zoroastre, contenant les Idées théologiques, physiques, et morales, de ce Législateur, les Cérémonies du culte Religieux qu'il a établi, etc., traduit en Français sur l'original Zend, avec des remarques, et accompagné de plusieurs traités propres à éclaircir les matières qui en sont l'objet; par M. Anquetil Duperron, *Paris*, 1711, 4to.

† Anquetil and Foucher, Memoirs on the Person, the Writings, and the Philosophical System of Zoroaster; in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. XXVII, p. 257 and sqq.; XXX, XXXI, XXXIV, XXXVII, XXXIX, XL; and in the Mémoires de Littérature, vol. XXX and XXXV.

(Jones), A Letter to M. A—— du P——, containing a Critique on his translation of the works attributed to Zoroaster, *Lond.* 1771, 8vo.

C. P. Meiners, De Zoroastris vitâ, Institutis, Doctrinâ, et Libris; In the Nov. Comment. Soc. Scient. Götting. vol. VIII, IX: and Comm. de variis religionum Persarum conversionibus; in the Comment. Soc. Götting. 1780, cl. phil. I, 45, et sqq; II, 19, sqq; and, concerning Zoroaster, in the Biblioth. Philos. tom. IV, p. 2.

T. Ch. Tyschen, Commentat. de Religionem Zoroastricarum apud exteras gentes vestigiis; In the Nov. Comm. Soc. Scient. Gött. tom. XI, XII.

The Dessatir, or Sacred Writings of the ancient Persian prophets, *Bombay*, 1818, 8vo.

† J. G. Rhode, The Sacred Tradition; or, A complete System of the Religion of the ancient Bactrians, Medes, and Persians, or the people of Zend, *Francf. on the Maine*, 1820, 8vo. Particularly p. 453 and sqq.; and the works of the same author enumerated § 66.

Der Schahnameh des Firdusi in epitomirter Uebertragung von Görres, etc. 2 vols. *Berlin*, 1819, 8vo.

Asiatic Researches, vol. VIII and IX.

On the Authenticity of the books of Zend consult also, † Buhle, Manual of the History of Philosophy; † Zoega, Dissertations published by Welcker; Valentia, Travels; and Erskine, Dissertation on the Parsees, in the second vol. of the Literary Society of Bombay.

70. In the times of the Greeks, the religion of the Persians *(Parsees)* consisted in the adoration of the heavenly bodies *(Sabeism)*, especially the sun; and of the powers of nature. The priests were called Magi. Zoroaster *(Serduscht)*, a Mede by birth, reformed the religion of the Medes, which, originally confined to the worship of fire, had been modified to the worship of the sun and the planets. This worship survives to the present day in India among the Parsees, who were driven out of Persia by the Mahometans; and who pretend to be still in possession of the sacred books of Zoroaster. This philosopher lived in the time of Guschtasb *(Darius Hystaspis)*. He asserts the existence of a supreme being, all-powerful and eternal *(Zeruane Akerene*, i. e. *infinite time)*, from whom have eternally proceeded, by his creative word *(Honofer)*, two principles, *Ormuzd* and *Ahriman*; Ormuzd *(Oromasdes)*, being pure and infinite Light, Wisdom, and Perfection, the Creator of every good thing; Ahriman the principle of darkness and evil, opposed to Ormuzd, either originally, or in consequence of his fall. To this belief are attached fables respecting the conflicting efforts and creations of these two powers; on the universal dominion ultimately reserved for the good principle, and the return of Ahriman during four periods, each of which is to last three thousand years;—on the good and the evil spirits *(Amshaspands, Izeds, Ferfers*[e], and *Deves)*, and their differences of sex and rank;—on the souls of men *(Ferfers)*, which, created by Ormuzd before their union with the body, have their habitation in the heavens; and which ultimately, according as in this world they have served Ormuzd or Ahriman, pass after death into the dwellings of the blessed, or are precipitated into obscurity:—finally, respecting the future resurrection of the bodies of the wicked after the victory of Ormuzd and the restoration of all things. Such, with some ascetic precepts, are the leading subjects of their sacred books. The doctrines of Zoroaster had an extensive influence owing to the principles of demonology and magic.

[e] These have been compared to the *Ideas* of the Platonists.

Chaldeans.

Authorities: The Scriptures, Diodorus Siculus, II, 29; Strabo, XVI, p. 739, ed. CASAUB.; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. lib. V.; Cic. de Div. I, 1, 41; II, 46, sqq.

BEROSI Chaldaica, in the work of SCALIGER, De Emendatione temporum; and in FABRIC. Bibl. gr. t. XIV, p. 175; and the work itself (probably not authentic), entitled, Antiquitates totius Orbis; published in FR. JO. ANNII, Antiquitt. Varr. vol. XVII, *Romæ*, 1798 (and subsequently).

† AUG. L. SCHLÖZER, On the Chaldeans, in the Repertory of Biblical literature published by EICHHORN, vol. VIII and X.

STANLEII, Philosophia Orientalis in Clerici opp. Philos.

† FR. MÜNTER, Religion of the Babylonians, *Copenh.* 1827, 4to.

JO. JAC. WAGNER'S Works before referred to.

71. The Chaldeans were devoted to the worship of the stars and to astrology: the nature of their climate and their country disposing them to it. The worship of the stars was revived by them and widely disseminated, even subsequently to the Christian era, under the name of *Sabeism*. The learned caste, which appropriated to itself the appellation of Chaldeans, had collected a certain number of astrological facts, and carried to a great length the delusive science of astrology. Under the empire of the Persians, this caste lost much of its credit, through the influence of the Magi, and ceased to attempt any thing but common place tricks of divination. The cosmogony of Berosus[f], and the pretended Chaldean oracles (allowed to be apocryphal), are evidently the productions of another age and country. The principal divinity of this nation was called *Bel*. The fables related of him by the pretended Berosus do not deserve recital.

Ægyptians.

Authorities: Books of Moses, Herodotus, lib. II, Manethonis Ægyptiaca et Apotelesmatica (fragments of dubious authority), Diodorus Siculus (with Heyne's Observations in the Comm. Soc.

[f] A contemporary of Alexander the Great.

ötting. V, VI, VII), Plutarchi Isis et Osiris, Porphyrius De Abstientiâ, Jamblichus De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, cum ep. Porphyrii d. Th. Gale, *Oxon.* 1678, fol., Horapollinis Hieroglyphica, Gr. et Lat. ed. De Pauw, *Traj.* 1727, 4to., Hermes Trismegistus in Franc. Patricii nova de Universis Philosophia, etc. *Ferrar*, 1591.

Fr. And. Stroth, Ægyptiaca seu Veterum Scriptorr. de reb. Egypti commentarii et fragmenta, *Gotha*, 1782-83, 2 vols. 8vo.

Athan. Kircheri, Œdipus Ægyptiacus, *Romæ*, 1652-54, folio, et Obeliscus Pamphilius, *Ibid.* 1656, folio.

Jablonski, Pantheon Ægyptiac. *Francf. ad Viadrim*, 1750-52, 2 vols. 8vo.

Conrad. Adami, Comm. de sapientia, eruditione atque inventis Ægyptiorum. (In his, Exercitatt. Exegett. p. 95, sqq.)

† C. A. Heumann, On the Philosophy of the Ancient Egyptians; in his, Acta Philosophorum, II, 659, sqq.

De Pauw, Recherches Philosophiques sur les Egyptiens et les Chinois, *Berlin*, 1773, 2 vols. 8vo.

† J. C. Meiners, Essay on the History of the Religion of the Ancients, particularly the Egyptians, *Götting.* 1775, 8vo. On the Worship of Animals, in his Philosophical Miscellanies, part I, p. 180; and several treatises by the same in the Comm. Soc. Götting. 1780-89-90.

† F. V. Lebrecht Plessing, Osiris and Socrates, *Berl.* and *Strals.* 1783, 8vo. cf. above § 38.

† C. P. Moritz, Symbolical Wisdom of the Egyptians, etc. *Berlin*, 1793, 8vo.

† P. J. S. Vogel, Essay on the Religion of the Ancient Egyptians and Greeks, *Nürnberg*, 1793, 4to.

Jos. Christoph. Gatterer, De Theogoniâ Ægyptiorum ad Herodotum, in Comm. Soc. Götting. vol. V et VII. De Metempsychosi, immortalitatis animorum symbolo Ægyptiaco, vol. IX.

† Creuzer, Religions of Antiquity (cited above, at the head of § 66), et Commentatt. Herodoteæ, c. II.

Heeren, Ideen, etc. second part, second edition.

See also the recent works on Egypt: Denon's Description; Belzoni; Gau; Minutoli, etc.; Pfaff's Hieroglyphica, *Nürnb.* 1824, 8vo.

72. The Egyptians were a nation highly remarkable for the antiquity of their civilization, and the originality of all their social system. Their priests, who formed a separate caste, were the sole depositaries of the secrets of certain sacred books written in hieroglyphics[g]. It is very

[g] See † Heeren, Thoughts on the Policy, Commerce, etc. of the Ancients;

difficult to determine with certainty, owing to the want of existing records, in what consisted their mysterious knowledge (*Esoteric* doctrine). It probably had a reference to the popular religion (*Exoteric* doctrine), which authorised the worship of the constellations (*Sabeism*); and that of certain animals (*Fetischism*), as symbolical of the former; of certain deified heroes (Thaut or Thot, Hermes, Horus); and lastly, maintained the doctrine of the Metempsychosis[h]. Their divinities Isis and Osiris, represented two principles, male and female. The peculiar character of the country seems to have given rise to, and encouraged, as the principal sciences of the Egyptians, geometry and astronomy; to which was united astrology and other superstitions, highly popular with the people at large. It is impossible to define with accuracy the progress which the priests may have made in the above sciences; but, previous to their intercourse with the Greeks, we cannot conclude them to have been possessed of any high degree of mental cultivation.

After the foundation of the Græco-Egyptian kingdom, the civilization of the two races was combined, and this circumstance renders yet more difficult any explanation of the mysteries of the ancient esoteric doctrines, and the former habits of the original inhabitants.

73. *The Hebrews.*

See the books of the Old Testament: the Introductions to the Old Testament by EICHHORN and others; and the Commentaries on each book, as for instance those on Job, Proverbs, and the Prophets in general.

FLAVII JOSEPHI Opera ed. HAVERKAMP. *Amstel.* 1726, 2 vols. folio.

Jos. FR. BUDDÆI Introd. ad Histor. Philos. Hebræor. *Halæ*, 1702, 8vo. Edit. emendata, 1721.

† FRIED. ANDR. WALTHER, History of the Philosophy of the Ancient Hebrews. *Gött.* 1750, 4to.

and the articles of the New Literary Journal of *Leipsig*, 1816, Nos. I and II, on the recent attempts to explain the hieroglyphics.

[h] HEROD. II, c. 123.

W. Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses, new edition, *ond.* 1756, 5 vols. 8vo. Supplement, 1788, 8vo.

† Jos. Fr. Jerusalem, Letters on the Books and the Philosohy of Moses, *Brunswick*, 1762, 8vo. and 1783.

† Jos. Dav. Michaelis, The Mosaic Law, *Francf. on the M.* 770-75, 6 vols. 8vo. New edition, 1775 and 1803.

† W. A. Teller, Theodicé of the First Ages, etc. *Jena*, 802, 8vo.

† C. A. Lindemann, On the Book of Job, *Wittenb.* 1811, 8vo.

Jul. Frid. Winzer, De Philos. Morali in libro Sapientiæ, uæ vocatur Salomonis, expositâ, *Viteb.* 1811, 4to.

C. Frid. Stäudlin, Comment. de Prophetar. Hebræor. Doctrinâ Morali, *Gött.* 1798, 4to.

† J. Jahn's Bibl. Archæology, *Vienna*, 1796, second edition, 817-18.

† Laz. Ben David, On the Religion of the Hebrews before Moses, *Berlin*, 1812, 8vo.

† Phil. Buttmann, Dissertation on the two first Mythi of he Mosaic History, etc. in the *Berliner Monatsschrift*, 1804, Jos. III and IV, and 1811 No. III.

† Phil. Buttmann, On the Mythos of the Deluge, *Berlin*, 812, 8vo.

The Phœnicians.

Sanchoniatho, and the authors who wrote upon him. Fragnents of Books attributed to him in Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. , 10.

Sanchoniatho, Phœnician History translated from the first ook of Eusebius, etc. with a continuation, etc. by Eratosthenes Cyrenæus; with historical and chronological remarks y R. Cumberland, *Lond.* 1720, 8vo.

H. Dodwell's Appendix concerning Sanchoniathon's Phœnician History, *Lond.* 1691, 8vo.

D. J. Baier, De Phœnicibus eorumque studiis et inventis, *Jena*, 1709, 4to.

J. Mich. Weinrich, De Phœnicum Litteraturâ, *Meiningæ*, 714, 4to.

See also † Heeren (Ideen, etc. I, 2), and † Münter, Religion of the Carthaginians, *Copenh.* 1821, with † Bellermann, on the Phœnician and Punic Coinage, *Berlin*, 1812-16.

74. The Phœnicians, a commercial people, served,

through their continual intercourse with other nations, to disseminate widely a knowledge of the discoveries effected in the arts and sciences. Nevertheless, their mercantile habits restricted[n] their own knowledge to the maritime art and the mathematics. The history and the doctrines of Sanchoniatho[o] and of Ochus (Mochus, Moschus), are, at the present time, matters of much dispute. The cosmogonies attributed to them, as well as the popular religion of the Phœnicians, are eminently *material.* Posidonius, the Stoic, cites Moschus as the first inventor of the doctrine of atoms. See SEXT. EMPIR. adv. Mathem. IX, 363, and STRABO, Geog. XVI, p. 757.

First Civilization of the Greeks, their Mythological and Poetical Traditions.

See, above, § 38, 1, *b*.

DE PAUW, Recherches Philosophiques sur les Grecs, *Berlin*, 1787, 4 vols. 8vo.

BARTHELEMY, Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis en Grèce.

† J. D. HARTMANN, Essay towards a History of the Civilization of the principal Nations of Greece, *Lemgo*, 1796, 1800, 2 vols. 8vo.

CHRIST. GOTTLOB HEYNE, De causis Mythorum veterum Physicis, in Opusc. Acad. tom. I.

† C. FR. CREUZER, Symbolik (above § 66).

† F. W. J. SCHELLING, On the Mythi, Traditions, and Philosophical Maxims of the first epochs of the World; in the Memorabilien of PAULUS, No. V.

† H. E. G. PAULUS, Chaos, a Poetic Fable, and not an era of physical cosmology. In his Memorabilien, No. V.

† FR. AST, On the Chaos of the Greeks, in the Journal of Arts and Science, 1808, vol. I, part. 2.

75. Greece was gradually rescued from barbarism, and advanced to a state of civilization, by the means of foreigners. Colonies from Egypt, Phœnicia, and Phrygia, introduced inventions and arts, such as agriculture, music, religious hymns, fabulous poems, and mysteries. It cannot be doubted that, in like manner, a great number of re-

[n] PLATO, De Repub. IV, p. 359. [o] About 1200 B.C (?).

ligious opinions and ideas must have migrated from Egypt to Greece. The only question is the degree of influence we should allow to these adventitious materials, the manner in which they became naturalized in their new country, and how far they were lost, or not, in the civilization and mental culture which they contributed to form. It is true that the Greeks possessed not only a rare aptitude for literature, but also a high degree of intellectual originality, the consequence of which necessarily was, that whatever they acquired from foreign nations speedily assumed among them a new and original character; the more so, because there was no sacerdotal race, no division into castes, no despotic authority to obstruct the advances of society and the development of the mental powers.

The religion of the Greeks, notwithstanding the *sensible* forms which it assumed in most of its mythi (the meaning of which was indeterminate), presented a subject-matter to engage and exercise the curiosity of the human mind. The poets laid hold on these materials, and employed them with unrivalled success. By these latter a sort of national education was established, addressing itself in part to the understanding, in part to the senses, which served as an introduction to scientific pursuits. Among those who in this respect exerted the greatest influence, was *Orpheus*[l]; by his religious hymns, his imaginations respecting cosmogony; by the introduction of mysteries, and by certain moral precepts[m]. *Musæus*, by his poetic description of the region of the dead,—Homer[n], by his national epic

[l] About 1250 B.C. (?)

[m] De Orpheo atque de Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, auctore K. Lycke, *Hafniæ*, 1786, 8vo. Cf. Jos. Gottlob Schneider, Analecta Critica, *Trajecti ad Viadrim*, 1777, 8vo. (Fasc. I. sect. 4.) Wagner, Mythol. sect. 344, sqq.

C. A. Lobeck, De Carminibus Orphicis, Diss. I. *Regiomont.* 1824.

G. H. Bothe, Orpheus Poetarum Græcorum antiquissimus, *Gött.* 1825,

On the Mysteries, see Euseb. Præpar. Evan. II, 3, p. 61; Meiners Verm. Phil. Schriften, Th. III, § 164, ff; S. Croix, Recherches Hist. et Critiques sur les Mystères, 2nd ed. ed. De Sacy, 2 vols. *Paris*, 1817; and Lobeck, De Mysteriorum Græcorum Argumentis, Diss. I, III, *Regiomont.* 1820, 4to; with the Mythological works of Creuzer, Baur, and Voss, mentioned above.

[n] About 1000 B.C. (?)

poems, which present a faithful picture of the manners of ancient Greece, and contain a multitude of mythological recitals [o],—Hesiod [p], by the collection he made of the sacred mythi (forming a system of theogony and cosmogony,) and by originating a great number of new ideas on morals [q],—Epimenides of Crete [r], and Simonides [s] of Ceos, with the lyric and gnomic poets, and the authors of fables (Æsop), belong to the same class, as having rendered to their country the like services [t].

Gnomic, or Sententious Philosophy.

C. G. HEYNE, De Zaleuci et Charondæ Legibus atque institutis. In his Opusc. Academ. tom. II.

† On the Legislation of Solon and Lycurgus, in the Thalia of SCHILLER, 1790, No. XI.

[o] CHR. GLOB. HEYNE, De Origine et Causis Fabularum Homericarum. Nov. Comment. Soc. Scient. Gött. vol. VII.

† J. F. ROTHE, On Homer's Idea of a Supreme Deity, *Görlitz*, 1768, 4to.

C. GUIL. HALBKART, Psychologia Homerica, *Züllichau*, 1796, 8vo.

K. H. W. VÖLCKER, On the ψυχὴ and εἴδωλον of the Iliad and Odyssey, etc., *Giessen*, 1825, 4to.

FR. GUIL. STURZ, De Vestigiis Doctrinæ de Animi Immortalitate in Homeri Carminibus, Prolusiones I—III, *Geræ*, 1794—1797, 4to.

JO. DAN. SCHULZE, Deus Mosis et Homeri comparatus, *Lips.* 1799, 4to.

† FRAGUIER, On the Gods of Homer; in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr. tom. IV.

GUST. GADOLIN, De Fato Homerico, *Abo*, 1800, 8vo.

JO. FR. WAGNER, De fontibus Honesti apud Homerum, *Luneb.* 1795, 4to.

[p] About 800 B. C.

[q] † L. WACHLER, On the Notions of Hesiod respecting the Gods, the World, Man, and his Duties, *Rinteln*, 1789, 4to.

† WAGNER, Homer and Hesiod, *Sulzb.* 8vo.

CH. GLOB. HEYNE, De Theogoniâ ab Hesiodo conditâ; in the Nov. Comment. Soc. Gött. vol. VIII.

CHPH. ARZBERGER, Adumbratio doctrinæ Hesiodi de origine Rerum, Deorumque Naturâ, *Erlang.* 1794, 8vo.

† Letters on Hesiod, by CREUZER and GOD. HERMANN, *Leips*, 1818, 8vo.

[r] † C. F. HEINRICH, Epimenides of Crete, *Leips.* 1805, 8vo.

PET. GERH. DUKERI, Diss. de Simonide Ceo, poetâ et philosopho, *Ultrajecti*, 1768, 4to.

[s] See the article SIMONIDES in BAYLE's Dictionary.

[t] ULR. ANDR. RHODE, De Veterum Poetarum Sapientiâ Gnomicâ, Hebræorum imprimis et Græcorum, *Hafniæ*, 1800, 8vo.

Jo. Fr. Buddei Sapientia Veterum, h. e. Dicta illustriora Septem Græciæ Sapientum explicata, *Halæ*, 1699, 4to.

† C. Aug. Heumann, On the Seven Sages; in the Acta Philosoph. No. X.

† Is. de Larrey, History of the Seven Sages, 2 vols. *Rotterdam*, 1713-16, 8vo. augmented by the remarks by Delabarre de Beaumarchais, *The Hague*, 1734, 2 vols. 8vo. (French).

76. In the legislative systems of the Greeks, particularly those of Lycurgus, Zaleucus, Charondas, and Solon, we observe a high sense of liberty, a profound observation of the human heart, and great political prudence and experience. The sentences of the Seven Wise Men[u], and the ancient Gnomic poets, contain, it is true, nothing more than rules of practical wisdom, expressed with energy and conciseness; but they evince, even at this early period, an advancement in civilization, and a ripeness of intellect for the pursuits of science; whenever an occasion should present itself to facilitate their prosecution.

J. Conr. Durii Diss. de reconditâ Veterum Sapientiâ in Poetis, *Altdorf* 1655, 4to.

El. Weihenmaieri Diss. de Poetarum Fabulis Philosophiæ involucris, *Ulmæ*, 1749, 4to.

Chr. Glob. Heyne, Prog. quo disputantur nonnulla de Efficaci ad Disciplinam publicam privatamque vetustissimorum Poetarum doctrina morâli, *Götting.* 1764, 4to.

[u] From the XLth to the LVIIth Olympiad.

PART THE FIRST.

FIRST PERIOD.

GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

FROM THALES TO JOHN OF DAMASCUS; i. e. FROM 600 YEARS B. C. TO THE END OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY.

Progress of the understanding towards knowledge, but without a clear perception of the principles which should direct it.

77. The Greeks, who had derived from foreigners the first seeds of civilization, distinguished themselves above all the other nations of antiquity, by their taste for poetry, for the arts and sciences. The position of their country, their religion, their political constitution, and their love of liberty, contributed to develop, in all its originality and grandeur, the native genius of their country. They thus were betimes matured for philosophy, and engaged in the pursuit of it, even from the earliest date of their political liberty (§ 75).

78. A philosophical spirit having been once awakened among the Greeks, continued to extend its dominion. They devoted their attention to the most important objects of science (theoretically and practically); introduced method into their researches, forming a system of scepticism in opposition to dogmatism, and rarely failing to apply these speculative inquiries to purposes of real life. The wise men of Greece have justly been regarded by succeeding ages as models; as well for their spirit of research and investigation, as for the results to which these

have led, both in the *manner* and the *matter* of their philosophic inquiries; but above all for a certain character of elegance and urbanity, and a command of philosophical language, which satisfies at once the judgment and the taste.

79. Their philosophy did not arrive at this perfection at once; it began by disjointed speculations on the external world. The habit of reflection which grew out of these first essays; the diversity of the results at which they arrived; and the continually increasing sense of a want of unity and harmony in their conclusions, recalled wandering speculation to the contemplation of the human mind, as the ultimate source of all certain knowledge; and philosophy became more enlarged, more methodical, and more systematic. In after times, the discord of different systems; the prevalence of a subtile scepticism; the oppression of the understanding under a load of historical erudition, eventually diverted the mind from the investigation of its own properties; till the philosophers of Greece, having borrowed from those of the East some of their opinions, in the hope of attaining to something like *positive* knowledge, fell, instead, into *syncretism* and *mysticism*[a]. It is true that the passionate enthusiasm which mixed itself up with this later philosophy, belonged in part to the natural character of the Greeks.

80. The history of Grecian philosophy may, therefore, be divided into three periods analogous to the ages of man; his youth—his maturity—and his decrepitude. Period the first: an ardent spirit of speculation, but with limited views and deficient in system; from *Thales* to *Socrates*, i. e. from 600 to 400 B. C. Period the second: a spirit of inquiry more universal, more systematic; both *dogmatical* and *sceptical;* from *Socrates* to the union of the Porch and the Academy, i. e. from 400 to 60 B. C. Pe-

[a] [The force of these terms, as used by the author, will be sufficiently explained in the course of the work. *Trans.*]

riod the third: cultivation of Greek philosophy by the Jews and the Romans, and its declension; philosophical learning, without a philosophical spirit; sceptical speculations under a more learned aspect, but speedily lost in mystical and enthusiastical fancies, and destroyed by the union of Grecian literature with that of the Orientals. Prevalence of Christianity, from *Ænesidemus* to John of Damascus; i. e. from the year 60 B. C. to the eighth century [a].

Authorities for the history of Grecian philosophy.

81. These are twofold; direct and indirect. The first are the works of the philosophers themselves, of which only a portion have come down to us entire, and for the most part consist of unconnected fragments, which have inflicted on the learned a prodigious deal of labour to arrange and illustrate them. The *indirect* sources consist in notices and information respecting the lives, the doctrines, and labours of the philosophers, which are to be found in subsequent writers of whatever description; whether presented to us in detached and unconnected pieces, or in a more complete form, and with a systematic arrangement. To this class belong: 1st. The writings of philosophers which contain accounts of the theories of their predecessors; among others, the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero (§ 180), Seneca, Plutarch (§ 185), Sextus Empiricus (§ 189, sqq.), Simplicius (§ 220). 2dly. The collections of Diogenes Laertius [b], Philostratus [c], Eunapius [d],

[a] Consult also † Ast, Epochs of Greek Philosophy, in the Europa of Fr. Schlegel, vol. II, No. II.

[b] Diogenes Laertius, De Vitis, dogmatibus et apophtegmatibus clarorum Philosophorum, curâ Marc. Meibomii, *Amst.* 1692, 2 vols. 4to. Curâ P. Dan. Longolii, Cur. Regn., 2 vols. 1739, 8vo. *Lips.* 1759, 8vo.

[c] Flav. Philostrati Vitæ Sophistarum in Philostratorum Operibus, Gr. et Lat. c. not. Olearii, *Lips.* 1709, fol.

[d] Eunapii Vitæ Philosophorum et Sophistarum, ed. Junius, *Antwerp*, 1568, 8vo. Ed. Commelin, *Heidelb.* 1596, 8vo. Ed. Schott, *Genevæ*, 1616, 8vo.

The history of philosophy ascribed to Galen[e], and that of Origen[f]; with the collections of the Pseudo-Plutarch[g], and of Stobæus[h]. 3dly. The works of other Greek and Latin authors, such as Athenæus[i], Aulus Gellius[k], Macrobius[l], Suidas[m]. 4thly. The writings of the ecclesiastical Fathers; Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Eusebius, Lactantius, Augustine (§ 232), Nemesius, Photius (§ 235).

CHAPTER FIRST.

FROM THALES TO SOCRATES (FIRST PERIOD OF GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY).

Partial and Unsystematic Speculation.

Henr. Stephani Poesis Philosophica, *Paris*, 1573, 8vo. Ἠθικὴ ποίησις seu Gnomici Poetæ Græci, ed. Brunck. *Argent*, 1784, 4to. And the Works on the Seven Sages and the Legislators of the Greeks.

[e] Claudii Galeni Liber περὶ φιλοσόφου ἱστορίας, in Hippocratis et Galeni Operibus ex edit. Carterii, tom. II, p. 21, seq.

[f] Origenis φιλοσοφούμενα in Jac. Gronovii Thes. Antiq. Græc., tom. X. (Also published by),

Jo. Chph. Wolff, Compendium Historiæ Philosophicæ Antiquæ sive Philosophumena quæ sub Origenis nomine circumferuntur, *Hamb.* 1706—1716, 8vo.

[g] Plutarchus, De placitis Philosophorum, sive de Physicis Philosophorum decretis, ed. Chr. Dan. Beck, *Lips.* 1787, 8vo.

[h] Joh. Stobæi Eclogæ Physicæ et Ethicæ, ed. A. H. L. Heeren, *Gött.* 1792—1801, 2 parts in 4 vols. Sermones, *Francf.* 1781, fol. Ed. Nic. Schow, *Lips.* 1797, 8vo.

[i] Athenæi Deipnosophistarum, libri XV, ed. Casaubon, *Lugd.* 1657—64, 2 vols. fol. Jo. Schweighæuser, *Argent.* 1801—7, 14 vols. 8vo.

[k] † Fragments of the History of Ancient Philosophy, drawn from the Nights of Aulus Gellius, *Lemgo*, 1785, 8vo.

Noctes Atticæ, Henr. Steph. 1585. Gronov. *Lugd. Batav.* 1706, 4to. etc.

[l] Macrobii Saturnal. ed. Jac. Gronovius, *Lugd. Bat.* 1670, 8vo. Ed. Zeune, *Lips.* 1774, 8vo.

[m] The modern works on the history of philosophy among the Greeks, have been mentioned, § 38, I, *a* and *b*.

Scipio Aquilianus, De placitis Philosophorum ante Aristotelem, *Milan*, 1615, 4to. Op. Ge. Monalis, *Venet.* 1620, 4to. Ed. Car. Phil. Brucker, *Lips.* 1756, 4to.

† D. Tiedemann, First Philosophers of Greece, *Leips.* 1780, 8vo.

† G. Gust. Fülleborn, On the History of the first ages of Grecian Philosophy. In his Collection, Fasc. I.

J. Gottl. Buhle, Comment. de Veterum Philosophorum Græcorum ante Aristotelem conaminibus in arte Logicâ inveniendâ et perficiendâ. Comment. Soc. Scient. Gött. tom. X.

Fried. Bouterwek, De primis Philosophorum Græcorum decretis Physicis. Comment. Soc. Gött. tom. II, 1811.

See also the works enumerated above, § 75, on the Greek Mythology, particularly on Orpheus, Homer, and Hesiod, and the Gnomic poets.

82. A spirit of philosophical research first manifested itself in some rude attemps in Ionia, made at the period when this country, colonized from Greece, enjoyed the utmost prosperity. Thence it extended to some of the neighbouring colonies; subsequently into Magna Græcia, until the conquests of the Persians and the troubles of southern Italy compelled it to take refuge in Athens; from which, as a centre, intellectual civilization was disseminated, and, as it were, radiated over the whole of Greece.

83. The starting-point of philosophy was the question concerning the origin and the elementary principle of the world: the resolution of which was attempted after the *experimental* method by the *Ionic* school; and the *formal* method by the *Pythagoreans*. The *Eleatic* school opposed to each other the *experimental* and *intellectual* systems; which were combined by the *Atomistic* philosophers. Last of all came a *Sophistical* school, which threatened to destroy all belief, religious and moral.

84. But this progress of investigation was a sort of prelude to a more scientific philosophy, which by and by turned from the external *object* to the internal *subject*: from the world without to the mind within. Philosophical

reflection, discarding poetical fictions, applied itself to practical purposes, by the discovery of moral and political apothegms, for a long time delivered in verse (*Gnomæ*, whence *philosophia gnomica* sive Sententiaria; cf. § 75-76). In theory, men wandered, went from one hypothesis to another, until, in the end, they endeavoured to substitute for these a system of metaphysical knowledge. The earliest philosophers were solitary, and without a school (Pythagoras nevertheless being an exception). Their notions were disseminated at first by oral tradition; subsequently by writings; which gradually disengaged themselves from poetic fictions.

I. *Speculations of the Ancient Ionians.*

† H. Ritter, History of the Ionian Philosophy, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo.

Bouterwek, Dissertation referred to above, at the head of § 82.

Thales.

† The Abbe de Canaye, Inquiry respecting the Philosophy of Thales, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. X.

Chr. Ald. Dolderlini Animadversiones Historico-criticæ de Thaletis et Pythagoræ Historicâ ratione, 1750, 8vo.

Godofr. Plouquet, Dissert. de Dogmatibus Thaletis Milesii et Anaxagoræ Clazomenii, etc. *Tubing*, 1763; and in his Comment. Philos. Select.

Gliem. Chph. Harles, Tria Programmata de Thaletis Doctrinâ, de Principio Rerum, imprimis de Deo, ad illustrandum Ciceronis de Nat. Deor. locum, lib. I, 10, *Erlang*. 1780-84, folio.

J. Frid. Flatt, Diss. de Theismo Thaleti Milesio abjudicando, *Tub.* 1785, 4to.

† Goess, On the System of Thales. See above, at the head of § 2.

85. *Thales* (600 B. C.), of Miletus, the most flourishing commercial city of Ionia, improved himself by travel, was possessed of some mathematical and astronomical knowledge, and was ranked by his fellow-citizens among

the Seven Sages. He was the first Grecian who discussed, on principles of reason, the origin of the world. *Water* (ὕδωρ), or humidity[a], was in his opinion (formed in consequence of some experimental observations very partial in their nature) the original element (ἀρχή), whence all things proceeded[b]; and spirit, νοῦς, the impulsive principle. He observed the attractive power of the magnet and, consistently with his theory, supposed the stone to have a soul. Every thing is full of the divinity[c]. It is not exactly known in what manner Thales associated the spiritual parts of his system with his material principle. Accordingly, the discussions which his theism has occasioned commenced at a very early epoch[d]. Among other sentences, they attribute to him γνῶθι σεαυτόν.

Anaximander and Pherecydes.

† The Abbe de Canaye, Inquiry concerning Anaximander, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. X.

† Fr. Schleiermacher, Dissertation on the Philosophy of Anaximander, in the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin, 1804-11, *Berlin*, 1815, 4to.

† H. Ritter, The work referred to above, and the article Anaximander, IVth part of the Encyclopedia published by Ersch and Gruber.

Pherecydis fragmenta e variis scriptoribus collegit, etc. commentationem de Pherecyde utroque philos. et historico præmisit Fr. Guil. Sturz, *Gera*, 1789, 8vo. second edition, 1824.

† Heinius, Dissertation on Pherecydes, in the Mémoires de l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences, Berlin, V, 1747.

† See also the work of Tiedemann mentioned above, at the head of § 82, p. 172, sqq.

86. *Anaximander*[e], a Milesian like Thales, and a friend of that philosopher, chose as the basis of his argument, on the same subject, not analogy, but an assumed philosophical principle. The primary essence he asserted to be *infinite* (ἄπειρον), comprehending all things, and *divine* (τὸ

[a] J. H. Müller, De Aquâ, principio Thaletis, *Altd.* 1719, 4to.
[b] Aristot. Metaph. I, 3. De Cœlo, II, 13.
[c] Aristot. De Animâ, I, 2, 5. Cf. De Mundo, VI.
[d] Cicero, De Nat. Deor. I, 10.
[e] About 610 B. C.

θεῖον), without, however, more exactly defining it[f]. According to some he attributed to this divine nature an essence altogether distinct from the elements; according to others, he made it something intermediate between water and air. It is only in infinity that the perpetual changes of things can take place; from infinity, opposites detach themselves by a perpetual movement, and in like manner continually return to the same. By this principle the heavens and the earth subsist: with respect to which Anaximander did not content himself with astronomical speculations only. Every thing which is contained in infinitude (τὸ ἄπειρον), is subject to change, itself being unchangeable[g]. Such also was the doctrine, with some slight differences, of his contemporary, (but younger than himself), Pherecydes of Syros; who recognised as the eternal principles of all things Jupiter (Ζεὺς or αἰθήρ), Time, and the Earth. It appears also that he attempted an account of the origin of the celestial bodies and of the human race, and that he believed the soul to be immortal[h]. Anaximander and Pherecydes were the first philosophers who committed their thoughts to writing.

Anaximenes.

Dan. Grothii (præs. J. Andr. Schmidt), Diss. de Anaximenis Psychologiâ, *Jen.* 1689, 4to.

87. *Anaximenes*, of Miletus[i], followed the doctrine of his friend and teacher Anaximander; but instead of the indeterminate ἄπειρον of the latter, certain observations, though partial and limited, on the origin of things and the nature of the soul, led him to regard the air (ἀήρ) as the primitive element[k]. In after time, *Diogenes* of *Apol-*

[f] Diog. Laert. II, 1.

[g] Aristot. Physic. I, 4, 5; III, 4—7; and Simplic. Comment. in Phys. p. 6; and De Cœlo, p. 151.

[h] Aristot. Metaph. XIV, 4. Diog. Laert. I, 119. Cic. Tusc. Qu. I, 16.

[i] Flourished about 557 B. C.

[k] Aristot. Metaph. I, 3. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 6 et 9. Cic. Acad. Quæst. II, 37. Plutarch. De plac. Philos. I, 3. Stob. Ecl. I. p.

lonia, revived and improved upon this system; in which we may already observe a more enlarged view of nature, and a freer exercise of the understanding.

II. *Speculations of the Pythagoreans.*

Authorities: besides Plato and Aristotle, and the Pythagorean Fragments, particularly those of Philolaus:

Pythagoræ Aurea Carmina. Timæus Locrus. Ocellus Lucanus. Porphyrius de Vita Pythagoræ, ed. CONR. RITTERSHUSIUS, *Altd.* 1610, 8vo. See also χρύσεα ἔπη, in the Sententiosa vetustissimorum Gnomicorum opera, tom. I. ed. GLANDORF, *Lips.* 1776, 8vo. and in the Collection of BRUNCK.

JAMBLICHI De Vita Pythagorica liber Gr. cum vers. Lat. Ulr. Obrechti notisque suis edid. LUDOLF KUESTERUS, acced. MALCHUS sive PORPHYRIUS De Vita Pythagoræ cum not. L. HOLSTENII et CONRAD. RITTERSHUSII, *Amstelod.* 1707, 4to. ed. THEOPH. KIESLING, *Lips.* 1815, 8vo. p. I and II.

Pythagoræ Sphæra Divinatoria de decubitu ægrotorum; and the Epistolæ Pythagoræ, in the Opusc. Myth. Phys. of GALE, p. 735, sqq.

Socratis et Socraticorum, Pythagoræ et Pythagoricorum, quæ feruntur Epistolæ, ed. ORELLIUS, 1816, 8vo.

RICH. BENTLEII, Dissert. de Phalaridis, Themistoclis, Socratis, Euripidis, aliorumque Epistolis, in Latin. sermonem convertit J. D. A. LENNEP, *Groning*, 1777, 4to. Et, BENTLEII Opuscula Philologica, Dissertationem in Phalaridis Epistolas et Epistolam ad J. MILLIUM complectentia, *Lips.* 1781, 8vo.

† MEINERS, History of the Sciences in Greece and Rome, tom. I, p. 187.

† MEINERS, Dissertation on the Authenticity of some works of the Pythagorean School in the Bibliotheca Philol. tom. I, No. V.

† TIEDEMANN, Early Philosophers of Greece, p. 188, sqq.

W. LLOYD, A Chronological Account of the Life of Pythagoras, and of other Famous Men his Contemporaries, with an Epistle to Dr. Bentley, etc., *Lond.* 1699-1704, 8vo.

HENR. DODWELLI Exercitationes duæ, prima de ætate Phalaridis, altera de ætate Pythagoræ, *Lond.* 1699-1704, 8vo.

Dissertations sur l'Epoque de Pythagore, par DE LANAUZE et FRERET, dans les Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XIV.

296. SEXT. EMP. Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 30; Adv. Mathem. VII, 5; IX, 360. DIOG. LAERT. II, 3.

* * *

Ge. Lud. Hamberger, Exerc. de Vitâ et Symbolis Pythagoræ, *Vitemb.* 1676, 4to.

Dacier, La Vie de Pythagore, ses symbols, ses vers dorés, etc. *Par.* 1706, 2 vols. 12mo.

Chph. Schrader, Diss. de Pythagorâ, in quâ de ejus Ortu, Præceptoribus et Peregrinationibus agitur, *Lips.* 1708, 4to.

Je. Jac. Lehmann, Observatt. ad Histor. Pythagoræ, *Frcft. et Leips.* 1731, 4to.

M...., Vies d'Epicure, de Platon, et de Pythagore, *Amst.* 1752, 12mo.

† Fred. Christ. Eilschov, History and Critical Life of Pythagoras, translated from the Danish of Philander von der Weistritz, *Kopenhagen*, 1756, 8vo.

† Aug. E. Zinserling, Pythagoras-Apollon, *Lips.* 1808, 8vo.

Joh. Scheffer, De Naturâ et Constitutione Philosophiæ Italicæ, *Ups.* 1664. Edit. II, cum carminibus, *Vitemb.* 1701, 8vo.

† J. Le Clerc, in his Bibliotheca, tom. X, art. II, p. 79.

† H. Ritter, History of the Pythagorean Philosophy, *Hamburg*, 1826, 8vo.

† Ern. Reinhold, On the Pythagorean Metaphysics, *Jena*, 1827, 8vo.

For the ancient works relative to Pythagoras and his Philosophy, see the † Acta Philos. of Heumann, part II, p. 370, part IV, p. 752.

88. The difficulties which embarrass this part of history and demand the exercise of much critical discernment, are,—The want of authentic writings, the abundance of those which are apocryphal, the mystery which appears to involve every thing belonging to the person, the character, and views of Pythagoras and his society; the difficulty of discriminating between what was his own, and what was borrowed from the Egyptians, or may have proceeded from others of his school, and finally, the re-establishment of the same school at a later period, under different masters, and with somewhat different views.

89. Pythagoras was born at Samos[1]; and improved

[1] In 584, according to Meiners.

himself by his travels in Greece and Egypt[m], and probably also by the lessons of Thales and Pherecydes, (whose disciple he is said to have been[n]), as well as by those of Anaximander. After having previously attempted to establish a school and a species of philosophical congregation, at Samos, he founded one (about 527) at Croto, in Italy, whence his school came to be called the *Italic*. Besides the improvement of the intellectual, moral, and religious capacities of man, this society had also considerable political influence; which circumstance occasioned the ruin of the society, about the year 500; and the death of its founder[o]. Pythagoras may justly be esteemed a man remarkable for his talents, his discoveries, the elevation of his ideas, and the authority he possessed over others; but the ancient Greeks and Romans invested him with something more than this, amounting to a sort of superstitious reverence. He was the first who assumed the name of *philosopher*. See Cic. Tusc. Quæst. V, 3, 4. Diog. Laert. VIII, 8, and I, 12.

90. He investigated the principles of the mathematical sciences; particularly of Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy; his discoveries in which are of themselves sufficient to immortalise his name. He ascribed an occult power to words and numbers[p]; and the science of arithmetic, which he considered as the key to the mathematics, he looked upon as containing also the essence of all philosophical knowledge[q]. From this principle he was led to adopt a sort of Mathematical Philosophy, which gave to his school also the name of *Mathematical*. We possess only fragments of the speculations of his school on these subjects; in which we are not enabled to distinguish the hand of the master from that of his disciples.

[m] Fr. Buddei Diss. de Peregrinationib. Pythagoræ, *Jena*, 1692, 4to.; and in his Analect. Hist. Philos.

[n] Diog. Laert. I, 118, sqq. Cic. De Div. I, 13.

[o] About 504, according to Meiners; according to others 489 B.C.

[p] Ælian. Var. Hist. IV, 17. Jamblich. c. 10.

[q] Aristot. Metaph. I, 5.

§ 91.

On the subject of the Pythagorean numbers, see Jac. Brucker, Convenientia Numerorum Pythagoræ cum Ideis Platonis, Miscell. Hist. Philos.

De Numerorum, quos Arabicos vocant, vera origine Pythagoricâ commentatur Conr. Mannert. *Norimb.* 1801, 8vo.

† C. A. Brandis, On the Doctrine of Numbers of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (in the Rhen. Mus. of Hist. Philos. etc. 1828, No. II, s. 208).

Amad. Wendt, De rerum principiis secundum Pythagoreos Comment. *Lips.* 1827, 8vo.

Numbers were defined by the Pythagoreans to be the principles (αἰτίαι) of all things[q]; this school being disposed by their mathematical studies to make the system of external things subordinate to that of numbers, agreeably to their axiom, μίμησιν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα τῶν ἀριθμῶν[r]. Numbers are equal and unequal, ἀρτίοι and περιττοί; the elementary principle of the latter being *unity* (μονάς), that of the former duality (δυάς). Unequal numbers are limited and complete; equal ones unlimited and incomplete. The abstract principle then of all perfection is unity and limitation (τὸ πεπερασμένον); that of imperfection, duality, and indeterminateness (τὸ ἄπειρον). The ten elementary numbers which are represented in the *tetractys*[s], and which embrace a complete system of numeration, contain also the elements of a perfect system of nature. (See Arist. Met. I, 5). In this instance they applied the theory of numbers to explain the natures and substances of things, as, in others, to illustrate their formation and origin. But on this subject, we are acquainted only with subsequent essays, and belonging to a later school[t].

92. *On the World and the Deity.* The Pythagoreans,

[q] Arist. Metaph. I, 3. Jamblich. Vit. Pythag. c. xii, p. 120, ex Heraclide Pontic.

[r] Arist. Metaph. I, 5, 6; XII, 6, 8.

[s] Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. IV, 3.

J. Geo. Michaelis, Diss. de Tetracty Pythagoricâ, *Francof. ad Viad.* 1735. Erh. Weigil, Tetractys Pythagorica.

[t] Sextus, Adv. Mathem. X, 249, sqq.

like their predecessors, considered the world to be a harmonious whole (κόσμος); consisting, according to a system of Decades, of ten great bodies revolving around a common centre, agreeably to harmonious laws; whence the music of the spheres [u], and their explanation of the symbolical lyre of Apollo. The centre, or central fire (the sun), in other words, the seat of Jupiter, Διὸς οἶκος φυλάκη, is the most perfect object in nature, the principle of heat, and consequently of life; penetrating and vivifying all things. According to the same system, the stars also are divinities; and even men, nay, the inferior animals have a sort of consanguinity with the Divine Being. They considered the *dæmones* as a race intermediate between gods and men, and attributed to them a considerable agency in dreams and divination; always, however, assigning as ultimate causes of all things, destiny and the deity. They ennobled their notion of the deity by the attribution of certain moral qualities, such as truth and beneficence [x].

93. *Doctrine of the Soul.* The soul also is a number, and an emanation from the central fire [y], resembling the constellations to which it is allied by its immortality and its constant activity; capable of combining with any body, and compelled by destiny to pass successively through several. This theory of the *metempsychosis*, borrowed (it is probable), from the Egyptians [z], Pythagoras appears to have combined with the doctrine of moral Retribution. It is to the Pythagoreans we are indebted for

[u] Aug. Boeckh, Disputatio de Platonico Systemate Cœlestium Globorum, et de verâ indole Astronomiæ Philolaicæ, *Heidelb.* 1810, 4to.

[x] Plato Phædon. p. 139, et Heindorf. ad h. l. Plutarch. De Plac. Philos. I, 3, 7; II, 4. Diog. VIII, 27. 21. Jamblich. LXXXVI, 137, sqq. Porphyr. Vitâ Pythag. § 41. Ælian. Var. H. XII, 59. Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 206.

Conr. Dietr. Koch, Diss.: Unum Theol. Pythagor. Compendium, *Helmst.* 1710. Mich. Mourgues, Plan Théologique du Pythagorisme et des autres Sectes, *Toulouse*, 1712, 2 vols. 8vo.

[y] Diog. Laert. VIII, 28.

[z] Herodot. II, 123. Arist. De An. I, 3.? Plut. De Plac. Philos. IV, 7. Jamblich. Vit. Pyth., c. 24. Diog. Laert. VIII, 14, 28, 30, 31. Stob. Ecl. I, 1044, sqq.

the first attempt, however rude, at an analysis of the operations and faculties of the mind. The understanding, and the intellectual faculties (νοῦς and φρένες), they placed in the brain; the appetites and the will (θυμός), in the heart[a], and distinguished between the rational and animal soul.

94. The doctrine of Pythagoras embraced also the question of *Ethics*[b]; and the fragments of his which we possess on this subject contain (in symbolical language), many admirable ideas, but of which *the principles* are not sufficiently developed[c]. Moral good they identified with *unity*—evil with *multiplicity*. Virtue is *the harmony and unison of the Soul;* (Aristot. Eth. Nicom. II, 5; cf. I, 4. Diog. Laert. VIII, 33. Clem. Alex. Strom. IV, c. 23); or in other words, *similitude to God*, ὁμολογία πρὸς τὸ θεῖον. Justice they defined to be, ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος[d]; and Right

[a] Cic. Tusc. Quæst. I, 17. Diog. VIII, 30. Stob. Ecl. Phys., p. 878.

Ambros. Rhodii, Dial. de Transmigratione Animarum Pythagoricâ, *Hafn.* 1638, 8vo.

Paganini Gaudentii De Pythagoricâ Animarum Transmigratione, *Pis.* 1641, 4to.

Essay of Transmigration, in defence of Pythagoras, *Lond.* 1692.

Guil. Irhovii De Palingenesiâ veterum, s. Metempsychosi sic dictâ Pythagoricâ, Libb. III, *Amst.* 1733, 4to.

[b] Marc. Mappi Diss. (Præs. Jac. Schaller) de Ethicâ Pythagoricâ, *Argent.* 1653; and in the Fragmm. Hist. Philos. of Windheim.

Magn. Dan. Omeisii Ethica Pythagorica, *Altd.* 1693, 8vo.

Frid. Guil. Ehrenfr. Rost, Super Pythagora Virtutem ad Numeros referente non revocante, *Lips.* 1803.

Fr. Bernii Arcana Moralitatis ex Pythagoræ symbolis collecta, *Ferrar.* 1669; ed. quartus Paul Pater. *Francf. ad M.* 1687.

Jo. Mich. Sonntag, Diss. de similitudine nostri cum Deo Pythagorico-Platonico, *Jen.* 1699, 4to.

Fr. Buddei, Diss. De καθάρσει Pythagorico-Platonicâ, *Hal.* 1701, 4to; cf. Analect. Hist. Philos. ejusdem.

Ch. Aug. Roth, De Examine conscientiæ Pythagorico vespertino, *Lips.* 1708, 4to.

Jo. Friedem. Schneider, Diss. De ἀνοδῳ seu ascensu hominis in Deum Pythagorico, *Hal.* 1710.

Jo. Schilteri, Diss. de Disciplinâ Pythagoricâ, in his Manuductio Philos. Moralis, *Jen.* 1676, 8vo.

[c] Arist. Eth. Magn. I, 2.

[d] Arist. Eth. Nicom. I, 1; cf. II, 6; V, 5. Diog. Laert. VIII, 33.

they made to consist in τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός; Friendship was made to consist in community of interests, and equality: self-murder was condemned by Pythagoras as a crime against the gods, and the virtue which he especially commended was self-command (καταρτυσις). But the attention of this school was principally engaged, and its disciples exercised in a species of ascetic morality, which pervaded all their system[e].

95. We are acquainted with but a small portion of the writings of the old Pythagorean sect, and these are merely commentaries on the opinions of their master. The philosophers belonging to it were *Aristæus* of Croto, the successor and son-in-law of Pythagoras, according to Jamblichus[f]; *Teleauges* and *Mnesarchus*, sons of Pythagoras; *Alcmæon* of Croto, principally distinguished as a naturalist and physician; *Hippo* of Rhegium, and *Hippasus* of Metapontum; (these two last were allied to the Ionic school, by their doctrine of a fundamental and elementary principle of nature); *Ecphantus* of Syracuse, who inclined to the Atomic school; *Clinias*, the contemporary of Philolaus, and *Epicharmus* of Cos, the comedian, called also the Megarean and Sicilian, on account of his residence at those places. Nothing can be advanced with certainty concerning *Ocellus* the Lucanian[g], and *Timæus* of Locri Epizephyrii, and on that account called Timæus the Locrian[h]. The work attributed to the latter[i] is nothing but an abstract of the Timæus of Plato,

[e] Several symbolical precepts are to be found apud PLUTARCH. De Pueror. Educ. fin.; and DIOG. LAERT. VIII, 17.

[f] Vita Pythag.

[g] Flourished about 496 B.C.

[h] Respecting both, consult † MEINERS, Hist. Doctr. de Vero Deo, P. II, p. 312, sqq. The same, in his † History of the Sciences among the Greeks and Romans, vol. I, p. 584. The same, in the † Bibl. Philol. of Gött., vol. I, No. I, p. 204; and † TIEDEMANN, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, vol. I, p. 89.

[i] Περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς, printed in the Opusc. Myth. Phys. et Eth. of THOM. GALE, p. 539, sqq., and published by D'ARGENS, *Berlin*, 1763, 8vo. translated by BARDILI, in the Collection of FÜLLEBORN, No. IX, § 9. On this work, consult † TENNEMANN, System of the Philosophy of Plato, vol. I, p. 93.

and the authenticity of the treatise on the Universe[k], attributed to Ocellus, is even more unquestionably apocryphal. Among the most distinguished Pythagoreans of a later period should be mentioned, *Archytas* of Tarentum[l], a contemporary of Plato, and *Philolaus* of Croto, or Tarentum[m]; who became celebrated for his system of astronomy, and composed the first treatise of his school which was committed to writing[n], entitled, "The Bacchæ, or Inspired Women[o]."

96. The doctrine of Pythagoras had great influence with the most eminent philosophers of Greece, and, in particular, with Plato; from the impression it communicated to their speculations. Subsequently, however, it became the fashion to call Pythagorean all that Plato, Aristotle, and others after them, had added to the doctrines of Pythagoras; even opinions which they themselves had started; and to this medley of doctrines of various origin was superadded a mass of superstitions (§ 184).

[k] Περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, first published in the Opusc. of Th. Gale, p. 99, sqq. The same, by Batteux, with the work of Timæus, *Par.* 1768, 3 vols. 8vo; and also separately, by D'Argens, *Berlin*, 1792, 8vo; by Rotermund, *Leips.* 1794, 8vo; and lastly, by Rudolphi, Ocellus Lucanus de Rer. Naturâ, Græcè; rec., comment. perpet. auxit et vindicare studuit Aug. Frid. Wilh. Rudolphi, *Lips.* 1801, 8vo., translated with a Dissertation on the Genius of Ocellus, by Bardili, ap. Fülleborn, Fasc. X, § 1—3.

[l] See C. G. Bardili, Epochen, etc., supplement to the first part. The same, Disquisitio de Archytâ Tarentino, Nov. Act. Soc. Lat. Jen. vol. I, p. 1. Tentamen de Archytæ Tarentini vitâ atque operibus a Jos. Navarra conscriptum, *Hafn.* 1820, 4to. Collection of the pretended Fragments of Archytas, in the † History of the Sciences by Meiners, vol. I, p. 598.

[m] The contemporary of Socrates.

[n] Concerning this philosopher, see the work of Aug. Boeckh, mentioned § 92, note; and † The Doctrine of the Pythagorean Philolaus, with the fragment of his work, by the same, *Berl.* 1819, 8vo.

[o] On the Pythagorean Ladies, see Jamblich. Vit. Pyth. ed. Kuster, p. 21. Theano is particularly mentioned as the wife or the daughter of Pythagoras. Diog. Laert. VIII, 42, sqq.; Jambl. l. c.; in the work of Gale, Opusc. Myth., p. 740, sqq., in the Collect. of J. Chph. Wolf, Fragmenta Mulierum Græcarum prosaica, p. 224, sqq., we find letters attributed to Theano and other women of this sect. See also, Fabricius, Bibl. Gr.; † Wieland, On the Pythagorean Ladies, in his works, vol. XXIV; Frd. Schlegel, Abhandlung über Diotima, fourth vol. of his works, *Vienna*, 1822, 8vo.

III. *Speculations of the Eleatic School.*

Liber de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgiâ Aristoteli vulgo tributus, partim illustratus Commentario a GE. GUST. FÜLLEBORN, *Hal.* 1789, 4to.

GE. LUD. SPALDINGII Vindiciæ Philosophorum Megaricorum; subjicitur Commentarius in priorem partem libelli de Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ, *Hal.* 1792, 8vo.

† J. GOTTFR. WALTHER, The Tombs of the Eleatic Philosopher unclosed, second edition, *Magd.* et *Leips.* 1724.

JOH. GOTTL. BUHLE, Commentatio de Ortu et Progressu Pantheismi inde a Xenophane primo ejus auctore usque ad Spinozam, *Götting.* 1790, 4to., et Commentt. Soc. Gött. vol. X, p. 157.

CHR. AUG. BRANDIS, Commentationum Eleaticarum, p. 1. Xenophanis, Parmenidis, et Melissi doctrina e propriis Philosophorum reliquiis repetita, *Alton.* 1813, 8vo.

97. All the philosophers, whom we have hitherto had occasion to mention, made *experience* the basis of their arguments, and consequently were led by the evidence of their senses to the consideration of the *contingent* and the *variable:* which it was their endeavour to reconcile with the *invariable* and *absolute*, by referring all to the same original. We are now called upon to observe the commencement, at Elea in Italy, of a school which boldly asserted that *experience* existed only in appearance: that the ideas of *movement* and *change* were unintelligible; and, by these doctrines, were led to derive all knowledge from the mind itself, as the only substantial foundation of Truth. The Deity they identified with the Universe.

All this amounted, as is obvious, to a species of *idealism* and *pantheism*[p], which was imagined by four philosophers, with the private circumstances of whose lives we have not much acquaintance.

[p] *Idealism* is used to denote the theory which asserts the reality of our ideas, and from these argues the reality of external objects: *Pantheism* is the opinion that all Nature partakes of the divine essence.

Xenophanes.

Fragments of the Poem of Xenophanes *περὶ φύσεως*, in the Collection of Fülleborn, No. VII, § 1; and in Brandis Comment. (above).

Tob. Roschmanni Diss. Hist. Philos. (præs. Feuerlin) de Xenophane, *Altd.* 1729, 4to.

Diet. Tiedemann, Xenophanis decreta, Nova Biblioth. Philolog. et Crit. vol. I. fasc. II.

† Fülleborn, Xenophanes, Collection, fasc. I, § 3. See the works mentioned in the preceding §.

98. *Xenophanes* of Colophon was the contemporary of Pythagoras, and, about the year 536, established himself at Elea or Velia, in Magna Græcia. From the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*, he concluded that nothing could pass from non-existence to existence. According to him, all things that really exist are eternal and immutable. On this principle he looked upon all nature as subject to the same law of unity; *ἕν τὸ ὂν καὶ πᾶν*. God, as being the most perfect essence, *τὸ πάντων ἄριστον καὶ κράτιστον*, is eternally, One; unalterable, and always consistent with himself; He is neither finite nor infinite, neither moveable nor immoveable; he cannot be represented under any human semblance; he is all hearing, all sight, and all thought, and his form is spherical. The same philosopher (on the principle of experience), proposed to explain the multifariousness of variable essences by assuming, as primitive elements, water and earth. He appears to have hesitated between the opposite systems of *empirism*[q] and *rationalism*, and bewailed the incertitude which he regarded as the condition of humanity[r]. Xenophanes was the first to set the example of a philosopher who divested the

[q] *Empirism*, or *experimentalism*, it is necessary to bear in mind, would derive all our knowledge from experiment, by the avenues of the senses: *rationalism*, on the contrary, from the mind.

[r] Arist. de Xenoph. c. 3; Met. I, 3, 5. Sextus, Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 224, sqq.; III, 228; Adv. Math. VII, 49, sqq. *Δόκος δ'ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται*, 52, 110; VIII, 326; X, 313, sqq. Diog. Laert. IX, 19, sqq. Stob. Ecl. II, p. 14, sqq. ed. Heeren.

Deity of the unworthy images under which he had been represented [s].

Parmenides.

Fragments of his Poem περὶ φύσεως, collected by H. STEPHENS. † FÜLLEBORN, Fragments of Parmenides, collected and illustrated, *Züllichau*, 1795, 8vo. The same in his Collection, fasc. VI and VII. The same Fragments, published with those of Empedocles, by PEYRON; see § 108. (On Parmenides cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 21, sqq.).

J. BRUCKER, Letter on the Atheism of Parmenides, translated from the Latin into French, in the Bibliothèque Germanique, tom. XXII, p. 90.

† NIC. HIER. GUNDLING, Observations on the Philosophy of Parmenides, in the GUNDLINGIANA, tom. XV, p. 371, sqq.

† J. T. VAN DER KEMP, Parmenides, *Edinæ*, 1781, 8vo.

99. *Parmenides* of Elea, who travelled with Zeno to Athens about 460, enlarged upon the above system. He maintained that the understanding alone was capable of contemplating Truth; that the senses could afford only a deceptive *appearance* of it. From this principle he deduced a twofold system of *true* and of *apparent* knowledge; the one resulting from the understanding, the other from the senses [t]. His poem on Nature treated of both these systems; but the fragments of it which have come down to us make us better acquainted with the former than the latter. In the *former*, Parmenides begins with the idea of *pure existence*, which he identifies with *thought* and *knowledge* [u] (never expressly making it the same with the Deity), and concludes that *non-existence*, τὸ μὴ ὄν, cannot be possible; that all things which exist are one and identical; and consequently that existence has no commencement, is invariable, indivisible, pervades all space, and is limited only by itself; and consequently

[s] CLEM. ALEX. ed. POTT. p. 714, sqq.

[t] SEXTUS, Adv. Mathem. VII, 111. ARIST. Metaph. I, 5. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 22.

[u] See Frag. in FÜLLEBORN, V, 45, 46. 88—91. 93, sqq.

that all movement or change exists only in *appearance*[x]. The *manner*, notwithstanding, in which objects present themselves to our senses is uniform, and is called δόξα[y]. To account for this *appearance* conveyed by the senses, Parmenides assumed the existence of two principles, that of heat or light (ethereal fire), and that of cold or darkness (the earth); the first pervading and active, the second dense and heavy; the first he defined to be *positive, real;* and the *intellectual* element (δημιουργός); the second the *negative* element, or, ὕλη; or as he preferred to style it—a *limitation* of the former[z]. From this twofold division he derived his doctrine of *changes;* which he applied even to the phenomena of the mind.

Melissus.

Aristotelis liber de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgiâ, c. I, 2; et Spalding Comment. ad h. lib. See Bibliogr. § 97; cf. Diog. Laert. lib. IX, § 24.

100. *Melissus* of Samos[a], adopted (possibly from the teaching of the two last philosophers) the same system of idealism, but characterized by greater boldness in his way of stating it, and, in some respects, by profounder views. What really existed, he maintained, could not either be produced or perish; it exists without having either commencement or end; infinite, (differing in this respect from Parmenides), and consequently, one, invariable, not composed of parts, and indivisible: which doctrine implies a denial of the existence of bodies, and of the dimensions of space. All that our senses present to

[x] Parmenidis Fragmenta, in the Collection of Füllborn, V, 39, sqq. Arist. Physic. I, 2; Metaph. III, 4; Lib. de Xenophane, 4. Plutarch. De Plac. Philos. I, 24. Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. X, 46; Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 65. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 19 et 31. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 412, sqq.

[y] Simplic. Comment. in Arist. de Cœlo, p. 38, *b*.

[z] Cic. Acad. Quæst. II, 37. Plutarch. De Plac. II, 7—26; III, 1, 15; IV, 5; V, 7. Sext. Empiric. IX, 7, sqq. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 500. 510. 516, et al.

[a] He was distinguished as a statesman and naval commander, and flourished about 444 B. C.

us (that is to say, the greater part of things which exist), is nothing more than an *appearance*, and is altogether beyond the limits of real knowledge[b]. As for the relation between real existence and the Deity, we are ignorant of the sentiments of Melissus on this head; for what is reported by Diog. Laert. IX, 24, can be considered as relating only to the *popular* notions.

Zeno.

See the works mentioned in § 97.

DIET. TIEDEMANN, Utrum Scepticus fuerit an Dogmaticus Zeno Eleates; Nova Bibliotheca Philol. et Crit. vol. I, fasc. 2; cf. † STUADLIN, Spirit of Scepticism, vol. I, 264.

101. *Zeno* of Elea, an ardent lover of liberty[c], travelled, with his friend and teacher Parmenides, to Athens, about the LXXX. Olympiad[d], and appeared in the character of a defender of the idealism of the Eleatic school, which could not but seem to people at large strange and absurd; endeavouring, with great acuteness, to prove that the system of empiric realism is still more absurd[e]. 1st. Because if we admit that there is a plurality of real essences, we must admit them to possess qualities which are mutually destructive of each other, similitude, for example, and dissimilitude; unity and plurality; movement and repose[f]. 2dly. We cannot form an idea of the divisibility of an extended object without a contradiction being involved; for the parts must be either simple or compounded; in the first of which cases the body has no magnitude, and ceases to exist; in the second it has no unity, being at

[b] ARIST. Phys. I, 2, 3, 4; III, 9; De Cœlo, III, 1; De Sophist. Elench. 28. SIMPLIC. in Physic. Arist. p. 8 et 9. 22. 24, 25; in Arist. de Cœlo, p. 38, *a*. CIC. Acad. Quæst. II, 37. SEXT. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. III, 65; Adv. Math. X, 46. STOB. Ecl. I, p. 440.

[c] PLUTARCH. Adv. Colot. ed Reiske, vol. X, p. 630. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 25, sqq. VAL. MAX. III, 3.

[d] 460 B.C.

[e] PLATO, PARMENIDES, p. 74, sqq.

[f] PLATO, Phædr. vol. III, p. 261. SIMPLIC. in Phys. Arist. p. 30.

the same time finite and infinite[g]. 3dly. Innumerable difficulties result (according to Zeno) from the supposition of motion in space: if such motion be allowed to be possible, the consequence is, that infinite space must, in a given time, be traversed. He has acquired great celebrity by his four logical arguments against motion[h], and particularly by the well-known one named Achilles[i]. 4thly. *We cannot form a notion of space as an object, without conceiving it to be situated in another space*, and so on *ad infinitum*[k]. And in general he denies that the absolute unity which the understanding requires as a character of real existence, is in any sort to be recognised in the objects of the senses[l]. By thus opposing reason to experience, Zeno opened the way to scepticism; at the same time laying the foundations of a system of logic, of which he was the first teacher[m]; and employing dialogue[n].

102. The speculations of the Eleatæ (to which *Xeniades* of Corinth[o], also attached himself[p]), were subsequently pursued in the school of Megara. They did not fail to meet with opponents, but their real fallacy was not so readily discovered. Plato, by making a due distinction between ideas and their objects, approached the nearest to the truth.

IV. *Heraclitus.*

Joh. Bonitii Diss. de Heraclito Ephesio, P. I—IV, *Schneeberg*, 1695, 4to.

[g] Simplic. l. c.

[h] Arist. Physic. VI, 9. 14. Cf. Plato, Parmenid. l. c.

[i] Car. Henr. Erdm. Lohse, Diss. (præside Hoffbauer) de Argumentis quibus Zeno Eleates nullum esse Motum demonstravit, etc. *Hal.* 1794, 8vo.

[k] Arist. Phys. IV, 3. 5.

[l] Arist. Metaph. III, 4. Simplic. in Phys. p. 30. Senec. Ep. 30.

[m] Plutarch. Pericles. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII, 7. Diog. Laert. IX, 25, 47.

[n] Arist. De Sophist. Elench. c. 10.

[o] Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VII, 48, 53; VIII, 5.

[p] In the fifth century B.C.

GOTTFR. OLEARII Diatribe de Principio rerum Naturalium ex mente Heracliti, *Lips.* 1697, 4to. Ejusdem: Diatribe de rerum Naturalium genesi ex mente Heracliti, *ibid.* 1072, 4to.

JO. UPMARK, Diss. de Heraclito Ephesiorum Philosopho, *Upsal*, 1710, 8vo.

JOH. MATH. GESNERI Disp. de Animabus Heracliti et Hippocratis, Comm. Soc. Gött. tom. I.

CHR. GOTTLOB HEYNE, Progr. de Animabus siccis ex Heracliteo placito optime ad sapientiam et virtutem instructis, *Götting.* 1781, fol.; and in his Opusc. Acad. vol. III.

† FR. SCHLEIERMACHER, Heraclitus of Ephesus, surnamed the Obscure; compiled from the fragments of his work, and the testimonies of ancient writers, in the third fasciculus of vol. I, of the Musæum der Alterthumswissenschaften, *Berl.* 1808, 8vo. Cf. the work of RITTER, p. 60, referred to above at the head of § 85; and, in answer to the views of Schleiermacher, THEOD. L. EICHHOFF, Dissertationes Heracliteæ, partic. I, *Mogunt*, 1824, 4to.

103. By his birth *Heraclitus* of Ephesus belonged to the Ionian school[q]. He was a profound thinker, of an inquisitive spirit; and the founder of a sect called after him, which had considerable reputation and influence. His humour was melancholy and sarcastic, which he indulged at the expense of the democracy established in his native town, and with which he was disgusted. The knowledge he had acquired of the systems of preceding philosophers (vyeing with one another in boldness), of Thales, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes[r], created in him a habit of scepticism of which he afterwards cured himself. The result of his meditations was committed to a volume, the obscurity[s] of which procured for him the appellation of σκοτεινός[t]. *He* also made it his object to discover an elemental principle; but either because his views were different, or from a desire to oppose himself to the Eleatæ, he assumed it to be *fire*, because the most

[q] He flourished about 500 B. C.

[r] According to some, he was the disciple of this philosopher.

[s] This work is cited under different titles; e. g. Μοῦσαι, Fragments in HENR. STEPH. Pöes. Philos. Cf. SCHLEIERMACHER.

[t] DIOG. LAER. IX, 5; et II, 22. ARIST. Rhet. III; De Mundo 5. CIC. De Nat. Deor. I, 26; III, 14; De Fin. II, 5.

subtile and active of the elements. *Fire* he asserted to be the foundation of all things, and the universal agent. The universe he maintained to be neither the work of gods nor men; but a *fire*, continually kept alive, but with alternations of decay and resuscitation, according to fixed laws[u]. Hence he appears to have deduced among others the following opinions: 1. The variability, or perpetual *flux* of things (ῥοή[x]), wherein also consists the *life* of animals[y]. 2. Their formation and dissolution by fire; the motion from above and from below; the first by evaporation, or ἀναθυμίασις; and the future conflagration of the universe[z]. 3. The origin of all changes, in consequence of two principles, viz. *discord* (πόλεμος, ἔρις), and *concord* (εἰρήνη, ὁμολογία), and their mutual opposition (ἐναντιότης), according to fixed laws of fate (εἱμαρμένη[a]). 4. The principle of force and energy he asserted to be the principle also of thought. The universe he maintained to be full of souls and *dæmones*, endowed with a portion of this all-pervading fire. He maintained the excellence of the soul to consist in its *aridity*, or freedom from aqueous particles—αὖη ψυχὴ ἀρίστη or σοφωτάτη[b]. The soul, he continued, by its consanguinity to the divine mind, is capable, *by abstraction*, of recognising the universal, and the *true;* whereas by the exercise of the organs of the senses, it perceives only what is variable and individual[c]. We may remark, that this

[u] Aristot. Metaph. I, c. 3, 7; De Mundo, c. 5. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 6. Clem. Alexand. Strom. lib. V.

[x] Plat. Cratyl. vol. III, ed. *Bipont.* p. 267. Cf. Theætet. ibid. p. 69.

[y] Plutarch. De Plac. Phil. I, 23, 27, 28. De εἰ apud Delph. p. 227, 239.

[z] Arist. De Cœlo, I, 10; III, 1. Plutarch. de εἰ apud Delph. Diog. Laert. IX, 8.

[a] Diog. Laert. IX, 7, 8, 9. Simplic. in Phys. p. 6. Plat. Sympos. c. 12.

[b] According to Stob., Serm. 17, and Ast, on the Phædrus of Plato, c. III, ed. *Lips.* 1810, Αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη. On this expression, compare, besides the works mentioned above, Pet. Wesseling, Obs. de Heracl. αὖη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, in ej. Observatt. Miscell. Amstelod. vol. V, c. III, p. 42.

[c] Aristot. De Animâ, I, 2, 3. Plutarch. De Plac. Phil. IV, 3. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 126, sqq. Cf. 249; VIII, 286; Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 230. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 194, sqq. 906.

system, with which we are very imperfectly acquainted, and which furnished a great many hints to Plato, the Stoics, and Ænesidemus, contained many original and acute observations; which were applied also to moral and political questions.

V. *Speculations of the Atomic School.*

DIOG. LAERT. lib. IX, § 30, sqq.; and BAYLE's Dict. art. *Leucippe.*

104. *Leucippus*, a contemporary, possibly also a disciple of Parmenides[d], opposed the system of the Eleatæ; which he unjustly accused of contradicting itself, by advancing the exclusive and narrow doctrine of atoms (the corpuscular system[e]); a doctrine which, agreeably to experience, maintained the existence of *motion* and *plurality*[f]. He asserted also the existence of a matter filling space (τὸ πλῆρες), and constituting the element of *reality*; by the division of which we arrive at something indivisible, τὸ ἄτομον; while at the same time he taught the existence of a *vacuum* (τὸ κενόν); opposed to *material* reality, yet possessing a certain reality of its own[g]; and endeavoured to account for the actual state of the world by the union (σύγκρισις or συμπλοκή), and the separation (διάκρισις), of material reality, within the limits of this void. Accordingly, the *elementary principles* of this system of materialism are the atoms, vacuum, and motion; and we recognise in it none but *corporeal* essences. The atoms, the ultimate elements of what is real, are invariable, indivisible, and imperceptible, owing to their tenuity; they occupy space, and possess forms infinitely diversified; those which are round possessing also the property of motion. It is by their combination or separation (he continues)

[d] Flourished about 500 B. C. His birth-place is unknown; probably *Miletus.*

[e] Cf. above, § 74, at the end.

[f] ARIST. De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 8.

[g] ARIST. Phys. IV, 3.

that all things have their origin, and are brought to their dissolution; their modifications (ἀλλοιώσεις) and properties being determined by the position and order (θέσις and τάξις) of these particles; and take place in consequence of a law of absolute necessity. The soul itself he defined to be nothing but a mass of round atoms; whence result heat, motion, and thought[h].

Democritus.

The fragments of Democritus have been collected by Stephens, and are to be found still more complete in Orelli Opusc. Græc. Sententiosa, I, 91, sqq.

Diog. Laert. IX, 34, sqq.; and Bayle, art. *Démocrite.*

Joh. Chrysost. Magneni Democritus reviviscens, sive Vita et Philosophia Democriti, *Lugd. B.* 1648, *Hag.* 1658, 12mo.

Joh. Geuderi Democritus Abderita Philosophus accuratissimus, ab injuriis vindicatus et pristinæ famâ restitutus, *Altd.* 1665, 4to.

Gottl. Frid. Jenichen, Progr. de Democrito Philosopho, *Lips.* 1720, 4to.

Godofr. Ploucquet, De placitis Democriti Abderitæ, *Tubing*, 1767, 4to. And in his Commentatt. Philos. sel.

See also the work of Hill, mentioned § 151.

105. *Democritus* of Abdera[i]. This ardent inquirer into Nature, ill-understood by his countrymen of Abdera, and to whom has been attributed by subsequent tradition a laughing vein, in opposition to the melancholy of Heraclitus, his contemporary, had been a great traveller for the purpose of amassing instruction, and composed several works; none of which have come down to us entire. He expanded the atomic theory of his master, Leucippus[k]; to support the truth of which he maintained the impossibility of division *ad infinitum;* and from the difficulty of

[h] Arist. De Gen. I, 1, 2, 8; De Cœlo I, 7; III, 4; Metaph. I, 4; De Animâ I, c. 2. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 7. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 160, 306, 442, 796.

[i] Born about 490 or 494; according to others, 460 or 470.

[k] Arist. De Gen. Anim. 5, 8.

assigning a commencement of time, he argued the eternity of existing nature, of void space, and of motion[l]. He supposed the atoms, originally similar, to be endowed with certain properties such as impenetrability, and a density proportionate to their volume. He referred every active and passive affection to motion, caused by impact; limited by the principle he assumed, that only like can act on like[m]. He drew a distinction between primary motion and secondary; impulse and reaction (παλμὸς and ἀντιτυπία); from a combination of which he deduced rotatory motion (δίνη). Herein consists the law of necessity (ἀνάγκη), by which all things in nature are ruled[n]. From the endless multiplicity of atoms have resulted the worlds which we behold, with all the properties of immensity, resemblance, and dissimilitude, which belong to them. The soul consists (such is his doctrine), in globular atoms of *fire*[o], which impart movement to the body. Maintaining throughout his atomic theory, Democritus introduced the hypothesis of images (εἴδωλα); a species of emanation from external objects, which make an impression on our senses, and from the influence of which he deduced sensation (αἴσθησις), and thought (νόησις). He distinguished between a rude, imperfect, and therefore false perception, and a true one (γνησίη[p]). In the same manner, consistently with his theory, he accounted for the popular notions of the Deity; partly through our incapacity to understand fully the phenomena of which we are witnesses, and partly from the impressions communicated by certain beings (εἴδωλα) of enormous stature, and resembling the human

[l] ARIST. De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 2; Physic. VIII, 1; De Generat. Anim. II, 6. DIOG. LAERT. IX, 44.

[m] ARIST. De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 7.

[n] ARIST. De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 7; Physicor. IV, 3. DIOG. IX, 45, 49. SEXTUS, Adv. Math. IX, 113. PLUT. De Decret. Philos. I, 25. Cf. STOB. Ecl. I, 394.

[o] ARIST. De Anim. I, 2. PLUTARCH. De Plac. Philos. IV, 3.

[p] ARIST. De Animâ I, 2, 3. PLUTARCH. De Plac. Philos. IV, 3, 4, 8, 13, 19. ARIST. De Sensu, c. 4; De Divinat. per Somnum, c. 2. SEXTUS Adv. Math. VII, 135, sqq.; VIII, 6, 184; Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 213, sqq. ARIST. Metaph. IV, 5. CIC. De Divin. II, 67.

figure, which inhabit the air[q]. To these he ascribed dreams and the causes of divination[r]. He carried his theory into practical philosophy also, laying down that happiness consisted in an *equability of temperament* (εὐθυμία); whence he deduced his moral principles and prudential maxims[s]. Democritus had many admirers[t]; among others, *Nessus*, or Nessas, of Chios, and the countryman of the latter (and according to some his pupil), *Metrodorus* (by whom were propagated certain sceptical notions[u]); *Diomenes* of Smyrna; *Nausiphanes*, of Teios, the master of Epicurus; *Diagoras* of Melos, the freedman and disciple of Democritus, who is also numbered among the Sophists (§ 109), and was obliged to quit Athens[x], on account of his reputed atheism[y]; *Anaxarchus* of Abdera, the contemporary and friend of Alexander the Great; and others. It was from Democritus that Epicurus borrowed the principal features of his metaphysics.

VI. *Others of the Ionian School.*

Hermotimus and Anaxagoras.

For the traditions relating to Hermotimus of Clazomenæ, see a † Critical Inquiry by Fr. Aug. Carus, in the Collection of Fülleborn, fascic. IX, p. 58, sqq.

† Heinius, Dissertations on Anaxagoras, tom. VIII and IX of the History of the Royal Academy of Sciences and Belles Lettres of Prussia (French); and in the Magazine of Hissmann, tom. V, § 335, sqq. (Germ.).

[q] Jo. Conr. Schwarz, Diss. de Democriti Theologiâ, *Cobl.* 1718, 4to.

[r] Sextus, Adv. Math. IX, 19, 24. Plutarch. De defectu Oraculor. IX, p. 326; Vitâ Æmilii Paulli, II, p. 168. Cic. Nat. Deor. I, 12, 43; De Divin. I, 3.

[s] Diog. Laert. IX, 45. Stob. Ecl. II, p. 74, sqq. Cic. De Fin. V, 8, 29.

[t] Diog. Laert. IX, 58, sqq.

[u] Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 23. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 48, 88.

[x] In 415 B. C.

[y] Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 51, sqq.; Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 218. Mariangelus Bonifac. a Reuthen, de Atheismo Diagoræ. J. Jac. Zimmermanni Epist. de Atheismo Evemeri et Diagoræ, in Mus. Brem. vol. I, p. 4. Theod. Gotthold Thienemann, On the Atheism of Diagoras, apud Fülleb. fasc. XI, No. 2. Cf. p. 57, sqq.; and Bayle's Dict., s. h. v.

De Ramsay, Anaxagoras, ou Système qui prouve l'Immortalité de l'âme par la matière du Chaos, qui fait le Magnétisme de la Terre. *La Haye*, 1778, 8vo.

God. Ploucquet, A work mentioned above, § 85.

† Fr. Aug. Carus, On Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, and the Genius of his Age, in the Collection of Fülleborn, fascic X. The same, Disser. de Cosmo-Theologiæ Anaxagoræ fontibus. *Lips.* 1797, 4to.

† J. van Vries, Two Dissert. on the Life of Anaxagoras (Dutch), *Amsterd.* 1806, 8vo.

J. T. Hemsen, Anaxagoras Clazomenius sive de Vitâ ejus atque Philosophiâ Disquis. Philos. Hist. *Götting.* 1821, 8vo.

Ritter, Work mentioned above, at the head of § 85.

Anaxagoræ Clazomenii Fragmenta, quæ supersunt, omnia, collecta Commentarioque illustrata ab E. Schaubach, etc. *Lips.* 1827, 8vo.

Sketch of the Life, Character, and Philosophy of Anaxagoras, Classical Journal, No. XXXIII, p. 173-177.

106. *Anaxagoras*[z], animated by an extraordinary love of science, distinguished himself among the most celebrated thinkers by following this principle, that the study of the heavens and of nature is the proper occupation of man[a]. He is looked upon by some as the disciple of Anaximenes (which is inconsistent with chronology), and by others, of Hermotimus, who was also a native of Clazomenæ, and is said to have recognised a Superior Intelligence as the Author of nature[b]. In his forty-fifth year Anaxagoras fixed himself at Athens; but in consequence of the machinations of a party, he was accused of being an enemy to religion, without it being possible for Pericles himself to protect him; and retired to end his days at Lampsacus[c]. Nothing has so much contributed to his celebrity as his doctrine of a Νοῦς, or intellectual principle, the Author of the universe; a conclusion to which he was led in consequence of the superior attention he paid to the system of nature: the mystical revelations of his countryman Hermotimus[d] possibly contributing to

[z] Born at Clazomenæ, about 500 B. C. The friend of Pericles.
[a] Arist. Eth. Eudem. I, 5.
[b] Arist. Met. I, 3. Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 7.
[c] In 428 B. C.
[d] Arist. Metaph. I, 3. Plin. Hist. Nat. VII, 52.

form in him this opinion; as well as the manifest inconsistency and inadequacy of all those systems which had recognised only *material* causes. Adhering to the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, he admitted the existence of a chaotic matter, the constituent elements of which, always united and identical (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ)[e], are incapable of being decomposed; and by the arrangement of which and their dissemination he undertook to account for the phenomena of the natural world[f]: adding, that this chaos, which he conceived surrounded by air and ether, must have been put in movement and animated at the first by the Intelligent Principle. Νοῦς he defined to be the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. From this first principle he deduces motion, at first circular; the result of which rotation (he maintained), was the separation of the discordant particles; the union and amalgamation of those which were homogeneous; and in fine, the creation of symmetry and order. *Intelligence*, he considered the active and creative cause; he believed this principle to be endowed spontaneous energy: to be simple and pure; refined from all *matter;* pervading all things; defining and limiting all things; and consequently, the principle of life, sensation, and mental perception[g].

Anaxagoras was more inclined to the study of physics than of metaphysics, for which he is blamed by Plato[h]

[e] The term Homœomeriæ appears to be of more recent invention.

Another of his maxims was, ἐν πάντι πάντα, that in every thing there is a portion of every thing.

[Like lord Peter's loaf! Transl.]

[f] G. De Vries, Exercitationes de Homoiomeriâ Anaxagoræ, *Ultraject.* 1692, 4to. † Batteux, Conjectures respecting the Homoiomeriæ, or similar Elements, of Anaxagoras. The same, Développement d'un Principe Fondamental de la Physique des Anciens, etc. Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXV; and † Hismann, Magaz. vol. III, sect. 153 and 191. See also G. N. Wiener, On the Homœomeriæ of Anaxagoras, *Wormat.* 1771 (Lat.), and Eilers, Essay on his Principle, τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον. *Fef ad M.* 1822, 8vo.

[g] Diog. Laert. II, 6, sqq. Arist. Phys. I, 4; VIII, 1; Metaph. I, 3; De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 1. Simplic. in Phys. Arist. p. 33, sqq. Arist. De Animâ, I, 1.

[h] Phæd. c. 46, sqq.

and by Aristotle[h]. Accordingly he explained on physical principles the formation of plants and animals, and even of the heavenly bodies[i]: which drew upon him the reproach of atheism[k]. He admitted to a certain extent the validity of the evidence of the senses; but reserved for reason (λόγος), the discrimination of *objective* truth[l].

Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus.

† Fr. Schleiermacher, On the Philosophy of Diogenes of Apollonia, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Sc. of Berlin, 1815 (Germ.).

Fr. Panzerbieter, De Diogenis Apolloniatæ Vitâ et Scriptis, *Meining*. 1823, 4to.

107. *Diogenes* of Apollonia (in Crete), and *Archelaus* of Miletus (or, according to others, of Athens); both of whom were about this time resident at Athens, appear, in different ways, to have blended the doctrines of Anaxagoras with those of Anaximenes. Diogenes[m] maintained that air was the fundamental principle of all Nature, and imputed it to an intellectual energy[n]: uniting in this respect the system of Anaximenes with that of Anaxagoras. On the other hand, *Archelaus*, a disciple of Anaxagoras[o], maintained that all things were disengaged from the original chaos by the operation of two discordant principles of

[h] Metaph. I, 4. Aristotle accuses him of using the Deity only as a *machine* in his philosophy.

[i] Maintaining that the sun was originally ejected from the earth and heated, till it became a fiery mass, by rapid motion.

[k] Theophrast. Hist. Plantar. III, 2. Diog. Laert. II, 9. Xenoph. Memorab. IV, 7. Platon, Apol. Socr. 14.

[l] Sextus, Hypotyp. I, 33; Adv. Math. VII, 90. Arist. Metaph. IV, 5, 7. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. IV, 23. 31.

[m] Cf. above, § 87. He was sometimes surnamed *Physicus*; and flourished about 472 B. C. In his adoption of *one* elementary principle he resembled the Ionian school: his book was intitled περὶ φύσεως, of which Simplicius has preserved us several fragments.

[n] Arist. De An. I, 2; De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 6. Simplic. In Phys. Arist. p. 6 and 32. Diog. Laert. IX, 57. Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 12. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. XV.

[o] Flourished about 460 B. C.

heat and cold (or of fire and water); that mankind had insensibly separated themselves from the common herd of the inferior animals; and was inclined to believe that our ideas of what is just, and the contrary, are conventional, and not by nature: τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ [p]. With respect to the operations of the mind his system was one of pure materialism. The system of nature of this last is still more obscure than that of the former [q].

Empedocles.

Empedocles Agrigentinus, De Vitâ et Philosophiâ ejus exposuit, Carminum Reliquias ex Antiquis Scriptoribus collegit, recensuit, illustravit Fr. Guil. Sturz, *Lips.* 1805, 8vo. Cf. Phil. Buttmanni Observ. in Sturzii Empedoclea, in the Comment. Soc. Phil. Lips. 1804, et Empedoclis et Parmenidis Fragmenta, etc.; restituta et illustrata ab Amadeo Peyron, *Lips.* 1810, 8vo.

Jo. Ge. Neumanni Progr. de Empedocle Philosopho. *Viteb.* 1790, folio.

† P. Nic. Bonamy, Researches respecting the Life of Empedocles; in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscript. vol. X.

† Tiedemann, System of Empedocles; in the Magazine of Göttingen, tom. IV, No. 3.

† H. Ritter, On the Philosophic Doctrine of Empedocles, in the Litterarische Analekten of Fr. Aug. Wolf. fascic. IV.

Domenico Scina, Memorie sulla Vita e Filosofia di Empedocle Gergentino. *Palermo*, 1813, 2 tomi 8vo.

108. *Empedocles* of Agrigentum [r], distinguished himself by his knowledge of natural history and medicine [s]; and his talents for philosophical poetry. It is generally believed that he perished in the crater of Ætna [t]. Some suppose him to have been a disciple of Pythagoras or Archytas (Diog. Laert. VIII, 54, sqq.); others, of Parmenides.

[p] Diog. Laert. II, 16. Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 135.

[q] Plutarch. De Plac. Philos. I, 3. Cf. Simplic. in Ph. Aristot. p. 6; et Stob. Ecl. I.

[r] Flourished about 442; according to others 460 B.C.

[s] Which procured him of old the reputation of working miracles, Diog. Laert. VIII, 51. Cf. Theoph. Gust. Harles, Programmata de Empedocle, num ille meritò possit magiæ accusari, *Erl.* 1788-90, fol.

[t] Ge. Phil. Olearii Progr. de Morte Empedoclis, *Lips.* 1733, fol.

He cannot have been an immediate scholar of the first, inasmuch at Aristotle (Met. I, 3) represents him as contemporary with, but younger than Anaxagoras; and because he appears to have been the master of Gorgias. His philosophy, which he described in a didactic poem, of which only fragments have come down to us, combined the elements of various systems: most nearly approaching that of Pythagoras and Heraclitus, but differing from the latter, principally: 1st. Inasmuch as Empedocles more expressly recognises *four* elements [u], earth, water, air, and fire: these elements, (compare his system, in this respect, with that of Anaxagoras), he affirmed not to be *simple* in their nature; and assigned the most important place to fire [x]. 2dly. Besides the principle of concord (φιλία), opposed to that of discord (νεῖκος), (the one being the source of union and good, the other of their opposites), he admitted into his system *necessity* also, to explain existing phenomena [y]. To the first of these principles he attributed the original composition of the elements. The material world (σφαῖρος, μῖγμα [z]) he believed, as a whole, to be divine: but in the *sublunar* portion of it he detected a considerable admixture of evil and imperfection [a]. He taught that at some future day all things must again sink into chaos. He advanced a subtile and scarcely intelligible theory of the active and passive affections of things (Cf. Plato Menon. ed. Steph. p. 76, C. D. Arist. De Gener. et Corr. I, 8; Fragm. ap. Sturz. v. 117), and drew a distinction between the world as presented to our senses (κόσμος αἰσθητός), and that which he presumed to be the type of it, the intellectual world (κόσμος νοητός) [b]. He looked for the principle of life in fire: admitting at the same time, the existence of a Divine Being

[u] D. C. L. Struve, De Elementis Empedoclis, *Dorp.* 1807, 8vo.

[x] Arist. Met. I, 4; De Generat. et Corrupt. I, 1, 8; II, 6.

[y] Arist. Phys. II, 4; De Partib. Animal. I, 1; II, 8.

[z] Simplic. In Phys. Arist.

[a] Arist. Metaph. I, 4; III, 4. Plutarch. De Solertiâ Animal.

[b] Fragm. edit. Peyron, p. 27. Simplic. in Arist. Phys. p. 7. De Cœlo, p. 128.

pervading the universe[c]. From this superior intelligence he believed the *Dæmones* to emanate, to whose nature the human soul is allied. The soul he defined to consist in a combination of the four elements (to account for the knowledge it possesses, of external objects, which he conceived was owing to an *analogy* subsisting between the subject and the object); and its seat he pronounced to be principally the blood[d]. He appears to have made a distinction also between good and evil *dæmones*[e].

VII. *Sophists.*

Particulars and opinions respecting them to be found in Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Sextus E., Diogenes Laertius, and Philostratus.

Lud. Cresollii Theatrum Veterum Rhetorum, Oratorum, Declamatorum, i. e. Sophistarum, de eorum disciplinâ ac discendi docendique ratione, *Paris.* 1620, 8vo. and in Gronovius, Thes. tom. X.

Ge. Nic. Kriegk, Diss. de Sophistarum Eloquentiâ, *Jena.* 1702, 4to.

Jo. Ge. Walchii Diatribe de præmiis Veterum Sophistarum Rhetorum atque Oratorum; in his Parerga Academica, p. 129; and, De Enthusiasmo Veterum Sophistarum atque Oratorum, Ibid. p. 367, sqq.

† Meiners, History of the Sciences, etc. vol. I, p. 112, sqq. and vol. II.

109. The rapid diffusion of all sorts of knowledge and every variety of speculative system among the Greeks, the uncertainty of the principles assumed and the conclusions deduced in the highest investigations, (consequences of the little stability of the data on which they were grounded), together with the progress of a certain refinement which kept pace with the deterioration of their moral and religious habits, all these causes conspired to give birth to the tribe of Sophists[f]; that is, to a class of

[c] Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 64 et 127. Cf. Arist. Metaph. III, 4.

[d] Arist. De Anim. I, 2. Sext. Adv. Math. I, 303; VII, 121. Plutarch. De Decr. Philos. IV, 5; V, 25.

[e] Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. p. 361.

[f] The term σοφίστης had at first been equivalent to that of σοφός.

persons possessed of a merely superficial and *seeming* knowledge; to the profession of which they were influenced by merely interested motives. The Sophists *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Prodicus*, *Hippias* of Elis, *Polus*, *Thrasymachus*, and *Callicles*, were orators and scholars very well practised it is true in the art of speaking, of dialectics, criticism, rhetoric, and politics, but being totally devoid of any real love of philosophy, were anxious only so far to follow the current of their time which set that way, as to promote their own advantage by means of their ability as disputants. All they desired was to distinguish themselves by the show of pretended universal knowledge; by solving the most intricate, most fanciful, and most useless questions: and above all, hoped to get money by the pretended possession of the art of persuasion[g]. With this view they had contrived certain logical tricks of a kind to perplex their antagonists; and, without possessing in the least degree a spirit of philosophy, they maintained all sorts of philosophical theories. The end of their system would have been to destroy all difference between truth and error.

Their conduct reflected much of the general character of their age and country, while it had the advantageous effect of awakening at length, in others, a nobler and more elevated spirit of inquiry.

110. The celebrated orator, *Gorgias* of Leontium[h], a disciple of Empedocles, endeavoured, in his work on Nature[i], to demonstrate by certain subtile arguments, which it is not necessary to repeat here, *that nothing real exists;* nothing which can be known; or communicated by the means of words[k]. The distinction he established between

[g] PLAT. Tim. ed. *Bipont.*, tom. IX, p. 285. XENOPH. Memorab. I, 6. ARIST. Sophist. Elench. c. I. CIC. Acad. Quæst. II, 23.

[h] Flourished about 440. Was ambassador at Athens 424 B. C.

[i] We find, apud Aristot. et Sext. Empir., fragments of this work, under the title: Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως. To Gorgias are also attributed the Speeches which are to be found among the Oratores Græci of REISKE, vol. VIII.

[k] ARIST. De Xenoph. Zenone et Gorgiâ, especially c. V, sqq. SEXTUS, Adv. Math. VII, 65, sqq.

objects, impressions, and words, was important, but led to no immediate result. *Protagoras* of Abdera (said to have been the disciple of Democritus), maintained that all human knowledge consists solely in the apprehension of the object by the subject[l]; that consequently that man is the standard of all things (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος)[m]: that, as far as truth or falsehood are concerned, there is no difference between our perceptions of external objects[n]: that every way of considering a subject has its opposite, and that there is as much truth on the one side as the other; and that consequently nothing can be supported in argument with certainty[o]: maintaining at the same time the sophistical profession, "to make the worse the better argument." As for the existence of the gods, he appears to have esteemed it doubtful[p], in consequence of which he was banished from Athens (where he taught), and died in banishment, about the XCIII. Olympiad. *Prodicus* of Julis in the isle of Ceos[q], a disciple of Pythagoras, employed himself in investigating the synonymes of words: deduced the principle of religion from the appearances of a beneficent intention in external nature[r]; and

[l] Plat. Theætet. ed. *Bip.* II, 68. Sext. Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 217. Cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 51.

[m] Plat. Crat. tom. III, 234, sqq. Arist. Met. XI, 5. Sextus, Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 216, sqq.

[n] Plat. Theætet. p. 89, 90, 102. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 60, sqq. 369, 388. Cic. Ac. II, 46.

[o] Diog. Laert. l. l.

[p] Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 12, 23. Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 56, sqq. Diog. Laert. IX, 51, 53.

On Protagoras, consult, besides the Dialogue which bears his name, in Plato, ed. *Bip.* vol. III, p. 83, sqq.; and Meno, vol. IV, p. 372, sqq., Ælian, A. Gellius, Philostratus, and Suidas. † J. C. Bapt. Nürnberger, Doctrine of the Sophist Protagoras, on existence and non-existence, *Dortm.* 1798, 8vo.

Chr. Gottlob Heynii Prolusio in Narrationem de Protagora Gellii. N. A. V, 10.; et Apuleii in Flor. IV, 18, *Götting.* 1806, on his Sophisms and those of his disciple Evathlus.

Jo. Lud. Alefeld, Mutua Pythagoræ et Evathli Sophismata, quibus olim in judicio certarunt, etc. *Giess.* 1730, 8vo.

[q] About 420 B. C.

[r] Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 18. Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 42.

declaimed very plausibly on the subject of virtue[s]. *Hippias* of Elis was a pretender to universal knowledge[t]. *Thrasymachus* of Chalcedon[u] taught that "might made right;" and *Polus* of Agrigentum, *Callicles* of Acharnæ, *Euthydemus* of Chios, and others, that there is no other principle of obligation for man than instinct, caprice, and physical force; and that justice and its opposite are of political invention[x]. *Diagoras* of Melos was notorious for professing atheism (§ 105). *Critias*[y] of Athens, the enemy of Socrates, and reckoned among the partisans of the Sophists, ascribed the origin of religion to political considerations[z], and appears, like Protagoras, to have asserted that the soul was *material* and resided in the senses; which last he appears to have placed in the blood[a].

CHAPTER SECOND.

FROM SOCRATES TO THE END OF THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE PORCH AND THE ACADEMY (SECOND EPOCH OF GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY).

111. The Sophists compelled their antagonists to examine narrowly human nature and themselves, in order

[s] For example, in his celebrated ἐπίδειξις, *Hercules ad bivium*. See Xenoph. Memorab. II, 1, 21; and Cf. Xenophontis Hercules Prodiceus et Silii Italici Scipio, perpetuâ notâ illustrati a Gotth. Aug. Cubæo, *Lips.* 1797, 8vo.

[t] Plat. In Hipp. Maj. et Min. Xenoph. Memorab. IV, 4. Cic. De Orat. III, 32.

[u] Plat. De Republ. I; ed. *Bip.* tom. VI, p. 165, sqq.

[x] Plat. Gorgias, Theætet., de Republ. II, de Leg. X, p. 76.

[y] One of the thirty tyrants, died 404 B. C.

[z] Sext. Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 218; Adv. Math. IX, 54.

[a] Arist. De Animâ, I, 2.

Critiæ Tyranni Carminum aliorumque ingenii Monumentorum, quæ supersunt, dispos. illustr. et emend. Nic. Bachius. Præmissa est Critiæ Vitâ a Philostrato descripta, *Lips.* 1827, 8vo. Guil. Ern. Weber de Critia Tyranno Progr. *Francf. ad M.* 1824, 4to.

to be able to discover some solid foundation on which philosophy might take its ground, and defend the principles of truth, religion, and morality. With this period began a better system of Greek philosophy, established by the solid good sense of Socrates. Philosophy was diverted into a new channel, and proceeded from the *subject* to the *object*, from *man* to *external nature*, instead of beginning at the other end of the chain. It became the habit to investigate no longer merely speculative opinions; but likewise, and in a still greater degree, *practical* ones also. Systematic *methods* of proof were now pursued, and the conclusions arrived at diligently compared. The want which all began to feel of positive and established principles, gave birth to different systems; at the same time that the scrupulosity with which all such systems were examined, kept alive the spirit of original inquiry.

112. This alteration was effected under the influence of some *external* changes of circumstances also. Athens had now become, by her constitution and her commerce, by the character of her inhabitants, the renown she had acquired in the Persian war, and other political events, the focus of Grecian arts and sciences. In consequence, she was the scene of the labours of their philosophers: schools were formed in which ideas might be communicated, the intellectual powers of those who frequented them developed by more frequent and more various contact of the opinions of others, and emulation continually excited towards continually higher objects. On the other hand these schools were liable to the defect of fostering by their very facilities of acquiring knowledge, a certain intellectual indolence; increased by the easy repetition of the doctrines of their teachers, and aided by the *methodical* nature of the instruction itself. It was to the powerful influence of the character and inquiries of Socrates, that the philosophy of the period owed the new impressions and bias which were given to it.

I. *Socrates.*

The principal authorities are[a]: Xenophon (particularly the Memorabilia and Apology of Socrates), and Plato (Apology?) (Compare these two writers, in this respect). Secondary sources: Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius (II, 18, sqq.), Apuleius.

113. *Socrates* was born at Athens in 470 or 469, and was the son of a poor sculptor named Sophroniscus, and of Phænareta a midwife. He formed himself to a character completely opposed to the frivolity and sophistical habits of the refined and corrupted age to which he belonged, living all the while in constant habits of society, even with certain characters less distinguished for their

[a] The pretended Epistles of Socrates, lately published (cf. the bibliography at the head of § 88), are spurious. See CHPH. MEINERS, Judicium de quorumdam Socraticorum reliquiis in Comment. Soc. Gött. vol. V, p. 45, sqq.

Works on the Life, Doctrine, and Character of Socrates.

FR. CHARPENTIER, La Vie de Socrate, troisième édit. *Amst.* 1699, 12mo.

J. GILBERT COOPER, The Life of Socrates, collected from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, and the Dialogues of Plato, *Lond.* 1749-50, and 1771.

JAC. GUILL. MICH. WASSER, Diss. (Præs. G. CHR. KNORR) de Vitâ, Fatis atque Philos. Socratis, *Œtting.* 1720, 4to.

† W. FR. HELLER, Socrates, 2 parts, *Francf.* 1789-90, 8vo.

† C. W. BRUMBEY, Socrates, after Diog. Laertius, *Lemgo*, 1800, 8vo.

DAN. HEINSII Socrates, seu de Doctrinâ et Moribus Socratis Oratio; in his, Orationes, *Lugd. Bat.* 1627, 8vo.

DAN. BOETHIUS, De Philosophiâ Socratis, p. I. *Ups.* 1788, 4to.

† GARNIER, The Character and Philosophy of Socrates; in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXXII.

† G. WIGGERS, Socrates as a Man, a Citizen, and Philosopher, *Rost.* 1807; second edition, *Neustrel.* 1811, 8vo.

† FERD. DELBRÜCK, Reflections and Inquiry concerning Socrates, *Cologne*, 1816, 8vo.

J. ANDR. CAMMII Commentatio (Præs. Jo. SCHWEIGHÆUSER): Mores Socratis ex Xenophontis Memorabilibus delineati, *Argent.* 1785, 4to.

J. HACKER, Diss. (Præs. FR. VOLKM. REINHARD), Imago Vitæ Morumque Socratis è Scriptoribus vetustis, *Viteb.* 1787, 8vo.

J. LUSAC, Oratio de Socrate Cive, *Lugd. Bat.* 1796, 4to.

FR. MENZII Socrates nec Officiosus Maritus, nec laudandus pater familias, *Lips.* 1716, 4to.

JOH. MATH. GESNERI Socrates Sanctus pæderasta, in Comment. Soc. Reg. Götting. tom. II.

virtues than their accomplishments. He took for his model the abstract idea of a true philosopher, who throughout his life, as a man, and as a citizen, should exhibit an instance of the perfectibility of human nature. He became the instructor of his countrymen and of mankind, not for the love of lucre nor of reputation, but in consequence of a sense of duty. He was desirous above all things to repress the flight of speculative theories by the force of an imperturbable good sense; to submit the pretensions of science to the control of a higher authority, that of virtue; and to re-unite religion to morality. Without becoming, properly speaking, the founder of a school or system of philosophy, he drew around him, by the charms of his conversation, a crowd of young men and others, inspiring them with more elevated thoughts and sentiments, and forming several of those most devoted to him into very brilliant characters. He encountered the Sophists with the arms of good sense, irony, and the powerful argument of his personal character. A constant enemy to mysticism and philosophical charlatanism (even in the circumstances of private life), he drew upon himself the hatred of many; under which he ultimately fell[b], being put to death by hemlock in the year 400 B. C.[c], Ol. XCV, 1.

114. Although, properly speaking, Socrates was not

[b] † On the Trial of Socrates, etc. by Th. Christ. Tyschen, in the Biblioth. der alten Literatur und Kunst., I and II fasc. 1786.

† W. Süvern, On the Clouds of Aristophanes, *Berl.* 1826. With additions, *ibid.* 1827.

M. Car. Em. Kettner, Socratem Criminis majestatis accusatum vindicat. *Lips.* 1738, 4to.

Sigism. Fr. Dresigii Epistola de Socrate justè Damnato, *Lips.* 1738, 4to.

† J. C. Chph. Nachtigall, On the Condemnation of Socrates, etc. in the Deutsche Monatsschrift, June 1790, p. 127, sqq.

Car. Lud. Richter, Commentatt. I, II, III, de Liberâ quam Cicero vocat Socratis Contumaciâ, *Cassel.* 1788-90, 4to.

[c] Ge. Christ. Ibbecken, Diss. de Socrate Mortem minus fortiter subeunte, *Lips.* 1735, 4to.

Jo. Sam. Müller, Ad Actum oratorio-dramaticum de Mortè Socratis invitans, præfationis loco, pro Socratis fortitudine in subeundâ Morte contra Ibbeckenium pauca disputat. *Hamb.* 1738, fol.

the founder of a philosophical school, yet by his character, his example, by what he taught, and his manner of communicating it, he rendered, as a wise man and *popular* teacher, immense services to the cause of philosophy: calling the attention of inquirers to those subjects which are of everlasting importance to man, and pointing out the source from which our knowledge (to be complete), must be derived; from an investigation of our own minds (γνῶθι σεαυτόν).

GOD. WILH. PAULI, Diss. de Philosophiâ Morali Socratis, *Hal.* 1714, 4to.

EDWARDS, The Socratic System of Morals as delivered in Xenoph. Memorab. *Oxford*, 1773, 8vo.

LUD. DISSEN, Programma de Philosophiâ Morali in Xenophontis de Socrate Commentariis traditâ, *Gött.* 1812, 4to.

115. The exclusive object of the philosophy of Socrates was the attainment of 1. correct ideas concerning moral and religious obligation; 2. concerning the end of man's being, and the perfection of his nature; 3. and lastly his duties; all of which he discussed in an unpretending and *popular* manner; appealing to the testimony of the moral sense within us. 1st. The chief happiness of man consists in knowing the good which it his duty to do, and acting accordingly: this is the highest exercise of his faculties, and in this consists εὐπραξία (right-action)[d]. The means to this end are self-knowledge, and the habit of self-control. Wisdom (σοφία), which he often represents as moderation (σωφροσύνη), may be said, to embrace all the virtues[e]; and on this account he sometimes called virtue a *science*[f]. The duties of man towards himself embrace also ἐγκράτεια (continence), and courage, (ἀνδρεία)[g]. Our duties towards others are comprised in justice (δικαιοσύνη); the fulfilment, that is, of the laws, human and divine. Socrates appears to have been the

[d] XENOPH. Memorab. III, § 14, sqq.; Cf. I, 5; IV, 4, 5, 6.
[e] Ibid. III, 9, § 4 et 5.
[f] ARIST. Eth. Nicom. VI, 13.
[g] XENOPH. Memorab. I, 5, § 4; IV, 5, § 6; IV, 6, § 10, sqq.

first to make allusion to natural right or justice[h]. 2dly. Virtue and true happiness (εὐδαιμονία) he held to be inseparably united[i]. 3dly. Religion (εὐσέβεια), is the homage rendered to the Divinity by the practice of virtue; and consists in a continual endeavour to effect all the good which our faculties permit us to do[k]. 4thly. The Supreme Being is the first author and the guardian of the laws of morals[l]: his existence is proved by the order and harmony observable in all nature; both in the inward constitution of man, and the world without. (First instance of theology deduced from the order of nature). He is a rational but invisible Being, revealing himself only by his works[m]. Socrates acknowledged, moreover, a Providence; (to which doctrine he superadded a belief in divination, and in a tutelar dæmon of his own)[n]; with the

[h] Xenoph. Memorab. IV, c. 4, c. 6, § 12. Τὸ φύσει δίκαιον.

Jac. Guil. Feuerlin, Diss. Historico-philosophica, Jus Naturæ Socratis, *Altdorf.* 1719, 4to.

[i] Xenoph. Memorab. III, 9; IV, 2, § 34, sqq.; I, 6, § 10. Cic. Offic. III, 3.

[k] Ibid. I, 1, § 2, 3; III, 9, § 15.

[l] Ibid. I, 2, 4; IV, 3, 4. Plat. Apol. Socr. c. 15.

[m] M. Lud. Theoph. Mylii Diss. de Socratis Theologiâ, *Jen.* 1714, 4to.

J. Fr. Aufschlager, Comment. (Præside J. Schweighæuser): Theologia Socratis ex Xenoph. Memorab. excerpta, *Argent.* 1785, 4to.

[n] God. Olearii Dissert. de Socratis Dæmonio, *Lips.* 1702; and in Stanley, Hist. Philos. p. 130, sqq.

† Chph. Meiners, On the Genius of Socrates, in part III. of his Misc. Works.

† On the Genius of Socrates, a Philosophical Inquiry, by Aug. G. Uhle, *Hanov.* 1778, 8vo. The same, previously published in the Deutsches Museum, 1777.

† Parallel between the Genius of Socrates and the Miracles of Jesus Christ, by Doctor Less, *Götting.* 1778, 8vo. an Answer to the preceding.

See also the Dissert. of Schlosser, *Götting.* 1778, fasc. I, p. 71 and 76.

† On the Genius of Socrates, a new Philosophical Inquiry (by J. Chph. Kœnig), *Francf. and Leips.* 1777, 8vo.

† B. J. C. Justi, On the Genius of Socrates, *Leips.* 1779, 8vo.

Rob. Nares, An Essay on the Demon or Divination of Socrates, *Lond.* 1782, 8vo.

Matth. Fremling, De Genio Socratis, *Lund.* 1793, 4to.

† J. C. Nachtigall, Did Socrates Believe in his Genius? Deutsche Monatsschrift, 1794, fasc. XI, p. 326.

J. Fr. Schaarschmidt, Socratis Dæmonium per tot secula a tot hominibus

other attributes of the Divinity which have a reference to the good government of the world without, and in particular of man[o]. He deemed that beyond this his inquiries ought not to extend. 5thly. The soul he considered to be a divine essence, or partaking of the divine nature. He believed it to approximate the Divinity (μετέχειν τοῦ θεοῦ), in respect of its reason and invisible energy, and on this account he considered it immortal[p]. 6thly. All the other arts and sciences which have no reference to *practice* he looked upon as vain, without object, and unacceptable to God: though he himself was not unacquainted with the mathematics, and the speculations of the Sophists[q].

116. The method of teaching observed by Socrates[r] was a sort of intellectual obstetricism (μαιευτική); agreeably to which he made it his practice to elicit from each, in conversation, the principles of his convictions, employing induction and analogy. His own good natural sense suggested to him this method; which was admirably calculated to refute the Sophists by making them contradict themselves[s]. In such encounters he armed

doctis examinatum quid et quale fuerit, num tandem constat? *Nivemont.* 1812, 8vo.

[o] XENOPH. Memorab. I, 4; IV, 3.

[p] Ibid. I, 4, § 8, 9; IV, 3, § 14; Cyropæd. VIII, 7. PLAT. Phædo, c. 8, sqq.

† W. G. TENNEMANN, Doctrines and Opinions of the Socratic School respecting the Immortality of the Soul, *Jena*, 1791, 8vo.

[q] XENOPH. Memorab. I, 1, § 15; IV, 7. CIC. Tusc. Quæst. V, 3; Acad. I, 4.

[r] FR. MENZII Diss. de Socratis Methodo docendi non omnino præscribendâ, *Lips.* 1740, 4to.

J. CHRIST. LOSSIUS, De Arte Obstetriciâ Socratis, *Erf.* 1785, 4to.

† FR. M. VIERTHALER, Spirit of the Socratic Method, *Salzb.* 1793, 8vo.; second ed. *Wurzb.* 1810.

† J. F. GRÄFFE, The Socratic Method in its Primitive Form, *Gött.* 1794; third ed. 1798, 8vo.

G. J. SIEVERS, De Methodo Socraticâ, *Slesv.* 1810.

[s] † C. FR. FRAGUIER, Dissertation on the Irony of Socrates, his pretended Familiar Genius, and his Character; in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. IV.

himself with his characteristic εἰρωνεία, or affected ignorance, and with his peculiar logic[t].

117. The services which Socrates has rendered to philosophy are twofold; negative and positive. *Negative*, inasmuch as he avoided all vain discussions; combated mere speculative reasoning on substantial grounds; and had the wisdom to acknowledge ignorance when necessary; but without attempting to determine accurately what is capable, and what is not, of being accurately known. *Positive*, inasmuch as he examined with great ability the ground directly submitted to our understanding, and of which Man is the centre; without, however, any profound investigation of the different ideas and motives which influence practice. He first distinguished that Free-will and Nature were both under the dominion of certain laws; pointed out the proper sources of all knowledge; and finally laid open new subjects for philosophic research.

Chr. Fred. Liebegott Simon, Diss. (Præs. W. T. Krug), de Socratis meritis in Philosophiam rite æstimandis, *Viteb.* 1797, 4to.

† Fr. Schleiermacher, On the Merit of Socrates as a Philosopher; in the Memoirs of the Class of Philosophers of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin, 1818, 4to. p. 50.

118. As Socrates divided his time among men of very different habits and dispositions, some more inclined to active life, some to retired study, a great number of disciples in very different classes of society, and with very different views, were formed by his conversations, and still more by his method of teaching, so favourable to the development of the understanding[u]. The Athenians *Xenophon*[x] (cf. § 113,) *Æschines*,

[t] Xenoph. Memorab. IV, 2. Plat. Theætet., Meno, Sympos. p. 260. Cic. De, Fin. II, 1.

[u] Cic. De Oratore, III, 16. Diog. Laert. Procem. sect. 10.

[x] Born about 450, died 360 B. C.

On the pretended letters of the Socratic philosophers, see the remark above, § 113.

Simo[y], *Crito*, and the Theban *Cebes*[z], disseminated the principles of their master and lived agreeably to them. Among those who especially devoted themselves to the pursuits of philosophy, *Antisthenes* the Athenian, founder of the Cynic school, subsequently *Aristippus*, the chief of the Cyrenaic, and afterwards *Pyrrho*, gave their attention exclusively to questions of morals, and their practical application. *Euclid* of Megara, *Phædo* of Elis, *Menedemus* of Eretria, were occupied with theoretical or metaphysical inquiries. The more exalted genius of Plato embraced at once both these topics, and united the two principal branches of Socraticism; either of which separately was found sufficient to employ the generality of the Socratic philosophers. When we examine the spirit of these different schools, the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, the Pyrrhonists, and the Megareans; (as for the schools of Elis and Eretria we are but imperfectly acquainted with them); and lastly, that of the Platonists; we find that the four first did little more than expand the ideas of Socrates, with partial views of his system; while the latter is distinguished by a boundless activity, allied to the true Socratic spirit; and which explored all the subjects of philosophic investigation.

II. *Partial Systems of the Socratics.*

I. *Cynics.*

Authorities: Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, VI.

GE. GOTTFR. RICHTERI Diss. de Cynicis, *Lips.* 1701, 4to.

J. GE. MEUSCHENII Disp. de Cynicis, *Kilon.* 1703, 4to.

A. GOERING, Explicatur cur Socratici Philosophicarum, quæ inter se Dissentiebant, Doctrinarum Principes, a Socratis Philosophiâ longius recesserint, *Partenopol.* 1816, 4to.

[y] The authenticity of the two dialogues attributed to him is contested. See BOECKH, Simonis Socratici, ut videtur, Dialogi quatuor. Additi sunt incerti auctoris (vulgo Æschinis) Dialogi Eryxias et Axiochus, ed. AUG. BOECKH, *Heidelb.* 1810, 8vo.

[z] The writing known under the name of Πίναξ (Cebetis Tabula) is also attributed to a Stoic of Cyzicus, of a later age. See also, FR. G. KLOPFER, De C. Tabulâ, *Zwick.* 1818, 4to.

Christ. Glieb. Joecher, Progr. de Cynicis nullâ re teneri volentibus, *Lips.* 1743, 4to.

Fr. Mentzii Progr. de Cynismo nec Philosopho nec homine digno, *Lips.* 1744, 4to.

Antisthenes.

Gottlob Lud. Richter, Diss. de Vitâ, moribus ac placitis Antisthenis Cynici, *Jen.* 1724, 4to.

Lud. Chr. Crellii Progr. de Antisthene Cynico, *Lips.* 1728, 8vo.

119. *Antisthenes*, an Athenian[a], at first the disciple of Gorgias, afterwards the friend and admirer of Socrates; was virtuous even to excess, and proportionably arrogant. He placed the supreme good of man in virtue; which he defined to consist in abstinence and privations, as the means of assuring to us our independence of external objects: by such a course he maintained that man can reach the highest perfection, the most absolute felicity, and become like to the Deity. Nothing is so beautiful as virtue; nothing as deformed as vice; (*τ'αγαθὰ καλὰ, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά*); all things else are indifferent (*ἀδιάφορα*), and consequently unworthy of our efforts to attain them[b]. On these principles he built a system of practice so excessively simple, as to exclude even the decencies of social life; and for the same reasons professed a contempt for speculative science[c], alleging that the natures of things are undefinable. He maintained also that opinions are all identical, and that no man can refute those of another[d]. We must not omit his idea of one Divinity, superior to those adored by the populace[e].

120. In spite of the unattractive austerity of his way of

[a] Flourished about 380 B.C.

[b] Diog. Laert. VI, 11, sqq., 103, 106.

[c] Notwithstanding, many works of his are quoted (Diog. Laert. VI, 15, sqq.) of which only two speeches remain to us, printed among the Orat. Græc. of Reiske, tom. VIII, p. 52, sqq.

[d] Arist. Metaph. VIII, 3, V, 29. Plat. Sophist., p. 270.

[e] Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 13.

life, which procured him the surname of Ἀπλοκύων, Antisthenes, by his lofty spirit and the eccentricity of his character and conduct, drew about him a great number of partisans, who were called *Cynics;* whether from the *Cynosarges*, where their master taught, or from the rudeness of their manners[f]. Among these we remark *Diogenes* of Sinope[g], said, on doubtful authority, to have lived in a tub; who gave himself the name of Κύων[h], and practised a species of asceticism[i]: and after him, his disciple *Crates* of Thebes[k], and his wife, *Hipparchia* of Maronea; but these latter are not distinguished for having contributed any thing to the cause of science. *Onesicritus* of Ægina, *Metrocles* the brother of Hipparchia, *Monimus* of Syracuse, *Menedemus*, and *Menippus*, are cited, but less frequently. The Cynic school finally merged in that of the Stoics: it made an ineffectual attempt to rise again in the centuries immediately succeeding the birth of our Lord; but without displaying the spirit, merely by affecting the exterior of the ancient Cynics[l].

II. *Cyrenaics.*

Authorities: Xenophon, Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. VII, 11, Diog. Laert. II.

[f] Diog. Laert. VI, 13 et 16.

[g] Born 414, died 324 B. C.

[h] Diog. Laert. VI, 20—81.

[i] The letters which bear his name (probably suppositious), are found in the Collection published by Aldus Manut. (reprinted at *Geneva*, 1606); twenty-two more exist, according to the notice of the unedited letters of Diogenes, etc., by M. Boissonade, Notices and Extracts from the MSS. in the King's Library, tom. X, p. ii, p. 122, sqq. (French).

For remarks on this philosopher consult:

† F. A. Grimaldi, Life of Diogenes the Cynic, *Naples*, 1777, 8vo. (Ital.)

Chph. Mar. Wieland, Σωκράτης μαινόμενος, or Dialogues of Diogenes of Sinope, *Leips.* 1770; and among his works.

Fried. Mentzii Diss. de Fastu Philosophico, virtutis colore Infucato, in imagine Diogenis Cynici, *Lips.* 1712, 4to.

Jo. Mart. Barkhusii Apologeticum quo Diogenem Cynicum a crimine et stultitiæ et imprudentiæ expeditum sistit, *Regiom.* 1727, 4to.

[k] Diog. Laert. VI, 85, sqq. Cf. Juliani Imperat. Orat. VI, ed. Spangenb., p. 199.

[l] Luciani Κυνικός, and other Dialogues.

Frid. Menzii Aristippus Philosophus Socraticus, sive de ejus Vitâ, Moribus et Dogmatibus Commentarius, *Hal.* 1719, 4to.

† Batteux, Elucidation of the Morals of Aristippus, to explain a passage of Horace; in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. XXVI.

† C. M. Wieland, Aristippus, and some of his Contemporaries, 4 vols. *Leips.* 1800, 1802. Works complete, vols. XXXII—XXXVI.

H. Kunhardt, Diss. Philos. Histor. de Aristippi Philosophiâ Morali, quatenus illa ex ipsius Philosophi dictis secundum Laertium potest derivari, *Helmst.* 1796, 4to.

121. Aristippus[m] of Cyrene, a colonial city of Africa; born to easy circumstances, and of a light and sportive character, had, when he first attended the conversations of Socrates, an inclination for self-indulgence, which the latter eventually succeeded in rendering more elevated, without being able to eradicate[n]. He made the *summum bonum* and the τέλος of man to consist in enjoyment, accompanied with good taste, and freedom of mind, τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν ἄριστον, οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι[o]. Other pursuits and sciences he made very light of, especially the Mathematics[p]. His grandson *Aristippus*, surnamed *Metrodidactus* (because instructed by his mother Arete, daughter of the elder Aristippus[q]), was the first to develop, on these principles, a complete system of the philosophy of self-indulgence, ἡδονισμός. This sort of philosophy takes for its basis the affections, principally of the body (πάθη); which it divides into pleasurable and the reverse; giving the preference to the pleasures of the senses. Its degraded object is not εὐδαιμονία, but merely present and actual enjoyment (ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει); allowing something to wisdom and virtue (as they were pleased to term them), as means of attaining thereto[r]. The philo-

[m] Flourished 380 B.C.

[n] Diog. Laert. II, 65, sqq. Plutarch. Adv. Principem Indoct. II, p. 779. Xenoph. Memorab. II, 1; et III, 8.

[o] Diog. Laert. II, 75.

[p] Diog. Laert. II, 75. Arist. Met. III, 2.

[q] J. Ge. Eck, De Arete Philosophâ, *Lips.* 1775, 8vo.

[r] Diog. Laert. II, 86, sqq. Euseb. Præp. Evang. XIV, 18.

sophy of these teachers (neglecting logic and the natural sciences), was confined to what they called a system of morals; built entirely on that of the sensations, as being the only objects of knowledge concerning which we are not liable to err (καταληπτέα καὶ ἀδιάψευστα[s]), and at the same time the only *criteria* of virtue[t].

122. This species of philosophy, when it came to be compared with our notions of Truth, Justice, and Religion, gave birth to a subdivision of the sect of Cyrenaics, called also *Hdonics* (ἡδονικοί). *Theodorus* (of Cyrene?), surnamed the *Atheist*, a disciple of the second Aristippus[u], and probably also of the Stoic Zeno, the Sceptic Pyrrho, and others[x], taking, like his predecessors, Sensation for the basis of his argument, ended by denying the existence of all objects of perception; disallowed the reality of an universal *criterium* of Truth, and thus opened the way for the Sceptic school: framing to himself a system (*Indifferentism*,) which excluded all differences of right and wrong, in Morals and in Religion, and assuming pleasure or gaiety (χαρά), as the final end of existence. His followers denominated themselves Θεοδώρειοι[y]. His disciple, Bio of Borysthenis[z], and *Euhemerus* (according to some of Messene[a]), made an application of

[s] Cf. DIOG. LAERT. II, 92. CIC. Acad. Quæst. IV, 46.

[t] DIOG. LAERT. II, 86, sqq. SEXT. EMPIR. Adv. Math. VII, 11, 15, 191—198.

[u] Flourished about 300 B. C.

[x] SUIDAS, s. h. v. DIOG. LAERT. 86 et 97, sqq.

[y] SEXTUS, Adv. Math. VII, 191, sqq. PLUTARCH. Adv. Colot., XIV, p. 177. EUSEB. Præp. Evang. XIV, 18. DIOG. LAERT. II, 93, 97—100.

[z] Bio the Borysthenite, called also the Sophist, lived in the middle of the third century B. C.

See BAYLE's Dictionary: et MARIUS HOOGVLIET, Specimen Philosophico-criticum continens Diatriben de Bione Borysthenita, etc., *Lugd. Bat.* 1821, 4to.

[a] The fragments of his work, entitled, Ἱερὰ ἀναγραφή, in Diod. Sic., Bibl. Hist. ed. VESSELING, tom. II, 633; and among the fragments of ENNIUS, who had translated them into Latin. *Idem.* ed. HESSEL, p. 212. See also, concerning Euhemerus and Euhemerism:

† SEVIN, Researches concerning the Life and Works of Euhemerus; † FOURMONT, Dissertation on the Work of Euhemerus, entitled, Ἱερὰ ἀνα-

this doctrine to the religion then prevalent [b]. *Hegesias*, who in the time of Ptolemey taught at Alexandria, a native of Cyrene and pupil of the Cyrenaic *Paræbates*, was equally decided in maintaining the *indifference* of right and wrong, but asserted that perfect pleasure is unattainable in our present state (ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀνυπαρκτόν), and concluded that death was therefore preferable to life. Hence he was surnamed Πεισθάνατος [c]. He became the founder of a sect, the Hegesiacs.

123. *Anniceris* of Cyrene, who appears, like Hegesias, to have been a disciple of Paræbates, and to have taught at Alexandria, endeavoured, without renouncing the principles of his sect, to get rid of their revolting consequences, and to reconcile them with our sentiments in favour of friendship and patriotism, by pleading the refined pleasures of benevolence [d]: thus making the Cyrenaic system approximate that of Epicurus. The success of the latter caused the downfal of the Cyrenaic school.

III. *Pyrrho and Timon.*

Authorities: Cic. De Fin. II, 13; IV, 16. Sextus Empiricus. Diog. Laert. IX, 61, sqq. 105, sqq. Euseb. Præp. Evang. XIV, 18.

Cf. the bibliography § 38, II, *a*.

† G. P. de Crouzaz, Examination of Pyrrhonism, Ancient and Modern, *Hague*, 1733 (French). Extracts of the same work in, Formey, Triumph of Evidence; with a Prelim. Dissert. by M. de Haller, *Berlin*, 1756, 2 vols. 8vo. (French).

γραφή, etc.; and † Foucher, Memoirs on the System of Euhemerus, in the Mem. of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. VIII, XV, XXXIV. (all French.)

[b] Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 42. Plutarch. Adv. Stoicos, XIV, p. 77; De Is. et Osir., tom. VII, p. 420, ed. Reiske. Sextus, Adv. Math. IX, 17, 51, 55. Diog. Laert. II, 97; et IV, 46—58. Diod. Sicul. V, 11 et 45. Lact. Div. Instit. I, 11.

[c] Cic. Tusc. Quæst. I, 34. Diog. Laert. II, 86, 93, sqq. Val. Max. XVIII, 9.

J. J. Rambach, Progr. de Hegesia πεισθανάτῳ, *Quedlimb.* 1771, 4to. *Idem.* in his Sylloge Diss. ad rem Litterariam pertinentium, *Hamb.* 1790, 8vo. No. IV.

[d] Diog. Laert. II, 96, 97.

Stoici, — Cynici — Cyrenaici

J. Arrhenii Diss. de Philosophiâ Pyrrhoniâ, *Ups.* 1708, 4to.

God. Ploucquet, Diss. de Epochâ Pyrrhonis, *Tubing.* 1758, 4to.

J. Glieb. Munch, Diss. de Notione ac Indole Scepticismi, nominatim Pyrrhonismi, *Altd.* 1796, 4to.

Jac. Bruckeri, Observatio de Pyrrhone à Scepticismi Universalis maculâ absolvendo, Miscell. Hist. Philos, p. 1.

C. Vict. Kindervater, Diss. Adumbratio Questionis, an Pyrrhonis Doctrinâ omnis tollatur virtus, *Lips.* 1789, 4to.

Ricard. Brodersen, De Philosophiâ Pyrrhoniâ, *Kil.* 1819, 4to.

J. Rud. Thorbecke, Responsio ad Qu. Philos. etc. num quid in Dogmaticis oppugnandis inter Academicos et Scepticos interfuerit (?), 1820, 4to.

J. Frid. Langheinrich, Diss. I et II de Timonis Vitâ, Doctrinâ, Scriptis, *Lips.* 1729-31.

124. *Pyrrho* of Elis[e], originally a painter, together with his master Anaxarchus accompanied Alexander in his campaigns, and subsequently became a priest at Elis. In common with Socrates (whom in some particulars he resembled), he maintained that virtue alone is desirable[f]; that every thing else, even science, is useless and unprofitable. To support this last proposition, he alleged that the contradiction existing between the different principles supported by disputants (ἀντιλογία, ἀντίθεσις τῶν λόγων), demonstrates the *incomprehensibility* of things (ἀκαταληψία). All this, he argued, should make a philosopher withhold his assent (ἐπέχειν), and endeavour to maintain an ἀπαθεία, or freedom from all impressions. By this doctrine, Pyrrho and his school attached a special meaning on the word σκέψις (examination), which had already been frequently employed more loosely[g]. His friend and pupil *Timon*, a physician of Phlius, and previously a

[e] Flourished about 340, died about 288 B. C.

[f] Cic. De Orat. III, 17; De Finib. III, 3; Acad. Quæst. II, 42.

[g] Diog. Laert. IX, 70, sqq. Sext. Empir. Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 209, sqq. Aul. Gell. XI, 5.

Hence the Pyrrhonists are also called *Sceptics*, in the proper sense of the word: they have been more properly denominated *Ephectics* (from ἐποχή, suspension of judgment), *Zetetics*, and *Aporetics* (investigators, and doubters).

pupil of Stilpo at Megara[h], carried still farther this system of scepticism, which had begun on moral principles[i], and maintained with sarcastic bitterness the following propositions[k] against the Dogmatics*: the doctrines of the Dogmatics are founded not on substantial principles, but mere hypotheses:—the objects of their speculations do not come within the compass of certain knowledge:—all science is to be accounted vain, as not contributing to happiness:—in questions of practice we ought to give ear only to the voice of our own nature, that is of our sensations; and by withholding the assent in matters of speculation (ἀφασία), should endeavour to retain the mind in a state of unalterable repose (ἀταραξία)[l]. A question has been raised whether the *Ten sources of doubt* (τόποι or τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς), of the Sceptics[m], are the work of Pyrrho or Timon. The latter left behind him no disciple of note.

IV. *Megaric School.*

Authorities: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, Diog. Laert. II.

J. Casp. Guntheri Diss. de Methodo Disputandi Megaricâ, *Jen.* 1707, 4to.

J. Ern. Junn. Walch, Commentatio de Philosophiis Veterum Criticis, *Jen.* 1755, 4to.

G. Lud. Spalding, Vindiciæ Philosophorum Megaricorum, *Berol.* 1793, 8vo.

Ferd. Deycks, De Megaricorum Doctrinâ ejusque apud Platonem et Aristotelem vestigiis, *Bon.* 1827, 8vo.

J. G. Hager, Dissert. de Modo Disputandi Euclidis, *Lips.* 1736, 4to. See also Bayle.

[h] Flourished about 272 B. C.

[i] Sext. Adv. Math. I, 53.

[k] Particularly in his satiric poem, Σίλλοι, whence he has been occasionally denominated *Sillographus*. Fragments of the three books of this poem, and of his work Περὶ αἰσθήσεων, are to be found partly in the Dissert. quoted above (of Is. Fr. Langheinrich), and partly in. Hen. Steph. Poes. Philos. and among the Analect. of Brunck. tom. II and III.

* [For an account of what is meant by *Dogmatism*, see above §§ 55, 56, 57. *Trans.*]

[l] Cic. Fin. II, 21, 13; IV, 16; Offic. I, 2; De Orat. III, 17. Diog. Laert. IX, 61, sqq. 103, sqq. Euseb. Præp. XIV, 18. Sextus, Adv. Math. III, 2; XI, § 171; VII, § 30.

[m] See, subsequently, under the art. Ænesidemus.

125. *Euclid* of Megara[n], had studied the philosophy of the Eleatæ previously to his becoming a disciple of Socrates. After the death of his master; having, together with the most of his other pupils taken refuge at Megara, he established there a school; the principal object of which was the cultivation of Dialectics, on the principles of Socrates and the Eleatæ. The subtilties of this sect, which were sufficiently censured of old (witness the appellation of ἐριστικοί), have been still more severely condemned by the moderns; who it must be allowed, have not been able to collect a sufficiently accurate account of what their practice really was. They appear to have pointed out the difficulties which attend rationalism and empiricism: and to have pursued certain Dogmatics to their last defences, particularly Aristotle and Zeno. Practical philosophy appears, with the exception of Stilpo, to have engaged the attention of few of this school.

126. *Euclid* gave as it were a new edition of the Eleatic doctrine: Good is one (ἓν τὸ ἀγαθόν); which alone is real and invariable: reasoning by analogy he rejected (διὰ παραβολῆς λόγους); attacking not so much the premises assumed, as the conclusions drawn (ἐπιφοράν)[o]. *Eubulides* of Miletus, and his disciple *Alexinus* of Elis (nicknamed Ἐλέγξινος), are only known as the authors of certain captious questions (ἄλυτα); which they levelled at the Empirics, and in particular at Aristotle; such as; the σωρείτης, the ψευδόμενος, the κερατινης, etc.[p]. *Diodorus* surnamed *Cronus*, of Jasus in Caria, the pupil, according to some, of Eubulides, denied the twofold significations of words[q], investigated the question of possibilities (περὶ δυνατῶν)[r], and specu-

[n] Flourished about 400 B. C.

[o] Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 42. Diog. Laert. II, 106, 107.

[p] Diog. Laert. II, 108, sqq. Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 29. Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. VII, 13; cf. IX. 108. A. Gell. N. A. XVI, 2.

[q] A. Gell. Noct. Att. XI, 12.

[r] Arist. De Interpret. c. IX; Metaph. VIII, 3. Cic. De Fato Frag. VII, IX.

lated concerning the truth of hypothetical judgments (τὸ συνημμένον)[s]; and finally advanced some arguments to disprove the reality of *motion*[t]. His disciple *Philo*, the Dialectic (who must not be confounded with the Stoic, or with the Academician of the same name), became his opponent on these subjects. *Stilpo* of Megara, a philosopher venerable for his character[u], *disallowed the objective validity of relative ideas (τὰ εἴδη); and the truth of opinions not identical**[x]. He made the character of a wise man to consist in *apathy* or impassibility (*animus impatiens*, Senec. Ep. 9.): from which doctrine his disciple Zeno deduced a great number of consequences. We find also mentioned as *Megarics*, *Bryso* or *Dryso*, a son of Stilpo; *Clinomachus*[y] and *Euphantus*.

V. *Schools of Elis and Eretria.*

127. The schools founded by *Phædo* of Elis and *Menedemus* of Eretria (§ 118), are not, as far as we can learn, more distinguishable from each other than from that of Megara. The first was a true disciple of Socrates[z]: his opinions were set forth in dialogues which have not come down to us. The second, a hearer of Plato and Stilpo, may be said to have continued at Eretria the school of

[s] Sext. Empir. Adv. Log. II, 11, 114, sqq.; Adv. Phys. II, 115; Pyrrh. Hyp. II, 110; Adv. Math. VIII, 112, sqq. Cic. Acad. Quæst. II, 47.

[t] Sextus Empir. Adv. Math. X, 85, sqq.; IX, 363; Adv. Phys. II, 85, sqq.; Pyrrh. Hyp. II, 242 et 245. Stob. Ecl. I, p. 310. Euseb. Præp. Evang. XIV, 23.

[u] Diog. Laert. II, 113, sqq.; flourished 300 B.C.

* ——— "läugnete die objective Gültigkeit der Gattungsbegriffe (τὰ εἴδη), und die Wahrheit derjenigen Urtheile, die nicht identisch sind."

[x] Plutarch. Adv. Coloten, XIV, p. 174. Diog. Laert. II, 119. Plat. Soph. tom. II, p. 240, 269, 281. Simpl. In Physica, p. 26.

† J. Chph. Schwab, Remarks on Stilpo, in the Philos. Arch. of Eberhard, tom. II, No. 1.

J. Frid. Chph. Gräffe, Diss. quâ Judiciorum Analyticorum et Syntheticorum Naturam jam longe ante Kantium Antiquitatis Scriptoribus fuisse perspectam contra Schwabium probatur, *Gött.* 1794, 8vo.

[y] Diog. Laert. II, 112.

[z] Diog. Laert. II, 105.

Elis[a]. He and his disciples (in this respect resembling Stilpo), limited truth to *identical propositions*[b]. They denied that it could be inferred by negative categorical propositions, or conditional and collective.

III. *More complete Systems, proceeding from the School of Socrates.*

128. A more complete system of dogmatic philosophy was founded at the Academia by Plato; on the principles of the Rationalists: and another by his disciple Aristotle, on those of the Empirics[c]. From the Cynic school sprang the Stoics, and from the Cyrenaics the Epicureans. The dogmatism of the Stoics called forth the opposition of the Academician *Arcesilaus*, with whom began the scepticism of the later Academy. In this manner, from the Socratic school arose four dogmatical systems; diverging from one another in theory and practice; and, in addition to these, a school decidedly sceptical.

I. *Plato.*

Authorities: Plato, his works, with the Argumenta Dialogorum Platonis of Tiedemann (in the 12th vol. of the ed. Bipont.): Translated by Schleiermacher: Guil. van Heusde, Specimen Criticum in Platon. acc. Wyttenbachii Epist. ad auct. *Lugd. Bat.* 1803, 8vo. Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch. (Quæst. Platon.), Sext. Empiricus, Apuleius de Doctrinâ Platonis, Diogenes Laertius, lib. III, Timæus, Suidas.

Modern Works on the Life, Doctrine, and Works of Plato in general.

MARS. FICINI, Vitâ Platonis: Introductory to his translation of Plato.

Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato, with Answers to

[a] DIOG. LAERT. II, 125, sqq.

[b] SIMPL. In Phys. Aristot. p. 20. DIOG. LAERT. II, 135.

[c] [The Rationalists, it will be remembered, argue from the phenomena of the mind, or the world within us; the Empirics or Experimentalists, from those of the world without. *Transl.*]

the principal Objections against him, and a General View of his Dialogues, *Edinb.* 1760, 8vo.

† W. G. Tennemann, System of the Platonic Philosophy, *Leips.* 1792-5, 4 vols. 8vo.

† Fr. Ast, On the Life and Writings of Plato, intended as introductory to the Study of that Philosopher, *Leips.* 1816, 8vo.

† Ferd. Delbrück, Discourse on Plato, *Bonn.* 1819, 8vo.

† Jos. Socher, On the Works of Plato, *Munich*, 1820. A work principally relating to their authenticity and chronological order.

James Geddes, Essay on the Composition and Manner of Writing of the Ancients, particularly Plato, *Glasg.* 1748, 8vo.

J. Bapt. Bernardi Seminarium Philosophiæ Platonis, *Venet.* 1599-1605, 3 vols. fol.

Rud. Goclenii Idea Philos. Platonicæ, *Marb.* 1612, 8vo.

Lud. Morainvilliere, Examen Philos. Platonicæ, 1659, 8vo.

Sam. Parker, A Free and Impartial Censure of Platonic Philosophy, *Lond.* 1666, 4to.

† J. J. Wagner, A Dictionary of the Platonic Philosophy, *Götting.* 1779, 8vo. with a Sketch of that System.

† J. Fr. Herbart, De Platonici Systematis Fundamento, *Gött.* 1805, 8vo. Cf. his Manual to serve for an introduction to Philosophy, second edition, IV sect. ch. 4.

P. G. von Heusde, Initia Philosophiæ Platonicæ, Pars. I, *Ultraj.* 1827, 8vo.

Translations by Cousin (French), Sydenham, and Schleiermacher.

129. *Plato*[d] was born at Athens 430 or 429 B. C., in the 3rd or 4th year of the LXXXVII. Ol., the son of Aristo and Perictione, of the family of Codrus and Solon, and was endowed with distinguished talents for poetry and philosophy. By the advice of Socrates he attached himself to the latter pursuit. He had originally some inclination for public life, but was disgusted by the perpetual changes which took place in his time in the governments of Greece; by the corruptions of the democracy, and the depravity of the manners of his countrymen[e]. His studies were happily promoted by a diligent cultiva-

[d] His proper name was Aristocles.

[e] Plat. Epist. VII.

tion of poetry and the mathematics; by foreign travel, particularly in Italy and Sicily; and by familiar intercourse with the most enlightened men of his time; particularly with Socrates, whose conversations he attended for eight years * [f]; as well as by the correspondences which he entertained with the Pythagoreans of Magna Græcia [g]. In this manner was formed this great philosopher, surpassing, perhaps, all, by the vastness and profoundness of his views, and the correctness and eloquence with which he expressed them: while his moral character entitled him to take his place by the side of Socrates. He founded in the *Academia* a school of philosophy, which for a long period was a nursery of virtuous men and profound thinkers. Plato died in the first year of the CVIII. Olympiad, 348 B. C.

130. His works, principally in the form of dialogues [h]; (models of excellence for the rare union of a poetic and philosophic spirit) [i]; are the only incontestible authorities respecting his opinions; but we must not hope to attain his entire system except by conjecture, as he had certain doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα) which he did not communicate

* He had previously become acquainted with the system of Heraclitus.

[f] Xenoph. Memorab. III, 6. Apuleius.

[g] Jo. Guil. Jani Dissert. de Institutione Platonis, *Viteb.* 1706. De Perigrinatione Platonis, ibid. ejusd.

Chph. Ritter, De Præceptoribus Platonis, *Gryphisw.* 1707, 4to.

On his intercourse with Xenophon:

Aug. Boeckh, Progr. de Simultate quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur, *Berol.* 1811, 4to.

[h] J. Jac. Nast, Progr. de Methodo Platonis Philosophiam tradendi Dialogicâ, *Stuttg.* 1787. 4to.

J. Aug. Goerenz, Progr. de Dialogisticâ Arte Platonis, *Viteb.* 1794, 4to.

[i] Henr. Phil. Conr. Henke, De Philosophiâ Mythicâ, Platonis imprimis, Observationes variæ, *Helmst.* 1776, 4to.

† J. Aug. Eberhard, Dissert. on the proper end of Philosophy, and the Mythi of Plato, in his *Vermischte Schriften*, *Hal.* 1788, 8vo.

J. Chr. Hüttner, De Mythis Platonis, *Lips.* 1788, 4to.

† Garnier, Mem. on the use which Plato has made of Fables, in the Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. XXXII.

† M. Marx, The Mythi of Plato, a Dissert. in the *Eleutheria*, a Literary Gazette of Fribourg, published by Ehrhardt, tom. I, fasc. 2 and 3. *Frib.* 1819, 8vo.

except to those whom he entrusted with his *esoteric* philosophy [k] *.

131. Plato, by his philosophical education and the superiority of his natural talents, was placed on an eminence which gave him a commanding view of the systems of his contemporaries, without allowing him to be involved in their prejudices [l]. He always considered theoretical and practical philosophy as forming essential parts of the same Whole: and conceived that it was only by means of true philosophy that human nature could attain its proper perfection [m].

132. His critical acquaintance with preceding systems, and his own advantages, enabled Plato to form more adequate notions of the proper end, extent, and character of philosophy [n]. Under this term he comprehended a knowledge of the Universal, the Necessary, the Absolute; as well as of the relations and essential properties of objects [o]: Philosophy he defined to be Science, properly so called. The source of knowledge he pronounced to be not [p] the evidence of our senses, which

[k] Plat. Epist. II, VII, XIII.; Phædr. p. 388.; Alcib. Pr.; de Rep. IV. Arist. Phys. 1V, 2; De Gener. et Corrupt. II, 3. Simplic. in Arist. libr. de Animâ, I, p. 76. Suidas.

* This is denied by others.

We must not omit to notice, as sources of information respecting Plato, the passages in Aristotle, where that philosopher criticises the system of his master. See Fr. A. Trendelenburg, Platonis de Ideis et Numeris Doctrinâ ex Aristotele illustrata, *Lips.* 1826, 8vo.

[l] Sophista, vol. II, p. 252, 265. Cratyl., p. 345, 286.

[m] De Rep. VI, p. 76, 77; Ep. VII.

[n] On the *end* of the philosophy of Plato, see, besides the work of Eberhard quoted in the preceding section:

Aug. Magn. Kraft, De Notione Philosophiæ in Platonis ἐρασταῖς, *Lips.* 1786, 4to.

Gottlob Ern. Schulze, De summo secundum Platonem Philosophiæ fine, *Helmst.* 1789, 4to.

[o] Theætet., p. 141; De Republ. VI, p. 69; V, p. 62; De Leg. III, p. 131.

[p] Jo. Fr. Dammann, Diss. I et II de Humanâ sentiendi et cogitanda facultatis Naturâ ex Mente Platonis. *Helmst.* 1792, 4to.

are occupied with *contingent* matter, nor yet the *understanding*,* but Reason[q], whose object is that which is Invariable, and Absolute (τὸ ὄντως ὄν[r]). He held the doctrine of the existence in the soul of certain *innate ideas* (νοήματα) which form the basis of our conceptions, and the elements of our practical resolutions. To these ἰδέαι, as he termed them (the eternal παραδείγματα, types or models of all things, and the ἀρχαί, or principles, of our knowledge), we refer the infinite variety of individual objects presented to us (τὸ ἄπειρον, and τὰ πολλά[s]). Hence it follows that all these details of knowledge are not the results of experience, but only developed by it. The soul *recollects* the Ideas in proportion as it becomes acquainted with their copies (ὁμοιώματα), with which the world is filled: the process being that of recalling to mind the circumstances of a state of pre-existence[t]. Inasmuch as the objects thus presented to the mind correspond in part with its *Ideas*, they must

* [The Kantists (of whom Tennemann is one), make a broad distinction between the Understanding and Reason. *Trans.*]

[q] Phædo, p. 225.

[r] Phædr., p. 247.

[s] Besides the general treatises above, see, on the *Ideas* of Plato, the following works:

Scipionis Agnelli Disceptationis de Ideis Platonis, *Venet.* 1615, 4to.

Car. Joach. Sibeth, Diss. (Resp. J. Chr. Fersen) de Ideis Platonicis, *Rostoch.* 1720, 4to.

Jac. Bruckeri Diss. de Convenientiâ Numerorum Pythagoricorum cum Ideis Platonis; Miscellan. Hist. Philos., p. 56.

Glob. Ern. Schulze, Diss. Philosophico-Historica de Ideis Platonis, *Viteb.* 1786, 4to.

† Fr. V. L. Plessing, Dissertation on the Ideas of Plato, as representing at once Immaterial Essences and the Conceptions of the Understanding, in the Collection of *Cæsar*, vol. III, p. 110.

Theoph. Fähse, Diss. de Ideis Platonis, *Lips.* 1795, 4to.

De Schanz (Præs. Matth. Fremling), De Ideis Platonicis, *Lund.* 1795, 4to.

See work of Trendelenburgh, mentioned above, § 125.

H. Richteri de Ideis Platonis libellus, *Lips.* 1827, 8vo.

J. Andr. Buttstedt, Progr. de Platonicorum Reminiscentiâ, *Erlang.* 1761, 4to.

[t] Phædo, p. 74, 75; Phædr., p. 249.

have some principle in common; that principle is the Divinity, who has formed these external objects after the model of the Ideas[u]. Such are the fundamental doctrines of the philosophy of Plato; in accordance with which he placed the principles of identity and contradiction among the highest laws of philosophy[x]; and drew a distinction between *Empirical* knowledge and *Rational;* the one being derived from the Intellectual, the other from the External world, (κόσμος αἰσθητὸς and νοητός): making the latter the only true object of philosophy.

The system of Plato is an instance of *Rationalism.*

133. The division of philosophy into Logic (Dialectics), Metaphysics (Physiology or Physics), and Morals (the Political science), has been principally brought about by Plato[y], who clearly laid down the chief attributes of each of these sciences, and their mutual dependencies, and distinguished also between the analytical and synthetical methods. Philosophy therefore is under great obligations to him, *quoad formam.* She is no less indebted to him for the lights he has thrown upon the above parts considered separately; though he did not profess to deliver a system of each, but continually excited the attention of others, in order to further discoveries.

134. Plato considered the soul to be a self-acting energy (αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν)[z]: and viewed as combined with the body, he distinguished in it two parts, the rational (λογιστικὸν, νοῦς); and the irrational or animal (ἀλογιστικὸν or ἐπιθυμητικόν): mutually connected by a sort of middle term (θυμὸς, or τὸ θυμοειδές[a].) The animal part has its origin in the imprisonment of the soul in the body[b]; the intellectual still retains a consciousness of the *Ideas:*

[u] De Rep. VI, p. 116—124; Tim., p. 348.

[x] Phædr., p. 226, 230; De Rep. VI, 122, VII, 133; De Leg. III, p. 132.

[y] Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 16.

[z] De Leg. X, p. 88, sqq.

[a] De Rep. IV, 349. ed. Steph.

[b] Phædo.

whereby it is capable of returning to the happy condition of Spirits. In Plato we discover also a more complete discrimination of the faculties of knowledge, sensation, and volition[c]; with admirable remarks on their operations, and on the different species of perception, of sensation, of motives determining the will; as well as the relations between Thought and Speech. (See for the last, Theætet. ed. Steph. p. 189, E sqq. Phileb. p. 38, D.)

135. Plato has rendered no less service to philosophy by affording it the first sketch of the laws of thought, the rules of propositions, of conclusions, and proofs, and of the analytic method: the distinction drawn between the Universal (κοινόν), and Substance (οὐσία); and the Particular and the Accidental: he diligently investigated the characteristics of Truth, and detected the signs of the *phenomenon*, or *apparent* Truth[d]: to him we owe the first attempt at the construction of a philosophical Language[e]: the first development of an abstract idea of knowledge and science[f]: the first logical statement of the properties of Matter, Form, Substance, Accident, Cause and Effect, of Natural and Independent Causes of Reality (τὸ ὄν), and of Apparent Reality (φαινόμενον); a more adequate idea of the Divinity, as a being eminently good; with a more accurate induction of the Divine Attributes[g]; especially the moral ones; accompanied by remarks on

[c] De Rep. IV, p. 367.

On the doctrine of Plato as respecting the soul, consult the following works:

† CHPH. MEINERS, Dissertation on the Nature of the Soul, a Platonic Allegory (after the Phædrus); in the first vol. of his Miscellany, p. 120, sqq.

† C. L. REINHOLD, Dissertation on the Rational Physiology of Plato: in the first vol. of his Letters on the Philosophy of Kant, Letter XI.

EM. GF. LILIE, Platonis Sententia de Naturâ Animi, *Götting.* 1790, 8vo.

[d] For the Logic of Plato, consult † J. J. ENGEL, Essay on a Method of Extracting from the Dialogues of Plato his Doctrines respecting the Understanding, *Berl.* 1780, 8vo.

[e] In the Cratylus.

[f] The degrees of the latter are, δόξα—διάνοια—ἐπιστήμη.

[g] De Rep. II, p. 250; VII, 133.

the popular religion, and an essay towards a demonstration of the existence of God by reasonings drawn from Cosmology[g]. He represented the Divinity as the author of the world, inasmuch as he introduced into rude matter (ὕλη—τὸ ἄμορφον), order and harmony, by moulding it after the *Ideas*, and conferring (together with a rotatory motion), an harmonious body, governed as in the case of individual animals, by a rational spirit. He also described the Divinity (in respect of his providence), as the author and executor, or guardian of the laws of Morals; and to him we owe the first speculative essay on Divine Justice; according to his views, the existence of evil not being attributable to the Deity, inasmuch as it results from matter, and he having ordered all things in such a way as to exclude as much as possible its existence[h]: lastly, to him we owe the first formal development of the doc-

[g] De Leg. X, p. 68, XII, p. 229. Cf. X, p. 82, sqq.; Phileb. p. 244; Epinomis, p. 254, sqq.

[h] De Rep. IV, 10; Tim., p. 505, sqq.

On the Cosmogony and Theology of Plato, consult, besides the ancients (e. g. Proclus), the commentaries on, and translations of, the Timæus: † L. Hörstel, The Timæus of Plato, the doctrine and the end of this work, with Remarks and Illustrations, *Brunswick*, 1795, 8vo; and † The Timæus of Plato, a Primitive and Veracious Monument of true Physical Knowledge, translated, with illustrations, by K. J. Windischmann, *Hademar*, 1804.

Mars. Ficini Theologia Platonica, *Florent.* 1482, fol.

Es. Pufendorfii Diss. de Theologiâ Platonis, *Lips.* 1653, 4to.

J. Fried. Wucherer, Diss. II. de Defectibus Theologiæ Platonis, *Jen.* 1706, 4to.

Ogilvie, The Theology of Plato compared with the Principles of Oriental and Grecian Philosophers, *Lond.* 1793, 8vo.

† Diet. Tiedemann, On the Ideas of Plato respecting the Divinity, in the Mem. of the Antiq. Soc. of Cassel, tom. I. (Fr.). Cf. Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. II, p. 114, sqq.

† W. Gl. Tennemann, On the Divine Intelligence: in the Memorabilien of Paulus, fasc. I, p. 2.

Balth. Stolberg, De λόγῳ et νῷ Platonis, *Viteb.* 1676, 4to.

J. Ge. Arn. Oelrich, Commentatio de Doctrinâ Platonis de Deo a Christianis et recentioribus Platonicis varie explicata et corrupta, *Marb.* 1788, 8vo.

C. Fried. Stäudlin, Progr. de Phil. Platonicæ cum Doctrinâ religionis Judaïcâ et Christianâ cognatione, *Gött.* 1819, 4to. (See *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, No. XCV, 1819).

Lud. Hörstel, Platonis doctrina de Deo e Dialogis ejus, etc. *Lips.* 1814, 8vo.

trine of the spirituality of the soul, and the first attempt towards demonstrating its immortality[i].

136. The interesting research which Plato carried so far, respecting the Supreme good[k], belongs to the subject of *Morals*. Virtue he defined to be the imitation of God, or the effort of man to attain to a resemblance to his original (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν[l]); or in other terms a unison and harmony of all our principles and actions according to reason[m], whence results the highest degree of happiness. Virtue is *one*, but compounded of four

On the Matter and Formation of the World, and the Soul of the Universe, according to Plato.

DIETR. TIEDEMANN, De Materiâ quid visum sit Platoni; Nov. Biblioth. Philos. et Crit., vol. I, fascic. 1. *Gött.* 1782.

† CHPH. MEINERS, Considerations on the Greeks, the age of Plato, the Timæus of that Philosopher, and his Hypothesis of a Soul of the World, in vol. I. of his Vermischte Schriften.

AUG. BOECKH, On the Formation of the Soul of the World, according to the Timæus of Plato: in vol. III. of the Studien, published by Daub and Creuzer. (Germ.)

AUG. BOECKH, Progr. de Platonicâ Corporis Mundani fabricâ conflati ex Elementis Geometricâ ratione concinnatis, *Heidelb.* 1809, 4to; and De Platonico Systemate Cælestium Globorum et de Verâ indole Astronomiæ Philolaicæ, *Ibid.* 1810, 4to.

[i] Cf. J. CHPH. GOTTLEBERI Animadvers. ad Platonis Phædonem et Alcibiadem II. Adjuncti sunt excursus in quæstiones Socraticas de Animi Immortalitate, *Lips.* 1771, 8vo; † FRIED. AUG. WOLF, On the Phædo, *Berl.* 1814, 4to; and the following:

SAM. WEICKMANNI Diss. de Platonicâ Animorum Immortalitate, *Viteb.* 1740, 4to.

CHR. ERN. DE WINDHEIM, Examen Argumentorum Platonis pro Immortalitate Animæ Humanæ, *Gött.* 1749, 8vo.

MOSES MENDELSOHN's Phædo, *Berl.* 1767, 8vo.

† W. G. TENNEMANN, Doctrines and Opinions of the Socratic School respecting the Soul's Immortality, *Jena*, 1791, 8vo.

GUST. FRID. WIGGERS, Examen Argumentorum Platonis pro Immortalitate Animi Humani, *Rost.* 1803, 4to.

FRANC. PETTAVEL, De Argumentis, quibus apud Platonem Animorum Immortalitas Defenditur. Disp. Acad., Berol. 1815, 4to.

† The Phædo of Plato Explained and Examined, more especially inasmuch as it treats of the Immortality of the Soul; by KUHNHARDT, *Lubeck*, 1791, 8vo.

[k] Especially in the Theætetus, the Philæbus, the Meno, and the Republic.

[l] Tim., p. 338, vol. IX; Theætet. p. 176.

[m] De Rep. IX, p. 48.

elements: Wisdom (σοφία—φρόνησις); Courage, or Constancy (ανδρεία); Temperance (σωφροσύνη); and Justice (δικαιοσύνη[n]): which are otherwise termed the four cardinal virtues. Such virtues he describes as arising out of an Independence of, and Superiority to, the influence of the senses. In his practical philosophy Plato blended a rigid principle of moral obligation with a spirit of gentleness and humanity; and education he described as a liberal cultivation and moral discipline of the mind[o]. Politics he defined to be the application, on a great scale, of the laws of Morality; (a society being composed of individuals and therefore under similar obligations); and its end to be liberty and concord. In giving a sketch of his Republic, as governed according to reason, Plato had particularly an eye to the character and the political difficulties of the Greeks[p]; connecting at the same time, the discussion of this subject with his metaphysical opinions respecting the soul[q]. Beauty he considered to be the sensible representation of moral and physical perfection[r]: consequently it is one with Truth and Goodness, and

[n] De Rep. IV, 443, sqq.

[o] De Rep. III, p. 310; De Leg. I, p. 46, sqq., II, 59.

[p] De Rep.

[q] Consult the following works on the philosophy of Plato, as bearing upon practical principles:

Chrys. Javelli Dispositio Moralis Philosophiæ Platonicæ, *Ven.* 1536, 4to. Et, Dispositio Philosophiæ Civilis ad Mentem Platonis, *Venet.* 1536, 4to.

Magn. Dan. Omeisii Ethica Platonica, *Altdorf.* 1696, 8vo.

Fr. Aug. Lud. Adolph. Grotefend, Commentatio in quâ Doctrina Platonis Ethica cum Christiana Comparatur, etc., *Götting.* 1720, 4to.

Joh. Sleidani Summa Doctrinæ Platonis de Republicâ et de Legibus, *Argentor.* 1548, 8vo.

J. J, Leibnitii Respublica Platonis, *Leips.* 1776, 4to.

J. Zentgravii Specimen Doctrinæ Juris Naturæ secundum Disciplinam Platonicam, *Argentor.* 1679, 4to.

Car. Morgenstern, De Platonis Republ. Commentt. III., *Hal.* 1794, 8vo.

J. Lud. Guil. de Geer, Diatribe in Politices Platonicæ Principia, *Ultraj.* 1810, 8vo.

† Fr. Köppen, Polity, according to the Principles of Plato, *Leips.* 1818, 8vo.

G. Pinzger De iis, quæ Aristoteles in Platonis Politiâ reprehendit, *Leips.* 1822, 8vo.

[r] De Leg. II, p. 62, sqq., p. 89, sqq.; Sympos. Phædr. Hippias. Maj.

inspires love (ἔρως); which leads to virtue[s]. (Platonic Love.)

137. Plato borrowed considerably from other philosophers, particularly the Pythagoreans; who suggested to him the leading idea that all the variety of existing objects are compounded of a substance and a superinduced form: but what he borrowed his own genius stamped with a character of originality, and blended the discordant systems of older philosophy in an harmonious whole; the striking advantages of which are the Unity it presents in its system of *Ideas;* the combination in one and the same interest of all our motives of action, speculative or practical; the strictness of the union which he maintains between Virtue, Truth, and Beauty: the infinite variety of new ideas of which the germes are to be found in his system; and finally, for the love of science which his meditations inspire. On the other hand his system is not without its weak side: he did not sufficiently distinguish between ideas originating in the mind itself and those which are acquired by experience; and his account of the origin of the ἰδέαι, borders on Mysticism. There are faults also in his *manner:* the union of much imagination with reasoning, of a poetic with a philosophic spirit, and the total absence of any *systematic* form, have rendered his doctrine difficult to be apprehended; gave occasion for abundance of misinterpretations; and ultimately had great influence over the fortunes of Platonism.

138. Plato drew around him a crowd of disciples and admirers; many of them celebrated statesmen, and even several females[t]; among others *Axiothea* of Phlius, and *Lasthenia* of Mantinea. As the doctrines he had blended came subsequently to be redivided; and as succeeding ages produced a succession of different prevailing spirits of philosophy, his school was subdivided into several

[s] Sympos. Phædr., p. 301; Euthyphr., p. 20.
[t] Diog. Laert. III, 46.

sects; and thus gave birth to various *Academies*. To the *first* of these belonged *Speusippus* of Athens (died 339 B. C.), the nephew and successor of Plato [u]; and *his* successor *Xenocrates* of Chalcedon (died 314 B. C.) [x]; who in his manner of expressing himself resembled Pythagoras: for instance, in defining the soul to be *a self-moving number*. After him *Polemo* of Athens [y] presided at the Academy; who considered the *summum bonum* to consist in a life regulated according to nature [z]; and subsequently *Crates* of Athens [a]. Finally *Crantor* of Soli, the friend and disciple of Xenocrates and Polemo, maintained the original system of the founder of the school, with the exception of a small number of alterations, applied principally to the popular doctrines of practical morality [b]. The *new* Academy (see below § 166, sqq.) directed its speculations to prove the uncertainty of human judgment: while the Neo-Platonists founded a school of enthusiasts who laid claim to a high degree of *illumination*.

II. *Aristotle.*

Authorities: The works of Aristotle, and his numerous commentators, whose observations must be admitted with caution; (among others, Ammonius, Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Simplicius, and Themistius); Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Diog. Laert. lib. V., Suidas.

Modern Works on the Life and Philosophy of Aristotle in general.

Franc. Patricii Discussionum Peripateticarum, tom. IV, quibus Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ Universæ Historia atque Dogmata

[u] Diog. Laert. IV, 2, sqq. For some of his opinions, see Arist. Met. VII, 2; XII, 7; Eth. Nic. I, 4. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 145.

[x] Diog. Laert. IV, 6, sqq. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 16, etc.

[y] In 314 B. C.

[z] Diog. Laert. IV, 16, sqq. Cic. De Fin. IV, 6.

[a] About 313 B. C.

[b] *Heraclides of Pontus* the author of some treatises of which we possess certain fragments (ed. Geo. D. Koeler, *Hal.* 1804, 8vo. Cf. Diog. Laert. V, 86, sqq. Cic. Tusc. V, 3; De Div. I, 23, and Suidas, s.h.v.), was the hearer both of Plato and Aristotle; on which account he has by some been called a Peripatetic.

cum veterum placitis collata eleganter et eruditè declarantur, *Basil.* 1581, fol.

MELCH. WEINRICHII Oratio Apologetica pro Aristotelis Personâ adversus Criminationes Patricii, *Lips.* 1614, 4to.

HERM. CONRINGII Aristotelis Laudatio; Orationes duæ, *Helmst.* 1633, 4to.

F. V. L. PLESSING, On Aristotle, in *Cæsar's Denkwürdigkeiten aus der Philos.*, *Welt.* tom. III.

J. GOTTL. BUHLE, Vita Aristotelis per Annos Digesta: in the first vol. of his edition of the Works of Aristotle.

MICH. PICCARTI Isagoge in Lectionem Aristotelis cum Epistolâ Conringianâ et Præmissâ Dissertatione de Naturâ, Origine, et Progressu Philos. Aristotelicæ; ed. J. CONR. DURRIUS, *Altd.* 1667, 8vo.

PETR. JOH. NUNNESII, BARTH. JOS. PASCHASII, et JO. BAPT. MONTORII Oratt. tres. de Aristotelis Doctrinâ, *Francof.* 1591, 8vo.

MICH. PICCARTI Hypotyposis Philos. Aristotelicæ, *Norimb.* 1504, 8vo.

J. CRASSOTII Institutiones in Universam Arist. Philosophiam, *Par.* 1619, 4to.

J. CONR. DURRII Hypotyposis totius Philos. Aristotelicæ, *Altd.* 1660, 4to.

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PETRI RAMI Animadversiones Aristotelicæ XX libris comprehensæ, *Par.* 1558, 8vo.; and his other works quoted farther on.

PETRI GASSENDI Exercitationes Paradoxicæ Adversus Aristotel., etc. *Gratianop.* 1624, 8vo.; and in his Works, *Lugd.*

PETRI VALERIANI Philosophia contra Aristotelem, *Dantisc*, 1653, 4to.

On the other hand see the Works written in Defence of Aristotle, by MART. DORPIUS, P. GALLANDIUS, J. BROSCIUS, J. GUILLEMINAT, H. STABIUS, JOS. DE MUNNANA against VALLA, RAMUS, and others.

PET. VILLEMANDY, Manuductio ad Philosophiæ Aristoteleæ Epicuræ et Cartesianæ parallelismum, *Amst.* 1683, 8vo.

GE. PAUL. ROETENBECCII Disp. de Principio Aristotelico et Cartesiano, *Altd.* 1685, 4to.

SAM. MASCOVII Exerc. Acad. uter in Scrutinio Veritatis Rectius dubitet Aristoteles an Cartesius, *Regiom.* 1704, 4to.

HARRIS (JAMES) of Salisbury, Works (passim), published by his son (Lord Malmsbury), *Lond.* 1801, 2 vols. 4to. Again 1805.

Cf. besides, the articles Aristoteles, Aristotelische Philosophie (by BUHLE), in the great Encyclop. published by ERSCH, etc.; part V.

139. Aristotle was born at Stagira, 384 B. C. Ol. XCIX. He inherited from his father Nicomachus, who had been the physician and friend of Amyntas king of Macedon, a predilection for natural philosophy. From 368 B. C. he continued, for twenty years, the disciple of Plato, improving under that great master his admirable talents for analysis; though, subsequently, he separated from him. In 343 he became the preceptor of Alexander, who assisted his scientific pursuits by sending to him collections of objects of natural history, and furnishing him with sums of money for the purchase of books[c]. He founded in 334 a new school in the *walks* of the Lycæum; whence the name of *Peripatetics*[d]; and died in 322[e] at Chalcis in Eubœa; probably by poison which he had taken, on being obliged to leave Athens, under the suspicion of atheism. Aristotle has bequeathed to us excellent works on all the sciences known to the Greeks, and particularly on Moral philosophy. These treatises are to be divided into exoteric and esoteric, or acroamatic[f]. The peculiar fortunes to which his works have been exposed[g], have rendered still more difficult the examination and exposition of his doctrines, already sufficiently obscure, by their brevity and the peculiarity of the language he employed[h].

[c] Plin. Hist. Nat. VIII, 16.

[d] Diog. Laert. V, 2. Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 4. A. Gell. N. A. XX, 5.

[e] Ol. CXIV.—CXIII.

[f] J. Gotthl. Buhle, Commentatio de Librorum Aristotelis distributione in Exotericos et Acroamaticos, *Gött.* 1788, 8vo.; and in the first vol. of his edition of Arist.

Franc. Nic. Titze, De Aristotelis Operum serie et distinctione liber, *Lips.* 1826, 8vo.

[g] See Strab. Geo. lib. IX, et Plut. in Vit. Syllæ, c. 26. Heyne, Opusc. Acad., vol. I, p. 126, et Schneider, Epimetrum de Fatis Libror. Aristotelicorum, in his edition of Arist. Hist. of Anim. *Lips.* 1811, p. 76. See also Brandis in the Rhein. Museum, I. Jahrg, Nos. III and IV, *Bonn*, 1827.

[h] Petr. Joh. Nunnesius, De Causis Obscuritatis Aristotelis earumque remediis, unà cum Vitâ Aristotelis a Joh. Philopono descripta, etc. *Lugd. Bat.* 1621.

† Füllborn (Collect. fasc. IX.). On the Manner and Philosophy of Aristotle.

140. Aristotle possessed in a high degree the talents of discrimination and analysis, added to the most astonishing knowledge of books, and the works of nature. To the latter, more especially, he had devoted himself. He rejected the doctrine of ideas[i]; maintaining that all our impressions and thoughts, and even the highest efforts of the understanding, are the fruit of experience[k]; that the world is eternal, even in its *form*, and not the work of a creative providence. In the theory of composition he drew a distinction between the *matter*, which he referred to philosophy, and the *form*, which he derived from poetry. Instead of following his master in his way of reasoning from the universal to the particular, he always takes the opposite course, and infers the first from the latter. His writings contain valuable remarks on the systems of his predecessors; his *own* being that of Empiricism, modified, in a slight degree, by the Rationalism of Plato[l].

141. Philosophy, according to Aristotle, is science arising out of the love of knowledge; or knowledge according to certain principles[m]. There are two sorts of knowledge, mediate and immediate[n]. In order to make the first possible, the existence of the second is necessary. We become sensible *immediately* and by experience of *particulars* (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα): *mediately*, but still by experience, we acquire the *universal* (τὰ καθ' ὅλου), and we thus

[i] Metaph. I, 7; XII, 9.

[k] Analyt. Prior. I, 30.

[l] Here may be noticed the comparisons drawn between the two philosophers, by GEORGE of *Trebizond*, and G. GEMISTHUS PLETHO.

And also: PAGANINUS GAUDENTIUS, De Dogmatum Aristotelis cum Phil. Platonis comparatione, *Florent.* 1539, 4to.

JAC. MAZONIUS, De Comparatione Aristot. cum Platone, *Venet.* 1547, fol.

JAC. CARPENTARII Platonis cum Arist. in Universâ Philosophiâ comparatio, *Par.* 1573, 4to.

ANDR. BACHMANN, Aristoteles cum Platone comparatus, *Nordh.* 1629, 4to.

RAPIN, Aristotle and Plato compared, *Paris*, 1671, 8vo. (French).

CHR. HERRMANN WEISSE, De Platonis et Aristotelis in constituendis principiis differentia, Commentat. *Lips.* 1828, 8vo.

[m] Phys. II, 3; Met. I, 2.

[n] Anal. Post. I, 2; II, c. 19.

attain to that which is *real* and *necessary*, and is capable of being expressed in definitions and axioms. From *immediate* knowledge we deduce *mediate*, by means of arguments, the theory of which belongs to logic; the object of which is to show how we can ascertain by reasoning the certainty or the probability of things. Logic therefore is the instrument *(organum)* of all science or philosophy, but only *quoad formam;* (a distinction which was afterwards very often forgotten); for it is experience which must supply the matter to be worked upon, and wrought into general principles[o]. The first principle is that of contradiction; but, though productive of truth, it is the *test* and not the *constituent element* of truth[p]. By his works comprehended under the title of *Organum*, Aristotle has, next to Plato, rendered the greatest service to logic[q]; as the science which would establish the *formal* part of reasoning, and elucidate its theory: he there considers propositions and ideas as the elements of reasoning[r], with admirable remarks on language interspersed; and he ought not to be made responsible for the abuse, which afterwards prevailed, of this art, when it came to be considered as capable of supplying not only the *form* but the *matter* of argumentation.

142. Aristotle, above every other philosopher, enlarged the limits of philosophy. He comprised therein all the sciences (rational, empirical, or mixed), with the single exception of history: and appears to have divided it as a whole into Logic, Physics, and Ethics; or into speculative

[o] Anal. Post. I, 18.

[p] Anal. Post. Metaph. I, 1; 1V, 3; De Animâ, III, 5, 6.

[q] Mich. Pselli Synopsis Logicæ Aristotelis Gr. et Lat. ed. El. Ehinger, *Aug. Vind.* 1597, 8vo.

Niceph. Blemmydæ, Epitome Logicæ Doctrinæ Aristotelis Gr. et Lat. ed. Jo. Wegelin, *ibid.* 1605, fol.

Geo. Aneponymi Compendium Philosophiæ seu Organi Aristotelis Gr. et Lat. ed. Jo. Wegelin, *ibid.* 1600, 8vo.

Jac. Carpentarii Descriptio Universæ Artis disserendi ex Arist. Organo collecta et in III. libros distincta, *Par.* 1654, 4to.

Car. Weinholtz, De Finibus atque pretio Logicæ Aristotelis, *Rost.* 1824.

[r] Sophist. Elench. 34, fin.

and practical[s]. *Speculative* philosophy contemplates the *real* order of things; which is not dependent on our will: *practical*, the accidental and voluntary; real substances are either invariable (ἀκίνητα), or variable (κίνητα). The latter either perishable (φθαρτά), or imperishable. Sublunary things are variable and perishable: the heavens are imperishable, but variable: the Deity alone is imperishable and invariable. Consequently, speculative philosophy becomes, in proportion as it advances in abstraction, either Physics, or Mathematics, or what came to be afterwards called Metaphysics: relatively to *its objects*, it is divided into Physics, Cosmology, Psychology, and Theology. Practical philosophy comprehends Ethics, Politics, and Economy[t]. These subdivisions are not broadly traced, on defined principles, yet it is to Aristotle that we are indebted for the first hint of an encyclopædic system of the sciences; for having subjected to a rigorous examination the notions and principles of his predecessors; for having himself laboured to establish others by induction and reflection: and we are called upon to admire the multitude of hints, inquiries, and observations, which are dispersed up and down his works, without forming integral parts of his system.

§ 143.

JAC. CARPENTARII Descriptio Universæ Naturæ ex Aristotele; pars I et II. *Par.* 1562, 4to.

PET. RAMI Scholarum Physicarum, libri VIII. *Par.* 1565, 8vo.

SEBASTIANI BASSONIS Philosophiæ Naturalis Adversus Aristotelem libri XII, *Par.* 1621, 8vo.

Speculative philosophy. Ist. *Physics* or *Natural Philosophy*. Nature (φύσις), is the *sum* of all existing things, whose existence can be known only by means of perception and experience founded thereon. Τὰ νοητά,

[s] DIOG. LAERT. V, 28.

GE. PAUL. ROETENBECK, Diss. Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ divisionem sub examen vocans, *Altd.* 1705, 4to.

[t] Metaph. I, 2; VI, 1; XI, 3; Ethic. X, 9; Œcon. I, 1.

the objects of our mental conception, do not exist *per se*[u]. Nature is also the *internal* principle of change in objects, and this constitutes a distinction between her works and those of art. The knowledge of nature is properly the knowledge of the laws of bodies, so far as they are in movement. In this science are comprised the following subjects of discussion: Nature, Cause, Accident, End, Change (and its subdivisions), Infinitude, Space, and Time: and moreover a general theory of movement. Nature, as a principle of change, does nothing without an end or object; which end is *the Form*[x]. When we speak of chance (τὸ αὐτόματον), we always in fact mean real causes, unknown to ourselves. All change necessarily presupposes a subject-matter (ὑποκείμενον, ὕλη): and a form (εἶδος). A change (κίνησις, μεταβολή), is the realization of that which is possible (ἐντελεχεία)[y], so far as it is possible, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελεχεία ᾗ τοιούτου[z]. As soon as the Possible (δυνάμει ὄν) assumes a certain form and is developed after a particular manner, every other condition and state is excluded (στέρησις). Matter, Form, and Privation, are therefore the three principles, or elements of existence and of change. Change is possible in respect of Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Place. This last condition, and *generally* that of space and time, serve as a foundation for the others[a]. Place (τόπος), is the first immoveable limit of that which surrounds us: (τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον)[b]; there is no vacuum (κενόν). Time is the measure or numeration (ἀριθμός), of movement, with reference to priority and posteriority (ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον[c]. Infinitude is that which continually

[u] Metaph. III, 2—4; V, 5.

[x] Phys. II, 4—6, 8, sqq.

[y] Cf. SUIDAS, sub hâc v. Cf. also FATHER ANCILLON, Critical and Philosophical Researches respecting the Entelechia of Aristotle, in the Mem. of the Royal Acad. of Prussia (Class of Phil.), for the years 1804—11, *Berl.* 1816, p. 1, sqq. (Fr.).

[z] Phys. III, 1; VIII, 1.

[a] Ibid. III, 1; VII, 7; VIII, 7.

[b] Ibid. IV, 4, sqq.

[c] Ibid. IV, 11.

suggests the idea of still greater extent, in addition to that already ascertained. In reality there is no being which can be called Infinite; only in our conception. Time is infinite, Body and Space are finite, although susceptible of infinite division[d]. Motion in general, like time, has neither beginning nor end. Nevertheless it must be supposed to have a first cause of movement, itself unmoved (*τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*). This source of movement must be eternal and invariable; its essence is eternal and pure, activity and life: such a cause is the Divinity. The first thing put in motion from eternity was the Heavens [e].

144. *Cosmology.* The world (*κόσμος, οὐρανός*), is the sum total of all things subject to change. Beyond its limits is neither change, nor time, nor space. Itself is eternal and immoveable[f]. The First Being, who is the author of all movement, is not himself a part of the world. The latter is a whole, bounded by the heavens, without beginning or end, and of a spherical form. The earth is the central point, the heavens the circumference. Hence arise three simple movements; towards the centre (the gravitation of bodies towards the earth); from the centre to the circumference (light bodies, for instance, fire); and finally *about* that centre (the circumambient bodies, the heavens, etc.). The circular motion is the most perfect, and the upper region of the heavens in which it prevails is perfect and divine; indestructible, not subject to suffering or change; and consequently of a nobler nature than sublunary parts. The elementary matter of the constellations is the principle of all life, action, and thought in the inferior region; and all things here are subject to its influence and direction. The constellations are animated beings (*ἔμψυχα*); their principle of motion is within themselves, although they revolve in the circle to which they

[d] Phys. III, 1—7; VI, 1—9.
[e] Ibid. VIII, 5, sqq.; De Cœlo, II, 3, sqq.
[f] De Cœlo, I, 12.

are attached. In general, this part of Aristotle's system is obscure and inconsistent, and appears to waver between two opposite doctrines[g].

145. *Physiology* is indebted to Aristotle for its first cultivation; for an essay, imperfect indeed, but built upon experiment associated with theory. The soul he pronounced to be exclusively the active principle of Life; the primitive form of every body capable of life, i. e. *organized;* (ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελεχεία ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ζωὴν ἔχοντος δυνάμει[h]). The soul is distinct from the body: but considered as its form (εἶδος or ἐντελεχεία), it is inseparable therefrom[i]. The faculties (δυνάμεις), of the soul are: Production, and Nutrition[k], Sensation[l], Thought (τὸ διανοητικόν), and Will or Impulse. Notwithstanding, Aristotle maintains the unity of these faculties in one soul, and rejects the notion of a plurality of souls. His remarks on the characteristics of our means of knowledge, that is the senses, are deserving of particular attention[m]; as well as his observations on the Common Sense, (κοινὴ αἴσθησις); and on Consciousness (the existence of which he was the first distinctly to recognise[n]); on Imagination (φαντασία), Memory (μνήμη[o]); and Recollection (ἀνάμνησις.) Perception is the faculty which conveys to us the forms of objects: Thought is the perception of forms or ideas by means of ideas; which presupposes the exercise of Sensation and Imagination[p]. Hence a passive (παθητικός), and an active Intelligence (ποιητικὸς νοῦς). The last is imperish-

[g] De Cœlo, I, 6—12; II, 1, 2, 3, 4; De Gener. et Corrupt. II, 10; De Gener. Animal. II, 3; III, 11; Meteorol. I, 1; Metaph. XII. 8; Phys. VIII, 2, 3, 5.

[h] De An. II, 1.

[i] Ibid. I, 1—4.

To this subject belong the Commentaries on the works of Aristotle which treat of the soul, etc.

[k] De An. II, 2, 4; De Gener. Anim. II, 3.

[l] Ibid. II, 5, 6, 12; III, 12.

[m] Ibid. II, 6; III, 12, sqq.; De Sensu et Sensibili.

[n] Ibid. III, 1, sqq.

[o] Ibid. III, 3, et De Memoriâ.

[p] Ibid. III, 4.

able (Immortality independent of Conscience or Memory[q]). The thinking faculty is an energy distinct from the body, derived from without[r], resembling the elementary matter of the stars[s]. The understanding becomes Theoretical or Practical, according to its application, and, together with the Will, determines our actions. The Will (ὄρεξις), is an impulse directed towards matters of practice, that is to say, toward Good; which is real or apparent, acing as it procures a durable or a transient enjoyment[t]: ὄρεξις is subdivided into βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία; the *Will*, properly so called, and *Desire*. Enjoyment is the result of the complete development of an energy: which at the same time perfects that energy. The most noble of all enjoyments is the result of Reason[u].

§ 146.

† J. G. Buhle, On the Authenticity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle: in the Biblioth. of Ancient Arts and Literature, fasc. IV. See also his Compend. of the Hist. of Phil. II, § 331, sqq.

† Fülleborn, On the Metaphysics of Aristotle: in his Collect. fascic. V.

Petri Rami Scholarum Metaphysicarum lib. XIV. *Par.* 1566, 8vo.

Primary philosophy, treating of the nature of Being in the abstract, was an attempt of Aristotle's, the first which had been made, in the science since denominated Metaphysics. It was reasonable to expect that this attempt should be as yet an imperfect one. It contains an analytical statement of what he denominated the Categories (ten in number[x]), a title under which he comprised

[q] De An. II, 1—6; III, 2, sqq., 5.

[r] De Gen. Animal. II, 3.

[s] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 7.

[t] De An. III, 9—11; Eth. III, VI.

[u] Ethic. X, 4, 5, 8.

[x] The ten Categories, or *prædicamenta* of Aristotle, are: ἡ οὐσία, τὸ ποσόν, τὸ ποιόν, πρός τι, ποῦ, ποτέ, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν, Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Possession, Action, Passion. Aristotle distinguishes between these and the Categoremata, or *Prædicabilia*,

and elucidated without much systematic order, the leading characteristics of Being, as apprehended by the Understanding and the Senses[y]. With this arrangement he connected the question of the First Being, and His properties (theology[z]). God, the absolute cause of regular movement[a], is the perfection of Intelligence (νοῦς), to whom appertains, of his own nature, pure and independent Energy, and the most complete Felicity[b]: He is immutable, and the end of all Nature[c].

147. *Practical philosophy*, by the profound analysis of Aristotle, became a moral theory of happiness, on Empirical principles. The fundamental point was the idea of a sovereign good and final end. The final End (τέλος), is happiness (εὐδαιμονία, εὐπραξία), which is the result of the energies of the soul, ἐν βίῳ τελειῳ, in a perfect life[d]: such happiness being the highest of which our nature is capable. This perfect exercise of reason is virtue; and virtue is the perfection of speculative and practical reason: hence the subdivision of Intellectual virtue (διανοητικὴ ἀρετή), and moral (ἠθικὴ[e]). The first, in its per-

which have reference to the former, and are five in number: Ὅρος, γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά, ἴδιον καὶ συμβεβηκός (Top. I, 6.)

See Harris's Philos. Arrangements, *Edin. and Lond.* 1775, 8vo.

Cf. the Categories of Aristotle, with illustrations, offered as an introduction to a new theory of Thought, by Sal. Maimon, *Berl.* 1794, 8vo. On the authenticity of the treatise on the Categories: Krug, Observationes Crit. et Exeget. in Aristotelis librum de Categoriis, part I, *Lips.* 1809, 4to.

[y] Metaph. V, 7. Cf. Categor., II, ed. Buhle.

[z] Besides the old treatises on the Theology of Aristotle, by J. Faustus, Hier. Caprædonus, Fortunius Licetus, and the treatises of Valerianus Magnus and Zachar. Grapius on the Atheism of Aristotle, consult:

Joh. G. Walch, Exercitatio Histor. Philosophica de Atheismo Aristotelis. Parerga Academica, *Lips.* 1721, 8vo.

Joh. Sev. Vater, Theologiæ Aristotelicæ Vindiciæ, *Lips.* 1795, 8vo.

† Fülleborn, in his Collect., fasc. III, on the Nat. Theol. of Aristotle.

[a] Cf. § 143—144.

[b] Pol. VII, 1.

[c] Metaph. I, 1; XII, 7, sqq.; De Cœlo, II, 3, sqq.; De Gener. et Corrupt. I, 6.

[d] Eth. Nic. I, 1—7; X, 5, 6.

[e] Idem, I, 13; II, 1.

fection, belongs to God only, and confers the highest degree of felicity; the second, adapted to human nature, is the perfection of reasonable will (ἕξις, *habitus*), the effect of a rational deliberation (προαιρετική *), of which the principle is constantly to take the mean between two extremes (τὸ μήσον, μεσότης [f]). Moral virtue presents itself under seven principal characters, having reference to the different objects of desire or avoidance; (the cardinal virtues). To these are added certain virtues of a mixed character; and Justice, which in its most extensive signification may be said to embrace all the virtues. Under the head of Justice Aristotle comprehends Right also [g]. Justice consists in rendering to each his due, and its operation may be explained by applying to it the Arithmetical and Geometrical proportions conformably to the two species, the *Distributive* and *Corrective*, into which he subdivided the virtue. To these must be added Equity, which has for its end the rectification of the defects of law [h]. Under the head of Right (δίκαιον), he distinguishes that appertaining to a family (οἰκονομικόν), from that of a city (πολιτικόν); dividing the latter into the natural (φυσικόν), and the positive (νομικόν).

Aristotelis Ethicorum Nicomacheorum adumbratio accommodatè ad nostræ Philosophiæ rationem facta, Disp. Jo. Fr. Gottl. Delbrück, *Hal.* 1790, 8vo.

† The Ethics of Aristotle, translated and illustrated by Chr. Garve, *Bresl.* 1798—1802, 2 vols. 8vo.

Aristotle's Ethics and Politics comprising his Practical Philosophy, translated from the Greek, illustrated by Introductions and Notes, the Critical History of his Life, and a new Analysis of this Speculative Works, by J. Gillies, *Lond.* 1797, 2 vols. 4to.

† K. L. Michelet, On the Ethics of Aristotle, *Berl.* 1827, 8vo.

* Aristotle may be said to have been the first to analyse προαίρεσις, or deliberate free-choice.

[f] Eth. Nic. II, 6.

[g] Idem, V, 1, 6, sqq.

[h] C. A. Droste-Huelshoff, De Aristotelis Justitia Universali et Particulari, deque nexu, quo Ethica et Jurisprudentia junctæ sunt, *Bonn*, 1816, 8vo.

148. A perfect unity of plan prevails throughout his Morals, his Politics, and his Œconomics. Both the latter have for their end to show how the object of man's existence defined in the Ethics, viz. Virtue combined with Happiness, may be attained in the civil and domestic relations, through a good constitution of the state and household [i]. The state (πόλις), is a complete association of a certain number of smaller societies sufficient to provide in common all the necessities of life [k]. Intellectual influence alone should preponderate. The science of Politics is the investigation of means tending to the final end just mentioned: its principle is expediency, and its perfection the suitableness of means to the end. By this principle Aristotle would prove the lawfulness of slavery [l]; (Pol. I, 5). All education he refers to the ultimate end of political society.

149. Aristotle also rendered great services to philosophy by his investigations with regard to the elements of language; particularly in his treatise περὶ ἑρμηνείας: and by the first profound examination instituted of the principles of the fine arts [m]; the theory of which, agreeably to his system, he deduced from the imitation of Nature.

150. The first successors of Aristotle were, for the most part, skilful commentators on his doctrines, who endeavoured in publications under similar titles to restate more clearly what he had first advanced: the effect of which was that his system gradually withdrew farther and farther from that of Plato, and proportionably ap-

[i] Ethic. VIII, 9; X, 9.—See the translations of the Politics and Œconomics, by Schlosser, *Lubeck and Leips.* 1798, 2 vols. and that of the Politics by Garve, with Remarks and Dissertations by Fülleborn, *Bresl.* 1799, 1802, 2 vols. 8vo. Also: Aristotelis Rerum Public. relliq. coll. illustr. etc. C. Fr. Neumann, *Heidelb. et Spir.* 1827, 8vo.

[k] Pol. I, 2.

[l] W. T. Krug, De Aristotele Servitutis Defensore, *Lips.* 1813, 4to.

C. G. Goettling, Commentatio de Notione Servitutis apud Aristotelem, *Jen.* 1821, 4to.

[m] To this head belong the Rhetoric and Poetics of Aristotle.

proached the limits of Materialism. The most distinguished of his immediate followers were *Theophrastus* of Eressus[n]; whom Aristotle himself had characterised as the most learned and the ablest of his auditors, and the most proper to be his successor and heir[o]: *Eudemus* of Rhodes, who, as well as Theophrastus, republished with very few alterations Aristotle's doctrines in Physics, Logic, and Ethics: *Dicæarchus* of Messana[p], and *Aristoxenus* of Tarentum, the musician; both materialists in their opinions on psychology: the first considering the soul to be a vital energy, inherent in the body[q]: the latter believing it to be a symphony or harmony resulting from the body, analogous to those elicited from the chords of an instrument[r]. *Heraclides Ponticus* has been already mentioned (§ 138). Subsequently, we have occasion to remark, among the disciples of Aristotle, the follower and successor of Theophrastus[s] *Strato* of Lampsacus; who died about 270 B. C., and published, with more of original character about it, a system of Physics[t], in which he referred the existence of all things to the productive energy of nature, acting unconsciously; which caused him to be considered by many an atheist[u]. We

[n] Formerly called Tyrtamos.

[o] DIOG. LAERT. V, 36, sqq. A. GELL. Noct. Att. XIII, 5.

Of his numerous works the only one which has come down to us, besides his treatises on Natural History, is his book of Characters (*ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες*), and some fragments. Opera Gr. et Lat. ed. DAN. HEINSIUS, *Lugd. Bat.* 1613, 2 vols. fol. See also the work of HILL, mentioned in the following section.

[p] Flourished about 320 B. C.

[q] NIC. DODWELL, De Dicæarcho ejusque Fragmentis. Cf. BREDOW, Epp. *Paris.* p. 4, et alibi. et BAYLE, Dict.

[r] G. L. MAHNE, Diatr. de Aristoxeno Philos. Peripatetico, *Amstel.* 1793, 8vo.

[s] CIC. Tusc. Quæst. I, 10, 31.

[t] Hence he was surnamed *Physicus*.

[u] DIOG. LAERT. V, 58. CIC. Acad. Quæst. IV, 38; De Nat. Deor. I, 13. SEXT. EMP. Hyp. Pyrrh. III, 32, 136, sqq.; Adv. Math. VII, 350; X, 155, 177, 228. SIMPLIC. In Phys. p. 168 et 225. LACTANT. De Ira Dei, 10. PLUTARCH. Adv. Coloten. p. 163; De Plac. IV, 5; De Solert. Anim. p. 141. STOB. Ecl. p. 298—348.

PHIL. FRID. SCHLOSSER, De Stratone Lampsaceno et Atheismo vulgo e tributo, *Viteb.* 1728, 4to.

have fewer details with regard to *Demetrius Phalereus*[x], a follower of Theophrastus: as an orator and statesman he was sufficiently distinguished. As for those who came after, *Lyco* or *Glyco*, of Troas, the successor of Strato[y], (about 270 or 268 B. C.), *Hieronymus* of Rhodes his contemporary[z], *Aristo* of Ceos, the successor of Lyco[a], *Critolaus* of Phaselis, who went to Rome as ambassador at the same time with Carneades[b], and his pupil and successor *Diodorus* of Tyre—all we know of these Aristotelians is that they devoted their especial attention to the investigation of the supreme good[c]. After them, we are ignorant even of the names of the masters of the Peripatetic school, till the time of Andronicus (see § 183).

The system of Aristotle for a long time maintained its ground as distinct from that of Plato: subsequently, attempts were made to associate them, as identical; or by giving the superiority to one or other. In the Middle ages that of Aristotle, degraded to a system of formularies, became universally prevalent; till in the end it yielded to Platonism: not, however, without continuing to retain great influence, from the general adoption of its Logic[d].

III. *Epicurus.*

Authorities: Epicuri Physica et Meteorologica duabus Epistolis ejusdem comprehensa, ed. Jo. Glob. Schneider, *Lips.* 1813, 8vo.

Epicuri Fragmenta librorum II et XI, De Naturâ, etc., illustrata a Rosinio ed. Orellius, *Lips.* 1818, 8vo.

Brucker, Diss. de Atheismo Stratonis; Amœnitates Litterariæ of Schellhorn, tom. XIII.

[x] Flourished 320 B. C.

[y] Diog. Laert. V, 65, sqq.

[z] Idem, IV, 41, sqq. 68.

[a] Idem, V. 70—74.

[b] 155 B. C.

[c] Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 42; De Fin. II, 3; V, 5.

[d] J. Launoy, De Variâ Philosophiæ Aristotelicæ Fortunâ, *Paris,* 1653, third edition, *Hagæ Comit.* 1662, 8vo. Recudi curavit Joh. Herm. ab Elswich, *Viteb.* 1720, 8vo.

G. Paul Roetenbeck, Oratio de Philosophiæ Aristotelicæ per singulas ætates Fortunâ Variâ, *Altd.* 1668, 4to.

DIOGENIS LAERTII De Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmatibus clarorum Philosophorum lib. X, Gr. et Lat. separatim editus, atque Adnotationibus illustratus a CAR. NÜRNBERGER, *Norimb.* 1791, 8vo.

Cf. also the Didactic Poem of LUCRETIUS de Rerum Naturâ: and likewise CICERO, SENECA, PLUTARCH.

PETRI GASSENDI Animadversiones in Diogenem Laert. de Vitâ et Philosophiâ Epicuri, *Lugd. Bat.* 1649, fol.

Ejusdem de Vitâ, Moribus et Doctrinâ Epicuri, libb. VIII, *Lugd.* 1647, 4to. *Hagæ Comit.* 1656, 4to.

† SAM. DE SORBIERE, Letters on the Life, Character, and Reputation of Epicurus, with Remarks on his Errors (among his Letters and Discourses), *Paris*, 1660, 4to.

† J. RONDEL, Life of Epicurus, *Par.* 1679, 8vo. transl. into Lat. *Amst.* 1693, 12mo.

† Essay towards an Apology for Epicurus, by an Opponent of Batteux (J. G. BREMER), *Berl.* 1776, 8vo.

FR. ANT. ZIMMERMANN (RESP. ZEHNER), Vita et Doctrina Epicuri Dissertatione Inaugur. Examinata, *Heidelb.* 1785, 4to.

† H. E. WARNEKROS, Apology for, and Life of, Epicurus, *Greifsw.* 1795, 8vo.

NIC. HILL, De Philosophiâ Epicureâ, Democriteâ, et Theophrasteâ, *Genev.* 1669, 8vo.

PETRI GASSENDI Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri, *Hag. Com.* 1655 et 1659, 4to. and in his Opp.

151. *Epicurus*[e] of the *demus* of Gargettos, near Athens, was born of poor parents. His father, who had settled at Samos, gained his livelihood as a schoolmaster, and his mother by divining. The constitution of Epicurus was feeble, and his education imperfect, but his talents were superior. A verse of Hesiod, and the works of Demosthenes awakened in him, while yet young, a spirit of inquiry. Soon after, he attended at Athens, but in a desultory manner, the lessons of Xenocrates the Academician, Theophrastus, and others. In his thirty-second year he opened a school at Lampsacus, which, five years after, he removed to Athens[f]; where he taught, in his garden, a system of philosophy which readily recommended itself by the indulgence it held out to sensual

[e] Born 337, died 270.

[f] DIOG. LAERT. X. 15.

habits, combined with a taste for the refinements of social life, an abhorrence of superstition, and a tone of elegance and urbanity which blended with all his doctrines. He may be justly reproached with depreciating the works of other philosophers. Of his numerous writings [g] we possess only a few fragments cited by Diogenes Laertius, and the book περὶ φύσεως, which by a fortunate chance was discovered among the ruins of Herculaneum.

152. According to him, philosophy directs us to happiness by the means of reason [h]. Consequently, Ethics form a principal part of his system, and Physics, etc. are only accessories. He assigns the same inferior place to what he terms *Canonics*, the Dialectics of his system [i]. There is little originality in this theory of happiness; and the form alone in which it is put belongs to Epicurus. The theory is in fact nothing more than one of Eudæmonism, with a sprinkling of moral sentences, built upon an Atomic system by way of Physics; with a theology suitable to such a whole: a system which if rigorously pursued through all its consequences, could not fail of leading to immorality.

153. Epicurus borrowed from Democritus his theory of certain subtile emanations of objects (ἀπόῤῥοιαι, ἀποστάσεις), which he supposes to detach themselves therefrom, and so disperse themselves through the air (§ 105). These, impressing the senses, produce on them corresponding images, and these again create the *mental* conceptions of the same; less perfectly representing the original objects. It is from the senses that we derive all our ideas, even those which are *universal*, and of which there existed previously what he termed προλήψεις [k]; the

[g] Diog. Laert. X, 17.

[h] Sextus Emp. Adv. Mathem. XI, 169.

[i] Senec. Ep. 89. Diog. Laert. X, 24—31.

[k] Joh. Mich. Kern, Diss. Epicuri Prolepses, seu Anticipationes, Sensibus demum administris haustæ, non vero menti innatæ, in locum Cic. de Nat. Deor. I, 16, *Gott.* 1756, 4to.

Taconis Roorda, Disp. de Anticipatione cum omni, tum inprimis Dei,

understanding *contributing* however to their formation[l]. Every perception of the senses and imagination is true, because necessarily responding to the images impressed upon them, and the results are neither capable of being demonstrated nor refuted (ἐναργὴς, ἄλογος). Our opinions, on the other hand (δόξαι), are either true or false, according as they respond or not to our *sensible* impressions; wherefore these are always to be referred to as their *criteria*. Our sensations (πάθη), are our criteria with respect to what we ought to desire or to avoid (αἵρεσις and φυγή). There is no law of necessity for thought; or a Fatalism would be the consequence. Such are the principles of his Canonics[m].

§ 154.

† The Morals of Epicurus, with Remarks, by M. the Baron DES COUTURES, *Par.* 1685. † With additions by RONDEL, *the Hague*, 1686, 12mo.

† The Morals of Epicurus, drawn from his own writings, by the ABBE BATTEUX, *Par.* 1758, 8vo.

MAGNI OMEISII Diss. Epicurus ab Infami Dogmate, quod Summum Bonum consistat in Obscœnâ Corporis Voluptate, Defensus, *Altd.* 1679, 4to.

† Investigation respecting the Partial and Exclusive Opinions of the Stoic School, and that of Epicurus, with respect to the Theory of Happiness (by E. PLATNER); in the *Neue Biblioth. der Schœnen Wissenschaften*, XIX. B.

Morals. Pleasure is the sovereign good of man; for all beings from their birth pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure consists in the activity or the repose of the soul; in the enjoyment of agreeable sensations, and the absence of those which are painful (ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει, and ἡδονὴ καταστηματική). Epicurus regarded this well-being as the end of man's existence; and pronounced the *sum-*

atque Epicureorum et Stoicorum de Anticipationibus Doctrina, *Lugd. Bat.* 1823-4.

[l] DIOG. LAERT. X, 31, sqq. 46, sqq. 52. LUCRET. IV, particularly vv. 471—476. 726—753. CIC. Divin. II, 67.

[m] DIOG. LAERT. X, 32. SEXT. Adv. Math. VII, 203, sqq. CIC. Acad. Quæst. IV, 25. 32; Nat. Deor. I, 25; De Fato, 9, 10.

mum bonum to be a state exempt from suffering, the result of the satisfaction of all our necessary, and natural desires [n]. All our sensations, in themselves are equal in worth and dignity, but differ greatly in intensity, duration, and their consequences. The pleasures and the pains of the mind exceed those of the body. To attain happiness, therefore, it is necessary to make a choice (αἵρεσις); and to rule our desires by the help of reason and free-will, or individual energy independent of nature, which Epicurus explains in a manner not the most philosophical [o]. Consequently Prudence (φρόνησις), is the first of virtues: next to that Moderation and Justice. Virtue in general has no value or worth but for the consequences which attend her; namely, that she is inseparably allied to enjoyment [p]. *Contracts* are the origin of Right: their end is the mutual advantage of the contracting parties, and expediency the principle which makes their performance obligatory [q]. Occasionally Epicurus took higher ground [r]; with the same inconsistency which compelled his adversaries to praise the *life* he led; so much at variance with the spirit of his precepts [s].

Observation. A difference is to be observed between the system of happiness adopted by the Cyrenaics and that of Epicurus; who appears to have made his more perfect, in proportion as he became gradually more alive to the deficiencies of the former. See Diog. Laert. X, 6, 131, 137. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. III, 18; Fin. I, 17.

§ 155.

Gualt. Charleton, Physiologia Epicureo-Gassendo-Charletoniana, etc. *Lond.* 1654, fol.

Gottfrid. Ploucquet, Diss. de Cosmogoniâ Epicuri, *Tub.* 1755, 4to.

† Restaurant, Agreement between the Opinions of Aris-

[n] Diog. Laert. X, 131. 136, 137. 139. Cic. Fin. I, 9. 11.
[o] Diog. Laert. X, 144. Cic. Nat. Deor. I, 25.
[p] Diog. Laert. X, 129. 140. 142.
[q] Idem, X, 150, 151.
[r] Idem, X, 135. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. II, 7.
[s] Cic. Tusc. Quæst. III, 20. Senec. De Vitâ Beatâ. 13.

totle and Epicurus on Philosophy, *Lugd. Bat.* 1682, 12mo. (French).

Physics. He considered the science of Physics as subordinate, in some sort, to that of Morals; and that its proper end was to liberate mankind from all superstitious terror derived from their conceptions of the celestial phenomena, the Gods, Death, and its consequences; i. e. from vain apprehensions affecting the living[t]. With these views, Epicurus found nothing which suited him better than the Atomic theory, which he enlarged by adding a great number of hypotheses, and applied to explain different natural phenomena. If we admit the objects presented to our senses to be compound in their nature, we are led to presume the existence of simple uncompounded bodies, or Atoms. Besides weight, form, and volume, and that which he considered to be the primitive movement common to all, viz. a perpendicular, he assigned to them also an oblique motion[u], without adding any proof. The various mechanical movements of Atoms *in vacuo* (τὸ κενὸν), or space (τόπος), have produced *aggregates*, or bodies, and even the universe itself; which is a body, and which, considered as a whole, is immutable and eternal, though variable and perishable in respect of the parts, or worlds, of which it is composed[x]. The world being imperfect and presenting nothing but scenes of misery, destruction, and death (imperfections especially observable in Man), cannot be considered the work of an Intelligent Cause. Besides, such an origin is irreconcileable with the tranquil and happy lot of the Gods[y]. All the appearances of final causes which are observable in the world are purely fortuitous[z]. The soul is of a corporeal nature, as is attested by its sympathy with the body: but at the same time of a nature more

[t] DIOG. LAERT. X, 81, sqq.; 142, sqq. LUCRET. I, 147. PLUTARCH. Non posse suavitèr Vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 8, 9.

[u] LUCRET. II, 217. CIC. Fin. I, 6.

[x] DIOG. LAERT. X, 39, 43, sqq., 73, sqq. LUCRET. II, 61, sqq.

[y] DIOG. LAERT. X, 139. 76, 77. LUCRET. V, 157. 235; III, 855. 984. CIC. De Nat. Deor. I, 9—16.

[z] LUCRET. IV, 821.

refined, involved in one less perfect. Its elemental principles are heat, the ether spirit, and an anonymous matter on which depends its sensibility: this last is situated in the breast, the others dispersed over the body[a]. The soul and the body are united in the most intimate manner; the latter is born with the body, and perishes with it, by the dissolution of its component Atoms[b]. To suppose the soul immortal is to contradict all our notions of the characteristics of an immutable and eternal being[c]. By such arguments Epicurus would disprove the immateriality of the soul, which Plato had maintained. Death he affirmed to be no evil[d].

§ 156.

Jo. Fausti Diss. de Deo Epicuri, *Argent.* 1685, 4to.

J. Conr. Schwarz, Judicium de Reconditâ Theologiâ Epicuri. Comment. I, II, *Cob.* 1718, 4to.

Jo. Henr. Kronmayer, Diss. (præs. Gottl. Stolle) de Epicuro, Creationis et Providentiæ Divinæ assertore, *Jen.* 1713, 4to.

Joh. Achat. Fel. Bielke, Diss. qua sistitur Epicurus Atheus contra Gassendum, Rondellum, et Bælium, *Jen.* 1741, 4to.

† Chph. Meiners, Dissertation on the Character of Epicurus, and the Contradictions in his Theory of the Divine Nature: Vermischte Schriften, II, p. 45, sqq.

Theology. Such a system, as the ancients themselves remarked of it, approaches Atheism rather than Theism[e]; and accordingly some Stoics, among others Posidonius, treated Epicurus as an avowed Atheist[f]: but it may be nearer the truth to look upon him as an inconsistent Theist, who asserted the existence of the Gods, and enlarged upon their attributes with all the hardihood of

[a] Diog. Laert. X, 63, sqq. Lucret. III, 31, sqq., 95, sqq., 138. 188. 204, sqq. Sextus Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. 187. 229.

[b] Lucret. III, 324, sqq., 396, sqq., 426, sqq. Diog. Laert. 64, sqq.

[c] Lucret. III, 807, sqq.

[d] Diog. Laert. X, 139. Cf. 124, sqq. Lucret. III, 670, sqq.

[e] Plutarch. Non posse suaviter Vivi sec. Epicur. c. 8.

[f] Cic. De Nat. I, 30—44.

Dogmatism. He concludes that they exist, from the universality of a Religious belief; which according to his system, is the *Effluence* of certain real objects. The Gods are compounded of Atoms, and bear the human shape, the most perfect of all figures, their substance being analagous to that of our bodies, without being altogether the same: they are eternal, imperishable, and supremely happy: as such they are worthy of our worship, although they inhabit the space intermediate between the Worlds, in a state of repose and indifference, in which their felicity consists, and without exerting any influence over the affairs of this lower region.

157. Epicurus had a great number of disciples, among whom we remark *Metrodorus*[g] and his brother *Timocrates*, *Colotes* (the same against whom is directed a treatise of Plutarch), *Polyænus*, *Leonteus* and his wife *Themista*, all of Lampsacus; add to these another *Metrodorus* of Stratonicea, who subsequently went over to the Academy[h]: and the friend and confidant of Epicurus, *Leontium*, the noted courtesan of Athens; next came *Hermachus* of Mitylene, the successor of Epicurus[i]; and, at a later period, *Polystratus*, *Dionysius*, *Basilides*, *Apollodorus*, *Zeno* of Sidon, *Diogenes* of Tarsus, *Diogenes* of Seleucia, *Phædrus* and *Philodemus* of Gadara, etc. His school subsisted for a long time without undergoing any important modifications[k]: of which the reason probably was, the spirit of the system itself, and the deference entertained by his followers for their master. He had, besides, guarded his doctrines against any considerable innovation by founding them on formal propositions, or general maxims (κύριαι δόξαι[l]). If on the one hand this system had a tendency to extinguish all belief in the

[g] DIOG. LAERT. X, 22, sqq.

[h] Idem, X, 9.

[i] 270 B. C.

[k] SEN. Ep. 33. Who are the real Epicureans and real Sophists? (See Diog. Laert. X, 26.

[l] LUCRET. III, 14. CIC. Fin. I, 5—7; II, 7. DIOG. LAERT. X, 12, 13.

Intellectuality of the human soul, on the other it fortified it against superstition; with the loss, it is true, of all belief derived from the understanding[m].

IV. *Zeno and the Stoics.*

Authorities: The Hymn of Cleanthes, and the Fragments of Chrysippus and Posidonius; Cicero; Seneca; Arrian; Antoninus; Stobæus; Diogenes Laertius, VII; Plutarch, in several of his Treatises against the Stoics; Simplicius.

Modern Works.

Hemingii Forelli Zeno Philosophus levitèr adumbratus. Exercitatio Academica, *Ups.* 1700, 8vo.

Justi Lipsii Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam, *Antwerp*, 1604, 4to.; *Lugd. Bat.* 1644, 12mo.

Thom. Gatakeri Diss. de Disciplinâ Stoicâ cum Sectis aliis collatâ. Prefixed to his edition of Antonin., *Cambridge*, 1653, 4to.

Fr. de Quevedo, Doctrina Stoica, in ejus Opp. tom. III, *Bruxell.* 1671, 4to.

Jo. Fr. Buddei Introduct. in Philos. Stoicam. Prefixed to his edition of Antonin., *Lips.* 1729, 8vo.

Dan. Heinsii Oratio de Philos. Stoicâ; in suis Orationib. *Ludg. Bat.* 1627, 4to., p. 326, sqq.

† Dietr. Tiedemann, System of the Stoic Philosophy, *Leips.* 1776, 3 vols. 8vo.; and in his Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, vol. II, § 427, sqq.

Joh. Alb. Fabricii Disp. de Cavillationibus Stoicorum, *Lips.* 1692, 4to.

157. *Zeno* was born at Cittium, in Cyprus[n]; his father Mnaseas being a rich merchant. Having received a good education, chance, added to his own inclinations, caused him to attend the Socratic schools. He became a hearer of the Cynic Crates, Stilpo, and Diodorus Cronus the Megareans, and the Academicians, Xenocrates and Polemo, for several years. His object was to found a system of Human instruction which might oppose itself to

[m] Lucian, Alexander.

[n] About 340 B.C.

Scepticism; and, in particular, to establish rigid principles of Morality, to which his own conduct was conformable. In the Portico (στοά), at Athens, he formed a school[o], distinguished for a succession of able philosophers, and lovers of virtue; a school which became memorable for the influence it possessed in the world, and its resistance to vice and tyranny. Zeno died after Epicurus[p]. His system was extended, developed, and completed in the course of a long rivalship with other schools, particularly that of Epicurus and the New Academy. Its principal supporters were *Persæus* or *Dorotheus* of Cittium[q], *Aristo* of Chios[r], who founded a separate school approaching that of the Sceptics[s], *Herillus* of Carthage[t]; and lastly, the pupil and worthy successor of Zeno, *Cleanthes* of Assos[u]. Next came the disciple of the last, *Chrysippus* of Soli or of Tarsus, the pillar of the Portico[x]; then his disciple *Zeno* of

[o] About 300 B.C.

[p] Between 264 and 260 B.C.

[q] Suidas, s. v. Persæus and Hermagoras.

[r] Godofr. Buchneri, Diss. Hist. Philos. de Aristone Chio, Vita et Doctrina Noto, *Lips.* 1725, 4to.

Jo. Ben. Carpzovii Diss. Paradoxon Stoicum Aristonis Chii: Ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ τὸν σοφόν, novis Observationibus illustratum, *Lips.* 1742, 8vo.

[s] We must not confound him with Aristo of Ceos, the Peripatetic, § 150.

[t] Persæus, Aristo, and Herillus flourished about 260 B.C.

Quill. Traugott. Krug, Herilli de Summo Bono sententia explosa non explodenda, Symbolar. ad Hist. Philos. Partic. III, *Lips.* 1822, 4to. (Cf. Cic. De Offic. I, 2.)

[u] Flourished about 264 B.C.

† Hymn of Cleanthes to the Supreme Being, in Greek and German, with a Statement of the principal Doctrines of the Stoics, by Herm. Heimart Cludius, *Gött.* 1786, 8vo.

† Gr. C. Fr. Mohnike, Cleanthes the Stoic, *Greifswald*, 1814, 8vo.

J. Fr. Herm. Schwabe, Specimen Theologiæ Comparativæ exhibens Κλεάνθους ὕμνον εἰς Δία, *Jen.* 1819.

[x] Cic. Acad. Quæst. IV, 24. Diog. Laert. VII, 183. He was born 280, died 212 or 208 B.C.

J. Fr. Richter, Diss. de Chrysippo Stoico Fastuoso, *Lips.* 1738, 4to.

Ge. Albr. Hagedorn, Moralia Chrysippea e Rerum Naturis petita, *Altd.* 1685, 4to.

Joh. Conr. Hagedorn, Ethica Chrysippi, *Norimb.* 1715, 8vo.

Tarsus[y], and *Diogenes* of Babylon, who with Carneades and Critolaus went as ambassador to Rome about 155 B. C.; still later came *Antipater* of Tarsus or Sidon[z], *Panætius* of Rhodes, who succeeded him at Athens, but also taught at Rome, and accompanied Scipio Africanus to Alexandria[a]; and lastly, *Posidonius* of Apamea in Syria, a pupil of the former, and surnamed the *Rhodian*, from the school which he established at Rhodes[b]. Even after an examination of all the historical authorities relative to the philosophers of this sect, it is no easy matter to assign to each his respective part in the composition of its doctrines. On the present occasion we can only find room for the principles and general characteristics of the system.

159. According to the Stoics, philosophy is the science of human perfection (σοφία, wisdom), which developes itself in thought, knowledge, and action. Its three principal subdivisions are Logic, Physiology, and Ethics. The latter is the most important, the others subordinate. The Stoics were not able to digest these into a systematic form, founded on solid principles; because they pursued the theory of Empiricism; their fundamental maxim being—to follow Nature[c].

160. The Logic of Zeno and his successors was of

[y] About 212 B. C.

[z] About 146 B. C.

[a] Flourished about 130 B. C.

† Memoirs of the Life and Works of Panætius, by the Abbé Sévin, in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscript. tom. X.

Car. Günth. Ludovici Progr. Panætii Vitam et Merita in Romanorum tum Philosophiam tum Jurisprud. illustrans, *Lips.* 1733, 4to.

Fr. Ge. van Lynden, Diss. Historico-Critica de Panætio Rhodio, Philos. Stoico (præs. Dan. Wyttenbach), *Lugd. Bat.* 1802, 8vo.

[b] He flourished about 103 B. C.

Fr. Bake, Posidonii Rhodii Reliquiæ Doctrinæ. Collegit atque illustravit, *Lugd. Bat.* 1810, 8vo.

[c] Cic. Fin. III, 21; IV, 2; Acad. Quæst. I, 10, sqq. Senec. Ep. 89. Plutarch. Decret. Philos. Præm., et De Stoicorum Repugn., p. 342. Diog. Laert. VII, 40, sqq. 54.

much more extensive application than that of Aristotle: forming a considerable part of the wisdom he professed to teach, and being adapted *ad materiam* as well as to the *form* of argumentation; and comprehending in its range as subordinate to itself, something of Psychology, Grammar, and Rhetoric. Such a system of Logic was intended to oppose to the uncertainty and the instability of popular notions a solid and stable science, worthy of a philosopher; and which might serve him as a touchstone of Truth and Falsehood. It rested on the theory of perceptions. Every original perception is the result of impressions produced upon the mind, and is therefore denominated φαντασία, *visum*. Out of these original and *sensible* impressions Reason, a superior and directing power (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), forms our other notions and opinions. The *true* are styled by Zeno φαντάσιαι καταληπτικαί, or καταλήψεις, that is, such as are verified by their correspondence with the object to which they refer, are freely assented to, and constitute the foundation of science. The rule of Truth, accordingly, is Right Reason, ὀρθὸς λόγος, which conceives of an object as it is. On this Dogmatic Empiricism rested the system of Zeno. Chrysippus remarked with still greater exactitude the difference between sensible impressions (αἰσθητικαί), and those which are not derived from the senses. The latter i. e. *ideas* result from the mutual comparison of the former, and by combining whatever they contain of *Universal*. This union takes place sometimes involuntarily, sometimes in consequence of a voluntary application of the understanding; and hence result, on the one hand, natural ideas (φυσικαι ἔννοιαι καὶ προλήψεις), and on the other notions artificially acquired (ἔννοιαι). Of these the former constitute the *Sensus communis* (κοινος λόγος), which is the criterium of Truth[d]. The versatility, or as it may be termed the subtilty of the mind of Chrysippus, displayed itself especially in the manner in which he perfected the Syllo-

[d] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 11; II, 42. Plutarch. Dogm. IV, 11. Diog. Laert. VII, 54. A. Gellius, XIX, 1.

gistic system of Logic; and particularly in his theory of Hypothetical and Disjunctive arguments.

§ 161.

Justi Lipsii Physiologiæ Stoicorum libri III, *Antw.* 1610, 4to.

Th. A. Suabedissen, Programma: cur pauci semper fuerint Physiologiæ Stoicorum Sectatores, *Casel.* 1813, 4to.

Zeno attempted, in his Physiology, to give such an account of the notions commonly received respecting the objects of the natural world, as, without the substitution of any hypothesis, might afford a foundation for practical judgment. Of all preceding systems, that of Heraclitus, which supposed the existence of an all-pervading λόγος, appeared to Zeno to suit his purpose best, and agreed with his doctrine that immaterial beings are nothing more than chimeras[e]. According to the Stoics all that is real—all that can act or suffer is corporeal. They make a distinction however between solid bodies (στερεά), and the contrary. Space, Time, and Ideas are incorporeal[f]. Chrysippus also distinguished between Space and Vacuum; and pronounced the latter, like Time, to be infinite. There are two eternal principles (ἀρχαί), of all things: the one (ὕλη)[g], matter, passive; the other active, namely the Divinity, or creative principle; the source of activity, and author of the forms and arrangement of all things in the world. God is a living fire, unlike however to common fire; he is named also πνεῦμα or *spirit*[h]; he fashions, produces, and permeates all things, agreeably to certain laws (λόγοι σπερματικοί). *Matter* is thus subject to universal reason, which is the law of all nature[i].

Various proofs of the existence of a Divinity were

[e] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 11. Diog. Laert. VII, 56.

[f] Diog. Laert. VII, 135.

[g] Idem, VII, 140.

[h] Cic. Nat. Deor. II, 14. Diog. Laert. VII, 139. Stob. p. 538.

[i] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 11; Nat. Deor. II, 8, 9. 14. 22. 32. Sextus, Adv. Math. IX, 101. Diog. Laert. VII, 134, sqq. 147—156, sqq. Stob. Ecl. Phys. I, p. 312—538.

alleged by the Stoics, particularly by Cleanthes and Chrysippus [k].

According to the doctrines we have reviewed, God is *in*, not *without* the world. The world itself is a living being and divine. Hence resulted the close connection maintained by these philosophers between Providence (*προνοία*) and Destiny (*εἱμαρμένη*), founded upon the relations between Cause and the Effect observable in the world [l]: this notion led Chrysippus still farther, to *Determinism;* and thence to *Optimism* [m], to *Divination* (*μαντική*), and an attempt to explain the Mythological Polytheism by the aid of Physiology and Theology [n]. In like manner as the world was produced by the action of fire, when the four elements (*στοιχεῖα*), out of which the Divinity formed all things, were separated from primeval matter [o]; so must it ultimately perish by the same [p]. This combustion or dissolution by fire, by which all things will be resolved into their original state (*ἐκπύρωσις τοῦ κοσμοῦ*) has been rejected by some subsequent Stoics [q], among others by Zeno of Tarsus, Panætius, and Posidonius [r].

162. The soul is an ardent spirit (*πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον*), being a portion of the Soul of the world, but, like every other real individual being, is corporeal and perishable [s]. Cle-

[k] GUILL. TRAUG. KRUG, Progr. de Cleanthe Divinitatis assertore ac prædicatore, *Lips.* 1819, 4to.

[l] PLUTARCH. De Stoic. Repugn. p. 1056. STOB. Ecl. Phys. vol. I, p. 180.

[m] JOH. MICH. KERN, Disp. Stoicorum Dogmata de Deo, *Gott.* 1764, 4to.

JAC. BRUCKER, De Providentiâ Stoicâ in Miscell. Hist. Philos. p. 147.

S. E. SCHULZE, Commentatio de Cohærentia Mundi partium earumque cum Deo conjunctione summa secundum Stoicorum Disciplinam. *Viteb.* 1785, 4to.

MICH. HEINR. REINHARD, Progr. de Stoicorum Deo, *Torgav.* 1737, 4to. Et Comment. de Mundo Optimo præsertim ex Stoicorum Sententia. *Torgav.* 1738, 8vo.

[n] CIC. Nat. Deor. I, II, III; De Fato, c. 12, 13. 17. A. GELLIUS, N. Att. VI, c. 2.

[o] DIOG. LAERT. VII, 142.

[p] CIC. Nat. Deor. II, 46.

[q] PHILO, De Æternn. Mundi.

[r] JAC. THOMASII Exercitatio de Stoicâ Mundi Exustione, etc. *Lips.* 1672, 4to.

MICH. SONNTAG, Diss. de Palingenesiâ Stoicorum, *Jen.* 1700, 4to.

[s] CIC. De Nat. Deor. III, 14; Tusc. Quæst. I, 9. DIOG. LAERT. VII, 156.

anthes and Panætius went so far as to endeavour to establish its mortality by proof[t]. It consists of eight parts or powers: one, and the principal (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), or Intelligence (λόγισμος), is the source of all the rest, namely, the five senses, speech and the generative faculty; in the same manner as the Divinity is the origin of all individual energies in the world without[u]. The emotions also, as well as the passions and appetites of the soul (πάθη and ὁρμαί), are the results of the intellectual faculty; because they are always founded on some belief of the reality of their object, on some approbation, or judgment[x].

§ 163.

Casp. Scioppii Elementa Stoicæ Philosophiæ Moralis, *Mogunt.* 1606, 8vo.

J. Fr. Buddei Exercitt. Historico Philos. IV. de Erroribus Stoicorum in Philos. Morali, *Hal.* 1695-96.

Ern. Godf. Lilie, Commentationes de Stoicorum Philos. Morali. Comment. I. *Alton.* 1800, 8vo.

† J. Neeb, Examination of the Morality of the Stoics compared with that of Christianity, *Mainz*, 1791, 8vo.

Ern. Aug. Dankegott Hoppe, Diss. Hist. Philos.: Principia Doctrinæ de Moribus Stoicæ et Christianæ, *Viteb.* 1799, 4to. (See also the works of Conz and Wegscheider, cited § 182).

The morality of the Stoics was built upon profound observation of the essential characteristics of human Nature, of Reason, and Free-will; and a close association of the laws of Practice with those of Nature[y], in virtue of this principle, that God, the inherent cause of all the existing forms and proportions of the world, is himself the supreme Intelligence and Law. In consequence of the Rational nature of Man, the Stoic considers Order, Legality,

[t] Ciph. Meiners, Commentar. quo Stoicorum Sententia de Animorum post Mortem statu et fatis illustratur; Verm. Philos. Schriften, vol. II, p. 265.

[u] Plutarch. Decret. Philos. IV. 4. 5. 21. Sextus, Adv. Math. IX, 101.

[x] Cic. Tusc. Quæst. IV, 6, sqq.; Fin. IV, 38. Diog. Laert. VII, 110. Stob. Ecl. Eth., p. 166. 170. Plutarch. De Virt. Morali; de Decret. Philos. IV, 25.

[y] Cic. De Nat. Deor. I, 14.

and Reason, as what we are above all things bound to respect, as the only condition on which man can attain to the end of his being, that is Virtue; towards which all Nature is framed to lead us. Accordingly the first of all maxims is[z]: *To live agreeably to the law of Right Reason* (ὀρθὸς λόγος); or according to the formulary of Cleanthes and other Stoics: *To live conformably to Nature*, (ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, or ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν)[a]. See above Polemo (§ 138). Such a life is the proper end of Human existence[b].

164. The most remarkable principles of the *Practical* system of this school are: 1st. τὸ καλόν, (or Virtue), is the only absolute good: Vice, on the other hand, is the only positive evil: every thing else is morally indifferent, (ἀδίαφορον), possessing only a relative value, which renders it in a greater or less degree capable of becoming an object of choice, of avoidance, or simply of toleration, (λητὸν, ἄλητον, μέσον[c]). 2dly. All actions are conformable or unconformable to the character of the agent, καθήκοντα, παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον: the first being subdivided into καθήκοντα τελεῖα, and κ. μέσα; the former, inasmuch as they are done in fulfilment of the law, are called *good actions*, κατορθώματα, and their contraries, transgressions, ἁμαρτήματα. The κατορθώματα alone are virtuous and worthy of commendation; without respect to their consequences[d]. 3dly. Virtue is founded on Prudence (φρόνησις); it consists in a Rational and Spontaneous practice, consistent with itself, and with Nature; having for its object the knowledge and the performance of what is good[e]: Or, again, Virtue is a system of conduct regulated by the principle, that no-

[z] AUT. CRESS. Comment. de Stoicorum Supremo Ethices Principio, *Viteb.* 1797, 4to.

[a] CIC. Fin. III. 6; Cleanthes, Hymn. V. DIOG. LAERT. VII, 87. STOB. Ecl. Eth. Pl. II, p. 32. 132. 134. 138, sqq.

[b] JOH. JAC. DORNFELD, Diss. de Fine Hominis Stoico, *Lips.* 1720, 4to.

[c] CIC. Fin. III, 3, 8. 15.

[d] Idem, 7. 9. 17, 18. STOB. Ecl. Eth. II, p. 58, sqq.

[e] DIOG. LAERT. VII, 89. Διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη. STOB. Ecl. Eth. II, p. 204: Διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.

thing but the practice of good is good, and that therein alone consists the character of true liberty[f]. Vice is an inconsistent mode of action, (*inconstantia*), resulting from the neglect or the perversion of reason: the evil passions accompanying which are voluntary and blameable[g]. 4thly. Virtue being the only good, can alone enable us to attain felicity[h] εὐδαιμονία: which latter consists in a tranquil course of life, (εὐρροία βίου), and cannot be augmented by any increase of duration[i]. 5thly. Virtue is one, and Vice is one: neither of them are capable of augmentation or dimunition[k]. All good actions are respectively equal, and in like manner all evil, inasmuch as they flow from the same sources. Virtue is manifested under four principal characters: Prudence, (φρόνησις); Courage, (ἀνδρία); Temperance, (σωφροσύνη); Justice, (δικαιοσύνη): with a corresponding number of Vices[l]. 6thly. The Virtuous man is exempt from Passions (πάθη), but not insensible to them. It is in this sense that we must understand the ἀπαθεία of the Stoics[m]. The Passions ought to be not

[f] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 10; Fin. III, 7; Tusc. Quæst. IV, 15; Paradoxon V. Plutarch. De Virt. Mor. c. 3.

[g] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 10; Tusc. Quæst. IV, 9. 23.

[h] Ben. Bendtsen, Progr. de *αὐταρκεία τῆς ἀρετῆς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*. *Hafn.* 1811, 4to.

Joh. Colmar (præs. Ge. Paul. Rœtenbeccio), Diss. de Stoicorum et Aristotelis circa gradum necessitatis bonorum externorum ad summam beatitatem disceptatione, *Norimb.* 1709, 4to.

[i] Cic. Fin. III, 14. Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 138. 154. Diog. Laert. VII, 88.

[k] Cic. De Fin. III, 14, 15.

[l] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 10; Fin. III, 14, 15. 21; IV, 20—27, sqq. Paradox. III, 1. Plutarch. De Virt. Mor. c. 2. Stob. Ecl. Eth. Pl. II, p. 110. 116. 218. 220.

[m] Cic. Acad. Quæst. I, 10; Tusc. Quæst. IV, 16—19. A. Gellius, XIX, 2.

Joh. Barth. Niemeyer, Dissert. de Stoicorum *ἀπαθείᾳ*, etc. *Helmst.* 1679, 4to.

Joh. Beenii Dispp. III, de *ἀπαθείᾳ* Sapientis Stoici, *Hafn.* 1695, 4to.

Joh. Henr. Fischer, Diss. de Stoicis *ἀπαθείας* falso suspectis, *Lips.* 1716, 4to.

Mich. Fr. Quadius, Diss. Hist. Philos. tritum illud Stoicorum *παράδοξον περὶ ἀπαθείας* expendens, *Sedini.* 1720, 4to.

† Chph. Meiners, On the Stoic Apathy: Verm. Philos. Schriften, tom. II, p. 130, sqq.

moderated but eradicated. The Wise man alone is free. Chrysippus mainly contributed to systematise the Ethics of the Stoics, and asserted that the principle of Right was founded *in the nature of Reasonable Beings*, (φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει δίκαιον): and derived from this the characteristics of Natural Right.

165. The Stoics admitted only two descriptions of men; the good, σπουδαῖοι; and the bad, φαῦλοι: without allowing the existence of any intermediate class. With such a view they drew a portrait of their ideal Wise man[n]; with all the most sublime features of moral and intellectual perfection, but without a sufficient observation of the differences which must necessarily exist between the ideal image and the reality; and more as if they were describing the qualities of a superior nature, than a degree of perfection attainable by man[o]. On the same principle they permitted their Wise Man, under certain circumstances, to deprive himself of life (αὐτοχειρία), as a part of his absolute freedom[p]. In later times this licence was made still greater, particularly by the authority of Seneca[q]. The blending of the moral system of the Stoics with their views of Physics and Theology, and an imperfect estimate of the distinctions which form the limits between the Law of Nature and Free-will, Morality and Felicity, gave occasion, in this system, to many inconsistencies which are easily observable; especially in their ideas of absolute liberty, and the incompatibility of this entire independence with Fate[r]. The system bears also throughout a character of extravagant pride and asperity, which is hostile to the cultivation of moral sentiment. On the other hand, we find abundant germs of noble

[n] † ANT. LE GRAND, The Stoic Wise Man. *The Hague*, 1662, 12mo. (Fr.). ERH. REUSCH (præs. OMEISIO), Diss. Vir Prudens Aristotelicus cum Sapiente Stoico collatus, *Altorf.* 1704, 4to.

[o] STOB. Ecl. Eth., p. 198. 221.

[p] CHR. AUG. HEUMANN, Diss. de *αὐτοχειρίᾳ* Philosophorum, Maxime Stoicorum, *Jena.* 1703, 4to.

[q] CIC. Fin. III, 18. DIOG. VII, 130—176. STOB. Ecl. Eth. II, p. 226.

[r] CIC. De Fato, c. 12, sqq., 17. A. GELL. VI, 2.

sentiments, calculated to elevate man, and inspire him with a sense of his own dignity: and it has on many occasions communicated to its disciples an invincible courage, and fortitude to resist all the rigours of Tyranny.

V. *New Academy.*

Authorities: Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, Diog. Laertius, lib. IV.

† Stäudlin, work mentioned above (§ 38, II.)

† Foucher, History of the Academicians, *Paris*, 1690, 12mo. Diss. de Philos. Academicâ, *Paris*. 1692, 12mo.

J. D. Gerlach, Commentatio exhibens Academicorum Juniorum de Probabilitate Disputationes, *Gotting*. 1815, 4to.

J. Rud. Thorbecke, Responsio ad Qu. Philos.: quæritur in Dogmaticis oppugnandis numquid inter Academicos et Stoicos interfuerit? Quod si ita sit, quæritur, quæ fuerit discriminis causa? (Place?) 1820, 4to.

166. The bold and uncompromising Dogmatism which prevailed in the Porch, and the bitter attacks made by Zeno and Chrysippus on the founder of the Academy[s], induced the successors of the latter to investigate, after a more scrupulous manner, the prevailing Dogmatical systems, and in particular, that of the Stoics. The consequence was a habit of *doubting* in philosophical inquiries; a habit which characterised a whole class of Academicians, in opposition to the practice of the original school: hence the *New Academy;* the founder of which was Arcesilaus of Pitane, in Æolia[t]. This is sometimes called the *Second* or the *Middle* Academy, with reference to the one which followed. After having previously applied himself to the study of Poetry, Eloquence, and the Mathematics, this philosopher attended, at Athens, Theophrastus, and afterwards Polemo. Crantor and Zeno were his fellow disciples under the latter: and their methodical and innovating spirit incited him to contradiction. He subsequently took the place of Sosicrates, as Chief of

[s] Diog. Laert. VII, 32.
[t] Born 318 or 316 B. C.

the Academy, and died 241 or 239 B. C. He was a philosopher of extensive knowledge, of great ability in Dialectics, and of stainless morals.

167. The character thus introduced, by a spirit of doubt, into the Academy, was one of Diffidence; which tended to circumscribe the pretensions of Philosophy, without denying the possibility of certain, or at least, of probable knowledge. In this manner, by the subtilty of his Logic, Arcesilaus brought into question the principal Dogmatical doctrines, in order to open the way for more profound inquiries; and to this end introduced into the Academy the method of *Disputation*[u]. He attacked, above all, the φαντασία καταληπτική, as it was termed, which Zeno taught, and admitted as a *criterium in thesi*, while at the same time he denied it *in hypothesi*[x]. Constantly opposing himself to the opinions of his adversaries, he was drawn into a general Scepticism with regard to our knowledge of the Absolute Existence and nature of things[y]; so much so, that he denied the reality of any adequate *criterium* of Truth, and recommended, as a quality of wisdom, a suspension of all definitive Judgment[z]. In *Practical* philosophy, he maintained that the safest rule was the principle of Conformity to Reason; τὸ εὔλογον[a]. His immediate followers were *Lacydes* of Cyrene, *Evander* and *Telecles*, both of Phocis; and *Hegesinus* of Pergamus[b].

168. But a much more distinguished personage followed in Carneades of Cyrene[c]. He attended at first the school of the Stoics; afterwards he became the pupil

[u] Cic. Ac. Quæst. I, 12; II, 6, sqq.; Fin. II, 1. Diog. Laert. IV, 28. Plutarch. Adv. Coloten. c. 27.

[x] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 24. Sextus Adv. Math. VII, 154. 408, sqq.

[y] Cic. Ac. Quæst. I, 12. Sext. Hypotyp. I, 1. 4. 220—235 (where a distinction is made between Pyrrhonism and the principles of the New Academy). Adv. Math. VII, 153.

[z] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. I, 232, sqq.; Adv. Math. VII, 150, sqq.

[a] Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 158. Cf. Hyp. Pyrrh. I, 231.

[b] Diog. Laert. IV, 59, sqq.

[c] Born about 215 died 130 B. C.

and successor of Hegesinus at the Academy; and having been sent a deputy to Rome[d], he excited universal admiration by his eloquence and his logic[e]. This philosopher, who has by some been considered the founder of a *Third* Academy, directed his Scepticism more especially against Chrysippus, with great oratorical and argumentative talent. Taking into consideration the twofold relation of the φαντασία, to the object (τὸ φανταστόν), and the subject (φαντασιούμενος), he concluded that there could be no real knowledge of any object, inasmuch as neither the senses nor the understanding afford a sure testimony (κριτήριον) of its truth; and maintained that all that can be inferred is *probability*[f] (τὸ πιθανόν); in three distinct degrees: ἔμφασις, or πιθανὴ φαντασία: ἀπερισπαστός: and διεξωδευμένη ἢ περιωδευμένη φαντασία[g]. In this consists the system of *Probabilities* of Carneades (εὐλογιστία). He attacked the Theology of the Stoics in detail: proving that the Divinity cannot be conceived of as a ζῶον: and that we cannot apply to him our ideas of Existence and Morality. He exposed, in like manner, by victorious demonstration, the fallacies attending the practice of attributing to the Deity a human form[h]. He defended against the Stoics, the existence of a Particular Natural Right; and, on the subject of the Supreme Good, opposed to theirs the opinion of a certain *Callipho;* who made it consist in Virtue united to Pleasure. He threw considerable light on practical morals, by comparing Civil with Natural Right; and Prudence with Morality; (making Prudence the principle of action;) but for want of solving the apparent contradictions between these two principles he did injury to the cause of Virtue, though his own charac-

[d] See above § 158.

[e] 598 of Rome; 155 or 156 B. C.

[f] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 10, sqq.

[g] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 9. 31, sqq. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 159, sqq.; 161, 167, sqq. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. XIV, 7, sqq.

[h] Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 138, sqq.; 140, sqq.; 182, sqq. Cic. De Nat. Deor. III, 12, sqq.; De Divin. II, 3.

ter was far from being opposed to it[i]. *Clitomachus* of Carthage, the disciple and successor of Carneades (129 B. C.), put the sceptical arguments of his master in writing[k].

169. The Stoics were sensible of the danger which menaced the foundations of their system, but the only answer they were able to make was the reproach of inconsistency with which *Antipater* taxed the Academicians[l], or they cut short their attacks by the downright assertion; That we ought not to endeavour to discover any new grounds of knowledge and certainty[m]. Nevertheless, Dogmatism and Scepticism in their respective schools, relaxed somewhat of their rigour, and a sort of reconciliation between them was brought about by *Philo* of Larissa and *Antiochus* of Ascalon[n], his pupil and follower, who became a teacher at Athens, Alexandria, and Rome. The first was the pupil and successor of Clitomachus; he also taught at Rome, whither he retreated during the war of Mithridates, a hundred years B. C,: and by some he has been considered the founder of a *Fourth* Academy. He confined Scepticism to a contradiction of the Metaphysics of the Stoics and their pretended *criteria* of knowledge[o]: he contracted the sphere of Logic[p]: made Moral philosophy merely a matter of public instruction; and endeavoured to prove that the old and new Academies equally doubted the certainty of speculative knowledge[q]. *Antiochus* derived from the *Conscience* a strong argument against Scepticism[r], to which

[i] LACT. Div. Instit. V, 14. 16, 17. QUINTIL. XII, 1. CIC. De Leg. I, 13; Fin. II, 18.

[k] † HEINIUS, Dissertation on the Philosopher Clitomachus; in the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin, 1748.

[l] CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 9. 34.

[m] Ibid. 6.

[n] Died 69 B. C.

[o] SEXT. Hypotyp. I, 235. CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 6.

[p] That is if it is of him that Cicero writes, Ac. Quæst. II, 28.

[q] CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 5. 23. SEXT. Hyp. I, 220. STOB. Ecl. Eth. II, p. 38, sqq.

[r] CIC. Ac. Quæst. II, 8, sqq., 34.

in his youth he was inclined. Consequently, he became an opponent of his master[s]: and in the end endeavoured to demonstrate the identity of the Academic, Peripatetic, and Stoic doctrines with respect to Morals[t]; maintaining that the differences were merely nominal. He has been improperly regarded by some as the founder of a *Fifth* Academy; for he rather approximated the doctrine of the Stoics; inasmuch as he admitted that there is a degree of certainty in Human Knowledge[u]; and rejected the system of *Probabilities* of the Academy. These two attempts at union were the prelude to many more[x].

In his moral system, Antiochus treated self-love as the *Primum Mobile* of men and animals; considering its operation to be at first instinctive; and afterwards aided by consciousness and reason. In this respect he modified and tempered the Stoic principle[y].

170. Thus was the debate between Dogmatism and Scepticism for a time suspended: and the latter, at least, ceased to be heard of in the Academy. It is true that all these disputes had not settled the grand point in question; whether there be any solid principle and foundation for knowledge in general, and, in particular, for Philosophic Knowledge: but by the observation of Moral Consciousness the disputants had come to the conclusion that something stable and certain in knowledge is necessary; and had drawn broader distinctions between what belongs to the subject (man), and what relates to the external object.

The four great philosophical factions continued to maintain at Athens their several schools, close by each other, without mutually interrupting their discussions; and prosecuted, but with less vivacity than of old, their ancient disputes.

[s] Cic. Ac. Quæst. I, 4; II, 4. 22.

[t] Cic. De Fin. II, 3. 8. 25.

[u] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 7. 11. 13, sqq., 21.

[x] Cic. Ac. Quæst. II, 1. 1., et 35, 43, sqq.; De Fin. V, 3. 7; De Nat. Deor. I, 7. Sext. Emp. Hyp. I, 233.

[y] Cic. Fin. V, 8, 9. 11, sqq., 21, sqq.

CHAPTER THIRD.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ROMANS, AND THE NEW SCEPTICISM OF ÆNESIDEMUS, DOWN TO THE TIME OF JOANNES DAMASCENUS (FROM 60 B.C.—TILL THE END OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY). (THIRD EPOCH OF GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY.)

Propagation and Downfal of Grecian Philosophy.

General Sketch.

171. Scepticism, after it had lost much of its influence in the Academy, re-appeared in the schools of Medicine: where it called forth fresh inquiries on the part of those who were inclined to more *positive* doctrines: inquiries which were fostered by the increased intercourse which had taken place between the Orientals and the Greeks, as well as by some other great external events, such as the conquests of Alexander and the Romans, and, subsequently, the growth of Christianity. Combined with other causes, these events contained the principle of the decline and fall of Grecian philosophy, at the same time that they laid open new paths to the spirit of Philosophic research.

172. Alexander[a] had annihilated the republican liberty of Greece and subdued to the Grecian arms, together with Egypt, the whole of Asia, as far as the Indus: thus opening the way for an active commerce between the East and the West, which contributed to enlarge the sphere of Grecian art and science. Alexandria, that mighty commercial city which gradually succeeded to the importance of fallen Athens, strengthened these distant relations, and helped to convert them to the interests of science. The Ptole-

[a] Died 323 B.C.

mies, the successors of Alexander in Egypt[b], aided the cause of knowledge by founding their famous Library and Museum; although original inquiry appears to have been damped by this vast accumulation of scientific resources, and the facility with which they were accessible. A progressive decline became observable in the Spirit of Philosophy, which was gradually directed to humbler objects, of a more pedantic character; such as Commentaries, Comparisons, Miscellanies, Compilations, etc. etc.

Reference may be made to:

Chr. Gottl. Heyne, De Genio Seculi Ptolemæorum. Opusc. Acad., vol. I, p. 76.

Chr. Dan. Beck, Specimen Historiæ Bibliothecarum Alexandrinarum, *Lips.* 1779, 4to.

§ 173.

See the Works mentioned § 38.

The Romans, a nation of mere warriors and conquerors, with whom the interests of their Republic outweighed all others, became acquainted with Grecian philosophy, particularly with the Peripatetic, Academic, and Stoic doctrines, only after the conquest of Greece; and more especially through the intervention of three philosophers whom the Athenians deputed to Rome[c]. In spite of determined prejudices and reiterated denunciations[d], one of these doctrines (that of the Academy), daily gained disciples there; especially when Lucullus and Sylla had enriched the Capital with conquered libraries. The latter, after the capture of Athens, 84 B. C., sent thither the collection of Apellicon, which was particularly rich in the works of Aristotle.

[b] Third century B. C.

[c] 155 B. C.

Levesow, De Carneade, Diogene et Critolao, et de Causis Neglecti studii Philosophiæ apud Antiquiores Romanos, *Stettin.* 1795.

Dan. Boethii Digest. de Philosophiæ nomine apud Veteres Romanos inviso, *Upsal.* 1790, 4to.

[d] A. Gell, N. A. XV, 11.

The Romans almost always looked upon philosophy as a mean to attain some personal or political end: betraying by that very circumstance their want of a genuine philosophic spirit. Nevertheless they eventually became the depositaries of Grecian philosophy.

174. Christianity, the religion of the "Pure in Heart," which prescribed a disinterested love of our neighbours, and proclaimed to all mankind, without any outward display of philosophy, the reconciliation of God to Man, afforded, as it were, a fresh text, of the highest interest; which was no less capable of being enforced by reason than by revelation. It has exercised a various influence over the progress of Philosophical Reason, by the matter of its doctrines, as well as by their form.

175. The Spirit of research of Grecian Philosophy, once so original and independent, was exhausted. Reason had tried every path, every direction then open to her, without being able to satisfy herself: because she had not advanced to the original sources of knowledge, and consequently had continued an enigma to herself. The different philosophic systems had viewed truth only in one of its aspects; and consequently were involved in errors. The want of philosophical method had rendered the disentanglement of these errors the more difficult; and a reconciliation or adjustment had become impossible between the different sects, whose disputes, while they prevented the understanding from sinking into lethargy, had also the effect of detracting from the pure and disinterested love of Truth. Consequently, the efforts of Science were not so much directed to the investigation of the first principles of knowledge, as to maintain, consolidate, illustrate, and apply conclusions which had been already drawn.

176. The political, religious, and moral condition of the Roman Empire during the first centuries after the Christian era, were not such as to animate and sustain a spirit

of philosophical research. Greece had lost her political existence; Rome her republican constitution. Beginning with the Capital, Luxury, Egotism, and Indolence, had spread their reign to the remotest provinces. The characteristic features of the period were a neglect of the popular religion; a preference for foreign rites; (of which an incongruous medley was tolerated); a widely prevalent superstition; a disdain of what was Natural; a mania for what was strange and extraordinary: a curious prying into the (pretended) occult arts; with an extinction of all sentiments truly great and noble. Such are the characteristics given by the Epicurean Lucian of Samosata (2nd. cent. A. C.) in a Satire, which exposes with the most poignant ridicule the false philosophy of his age. (Cf. § 181).

See † Chph. Meiners, History of the Decline of Morals under the Roman Government, *Leips.* 1782, 8vo.

177. Consequently the efforts of the understanding were directed in various ways, and tended: 1st. To maintain the Schools and Systems already existing; not without considerable modifications. 2dly. To revive superannuated doctrines, such as those of the Pythagorean and Orphic philosophies. 3dly. To combine by Interpretation, Syncretism, or Eclecticism,* the various systems; especially those of Plato and Aristotle; and to trace them all back to the ancient Dogmata of Pythagoras, the pretended Orpheus, Zoroaster, and Hermes[e]. 4thly. To combine in one the Spirit of Oriental and Occidental philosophy.

178. Nevertheless philosophy made at least some apparent progress, and extended the outward limits of her reign, if she did not improve the territory she had already acquired. The Romans and the Jews by this time had made themselves acquainted with the doctrines of the

* [*Syncretism* professes to combine the elements of different systems: *Eclecticism* to select from all what is consistent with truth. *Trans.*]

[e] Cf. L. E. Otto Baumgarten-Crusius, De Librorum Hermeticorum origine atque Indole, *Jen.* 1827, 4to.

Greeks, and had produced some philosophical works sufficiently original. Nor does this progress of philosophy appear to have been merely external; inasmuch as Scepticism assumed a more decided character, and gave occasion for a fresh Dogmatical system in the school of the Platonists. By imagining a new source of knowledge, consisting in the contemplation of that which is absolute; by labouring to combine the old and the new theories of the East and the West, they endeavoured to provide a broader basis for Dogmatic philosophy, to prop up religion, and to oppose a barrier to the rapid progress of Christianity; but eventually lost themselves in the dreams of Metaphysics. On the other hand the Doctors of the Catholic Faith, who at one time had rejected and contemned the philosophy of the Greeks, ended by adopting it, at least in part, in order to complete and fortify their religious system. The invasions of the barbarous tribes, and the disunion of the Eastern and Western empires brought on at last an almost utter extinction of Philosophical research.

Introduction and Cultivation of Grecian Philosophy among the Romans.

179. Unquestionably the national character of the Romans, more disposed for action than speculation, did not encourage philosophy to spring up among them unassisted[f]. The revolutions also in their government, the loss of their republican constitution, the tyranny of the greater part of their emperors, and the general and continually increasing corruption were little favourable to the development of a truly philosophical spirit, yet from time to time they manifested a degree of interest in such researches, which they looked upon as indispensable to a cultivated mind, and as serviceable for certain civil offices. Agreeably to their native character and habits

[f] K. F. RENNER, De Impedimentis, quæ apud Vett. Romanos Philosophiæ negaverint successum, *Hal.* 1825. See also the authors mentioned at the head of § 24, *b*.

they showed more predilection for the doctrines of the Porch or of Epicurus, than those of Plato and Aristotle; which were of a more speculative character. The Romans thus applied themselves to Grecian philosophy; successfully transferred into their own language some of its treatises; enriched by the application of them their jurisprudence and polity, but did not advance a step by any original discovery of their own. Consequently, we can distinguish only a small number of Latins who have deserved a page in the history of philosophy. We shall proceed to mention the principal of those among them, who, whether Romans or foreigners, cultivated and diffused the philosophy of the Greeks, with some partial modifications in their manner of teaching it.

Cicero.

Authorities: The works of Cicero; Plutarch. Life of Cicero.

† Morabin, History of Cicero, *Paris*, 1745, 2 vols. 4to.

Conyers Middleton, Life of Cicero. (Several editions).

Jac. Facciolati, Vita Ciceronis Litteraria, *Patav.* 1760, 8vo.

H. Chr. Fr. Hulsemann, De Indole Philosophicâ M. T. Ciceronis ex ingenii ipsius et aliis rationibus æstimandâ, *Luneb.* 1799, 4to.

Gautier de Sibert, Examen de la Philosophie de Cicéron; dans les Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr. tom. XLI et XLIII.

Chph. Meiners, Oratio de Philosophiâ Ciceronis ejusque in Universam Philosophiam meritis; *Verm. Philos. Schriften*, I. § 274.

J. Chph. Briegleb, Progr. de Philosophiâ Ciceronis, *Cob.* 1784, 4to. Et, De Cicerone cum Epicuro Disputante, *Ibid.* 1779, 4to.

J. C. Waldin, Oratio de Philosophiâ Ciceronis *Platonicâ, *Jen.* 1753, 4to.

Math. Fremling (resp. Schantz), Philosophia Ciceronis, *Lund.* 1795, 4to.

† J. Fr. Herbart, Dissert. on the Philosophy of Cicero: in the Königsb. Archiv. No. I.

R. Kühner, M. T. Ciceronis in Philosophiam ejusq. partes merita, *Hamburg.* 1825, 8vo.

ADAM BURSII Logica Ciceronis Stoica, *Zamosc.* 1604, 4to.

CONR. NAHMMACHERI Theologia Ciceronis; accedit Ontologiæ Ciceronis specimen. *Frankenh.* 1767, 8vo.

DAN. WYTTENBACHII Dissert. de Philosophiæ Ciceronianæ Loco qui est de Deo, *Amstel.* 1783, 4to.

† An Essay towards settling the Dispute between Middleton and Ernesti on the Philosophic Character of the Treatise *De Natura Deorum;* in five Dissert. *Altona and Leips.* 1800, 8vo.

GASP. JUL. WUNDERLICH (resp. ANDR. SCHMALER), Cicero de Animâ Platonizans Disp. *Viteb.* 1714, 4to.

ANT. BUCHERI Ethica Ciceroniana, *Hamb.* 1610, 8vo.

JASONIS DE NORES, Brevis et Distincta Institutio in Cic. Philos. de Vitâ et Moribus, *Patav.* 1597.

180. *M. T. Cicero*[g], like many other young Romans of good family, was instructed by Greek preceptors. In order to improve himself in eloquence and the science of polity, he travelled to Rhodes and Athens; where he occupied himself with the pursuit of Grecian philosophy, directing his attention particularly to the Academic and Stoic systems. He owed, in part, his success as an orator and a statesman to the ardour with which he devoted himself to these studies. At a later period of his life, when his career as a statesman was closed by the fall of the Republic, with his characteristic patriotism, he consecrated his leisure to the discussion of points of philosophy; labouring to transplant the theories of the Greeks into his native soil: with little gratitude on the part of his countrymen[h]. In all speculative questions he maintained the freedom of opinion and the impartiality which became a disciple of the New Academy: following the *method* also of that school in the *form* of his writings. In questions of morality he preferred the rigid principles of the Stoics[i]; but not without doing justice to Plato, Aristotle, and even Epicurus, (as far as the correctness of his *life* was concerned[k]). His philosophical works, in which he appears to have made Plato his model, are a most valuable collec-

[g] Born at Arpinum, 107 B. C., died A. D. 44.

[h] Cic. Orat. pro Sextio. PLUTARCH. Vit. Cic. V.

[i] De Offic. I, 2.

[k] De Nat. Deor. I, 5; Acad. Quæst. IV, 3.

tion of interesting discussions, and luminous remarks on the most important topics, e. g. On the Nature of the Divinity; On the Supreme Good; On the Social Duties; On Fate; Divination; the Laws; the Republic, etc. etc.[l]: and have proved a mine of information to succeeding ages, without however betraying any great depth of thought. They are likewise highly valuable as throwing light on the history of philosophy[m], and have contributed to form the technical language of this science.

Epicureans.

181. The doctrine of Epicurus when first disseminated in their country attracted among the Romans a crowd of partisans[n], in consequence of its light and accommodating character, and the indulgence it afforded to the inclinations of all[o]; as also because it had the effect of disengaging the mind from superstitious terrors. Unhappily it favoured at the same time a frivolous and trifling spirit. Very few of the Roman Epicureans distinguished themselves by a truly philosophical character; and even these adhered literally to the doctrines of their master, without advancing a step beyond them. Such, among others, was *Lucretius*[p], who gave a statement of those doctrines in his didactic poem *De Rerum Naturâ:* as a poem, a work of superior merit[q].

[l] De Div. II, Init.

[m] M. T. Ciceronis Historia Philosophiæ Antiquæ. Ex illius Script. ed. Fried. Gedike, *Berl.* 1782, 8vo.

[n] Among the most considerable were, Catius and Amafanius; C. Cassius, Tit. Pomponius Atticus, Caius Velleius, Bassus Aufidius; add to these the poet Horace, with several more.

[o] Cic. Fin. I, 7; Tusc. Quæst. IV, 3; Ep. ad Div. XV, 19. Senec. Ep. 21, 30.

[p] Born 95, died 50 B. C.

[q] C. Plinius Secundus, author of the Natural History, who died A. D. 79, by the eruption of Vesuvius, and Lucian of Samosata, the satirist (§ 176), who flourished in the second cent. after Christ, (see † J. C. Tiemann, On the Philosophy and Language of Lucian, *Zerbst.* 1804, 8vo.), have been numbered among the Epicureans without sufficient grounds: as well as the contemporaries of the latter, Diogenes Laertius (flourished about 211), and Cel-

Stoics and Cynics.

† C. P. Conz. Dissertations on the Hist. and Characteristics of the later Stoic Philosophy; with an Essay on Christian Morality, on Kant, and the Stoics, *Tüb.* 1794, 8vo.

G. P. Hollenberg, De Præcipuis Stoicæ Philosophiæ Doctoribus et Patronis apud Romanos, *Leips.* 1793, 4to.

J. A. L. Wlosciledler, Ethices Stoicorum recentiorum fundamenta ex ipsorum scriptis eruta, cum principiis Ethicis quæ critica rationis practicæ sec. Kantium exhibet, comparata, *Hamb.* 1797, 8vo.

182. Next to those of Epicurus, the doctrines of the Stoics obtained the greatest success at Rome, especially among men of a severer character[r], who had devoted their lives to public affairs. With such men, the Stoic philosophy being more closely applied to real life, and exercising a marked influence over legislation and the administration of the laws[s], naturally acquired a more

sus. The latter is known to us as an adversary of Christianity by the work of Origen. By some he is esteemed a Neoplatonist.

[r] Such, in the days of the Republic, were the Scipios, and, in particular, the second Scipio Africanus, cf. § 158. C. Lælius; the jurisconsult Pub. Rutilius Rufus, Q. Tubero, Q. Mucius Scævola the augur; and subsequently, Cato of Utica, and M. Brutus, the assassin of Cæsar.

[s] See the preceding note.

We must here take notice of the sect of the Proculians, founded, in the time of Augustus, by Antistius Labeo, and his disciple Sempr. Proculus. This sect was formed in opposition to that of the Sabinians, headed by Masurius Sabinus, a disciple of C. Ateius Capito. See Just. Henning. Boehmeri Progr. de Philosophiâ Jureconsultorum Stoicâ, *Hal.* 1701, 4to.

Ehrh. Ottonis, Oratio de Stoicâ veterum Jurisconsultorum Philosophiâ, *Duisb.* 1714, 4to.

J. Sam. Heuring, De Stoicâ veterum Romanorum Jurisprudentiâ, *Stettin.* 1719.

These three works are collected in that of Gottlieb Slevogt, De Sectis et Philosophiâ Jurisconsultorum Opuscc. *Jen.* 1724, 8vo.

Chr. Wehrenal, De Stoâ Jurisconsultor. Roman. *Rost.* 1727, 4to.

Chr. Frieb. Geo. Meister, Progr. de Philosophiâ Jurisconsultorum Romanorum Stoicâ in Doctrinâ de Corporibus eorumque partibus, *Gott.* 1756, 4to.

Jo. Godofr. Schaumburg, De Jurisprud. veterum Jurisconsultorum Stoicâ, *Jen.* 1745, 8vo.

† J. Andr. Ortloff, On the Influence of the Stoic Philos. over the Jurisprudence of the Romans: a Philos. and Jurisprudential Dissert. *Erlang.* 1787, 8vo.

practical spirit, and began to disengage itself in some degree from speculative subtilties. Besides *Athenodorus* of Tarsus[t], *C. Musonius Rufus* the Volsinian[u], *Annæus Cornutus* or *Phornutus*[x] of Leptis, in Africa, (the two last expelled from Rome by Nero about 66 A. C.), *Chæremon* of Egypt, who was a preceptor of Nero, *Euphrates* of Alexandria, *Dio* of Prusa, or *Dio Chrysostom*[y], *Basilides* and others, we must not forget, as having distinguished themselves in Moral philosophy or by their practical wisdom, *Seneca*[z], *Epictetus* of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a

[t] Flourished about two years after Christ.

† Sevin, Researches concerning the Life and Works of Athenodorus, in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscr. tom. XIII.

J. Fr. Hoffmanni Diss. de Athenodoro Tarsensi, Philosopho Stoico, *Lips.* 1732, 4to.

[u] † Burigny, Mem. on the Philosopher Musonius, in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscr. tom. XXXI.

C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiæ et Apothegmata, ed. J. V. Peerlkamp, *Harl.* 1822, 8vo.

D. Wyttenbachii Diss. (resp. Niewland), de Musonio Rufo Philosopho Stoico, *Amstel.* 1783, 4to.

† Four unedited Fragments of the Stoic Philosopher Musonius, translated from the Greek, with an Introduction respecting his Life and Philosophy, by G. H. Moser, accompanied by the article of Creuzer on this publication, in the Studien, 1810, tom. VI, p. 74.

[x] D. Martini Disp. de L. Annæo Cornuto, Phil. Stoico. *Lugd. Bat.* 1825, 8vo. To him is attributed the *θεωρία περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν φύσεως*, republished by Gale, Opusc. M. et Ph. p. 137.

[y] Both flourished under Trajan and Adrian.

[z] Luc. Ann. Seneca, of Corduba in Spain; the preceptor of Nero. Born about 3, died 65 A. C.

Senecæ Opera ed. Ruhkopf. *Lips.* 1797, sqq. 6 vols. 8vo.

Essay on the Life of the Philosopher Seneca, on his Works, and the Reigns of Claudius and Nero, with Notes (by Diderot), *Paris*, 1778, 12mo.

It is to be found also in the collection of his works, and the French translation of Seneca by La Grange.

† Fell. Nüscheler, The Character of Seneca as deduced from his Life and Writings, *Zurich*, 1783, 8vo. 1 vol.

C. P. Conz, On the Life and Character of Seneca: as a preface to a translation of the Consolatio ad Helv. etc. *Tübing*, 1792, 8vo.

Jo. Jac. Czolbe, Vindiciæ Senecæ, *Jen.* 1791, 4to.

Jo. Andr. Schmidii Disp. de Senecâ ejusque Theologia, *Jen.* 1668, 4to.

Jo. Ph. Apini, Disp. de Religione Senecæ, *Viteb.* 1692, 4to.

Justi Sibeli Seneca Divinis Oraculis quodammodo consonans, *Dresd.* 1675, 12mo.

Fried. Chr. Gelpke, Tractatiuncula de Familiaritate quæ Paulo Apos-

slave who preserved nevertheless a free spirit[z], and who, having been banished from Rome, established a school at Nicopolis in Epirus[a]: *Arrian*[b], a disciple of the preceding, whose doctrines he preserved in writing, and *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, the philosophic emperor[c], and

tolo cum Senecâ Philosopho intercessisse traditur verisimillimâ, *Lips.* 1813, 4to.

CHRIST. FERD. SCHULZE, Prolegomena ad Senecæ Librum de Vitâ Beatâ, *Lips.* 1797, 4to.

† L. Ann. Seneca, by JOH. GE. CARL. KLOTZSCH, *Wittemb.* 1799, 1802, 2 vols. 8vo.

HENR. AUG. SCHICK, Diss. de Causis, quibus Zeno et Seneca in Philosophiâ discrepent, *Marb.* 1822, 4to.

E. J. WERNER, De Senecæ Philosophiâ, *Berol.* 1825, 8vo.

[z] Epicteti Enchiridium et Arriani Dissert. Epictetæ; edid. J. SCHWEIGHÆUSER; Epictetæ Philosophiæ Monumenta, etc, *Lips.* 1799, 1800, 5 vols. 8vo.

† The Manual of Epictetus translated into German by LINCK, *Nürenb.* 1783; and by THIELE, *Francf.* 1790.

Works of Epictetus, translated by CARTER (MRS.), *Lond.* 1758, 4to.

† ARRIAN, Conversations of Epictetus with his Disciples, translated, with Remarks Historical and Philosophical, and a Brief Exposition of the Philosophy of Epictetus, by J. MATH. SCHULZ, *Altona*, 1801—3, 2 vols. large 8vo.

† GILES BOILEAU, Life of Epictetus, and Account of his Philosophy, second edition, revised and corrected, *Paris*, 1667, 12mo.

M. ROSSAL, Disquisitio de Epicteto qua probatur eum non fuisse Christianum, *Groning.* 1708, 8vo.

JO. DAV. SCHWENDNERI Idea Philosophiæ Epicteteæ ex Enchiridio delineata, *Lips.* 1681, 4to.

CHPH. AUG. HEUMANNI Diss. de Philosophiâ Epicteti, *Jen.* 1703, 4to.

LUD. CHR. CRELLII Diss. II, *τὰ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου ὑπέρσοφα καὶ ἄσοφα* in Doctrinâ de Deo et Officiis erga se ipsum, *Lips.* 1711-16, 4to.

JO. ERD. WALTHERI Diss. de Vitâ regendâ secundùm Epictetum, *Lips.* 1747, 4to.

† H. KUNHARDT, On the Principal Points of the Ethics of the Stoics, after the Manual of Epictetus: in the *Neues Museum der Philos. und Literatur*, published by BOUTERWECK, tom. I, fascic. 2; and tom. II, fascic. 1.

† J. FRANC. BEYER, On Epictetus and his Manual of Stoical Morality, *Marb.* 1795, 8vo.

[a] Flourished about 90 A.C.

[b] Flavius Arrianus of Nicomedia, prefect of Cappadocia in 134.

[c] Became emperor in 161, died 180 A.C.

Antonini Commentarii ad se ipsum (*εἰς ἑαυτὸν βιβλία δώδεκα*), ed. THOM. GATAKER; WOLLE; MORUS; JO. MATH. SCHULZ; *Slesv.* 1802, sq[q]., 8vo. Translated into German by the same, with Observations and an Essay on the Philosophy of Antoninus, *Schlesw.* 1799, 8vo.

disciple of the Stoic *Q. Sextus* of Chæronea, the grandson of Plutarch. *Seneca*, who appreciated the truth which he discovered in various systems of philosophy but principally attached himself to that of the Portico [d], was one of the first who drew a distinction between a Scholastic and Practical philosophy. The latter he judged the most essential, its primary object being individual Morality; *(Philosophia Præceptiva)*. He gave admirable rules of conduct, after the principles of the Stoics [e], but betraying at the same time considerable predilection for Exaggeration and Antithesis [f]. *Epictetus* reduced the moral system of the Stoics to a simple formulary, *ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου, sustine et abstine:* and assumed as his leading principle, Freedom.

Antoninus imparted to the same system a character of gentleness and benevolence, by making it subordinate to a love of Mankind, allied to Religion. These two last are much less decided advocates of suicide than Seneca (§ 165). About this period a great number of writings of this school proclaimed a more fixed belief in the immortality of the Soul.—Of the *Cynics* the most distinguished during the second century were: *Demonax* of Cyprus, who taught at Athens; *Crescens* of Megalopolis, and *Peregrinus*, surnamed *Proteus*, of Parium in Mysia; who, they say, burnt himself at Olympia about 168 A. C. The two last contributed nothing to the cause of Science [g].

Chph. Meiners, De M. Aurelii Antonini ingenio, Moribus et Scriptis, in Comment. Soc. Gotting. 1784, tom. IV, p. 107.

Cf. C. Fr. Walchii Comm. de Religione M. Aur. Antonini in numina celebratâ, Acta Soc. Lat. Jenensis, p. 209.

J. Dav. Koeleri Diss. de Philosophiâ M. Aurel. Antonini in Theoriâ et Praxi, *Alton.* 1717, 4to.

Jo. Franc. Buddei Introductio ad Philosophiam Stoicam ad mentem M. Antonini; prefixed to the edition of Antoninus by Wolf, *Leips.* 1729, 8vo.

† J. W. Reche, Essay towards a Statement of the Stoic Maxims according to the Views of Antoninus: in his translation of Antonin. *Francf.* 1797, 8vo.

[d] Ep. 20. 45. 82. 108.

[e] Ep. 94.

[f] Quintil. Inst. X, 1.

[g] Lucian, Demonax, et de Morte Peregrini.—Cf. A. Gellius, N. A. VIII, 3; XII, 11.

Peripatetics.

On each of the Philosophers mentioned in this section, consult Suidas, and the first volume of Patricius, a work cited § 139.

183. The philosophy of Aristotle was not suited to the *practical* character of the Roman mind, and such as devoted themselves to the study of it, became mere commentators of various merit or demerit. We must account *Peripatetics: Andronicus* of Rhodes (§ 150), who arranged and expounded at Rome the works of Aristotle[g]; *Cratippus* of Mitylene, whom Cicero the Younger and several other Romans attended at Athens[h]; *Nicolas* of Damascus[i]; *Xenarchus* of Seleucia, who as well as the preceding, gave lessons in the time of Augustus; *Alexander* of Ægæ, one of the preceptors of Nero[k]; *Adrastus* of Aphrodisias[l]; and more especially the celebrated commentator *Alexander* of Aphrodisias[m],* the disciple of Herminus and Aristocles, who taught at Alexandria.

[g] Flourished about 80 B. C.

It is thought that he was not really the author of the book Περὶ πάθων, ed. Hoeschel, *Aug. Vind.* 1594; and the Paraphrase of Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Dan. Heinsius, *Lugd. B.* 1607, 4to.; 1617, 8vo.; *Cantab.* 1678, 8vo.

[h] Flourished about 48 B. C.

[i] † Franc. Sévin, Inquiry concerning the Life and Works of Nicolas Damascenus, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions; and the Fragments of Nicolaus Dam., published by Orelli, *Lips.* 1804; Suppl. 1811, 8vo. Some critics have attributed to him, without sufficient grounds, the book Περὶ κόσμου, found among the works of Aristotle.

[k] To him are attributed the Commentaries on the Meteorologics and Metaphysics of Aristotle, which by others are assigned to Alexander Aphrodisiensis.

[l] Second century after Christ.

[m] At Venice and Florence have been printed, in the sixteenth century, in a separate form, the different Commentaries attributed to him, on the following works of Aristotle:

The Analytica Priora, the Topics, the Elenchi Sophistarum, the books De Sensu et Sensibili, the Physics, with the treatises De Animâ, and De Fato (Περὶ εἱμαρμένης καὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν).

Cf. Casiri Biblioth. Arabico-Hisp., vol. I, p. 243, for the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

* Called, by way of eminence, the Commentator.

He founded a school of commentators,* which bore his name, and attacked the Stoic doctrine of Fatalism, which he declared irreconcileable with Morality. Among the *Syncretic* Peripatetics, may be mentioned *Ammonius* of Alexandria, who taught at Athens[n]; *Themistius* of Paphlagonia; *Syrianus* and *Simplicius*[o]. (See § 221). The commentaries of the latter, next to those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, are the most distinguished production of these schools.

New Pythagoreans.

184. Pythagoras, whose reputation and even whose philosophy had long been familiar to the Romans[p]; had at the period of which we are treating a large number of followers: his exemplary life, and still more the mysterious character of his history and his doctrines, being the principal causes of the species of enthusiastic reverence with which he was regarded. Some Moral Reformers wished to adopt his principles of practice: of which number were *Qu. Sextius*[q], (a Roman who wrote in Greek), and *Sotion* of Alexandria[r]; both of them acquainted with Seneca at Rome[s]: and to this class of Pythagoreans it is probable that we should refer *Apollonius* of Tyana, in

* Surnamed the Alexandrians and Alexandrists. He differed from Aristotle in his doctrine respecting the soul.

[n] In the first century. Plut. de Et apud Delph. ed. Reiske, tom. vii, p. 512, sqq., et tom. VI, p. 260.

[o] His various commentaries on the works of Aristotle (especially his physical treatises), were published at Venice, at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries.

His Comment. on the Manual of Epict. has been given by Schweigh. Monum. Epict. Phil. tom. IV.

[p] Cic. De Senect., c. 21; Tusc. IV, 2.

[q] Or Sextus. He flourished about 2 A. C.

He must not be confounded with Sextus of Chæronea (§ 182), the Stoic. His Moral Sentences are to be found in the dubious translation of Ruffinus, published by Th. Gale, Opusc. Mythol. Phys., etc. p. 645, sqq.

De Burigny, On the Philosophical System of Sextius, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. XXXI.

[r] About 15 A. C.

[s] Seneca, Ep. 108.

Cappadocia[t], a disciple of *Euxenus* of Heraclea, in Pontus, an imitator of Pythagoras, and a pretender to divination; and finally, *Secundus* of Athens[u]. Others (for instance, *Anaxilaus* of Larissa, banished from Italy under a suspicion of magical practices[x]), applied the principles of Pythagoras to the study of Nature; or, like *Moderatus* of Gades[y], and *Nicomachus* of Gerasa[z], endeavoured to discover, in the Pythagorean doctrine of Numbers, a sublime and occult science[a], which they blended with the theories of Plato.

Neoplatonists.

See the works mentioned § 200; particularly that of BOUTERWECK.

185. After the downfal of the Sceptic Academy (§ 169, 170), even in the time of Augustus, a new school of Platonists began to form itself, and became popular. Among

[t] Flourished about 70 A. C.

Flavius Philostratus de Vitâ Apollonii Tyanæi, in Philostratorum Opp. cura OLEARII, *Lips.* 1709, fol.: where are printed, with many other letters, those attributed to Apollonius.

JO. LAUR. MOSHEIM, Diss. de Existimatione Apollonii Tyanæi; in ejus Commentationib. et Oratt. Var. Arg. *Hamb.* 1751, 8vo., p. 347, sqq.

SIGISM. CHR. KLOSE, Diss. II de Apollonio Tyanensi Philosopho Pythagorico Thaumaturgo, et de Philostrato, *Viteb.* 1723-24, 4to.

J. C. HERZOG, Diss. Philosophia Practica Apollonii Tyanæi in Sciagraphiâ, *Lips.* 1719, 4to.

See also BAYLE, and the article by BUHLE in the great Encyclopedia, published by ERSCH, part IV.

[u] About 120 A. C.

For his Moral Sentences, see SECUNDI ATHENIENSIS RESPONSA AD INTERROGATA HADRIANI, in the work of TH. GALE, referred to above, (note [q],) p. 633, sqq.

[x] He flourished under Augustus.

[y] Flourished first century after Christ.

[z] Second century after Christ.

Nicomachus is said to have been the author of a theory of Numbers (Introductio in Arithmeticam, Gr. *Paris*, 1538, 4to.), explained by JAMBLICHUS; and of a Manual of Harmony (apud MEIBOM.: ANTIQUÆ MUSICÆ AUCTORES, VII. *Amst.* 1652, 4to.)

Fragments of his Symbolics of the Science of Numbers (*Θεολογούμενα ἀριθμητικά*), are to be found in PHOTIUS, Biblioth. Cod. 187, p. 237.

[a] An Essay on this occult science of Numbers is to be found ap. SEXT. EMPIRIC. adv. Mathem. X, 248. Cf. also PORPHYR. Vit. Pythagor., § 32, sqq.

these *Thrasyllus* of Mendes[b], the Astrologer, distinguished himself; with *Theon* of Smyrna[c], the author of an Exposition of Plato[d]; *Alcinous*, who has left us a brief sketch of the Platonic doctrine[e]; *Albinus*, the preceptor of Galen; *Plutarch* of Chæronea[f], a disciple of Ammonius (§ 83), and preceptor of Adrian; *Calvisius Taurus* of Berytus near Tyre[g], the master of *Aulus Gellius; Luc. Apuleius* of Medaurus in Numidia[h]; and *Maximus Tyrius*, the Rhetorician[i].

These philosophers made it their object to disseminate in a popular form, the Ethics and Religious Theory of Plato, and constructed for themselves a system of allegorical interpretation, which connected the doctrines of that system with the ancient religious Mysteries[k]. With this they blended much that was derived from the Pythagoreans and Aristotle; and, in the Dogmatic manner, pursued the most lofty speculations (the outline of which had been traced in the treatises of Plato), on the Deity, the Creator, the Soul of the World, the Demons, the Origin of the World, and that of Evil. They supposed our

[b] First century after Christ.

[c] Eleventh century after Christ.

[d] Theon Smyrnensis de iis quæ in Mathematicis ad Platonis lectionem utilia sunt, Gr. et Lat. ed. Ism. Bullialdus, *Paris.* 1644, 4to.

[e] Alcinoi introductio ad Platonis Dogmata. Gr. cum vers Lat. Mars. Ficini, *Paris.* 1533, 8vo.; republished with Platonis Dialogi IV, ed. Fischer, 1783, 8vo.

[f] Plutarchi Opera Omnia Gr. et Lat. ed. Henr. Stephanus; ed. Reiske, XII vols. 8vo. *Lips.* 1774—82; ed. Hutten, XIV vols. 1791—1804, 8vo. Plutarchi Moralia ex recensione Xylandri, *Bas.* 1574, fol.; ed. Wittenbach, V vols. 4to. *Oxon.* 1795—1800, et XII vols. 8vo.

Plutarch was born 50 died 120 A.C.

[g] About 139.

[h] Flourished about 160.

Apuleii Opera, *Lugd.* 1614, 2 vols. 8vo.;—in usum Delphini 1688, 2 vols. 4to. Particularly his sketch therein of the Platonic Philosophy.

Cf. Apuleii Theologia exhibita a Ch. Falstero in ejus Cogitationib. Philos., p. 37.

[i] Flourished about 180 A.C.

Maximi Tyrii Dissertationes XXXI, Gr. et Lat. ed. Dan. Heinsius, *Lugd. Bat.* 1607 et 1614; ex recens. J. Davisii recudi curavit Jo. Jac. Reiske, *Lips.* 1774-75, 2 vols. 8vo.

[k] Euseb. Præp. Evang. IX, 6, 7.

Ideas to have a substantial existence; and applied their abstract principles to account for phenomena of their own days; for instance, the cessation of oracles[l]. The physician *Galen*[m], the inventor of the Fourth Figure of Logic, was a calm and sedate Platonist who admitted, to account for the phenomena of Life, the existence of a two-fold Spirit, Πνεῦμα Ζωϊκὸν—Ψυχικόν[n]: *Favorinus* of Arelas, in Gaul, was more inclined to Scepticism[o]. These Platonists were at the same time for the most part *Eclectics*, but not altogether after the manner of *Potamo* of Alexandria[p], who, while he selected what he judged most tenable from every system, pretended to form of these extracts a separate doctrine of his own; concerning which we have not sufficient details to enable us to judge[q].

The Neoplatonism of the Alexandrians, as we shall afterwards see, has been improperly deduced from this isolated attempt.

Scepticism of the Empiric School.

Ænesidemus.

Authorities: Eusebii Prepar. Evangel. XIV, 7. 18; Fragments of Ænesidemus, Πυῤῥωνείων λόγων ὄκτω βιβλία, apud Photium, Myriobiblion sive Bibliotheca cod. 212: and in Sextus Empiricus (cf. § 189); Diog. Laert. IX.

See also the article Ænesidemus by TENNEMANN, in the Encyclopedia by ERSCH, part. II.

[l] PLUTARCH. De Def. Orac.; De Is.

[m] CLAUDIUS GALENUS, born at Pergamus 131, died about 200 A. C.

[n] Galeni Opera Omnia, ed. REN. CHARTERIUS, *Paris*, 1679, XIII vols. Cf. § 81.

† KURT SPRENGEL, Letters on the Philosophic System of Galen, in his Collection towards a History of Medicine, part. I, p. 117.

[o] IMM. FRIED. GREGORII Duæ Commentatt. de Favorino Arelatensi Philosopho, etc. *Laub.* 1755, 4to.

Z. FORSMANN, Diss. (præs. EBR. PORTHAN) de Favorino Philosopho Academico, *Abo*, 1789, 4to.

[p] The period when he lived is uncertain.

C. G. GLÖCKNER, Diss. de Potamonis Alexandrini Philosophiâ Eclecticâ, recentiorum Platonicorum Disciplinæ admodum dissimili, *Lips.* 1745, 4to.

[q] DIOG. LAERT. I, 21.

186. Ænesidemus, a native of Gnossus in Crete, settled at Alexandria[r], revived, about the commencement of this period, the Scepticism[s] which had been silenced in the Academy, and wished to make it serve the purpose of strengthening the opinions of Heraclitus to which he was inclined[t]. In conformity with Heraclitus, who lays down that every thing has its contrary, he maintained that we ought to admit universally, that contradictory appearances are presented to each individual[u]. He placed the Thought under the dominion of external objects, making Truth to consist in the universality of the opinion or perception of the *subject* (Man[x]). He accused the Academicians of being deficient in Generalisation, as Sceptics, and thereby contradicting themselves[y]. In order therefore to strengthen the cause of Scepticism, he extended its limits to the utmost: admitting and defending the ten Topics (δέκα τρόποι ἐποχῆς), attributed also to Pyrrho (§ 124); to justify a suspense of all positive opinion. These Topics are deduced: 1. From the diversity of Animals; 2. From that of Mankind considered individually; 3. From the fallibility of our Senses; 4.—The circumstances and condition of the Subject; 5.—Position, Distance, and other local accidents; 6.—The combinations and associations under which things present themselves to our notice; 7.—The different dimensions and various properties of things; 8.—Their mutual relations; 9.—The habitude or novelty of the sensations; 10.—The influence of Education, and Institutions, Civil and Religious[z]. In short,

[r] He probably flourished a little later than Cicero.

[s] According to the testimony of Aristocles, related by Eusebius, loc. laud. At the same time, Diog. Laert. (IX, 114), mentions among the disciples of Timon (§ 124), a certain *Euphranor* of Seleucia, whose lessons *Eubulus* of Alexandria had followed. To the latter he assigns, as disciple, *Ptolemy* of Cyrene, who, he says, revived Pyrrhonism; and whose disciple *Heraclides*, a sceptical philosopher, had been the master of Ænesidemus.

[t] Sext. Adv. Math. IX, 337; X, 216. 233.

[u] Idem, Hypot. I, 210, sqq.

[x] Idem, Adv. Math. VII, 349, 350; VIII, 8.

[y] Photius.

[z] Euseb. Præpar. Evang. XIV, 18. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII, 345; Hypot. I, 36. Cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 87.

Ænesidemus opposed Sceptical objections to every part of Dogmatical philosophy. According to him, Scepticism (πυῤῥώνειος λόγος), is a Criticism exercised with regard to Sensible Phenomena and our Ideas of them; which would convict them all of the greatest inconsistency and confusion[a].

The fault of this Scepticism is its *End*, and *its pretensions to Universality.*

187. The boldest attack made by any of the ancient philosophers on the possibility of demonstrative knowledge, was that attempted by Ænesidemus against the reality of the Idea of Causality; with the application of his ideas to the investigation of natural causes (*Ætiology*[b]). He argued that the idea of Causality is unfounded because we cannot understand the relations of Cause and Effect: which he endeavoured to prove by arguments *à priori;* and also by insisting on the mistakes and false inferences of the Dogmatists in their inquiries into the nature of Causes.

188. From the time of Ænesidemus to that of Sextus, followed a succession of Sceptics, all of them physicians of the Empiric and Methodic Schools[c]; who confined themselves to the observation of facts, and rejected all theory respecting the causes of diseases. Among these, *Favorinus* (§ 185), attached himself to the principles of Ænesidemus. The most distinguished were *Agrippa*, *Menodotus* of Nicomedia, and *Sextus.* Agrippa[d] reduced the ten *Topics* of Dubitation to five more extensive ones, viz. 1. Difference of Opinions; 2. The necessity that every proof should be itself capable of proof; 3. The Relativeness of our impressions; 4. The disposition to Hypothesis; 5. The fault of arguing in a Circle.

Finally he insisted on this, that there cannot be any certain knowledge, either immediately, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, nor me-

[a] Diog. Laert. IX, 78.
[b] Sextus, Adv. Math. IX, 217, sqq.; Hypotyp. I, 180, sqq.
[c] Diog. Laert. IX, 116.
[d] First or second century after Christ.

diately, ἐξ ἑτέρου; and especially applied himself to criticise the *Formal* part of knowledge[e].

Sextus Empiricus.

Sexti Empirici Opera Gr. et Lat. ed. Jo. Alb. Fabricius, *Lips.* 1718, fol. Recens. Struve, *Regiomont.* 1823, 2 vols. 8vo.

Criticisms on this author:

Guil. Langius, De Veritatibus Geometricis adv. Sextum Empiricum, *Hafn.* 1656, 4to.

De primis Scientiarum Elementis, seu Theologia Naturalis methodo quasi Mathematica digestâ. Accessit ad hæc Sexti Empirici adversus Mathematicos decem Modorum ἐποχῆς seu Dubitationis, secundum editionem Fabricii, quibus scilicet Sextus Scepticorum Coryphæus, veritati omni in os obloqui atque totidem retia tendere haud dubitavit, succincta tum Philosophica tum critica refutatio (per Jac. Thomson), *Regiomont.* 1728, (id. 1734), fol.

Gotofr. Ploucquet, Diss. examen rationem a Sexto Empirico tam ad propugnandam quam impugnandam Dei existentiam collectarum, *Tubing.* 1768, 4to.

189. Sextus, surnamed Empiricus, from the School of Physicians to which he belonged, was a native, as appears, of Mitylene[f], and a pupil of Herodotus of Tarsus[g], the Sceptic. He put the finishing stroke to the Philosophy of Doubt, about the end of the second century. While he availed himself of the works of his predecessors, especially Ænesidemus, Agrippa, and Menodotus; he contributed much to define the object, end, and method of Scepticism; particularly in his three books Πυῤῥώνειων ὑποτυπώσεων; and to guard against the attacks of the Dogmatists, he made more accurate distinctions between the operation of his system and the practice of the New Academicians or of the Dogmatists themselves.

190. According to Sextus, Scepticism is the faculty (δύναμις), of comparing the perceptions of the senses and

[e] Diog. Laert. IX, 88, sqq. Sextus, Hypotyp. I, 164—178.

[f] This has been proved by Visconti in his Iconographia, on the testimony of a medal of that city.

[g] Diog. Laert. IX, 116.

the conclusions of reason (φαινόμενα τε καὶ νοούμενα), in order by such a competition, so instituted, to arrive (διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν), at a suspension of all judgment (ἐποχή), on matters the nature of which is obscure to us (ἄδηλον, ἄφανες): hence results a certain repose of the mind (ἀταραξία), and, in the end, a perfect equilibrium (μετριοπαθεία).

His Scepticism admits the existence of perceptions and appearances (φαινόμενα); does not deny the possibility of knowledge but the certainty of it; and abstains from its pursuit. His system is not a Doctrine, but a Manner of contemplating subjects, and consequently does not demand to be proved, but only requires to be stated[h]. His maxim was οὐδὲν μᾶλλον[i]: meaning that no one thing deserves to be preferred to another.

191. Sextus appears sometimes to have forgotten this principle, when he would erect his system into a Doctrine, and represent it as an Art; and an Art destructive of all inquiry after Truth, and denying the possibility of its attainment. He deserves this reproach because: 1. When he finds himself at a loss for arguments of Doubt, he suggests that *hereafter* they may be discovered[k]; 2. He declines all exposition of the real nature of our impressions and knowledge[l]; 3. He entrenches himself, when he finds it necessary, in downright Sophisms[m]; 4. He endeavours, in this manner, by mere sophistical arguments, to prove that no science can be taught or learnt[n]; 5. He goes so far as to argue, in opposition to his own doctrine (§ 190), against the reality of our perceptions[o]; 6. He does not define with sufficient perspicuity the facts which he assumes as data, e. g. our impressions, and the laws of Thought.

[h] SEXTUS, Hypotyp. I, 1. 4. 25.
[i] Ibid, 14.
[k] Ibid. 33, sqq.; II, 259.
[l] Idem, I, 9, sqq.
[m] Adv. Math. I, 9.
[n] Ibid.
[o] Ibid. 351, sqq.

192. Notwithstanding these objections, his statement of Scepticism is a very important work, both in respect of the manner in which he has treated it, and as a record of the state of Science, more especially of Metaphysical Philosophy, among the ancients. In the five last books of his treatises, Πρὸς τοὺς μαθηματικούς, he reviews the doctrines of the principal philosophers on the most important subjects; setting in a strong light the incertitude of their Principles, and contradictory or inconsistent conclusions. He endeavours to show that the Dogmatists had never discovered any solid and irrefragable *criterium* of Truth: and that they all disagree with respect to the Principles of Logic, Physics, and Ethics. Denying the existence of any self-apparent Certainty (in consequence of the contradictions which prevail in the theses of Philosophers), he begins by demanding that every truth should be proved; and then goes on to show that such proof is impossible, for want of self-evident Data. Beginning with such principles he proceeds to demolish all the Scientific labours of the human understanding; not excepting the Mathematics.

193. Such a system of Scepticism had the tendency to cut short all farther research, and appeared to threaten Science itself with extinction. Nevertheless, such a Scepticism contained in itself its own contradiction: pretending to restrain the natural tendency of the human understanding to these inquiries, without being able to make good the object it promised to realise, the repose of the mind. At the time when it appeared it seems to have made little impression; in consequence of the slight interest then felt for philosophical studies; and it died with *Saturninus* (also called Cythenas), a disciple of Sextus[p]. The only persons who paid attention to it were some physicians, such as Galen, (*De optimo docendi genere*[q]), and the philosopher Plotinus[r]. The latter[s] opposed to it a Dogmatism allied to the Supernatural and Enthusiastic.

[p] Diog. Laert. IX, 116.
[q] See § 185.
[r] See § 203.
[s] Plot. Enn. V, lib. V, II.

Philosophic Doctrines of the Jews and Gnostics.

194. It has not been perfectly ascertained whether at this period there existed an Eastern School of Philosophy, Ἀνατολικὴ διδασκαλία [t]. It has been asserted by Mosheim, Brucker [u], Walch [x], and Buhle; and denied by Meiners [y] and Tiedemann [z]. It is impossible to controvert the existence of certain opinions peculiar to the East; but the question is, whether they had already assumed a philosophical form and character, or whether they were not rather developed and brought to perfection in proportion to the progress which Grecian philosophy, and particularly that of Plato, made among the Orientals [a]. This last conjecture becomes still more probable when we reflect that at this period appeared the apocryphal writings, falsely ascribed to Zoroaster, Hermes, and others; as well as when we remark the efforts made by several Gnostics [b], to depreciate the works of Plato [c].

195. On the supposition that the Orientals had a philosophy of their own, it is natural to suppose that the immense extent of the Roman Empire would bring it into contact with that of the Western Nations, and contribute to their admixture. History has afforded us proof of

[t] Cf. THEODOT. in FABRICIUS, Bibl. Gr. tom. V, p. 135; PORPHYR. Vita Plotini, E. XVI; EUNAPII Vita Ædesii, p. 61.

[u] Hist. Crit. Phil. tom. II, c. 3, p. 639, sqq.

[x] Commentat. de Philosophiâ Orientali in MICHAELIS Syntagma Commentatt. part II, p. 279.

[y] † History of Philosophy, p. 170.

[z] † Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. III, p. 98. The same (a prize composition): De Artium Magicarum Origine, *Marb.* 1788, 8vo.

[a] BOUTERWECK, in an excellent treatise, which we shall have occasion to notice § 200, considers the mystical doctrines of immediate Intuition, and the Emanation of Spirits, as having been derived from the East and from Persia; particularly through the channel of Alexandria; where they had already been long established.

[b] PLOTIN. Enn. I, lib. IX, 6.

[c] See BUHLE, Compendium of the History of Philosophy (§ 37), part IV, p. 73, sqq: and the larger work of TENNEMANN on the History of Philosophy (ibid.) tom. VI, p. 438.

this in the doctrines of the Jews, the Gnostics, and the Neoplatonists. Alexandria, where, from the time of the Ptolemies, every system of philosophy had been taught, was the principal point of union between the Eastern and Western doctrines.

I. *Jews.*

See the works mentioned in § 73.

196. During their exile the Jews had collected many opinions belonging to the religion and philosophy of Zoroaster (§ 70), for example, that of a Primitive Light, of Two principles, the Good and the Evil, and of the Demons. Subsequently, a certain number of their countrymen who had settled in Egypt, and, in consequence of their medical studies had engaged in speculation (particularly those who were devoted to a contemplative life, and therefore called Therapeutæ), acquired some knowledge of Grecian philosophy [d]: but the discoveries which they found there they regarded as derived from their own religion. In order to substantiate this idea, Aristeas [e] devised the story of an ancient translation into Greek of the Old Testament; and *Aristobulus* [f], a Peripatetic, forged certain Apocryphal books and passages.

Philo of Alexandria.

Philonis Opera. Fl. Josephi Opera, (see § 73).

Jo. Alb. Fabricii Diss. de Platonismo Philonis, *Lips.* 1693, 4to. Idem.: Sylloge Dissertat. *Hamb.* 1738, 4to.

[d] The resemblance of the Essenes to the Pythagoreans had already been observed. See J. J. Bellermann, Historical Evidences respecting the Essenes and Therapeutæ, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo.

[e] Humfredi Hody, contra Historiam Aristeæ de LXX interpretibus, etc. *Oxon.* 1685, 8vo. Et: De Bibliorum Textibus Origin., Versionibus, etc. 1705, fol.

[f] Lud. Casp. Valkenaer, Diatribe de Aristobulo Judæo, Philosopho Peripatetico, *Lugd. Bat.* 1806, 4to. Other critics however consider the very existence of this author as doubtful, and attribute the Commentaries on the books of Moses, which bear his name, to a later period. He lived, perhaps, in the time of Ptolemy Philometor.

† C. F. STHAL, Attempt at a Systematic Statement of the Doctrines of Philo of Alexandria: in the *Allgem. Bibl. der Bibl. Literatur of Eichhorn*, tom. IV, fasc. V.

† J. CIPH. SCHREITER, Ideas of Philo respecting the Immortality of the Soul, the Resurrection, and Future Retribution: in the *Analecten* of KEIL and TZSCHIRNER, vol. I, sect. 2; see also vol. III, sect. 2.

197. The Jew Philo[g], a man of a cultivated mind, settled at Alexandria, brought forward in a better shape the same opinions. He applied his knowledge of the systems of the Greeks, and, in particular that of Plato, (who has so many points of correspondence with the Orientalists), to the setting forth in a more complete manner (as he fancied), the religion of his country. *Josephus*[h] subsequently followed the same course. On the other hand Philo transferred into his system of Platonic philosophy many of the opinions of the East, in return for those which he borrowed from Plato. He may be considered (as *Bouterweck* has ranked him), as the *first Neoplatonist of Alexandria*. He assumes that the Divinity and Matter, are the two first principles; existing from eternity. Agreeably to the opinions of Plato, he characterises them thus: the Divinity as a Being, Real, Infinite, and Immutable; Incomprehensible to any human understanding (Ὄν): Matter, as non-existing, (μὴ ὄν); but having received from the Divinity a form and life. He represents the Deity, by certain Oriental figures, as the Primitive Light, as an Infinite Intelligence; from whom are derived, by irradiation, all finite Intelligences. In the soul of the Divinity are concentrated the ideas of all things possible. This λόγος of the Divine Being, the focus of all Ideas (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), is in fact the Ideal World; and called also the Son of God, or the Archangel. He is the image of God, the type after which God by his creative power (λόγος προφερικός), formed the world, such as it presented to our senses. We cannot become ac-

[g] Born at Alexandria, some years B. C.

[h] Flavius Josephus, born at Jerusalem, 37 A. C.

quainted with the nature of God but by His immediate influence on our minds: hence the doctrine of internal Intuition[i]. We may clearly observe how, in the writings of Philo, the doctrines of the Jews were modified by those of Platonism; and how this admixture gave birth to new opinions. *Numenius* of Apamea in Syria[k], in part admitted these innovations, and maintained that reason is the faculty of acquiring a knowledge of that which is Absolute, and of whatever lies beyond the limits of sense. He distinguished in the nature of the Divine Being, whom he also maintained to be incorporeal (ἀσώματον), the Supreme Divinity and Pre-existent; an Immutable, Eternal, and Perfect Intelligence: and the Creator of the world or Demiurgos, (νοῦς); having a twofold relation: to the Divinity as His Son, and to the World, as its author. The same philosopher maintained the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul, and styled Plato the Attic Moses, (ἀττικίζων[l]).

The Cabbalists.

Authority: The Talmud.

Liber Jezirah, translatus et Notis illustr. a Rittangelo, *Amstel.* 1642, 4to.

Artis Cabbalisticæ, hoc est reconditæ Theologiæ et Philosophiæ Scriptores; (editor, J. Pistorius), tom. I, *Basil.* 1587, fol.

Kabbala Denudata, seu doctrina Hebræorum transcendentalis et Metaphysica atque Theologica, opus antiquissimæ Philosophiæ barbaricæ variis speciminibus refertissimum, in quo ante ipsam libri translationem difficillimi atque in literatura Hebraica summi, commentarii nempe in Pentateuchum et quasi totum scripturarum V. T. Kabbalistici, cui nomen Sohar, tam veteris quam recentis, ejusque Tikkunim seu supplementorum tam veterum quam recentiorum præmittitur apparatus. Tom. I, *Solisb.* 1677, 4to. tom. II. Liber Sohar restitutus (editore Christ. Knorr de Rosenroth), *Francof.* 1684, 4to.

† Rabbi Cohen Irira, Porta Cœlorum. (A Commentary on

[i] Philo de Mundi Opificio, de Confusione Linguarum, de Somniis, quod Deus sit immutabilis, de Præmiis et Pœnis. Euseb. Præp. Evang. VII, 13; XI, 15; Hist. Eccles. II, 4, sqq.; 7, sqq.

[k] Second century after Christ.

[l] Euseb. Præp. Evang. XI, 10. 18; IX, 6; XIII, 5; XIV, 5; XV, 17.

the two Cabbalistic books above). WOLF, Biblioth. Hebr. *Hamb.* 1721, 4 vols. 4to. (in the first vol.).

† EISENMENGER, Judaism displayed, *Königsb.* 2 vols. 1711, 4to.

† DE LA NAUZE, Remarks on the Antiquity and Origin of the Cabbala, in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscr. tom. IX.

† J. FR. KLEUKER, On the Doctrine of Emanation among the Cabbalists, etc. *Riga*, 1786, 8vo.

† Life of Solomon Maimon, published by PH. MORITZ, *Berlin*, 1792, in 2 parts, 8vo.

† On the Doctrines of Emanation and Pantheism in the first ages of Antiquity, with especial reference to the writers of the Old and New Testaments. An Historical, Critical, and Explanatory Essay, *Erf.* 1805, 8vo.

198. *Cabbala* (that is *oral* tradition) is a system of pretended illumination, diversified by a variety of fables, which the Jews affect to have received from a Divine source through secret tradition. To treat of it only as far as it belongs to the history of philosophy—it had its origin as early as the first centuries of the Christian era, and was invented or systematised by the Rabbi *Akibha*[m], and his disciple *Simeon Ben Jochai, the spark of Moses*. It consists in a string of philosophical legends, which represent all things as descending in a continued scale, from the First Light; the Deity and Creator. They are arranged in ten Sephiroths or luminous circles; and four worlds, Aziluth, Briah, Jezirah, and Aziah. Adam Cadmon, the first man, was the firstborn of the Divinity, the Messiah, by whose means the rest of the universe emanated from the Almighty, who, nevertheless, continues to maintain and uphold the same: God being the inherent cause of all things. All things that exist are of a *spiritual* nature, and matter, is nothing but a condensation or attenuation of the rays of light; forming, as it were, the *embers* of the Divine essence. In a word every substance partakes of the Divine nature.

To this theory of *Emanation* were added a tissue of imaginations respecting the Demons, which involved a belief in magic: respecting the four elements of souls;

[m] Died A. D. 138.

their origin and formation; and lastly with regard to man considered as a microcosm, or little world in himself. This last notion gave occasion to a new fancy, that of pretending to acquire knowledge by ecstacy. The whole is a mass of strange and exaggerated fictions, conceived under the influence of the religion of the Persians, but employed by those who advanced them to recommend to general notice the sacred history and doctrines of the Jews; especially with respect to the creation, and the origin of evil. It is probable that the Cabbalistic books Jezirah and Sohar (see the works mentioned at the head of this §), the first attributed to the Rabbi Akibha, the second to Simeon Ben Jochai, have been from time to time interpolated by their expositors. The Christians became acquainted with the Cabbala, by *name*, only in the fifteenth century; the Jews having carefully concealed from them these mysteries.

II. *Gnostics.*

Walch, De Philosoph. Oriental. Gnosticorum Systematis fonte; and Michaelis de Indiciis Gnosticæ Philosophiæ tempore LXX Interpretum et Philonis; second part of his last Syntagm. Commentt.

Ern. Ant. Lewald, Comment. ad Hist. Religionum vett. illustrandum pertinens, de Doctrinâ Gnosticorum, *Heidelb.* 1818, 8vo.

† J. Aug. Neander, Origin and Development of the principal Gnostic Systems, *Berlin*, 1818, 8vo.

The same author had previously published: De Fidei Gnoseosque ideâ et eâ, quâ ad se invicem et ad Philosophiam referuntur ratione secundùm mentem Clem. Alexandrini, *Heidelb.* 1811, 8vo.

199. The same spirit of extravagant speculation possessed the Gnostics also. They pretended to a superior and mysterious knowledge (γνῶσις) of the Divine Being, and the origin of the World: blending the religious dogmata of the Persians and Chaldees with those of the Greeks and Christians. The greater number of them professed Christianity, though they were looked upon as heretics: Some attached themselves to the

Jewish persuasion; others became its adversaries; others again appear to have belonged to no particular religious creed whatsoever. The most distinguished among them, (for the most part Orientals), were *Simon* Magus, *Menander* the Samaritan, *Cerinthus* the Jew, all belonging to the first century: then *Saturninus* the Syrian, *Basilides*, *Carpocrates*, and *Valentinus* of Alexandria, who approximated the Neoplatonists, (second century): *Marcion* of Sinope[n], *Cerdon* and *Bardisanes*, both Syrians[o], (about the middle of the second century); and *Manes*[p] a Persian, (put to death by Sapor A. D. 277). Their followers subsisted some ages after. One division of them recognised in the Divinity the One Great principle whence they derived all things, according to different degrees or classes of spirits called Æons; another admitted the existence of Two first principles, a Good and an Evil one, continually opposed to, and conflicting with each other. Lastly, a third division of Gnostics maintaining the existence of two Principles (of Light and Darkness), asserted that they were both derived from one common Creator. In general, they identified matter with the Evil principle, and regarded even the formation of the Universe as a fall and declension from the Divine Being. These their leading dogmata were associated with a multitude of fictions incredibly daring and extravagant: and each of which supposed a particular revelation imparted to their authors. The imagination has been allowed among the Orientals a predominant influence, and they delight in losing themselves in a labyrinth of hypotheses allied to the supernatural. Morality could not but suffer in consequence of such extravagancies, and was apt to sink into a narrow asceticism.

[n] Aug. Hahn, Progr. de Gnosi Marcionis Antinomi, P. I and II. *Regiomont.* 1820-21, 8vo. Et: Antitheses Marcionis Gnostici, liber deperditus, nunc quoad ejus fieri potuit restitutus, *ibid.* 1823, 4to.

[o] Aug. Hahn, Bardesanes Gnosticus Syrorum primus Hymnologus. Commentat. Hist. Theol. *Lips.* 1819, 8vo.

[p] † Beausobre, Critical History of Maniches and Manicheism, *Amsterd.* 1734—39, 2 vols. 4to. (French). See also Bayle, s. v. and Walch's Hist. of Heres. part. I. sect. 770.

† K. A. von Reichlin Meldegg, The Theological System of Manes, and its Origin, etc., *Francf. on the M.* 1825, 8vo.

Enthusiastic Neoplatonism of Plotinus; predecessors and successors of this philosopher.

Authorities: The works of Plotinus; Porphyry; Jamblichus; Julian; Eunapius, Vitæ Philosophorum, (see § 81); Sallustius, de Diis et Mundo; Proclus; Suidas.

† Sainte-Croix, Letter to M. Du Theil, on a new edition of all the works of the Eclectic Philosophers, *Paris*, 1797, 8vo.

Gottfr. Olearii Diss. de Philosophiâ Eclecticâ; in his translation of Stanley's History of Philosophy, p. 1205.

† Critical History of Eclecticism, or the Neoplatonists, *Avignon*, 1766, 2 vols. 12mo.

† G. G. Fülleborn, Neoplatonic Philosophy; in his Collect. fasc. III, No. 3.

† Chph. Meiners, Memoirs towards a History of the Opinions of the first century after Christ, with Observations on the System of the Neoplatonists, *Leips.* 1782, 8vo.

C. A. G. Keil, De Causis alieni Platonicorum recentiorum a Religione Christianâ animi, *Lips.* 1785, 4to.

J. G. A. Oelrich, Comm. de Doctrinâ Platonis de Deo a Christianis et recentioribus Platonicis variè explicatâ et corruptâ, *Marb.* 1788, 8vo.

Alb. Christ. Roth, Diss. (præs. J. B. Carpzov) Trinitas Platonica, *Lips.* 1693, 4to.

Joh. Wilh. Jani Diss. (præs. J. G. Neumann) Trinitas Platonismi verè et falso suspecta, *Viteb.* 1708, 4to.

H. Jac. Ledermüller, Diss. (præs. Ge. Aug. Will) de Theurgia et Virtutibus Theurgicis, *Altd.* 1763, 4to.

J. Aug. Dietelmaier, Progr. quo seriem Veterum in Scholâ Alexandrinâ Doctorum exponit, *Altd.* 1746, 4to.

Im. Fichte, De Philosophiæ Novæ Platonicæ Origine, *Berol.* 1818, 8vo.

Frid. Bouterweck, Philosophorum Alexandrinorum ac Neoplatonicorum recensio accuratior. Comment. in Soc. Gott. habita, 1821, 4to. (See Gott. gel. Anz. No. 166, 167, 1821).

200. Neoplatonism had its origin in the frequented school of the Platonists of Alexandria, and was characterised by an ardent and enthusiastic zeal. Its disciples aspired to attain the highest pinnacles of science, to acquire a knowledge of the *absolute*, and an intimate union (ἕνωσις) there-

with, as the final end of man's being. The way thereto they held to be contemplation, (θεωρία).

201. The principal causes which led to this new system were: The decline of genuine Grecian philosophy, and the admixture with its remains of the theories of the East; added to a continually-increasing attachment to Oriental exaggeration and enthusiasm, which they confirmed by frequent appeals to celestial revelations, while they depreciated the merit of Plato as a philosopher[q]. The prevailing spirit of the age, and the decline of the Roman empire contributed to this. To these may be added two other causes: the opposition the Sceptics of the modern school continually made to all pretensions to rational knowledge; and the alarm which the victorious progress of Christianity occasioned to the defenders of the old religion, lest it should be utterly overthrown.

The importance which Platonism assumed in this conflict between the Christians and the Polytheists, added to the daily increasing influence of Oriental notions, caused that philosophy to assume a fresh distinction: its ardent character being aided by the scientific turn of the Greeks, and heightened by the admixture of many other doctrines.

202. Philo of Alexandria (§ 197), Numenius (ibid.) and Atticus, had already given specimens of this sort of mystical speculation, and association of Oriental ideas with those of the Platonists. The same is observable in the writings of many of the Greek Fathers of the Church, Justin, for instance, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen; who not unfrequently *Platonise*. *Ammonius* of Alexandria, a man of low birth, obliged to gain his livelihood as a porter (whence his surname of *Saccas*), and probably also an apostate from Christianity[r], but endowed with a strong love of knowledge, great talents, and an enthusiastic temper, threw himself into this new career of philosophy,

[q] PLOTIN. Enn. II, lib. IX, 6.
[r] EUSEB. Hist. Eccles. VI, 19.

and became the founder of a school[s], which laboured to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle on the most important topics[t]. He infused the same enthusiastic spirit into his disciples, among whom *Longinus*[u], a celebrated critic and judicious thinker[x], *Plotinus*, *Origen*, and *Herennius*, were the most distinguished. The three last made a solemn engagement to keep their doctrines secret[y].

§ 203.

Plotini Opera, *Florentiæ*. 1492, fol., et cum Interpret. Ficini, *Bas.* 1580, 1615, fol.

Plotini liber de Pulchritudine ad Codd. fidem cum Annotatione perpetuâ et præparatione, ed. Fried. Creuzer, *Heidelb.* 1814, 8vo.

Plotinus Περὶ τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς τῶν πάντων, etc.; Villois Anecd. Gr. II, 237, sqq.

† The Enneades of Plotinus translated, with Explanatory Remarks by Doctor J. G. von Engelhardt, preceded by the Life of Plotinus by Porphyry, part. II, *Erl.* 1820, 8vo. See also the Studien of Creuzer, vol. I, *Francf.* and *Heidelb.* 1805.

Porphyrii Vita Plotini, at the commencement of the editions of the works of Plotinus.

Friedr. Grimmii Commentat. quâ Plotini de Rerum principio sententia (Enn. II, lib. VIII, c. 8. 10) Animadversionibus illustratur, *Lips.* 1788, 8vo.

Jul. Friedr. Winzer, Progr. adumbratio decretorum Plotini de Rebus ad Doctrinam Morum pertinentibus. Spec. I, *Viteb.* 1809, 4to.

Plotinus was born A. D. 205, at Lycopolis in Egypt. Nature had endowed him with superior parts, particularly with an extraordinary depth of understanding and a bold

[s] About 193 A. C.

[t] C. F. Rösler, Diss. de Commentitiis Philosophiæ Ammoniacæ fraudibus et noxis, *Tub.* 1786, 4to.

[u] Dav. Rhunkenii Diss. de Vitâ et Scriptis Longini, *Lugd. Bat.* 1776, and the editions of the treatise Περὶ Ὕψους attributed to him, by Toup, More, and Weiske, (*Leips.* 1809, 8vo.).

[x] Born at Athens 213. Put to death at Palmyra, A. D. 275.

[y] Porphyr. Vita Plotini. Euseb. Hist. Eccles. l. l. Hierocles de Providentiâ, in Photius, cod. 251. 214.

and vigorous imagination. He early manifested these abilities in the school of Ammonius at Alexandria. Subsequently he determined to accompany the army of Gordian to the East, in order to study the Oriental systems in their native soil. He returned a dreamer, perpetually occupied with profound but extravagant meditations; labouring to attain the comprehension of the Absolute by contemplation; a notion borrowed from Plato, which became exaggerated in his hands. Carried away by his enthusiasm he thought that he was developing the designs of the philosopher of the Academy, when in fact he exhibited his thoughts only partially and incompletely. The impetuous vivacity of his temper, which caused him perpetually to fall into extravagancies, prevented his reducing his mystical Rationalism to a system. His various scattered treatises were collected by Porphyry in six Enneades[z].

He died in Campania, A. D. 270; having taught at Rome, and excited the almost superstitious veneration of his disciples.

204. Plotinus* assumes, as his principle, that philosophy can have no place except in proportion as knowledge and the thing known,—the *Subjective* and the Objective—are identified. The employment of philosophy is to acquire a knowledge of the Unity, (τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἕν, τὸ ἀγαθόν), the essence and first principle of all things: and that not mediately by thought or meditation, but by a more exalted method, by direct intuition (παρουσία), anticipating the progress of reflection[b]. The end of his philosophy according to Porphyry (§ 215), is an immediate union with the Divine Being[c]. He was led by twofold considerations, Scientific

[z] PORPHYR. Vita Plotini, c. 6 and 24.

* [The translator regrets that he has not been able to diminish much of the obscurity of the system of Plotinus, as detailed in the admirable analysis of Tennemann. Without minute attention, it is not likely that even the practised reader will be able to follow the course of his theory; and unfortunately it will not repay the attention it demands.]

[b] Enn. V, lib. III, 8; lib. V, 7, sqq.; Enn. VI, lib. IX, 3 et 4.

[c] Enn. V, lib. I, 1, 2.

as well as Moral, to this mystical sort of Idealism: the only path which human Reason had not yet essayed.

205. Every thing that exists, exists by the law of Unity; is one; and partakes in Unity. Nevertheless External Nature and Unity are not identical; because every object comprises a plurality of others. Neither is reason Unity; for it contemplates Unity in a complete manner, not *without* but *within* itself. It is at once the subject contemplating and the object contemplated: therefore it is not single but twofold; it is not the first or Primitive Being, but only Unity deduced and derived from some other principle. Primitive Unity is not one thing, but the principle of all things; absolute good and perfection; absolute in itself, and incomprehensible. It has neither quantity nor quality; neither reason nor soul: it exists neither in motion nor repose; neither in space nor time; it is not a numeric unity nor a point, for these are comprehended in other things, in those namely which are divisible; but it is pure Existence without Accident; of which we may form a notion by conceiving it to be sufficient to itself: it is exempt from all want or dependency, as well as from all thought or will: it is not a thinking Being, but Thought itself in action: it is the principle and cause of all things, infinitely small, and at the same time of infinite power; the common centre of all things,—*Good*[d]—*The Deity.*

See the work of Oelrich, § 200, and:

Gottl. Will. Gerlach, Disputatio de Differentiâ, quæ inter Plotini et Schellingii Doctrinam de Numine Summo intercedit, *Viteb.* 1811, 4to.

206. Unity is also represented as Primitive and Pure Light, from which perpetually radiates a luminous circle pervading all space. It imparts the sight and knowledge of itself, and at the same time (without losing its

[d] Enn. VI, lib. IX, 1, sqq.

Unity), it is the essence of all things that exist[e]. The *One* and the *Perfect* continually overflows, and from it Being, Reason, and Life, are perpetually derived, without deducting any thing from its substance, inasmuch as it is simple in its nature, and not, like matter, compound[f]. This derivation of all things from Unity, does not resemble Creation which has reference to time, but takes place purely in conformity with the principles of causality and order, without volition; because to will is to change[g]. From this primordial Unity there emanates, in the first place (as light does from the sun), an eternal essence of the most perfect nature; viz. Pure Intelligence, (νοῦς), which contemplates Unity, and requires only *that* for its existence. From this in its turn emanates the Soul of the world, (ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός or τῶν ὅλων).

Such are the three elements of all real existence: which themselves have their origin in Unity[h]: this has been (somewhat *impiously*) called the Trinity *(Trias)* of Plotinus[i].

207. Pure Intelligence (Νοῦς), is the efflux and the image of Unity; but inasmuch as it contemplates Unity as its object, it becomes itself a subject, and is thus distinguished from that which it contemplates; hence the first instance of Duality. Inasmuch as Intelligence contemplates in Unity that which *is possible*, the latter acquires the character of something determined and limited; and so becomes the *Actual* and *Real* (ὄν). Consequently, Intelligence is the primal reality, the base of all the rest, and inseparably united to real Being. The object contemplated and the thinking subject, are identical; and that which Intelligence thinks, it at the same

[e] Enn. III, lib. VIII, 8, 9; Enn. VI, lib. VIII, 16; Enn. IV, lib. III, 17; Enn. V, lib. I, 7.

[f] Idem, VI, lib. IX, 9.

[g] Idem, V, lib. I, 6.

[h] Idem, II, lib. IX, 1. III; lib. V, 3, V; lib. I, 3 et 6; lib. II, 1.

[i] Joh. Heim. Feustking, De Tribus Hypostasibus Plotini, *Viteb.* 1694, 4to. Cf. Dissertations of Roth and Janus, quoted § 200.

time *creates*. By always thinking, and always in the same manner, yet continually with some new difference, it produces all things: it is the essence of all imperishable *essences:* the sum total of infinite life [k].

208. The Soul (i. e. the *Soul of the World*), is the offspring of Intelligence, and the thought (λόγος) of Intelligence, being itself also productive and creative. It is therefore Intelligence, but with a more obscure vision and less perfect knowledge; inasmuch as it does not itself directly contemplate objects, but through the medium of Intelligence; being endowed with an energetic force which carries its perceptions beyond itself. It is not an original but reflected light, the principle of action, and of external Nature. Its proper activity consists in contemplation (θεωρία); and in the production of objects by means of this contemplation. In this manner it produces, in its turn, different classes of souls, and among others the human; the faculties of which have a tendency to elevation or debasement. The energy of the lowest order, creative, and connected with matter, is Nature (φύσις [l]).

209. Nature is a contemplative and creative energy, which gives form to matter (λόγος ποιῶν); for form (εἶδος—μορφή); and thought (λόγος); are one and the same. All that takes place in the world around us is the work of contemplation [m]. Thus from Unity, as from the centre of a circle, are progressively derived Plurality, Divisible Being, and Life; by continued abstraction. In Unity, form and matter are distinguishable; for it is Form that fashions; which supposes something capable of receiving a determinate impression [n].

210. Form and Matter, Soul and Body, are inseparable.

[k] Enn. VI, lib. VIII, 16; Enn. IV, lib. III, 17; Enn. VI, lib. VII, 59; lib. VIII, 16; Enn. V, lib. I, 4, 7; lib. III. 5. 7; lib. V, 2; lib. IX, 5; Enn. VI, lib. VII, 12, 13.

[l] Enn. V, lib. I, 6, 7; lib. VI, 4; Enn. VI, lib. II, 22.

[m] Enn. III, lib. VIII.

[n] Enn. II, lib. IV, 14; Enn. III, lib. VI, 7.

There never was a time when the universe was not animated; but as we can *conceive* it not to have been so, the question suggests itself: *What is matter; and how was it produced by Unity* (since the latter is the principle of all Reality?) Matter is real, but devoid of Form; it is indeterminate, capable of receiving a form, and stands in the same relation to it as shade to light. Unity, as being the cause of Reality, continually progresses from itself as a centre: and following this progressive scale of production to the end, we arrive at a final product, beyond which no other is possible; an ultimate term whence nothing can proceed, and which ceases to retain any portion of unity or perfection. The Soul, by its progressive contemplation, which is at the same time *production* also, creates for itself the scene of its action; that is, Space, and therewith *Time* also. The Soul is a light kindled by Intelligence, and shedding its rays within certain limits, beyond which is night and darkness. It contemplates this darkness, and gives it a form, from its own incapability of enduring any thing unimpressed by Thought; and thus out of darkness it creates for itself a beautiful and diversified habitation, inseparable from the cause which produced it; in other words it bestows on itself a body [o].

Plotinus appears sometimes to regard unformed or rude matter as a product of the mind, but through an imperfection in its operations: supposing the mind while occupied in creation to have been sometimes carried out of itself, without fixing its view on the First and Perfect Principle; and consequently becoming liable to indeterminateness [p]. At other times he speaks of unformed matter as possessed of reality, but *not* derived from the Soul [q].

211. There is an Intellectual as well as a Sensible World: the latter is but the image of the former, and

[o] Enn. I, lib. VIII, 7; Enn. III, lib. IV, 9; Enn. II, lib. III, IV.
[p] Enn. I, lib. VIII, 3, 4.
[q] Enn. III, lib. VIII, 1.

hence their perfect accordance. The intellectual world is a Whole, Invariable, Absolute, Living; undivided in point of Space; unchangeable through time: it is Unity in Plurality and Plurality in Unity.* Indeterminateness exists even in the Intellectual world: the greater the distance from True Being the greater the degree of Indeterminateness.

In the Sensible World, (the reflection of the former), are plants, the earth, rocks, fire, etc.—all of them endued with life; for the World itself is an animated Idea. Fire, air, and water are ideas endowed with life: a Soul inhabiting Matter, as a creative principle.

Nothing in Nature is devoid of *Reason:* even the inferior animals possess it, but in a different degree from man[r].

212. Every object possesses Unity and Multiplicity. To the Body belongs Multiplicity, divisible with reference to Space. The Soul is an essence devoid of extent, immaterial, and simple in its nature; without body; or with a body which has two natures, the superior one indivisible: the inferior divisible. (Descent of Souls from the Intellectual to the Sensible world).

Plotinus states very ably the metaphysical arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the Soul: but at the same time gives loose to an extravagant imagination in his dreams respecting the reunion of the immaterial element with the corporeal substance[s].

213. Every thing that takes place is the result of Necessity, and of a principle identified with all its consequences; (in this we see the rudiments of Spinozism, and the Theodicée of Leibnitz[t]). All things are connected

* [The reader will be obliged to me for occasionally omitting small portions of this statement (as I have done elsewhere), which are too abrupt and concise to be intelligible to any one but those who may have just read the original author, and therefore have no occasion to consult the present work. *Trans.*]

[r] Enn. IV, lib. IV, VIII, IX; Enn. VI, lib. IV, VII.

[s] Enn. IV, lib. I, II, III, VI.

[t] Enn. VI, lib. VII, 8—10; Enn. IV, lib. IV, 4, 5; Enn. VII, lib. II, 3.

together by a perpetual dependency; (a system of universal Determinism, from which there is only one exception, and that rather apparent than real, of *Unity*). Out of this concatenation of things arise the principles of natural Magic and Divination[u]. As for the existence of Evil in the external world, Plotinus considers it to be sometimes an unavoidable negation of good, at others, something positive; such as Matter, Body; and, in this latter particular, sometimes as being superadded to the soul, and the cause of imperfection in its productions; sometimes as seated within the soul, as its imperfect product. In this manner he falls into the very fault which he urges against the Gnostics[x]. He is also led to adopt a system of Optimism and Fatalism, adverse to Morality[y]; though occasionally he admits that moral Evil is voluntary, and the author of it accountable[z].

214. Unity (the Divinity), being Perfection itself, is the end and object of all things, which derive from him their nature and their being; and which cannot become perfect but through him. The Human Soul cannot attain perfection or felicity but by the contemplation of the Supreme Unity, by means of an absolute abstraction (ἁπλώσις, Simplification), from all compounded things, and by ascending to the heights of pure existence. In this consists Virtue, which is twofold: Inferior Virtue, (or πολιτική), belonging to such souls as are in the progress of purification; and Superior Virtue, which consists in an intimate union, by contemplation, with the Divine Being (ἕνωσις). Its source is the Divinity himself. The Soul acquires by its contemplation of Divine beauty a similar grace; and derives warmth from the Celestial fire[a].

215. This system is built on two principles unsup-

[u] Enn. III, lib. II, 16; Enn. IV, lib. IV, 32. 40.
[x] Enn. I, lib. VIII; Enn. II, lib. IX; Enn. III, lib. II.
[y] Enn. I, lib. VIII, 5; Enn. III, lib. II, 18.
[z] Enn. III, lib. II, 9, 10.
[a] Enn. I, lib. II, VIII, 13; Enn. VI, lib. VII, c. 22; lib. IX, 9—11.

ported by proof. These are: 1st. That the Absolute and Universal, which is inaccessible to the senses, is the Principle of the Universe, and may be recognised as such: 2dly. That it can be comprehended by means of an intellectual contemplation, superior in its nature to Thought itself. Plotinus represents Thought as Contemplation—transforms Philosophy into Poetry—and our conceptions into substantial objects. His doctrine is a perversion of some Platonic notions carried to extravagance by the enthusiasm prevalent in that age. Neglecting the humble question of *possibilities*, his philosophy pretends to supply at once a complete theory of universal knowledge. At the same time it certainly contains several valuable hints respecting our faculties for acquiring knowledge, and some elevated thoughts, which have been borrowed and improved by other philosophers. It acquired the highest popularity, principally because it derived knowledge from a source superior to the senses; and owing to its doctrine of a *Triad*, and the relation it supposes between it and the external world: and in short was considered a complete exposition of the theory of the Great Plato: of that Plato whom men began now to consider divinely inspired[b]. Next came the attempt to prove the correspondence of Plato's system with those anterior doctrines whence he was supposed to have derived so many of his own: viz. of Pythagoras, Orpheus, Zoroaster, and Hermes; and they were not long without apocryphal books also, attributed to the same, to substantiate this notion. They went farther, and desired to prove a like correspondence between Plato and his successors, particularly Aristotle. All these attempts, which were inconsistent with a truly philosophical spirit, did but foster the prevailing taste of the age for superstition and mystical exaggeration. (Magic and Divination, etc.).

Among the numerous disciples of Plotinus were principally distinguished *Porphyry* (whose proper name was *Malchus*), and *Amelius* or *Gentilianus* of Etruria. The

[b] Procli Theol. Platonis, lib. I, c. 1.

works of the latter, illustrative of the theory of Plotinus, have not come down to us.

§ 216.

Porphyrii Liber de Vitâ Pythagoræ, ejusdem sententiæ ad intelligibilia ducentes, cum Dissertatione de Vitâ et Scriptis Porphyrii, ed. LUCAS HOLSTENIUS, *Rom.* 1630, 8vo. Cf. § 88.

Porphyrii de abstinentiâ ab esu Animalium libri IV, ed. JAC. DE RHOER, *Traj. ad Rhen.* 1767, 8vo.

Ejusd.: Epist. de Diis, Dæmonibus ad Anebonem (in IAMBL. de Mysteriis, *Ven.* 1497. Cf. § 217).

Ejusd.: De quinque Vocibus, seu in Categorias Aristotelis Introductio, Gr. *Paris.* 1543, 4to; Lat. per Jo. BERN. FELICIANUM, *Venet.* 1546, 1566, fol.

Πορφυρίου φιλοσόφου πρὸς Μαρκέλλαν, etc. Invenit, interpretatione notisque declaravit Angelus Majus, etc. acc. ejusdem Poeticum Fragmentum, *Mediol.* 1816, 8vo.

Malchus or *Porphyry* was born A. D. 233, at Batanea, a colony of the Tyrians in Syria, and after having been formed by the instructions of Origen and Longinus, whom he attended at Athens (§ 202), he went to Rome at the age of thirty, and there frequented the school of Plotinus, of whom he became a passionate admirer, and subsequently the biographer (§ 203). He possessed much more knowledge than his master, but less depth of understanding; coupled with considerable vanity and love of distinction. To judge from his writings, he possessed an inquisitive and critical spirit, and did not scruple to express doubts respecting some particulars of the Pagan mythology, the belief in apparitions, for instance, and demons[c]; but on the other hand he was at times carried away by mystical and extravagant notions. He appears to have been so particularly in his latter days; when, like Plotinus, he pretended to have been honoured by a divine vision[d]. His labours were principally devoted to the explanation and diffusion of the philosophy of his

[c] See his Epistle to Anebo.

[d] Porphyr. Vita Plot. sub fin.

master; to an attempt to blend the theory of Aristotle with those of Plato and Pythagoras; to the elucidation of certain topics connected with his religion, such as those of sacrifice, divination, the demons, and oracles; and lastly, to attacks on Christianity, against which he composed certain works [e], while resident in Sicily. He taught eloquence and philosophy at Rome, after the death of Plotinus, and died A. D. 304.

Iamblichus.

Iamblichus de Mysteriis Ægyptiorum liber seu Responsio ad Porphyrii Epistolam ad Anebonem, Gr. et Lat. ed. Thom. Gale, *Oxon.* 1678, folio; with the other works of Iamblichus.

Ejusd.: Περὶ βίου Πυθαγορικοῦ λόγος. See § 88: (with)

Ejusd.: Λόγος προτρεπτικὸς εἰς φιλοσόφιαν, adhortatio ad Philos. Textum, etc., recensuit, interpretatione Latina, etc., et Animadversionibus instruxit Theoph. Kiessling, *Lips.* 1813, 8vo.

Ejusd.: De Generali Mathematum Scientia (the original in the Anecdota Græca of Villoison, tom. II, p. 188, sqq.), and Introductio in Nicomachi Geraseni (see § 184) Arithmeticam, ed. Sam. Tennulius, *Arnh.* 1668, 4to, et Theologumena Arithmetices, *Paris.* 1543, 4to.

Ge. E. Hebenstreit, Diss. de Iamblichi Philosophi Syri doctrina, Christianæ Religioni quam imitari studet, noxia, *Lips.* 1704, 4to.

217. The mystical philosophy of Iamblichus was even still better adapted to the temper of the age. He was born at Chalcis in Cœle-Syria, became the disciple of a certain Anatolius and of Porphyry: obtained the surname of Θαυμάσιος and Θειότατος, and died A. D. 333. In reputation he soon surpassed his master, Porphyry; but not in talent. In his life of Pythagoras he appears as a Syncretist, or compiler and combiner of different systems, but without critical talent. In the fragments of his work on the soul, and in his letters [f], we discover some good sense, and more acquaintance with his opinions of the old philosophers,

[e] Euseb. VI, 19, Hist. Eccles.

[f] Preserved to us by Stobæus.

with which he is apt to blend his own philosophical tenets. It is very doubtful[g] whether he was the author of the work on the mysteries of the Egyptians, but if so, no one ever carried to a greater length than he did, the mysticism and extravagance of his age. Styling himself the priest of the Divinity, he there, with the most perfect assurance, gives solutions of the queries proposed by Porphyry in his letter to Anebon (§ 216): and defines with the utmost minuteness the different classes of angels, the apparitions of gods and demons; with a multitude of details equally authentic. He maintained the doctrine of union with God (θραστικὴ ἕνωσις), by means of theology and theurgy, or the supernatural science; to which he made philosophy subordinate.

By Theurgy he meant to express the practice of certain mysterious actions, supposed to be acceptable to the Divinity; and the influence of certain incommunicable symbols, the perfect knowledge of which belongs to God alone, whereby the Divinities are influenced according to our wishes: and to give some colour to these extravagances he referred to the Hermetical books, whence he chose to suppose that Pythagoras and Plato had derived their theories.

Successors of Iamblichus and their contemporaries.

218. *Iamblichus* had a great number of followers; among others *Dexippus*, *Sopater* of Apamea, *Ædesius*, the successor of Iamblichus, and *Eustathius* the successor of the latter, both of Cappadocia. Among the disciples of Ædesius were *Eusebius* of Myndus, and Priscus of Molossis, both of whom rejected the belief in Magic and Theurgy[h], to which *Maximus*[i] of Ephesus and *Chrysanthius* of Sardes were inclined. To the school of the latter be-

[g] See MEINERS, Commentat. Soc. Gotting. 1782, vol. IV, p. 50; and TIEDEMANN, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. III, p. 473, sqq.

[h] EUNAP. Vit. Soph. p. 69.

[i] Μαξίμου φιλοσόφου περὶ καταρχῶν, rec. etc. ed. GERHARD, *Lips.* 1820, 8vo.

longed *Eunapius* of Sardes[i], and the emperor *Julian*[k]. The Neoplatonic system was taught in part by *Claudian*, brother of *Maximus*, and by *Sallust*, the same doubtless who became consul under Julian, A. D. 363, and wrote an abstract of this system[l]. Then came the Eclectic *Themistius* of Paphlagonia[m] (§ 183), who taught at Nicomedia and Constantinople: the commentator and compiler *Macrobius*[n]: the Eclectics *Hierocles* and *Olympiodorus*, who taught at Alexandria[o] and *Æneas* of Gaza, the disciple of Hierocles (§ 224), who subsequently became a convert to Christianity. After the close of the fourth century, Athens became the principal seat of the new philosophy, where it was professed by *Plutarch* of Athens, the son of Nestorius[p], who was surnamed the Great; by *Syrianus* of Alexandria, his disciple and successor, who taught the Aristotelian system as an introduction to that of Plato[q]; by *Proclus* (see following §); and by *Hermias*[r] of Alexandria, a pupil of Syrianus, and husband of *Ædesia*, also a disciple of this school.

[i] See Bibliogr. § 81.

[k] Became emperor 360, died 363 A.C.

Juliani Opera ed. Dion. Petavius, *Paris.* 1630, 4to. Ed. Ezech. Spanheim, *Lips.* 1696, fol.

Ad. Kluit, Oratio inauguralis pro Imperatore Juliano Apostatâ, *Middelb.* 1760, 4to.

Joh. Pet. Ludewig, Edictum Juliani contra Philosophos Christianos, *Hal.* 1702, 4to.

Gottl. Fr. Gudii Diss. de Artibus Juliani Apostatæ Paganam superstitionem instaurandi, *Jen.* 1739, 4to.

Hiller, De Syncretismo Juliani, *Viteb.* 1739, 4to.

† Aug. Neander, On the Emperor Julian and his Age, *Leips.* 1812, 8vo.

[l] Sallustii Philosophi de Diis et Mundo, lib. Gr. et Lat. ed. Leo Allatius, *Rom.* 1638, 12mo; et *Lugd.* 1639. Id.: Opusc. Myth. Gale. Emendatius edidit, Lucæ Holstenii et Thomæ Galei Annotationibus integris, Formeii autem selectis aliorumque, etc., illustr. Jo. Conr. Orellius, *Turici.* 1821, 8vo.

[m] In the latter part of the fourth century.

[n] Aurelius Macrobius Ambrosius Theodosius, flourished about 409.

[o] Fifth century.

[p] 350—430 A.C.

[q] Died about 450 A.C.

[r] Not to be confounded with the Christian philosopher of the same name, who attacked Paganism in the third century. (Irrisio Philos. Gentil. ed. Guil. Worth. *Oxon.* 1700, 8vo.)

Proclus.

Marini Vita Procli Gr. et Lat. ed. J. A. FABRICIUS, *Hamb.* 1700, 4to; ed. Jo. Fr. BOISSONADE, *Lips.* 1814, 8vo.

Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera e codd. MSS. Bibl. Reg. Paris. Nunc primùm edid. VICTOR COUSIN, tom. I—V, *Paris.* 1819-24, 8vo.

Procli in Theologiam Platonis lib. VI, unà cum Marini Vitâ Procli et Procli Instit. Theol. Gr. et Lat. ed. ÆMIL. PORTUS et F. LINDENBROG, *Hamb.* 1618, fol. ed. FABRICIUS, 1704, 4to.

Ejusdem: Commentariorum in Platonis Timæum lib. V, *Bas.* 1534, fol.

Commentary on the Alcibiades of Plato, by Proclus. Two portions of this work, viz. De Animâ ac Dæmone; and De Sacrificiis et Magiâ, were published by FICINUS, in Latin, *Ven.* 1497, fol.: and often republished. Another portion, Περὶ ἑνώσεως καὶ κάλλους, has been published after the MSS. by CREUZER. The Dissertation of Plotinus is added thereto (§ 203).

Initia Philosophiæ ac Theologiæ ex Platonicis fontibus ductæ sive Procli Diadochi et Olympiodori in Platonis Alcibiadem Commentarii. Ex codd. MSS. nunc primùm Græcè ed. Fr. CREUZER, part I—IV, *Francof.* 1820-25.

† DE BURIGNY, Life of the Philosopher Proclus, and Notice of a MS. containing some of his works hitherto unpublished: in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, tom. XXXI.

219. This philosophy was reinforced by the accession of Proclus, surnamed Διάδοχος, and born at Constantinople A. D. 412. He spent his ardent and enthusiastic youth at Xanthus[s], a city devoted to Apollo and Minerva, where his parents resided. Thence he removed to Alexandria, where Olympiodorus was teaching; and subsequently to Athens, where the lessons of Plutarch, of Asclepigenia his daughter, and his successor Syrianus[t] (§ 218), instructed him in the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato. When on his travels he procured himself to be initiated in all the mysteries and arcana of Theurgy. He united an imaginative temper to great learning, but was unable to balance his acquirements by any weight of un-

[s] In Lycia, hence he was called *Lycius*.

[t] Proclus succeeded the latter in his school of Platonism—whence his name Διάδοχος.

derstanding. He looked upon the Orphic poems and Chaldæan oracles, which he had diligently studied, as divine revelations (§ 71), and capable of becoming instrumental to philosophy by means of an allegorical exposition; whereby also he endeavoured to make Plato and Aristotle agree[u]. He called himself the last link of the Hermaic chain (σειρὰ ἑρμαϊκή), that is, the last of men consecrated by Hermes, in whom, by perpetual tradition, was preserved the occult knowledge of the Mysteries[x]. He elevated faith (πίστις), above Science, as forming a closer bond of union with Good and *Unity*[y].

220. His sketch of philosophy contains a commentary on the doctrines of Plotinus, and an attempt to establish this point, that there is but one real cause and principle of all things, and that this principle is Unity, which produces all things in one uniform order, by triads. His obscure system was founded on an imperfect analysis and synthesis of the properties of Being, of which it admitted three grand divisions, Existence, Life, and Reason, or Νοῦς. All these he derived from Unity, and made them the sources of three other triads (Enned).

He distinguished the Divinities, (making these also descend from Unity and give birth to triads), into Intelligible and Intelligent, Supernatural and Natural: attributed a Supernatural efficacy to the *name* of the Supreme Being, and, like his predecessors, exalted Theurgy above Philosophy[z]. Proclus also attacked the Christian religion; being principally offended by the doctrine of the creation of the world[a]. In his three treatises on Providence, Fate, and Evil[b], he states with great ability his notion that

[u] Marin., p. 53—67; Procli Theol. Plat. I, 5; Comment. in Tim. V, p. 291.

[x] Marini Vita Procli, p. 76; Photius, cod. 242.

[y] Theologia Plat. I, 25. 29.

[z] In Timæum, p. 291. 299. Theol. Plat. I, 25. 29.

[a] Procli XXII Argumenta adversus Christianos, apud Philoponum, de Æternitate Mundi contra Proclum. ed. Trincavelli, Gr. 1535, fol.; Lat. *Lugd. Bat.* 1557.

[b] See Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. tom. VII et VIII, for extracts from a Latin translation.

the latter does not spring from *Matter*, but from the limitation of Power, and labours to reconcile the system of Plotinus with the conclusions of sound reason.

221. Proclus died A. D. 485, with a reputation for wisdom and even for miraculous powers approaching adoration; leaving behind him a crowd of followers, of whom some were females, such as *Hypatia*[c], *Sosipatra*, *Asclepigenia*, etc. His disciples were of very different degrees of talent, but little distinguished for improving the sort of philosophy he had bequeathed them. Among the most considerable were *Marinus* of Flavia Neapolis (Sichem), who succeeded Proclus as a teacher at Athens; and composed his life (see § 219); but subsequently differed from him in his interpretation of Plato; then *Isidorus* of Gaza, who took the place of Marinus at Athens, and afterwards removed to Alexandria; an enthusiastic character but devoid of originality; with *Zenodotus* the successor of the latter, in what they termed the Golden Chain: Still later *Heliodorus* and *Ammonius*, both the sons of Hermias of Alexandria (§ 218); and of whom the latter taught there; then the Egyptians *Heraiscus* and *Asclepiades*, *Asclepiodotus*, *Severianus*, *Hegius*, and *Ulpian*, the brother of Isidorus. To this epoch belongs likewise *John Stobæus* the compiler[d]. The last who taught the Neoplatonic system in the Academy of Athens was *Damascius* (of Damascus[e]), a disciple of Ammonius the son of Hermias, as well as of Marinus, Isidorus, and Zenodotus. He united a certain clearness of understanding to an active imagination; and being dissatisfied with the manner in

[c] Jo. Chph. Wernsdorf, Diss. IV de Hypatiâ, Philosopha Alexandrina, *Viteb.* 1747-48; et Jo. Chph. Wolf, Fragmenta et Elogia Mulierum Græcarum.

[d] John Stobæus of Stobi in Macedon, flourished at the beginning of the sixth century. For his collection see § 81.

[e] Fragments of his treatise, Ἀπόριαι καὶ λύσεις περὶ ἀρχων, are to be found in the Anecd. Gr. of Wolf. tom. III, p. 195, sqq. Fragments of the Biography of the Philosophers by Damascius (the Fragments relate to Isidorus of Gaza), are found apud Photium, cod. 142, and 118.

Damascius Damascenus flourished in the first half of the sixth century.

which Plotinus had subdivided Primitive Unity into many subordinate Unities, (Triad of Triads—or Ennead), he laboured to reduce every thing to a Simple Unity; at the same time that he admitted the impossibility of adequately comprehending the primordial and abstract principle of all things; and asserted that it was accessible to the human understanding only by means of analogies, and symbols, and that partially.

Among his disciples and those of Ammonius was the celebrated commentator on Aristotle, *Simplicius* of Cilicia[f]; who, as well as his teachers, endeavoured to reconcile Aristotle and Plato. The emperor Justinian having by a severe decree caused the schools of the heathen philosophers to be shut[g], Damascius, with Isidorus, Simplicius and others, was obliged to fly into Persia, to the protection of the king Chosroes. They returned indeed A. D. 533, but the ardour of this sect which had so long and so widely prevailed, and had exerted an insensible influence even over the opinions of the Christian philosophers, was manifestly on the decline.

Philosophy of the Fathers of the Church.

† Joh. Aug. Eberhard, Spirit of Primitive Christianity, *Halle*, 1807-8, 3 vols. 8vo.

† Fr. Köppen, Philosophy of Christianity, 2 parts, *Leips.* 1813-15, 8vo. Second edition, 1825.

† J. W. Schmid, On the Spirit of the Morality of Jesus and his Apostles, *Jen.* 1790, 8vo.

† J. Lud. Ewald, Spirit and Tendency of Christian Morality, *Tüb.* 1801, 8vo.

† C. Fr. Rösler, Dissertation on the Philosophy of the Primitive Christian Church, in the fourth vol. of his Library of

[f] Flourished about the middle of the sixth century.

Jo. Gottl. Buhle, De Simplicii Vitâ, ingenio et meritis, *Gott. Anz.* 1786, p. 1977. The Commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle's Categories, Physica, and the books de Cœlo, and de Animâ, were published at Venice, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Schweighæuser has given his Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus: Monum. Epict. Philos. tom. IV.

[g] A. D. 529.

the Fathers. See also his work: De Originibus Philosophiæ Ecclesiasticæ, *Tubing.* 1781, 4to.

Joh. Ge. Rosenmüller, De Christianæ Theologiæ Origine, *Lips.* 1786, 8vo.

† Marheinecke, On the Origin and Progress of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy, in the three first Ages of Christianity, *Studien*, tom. III, *Heidelb.* 1807, 8vo.

† C. W. Fr. Walch, Outline of a complete History of Heresies, 2 vols. *Leips.* 1762-85, 8vo.

C. Ch. Fr. Schmid, Progr. de ignaviâ Errorum in Religionis Christianæ Disciplina vulgarium principe causâ, *Jen.* 1698, 4to.

† W. Münscher, Manual of the History of Christian Doctrines, I and II vol. second edition, *Marb.* 1802-4; III and IV vol. 1802-9, 8vo.; third edition, 1817, etc.

222. The Christian religion was formed for Universality, by its Simplicity, its close alliance with Morality, and the Spirit of its worship, at once mild and severe. Its first teachers justly placed its claim to acceptation on the broad basis of its divine original, and were led to contrast its doctrines with those which had been devised by human reason. The limits of Truth and of Duty had, (if mankind would have been satisfied), been at last defined; and the strange dissensions of inquirers after both, reconciled. But the fact of the divine origin of the religion gave occasion to various questions; and it was asked, how revelation can be established; how it can be ascertained that a doctrine is divine; and what is its true import? Hence the various degrees of authority allowed by different parties to the pretensions of Tradition and Philosophy.

223. The disciples whom Christianity was continually gaining in different countries, were embued with very different principles and feelings, and many of them had also imbibed some philosophical system or other. The knowledge which such had already acquired of the theories of the Greeks; the necessity of replying to the attacks of Heathen adversaries; and the desire of illustrating the Christian doctrines, and forming into a whole

the solutions which were offered from time to time of the questions and cavils of their adversaries,—all these causes gradually led to the formation of a species of philosophy peculiar to Christianity, which successively assumed different aspects, as regarded its principles and object.

By these means something of the Grecian spirit of philosophy was transfused into the writings of the Fathers of the Church; and in after times proved the germ of original speculations.

224. Many of the Fathers of the Church, especially the Grecian, considered philosophy as in harmony with the Christian religion, (or at least partially so), inasmuch as both were derived from the same common source. This source of truth in the *Heathen philosophy* was, according to *Justin* Martyr (§ 226), derived from Internal Revelation by the λόγος, and Tradition[h]: according to *St. Clement*[i] (§ 226) and the other Alexandrians, it was drawn from Tradition recorded in the Jewish Scriptures[k]; according to *St. Augustine* (§ 232), it was simply *Oral*[l]. In the estimation of all these Fathers Philosophy was, if not necessary, at least useful for the defence and confirmation of the Christian doctrine.

225. Other Fathers of the Church, especially certain of the Latin, as *Tertullian*[m], *Arnobius*[n], and his disciple *Lactantius*[o], surnamed the Christian Cicero, deemed philosophy a superfluous study, and adverse to Christianity, as tending to alienate man from God:—nay, some of them

[h] Apolog. II, p. 50, 51. 83.

[i] Jo. Aug. Neander, De Fidei Gnoseosque ideâ, et eâ quâ ad se Invicem et Philosophiam referuntur ratione secundùm mentem Clementis Alexandrini, *Heidelb.* 1811, 8vo.

[k] Justini Cohortatio ad Græcos. Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. I, p. 298. 312; Euseb. Præp. Evang. XIII, 12, 13.

[l] Aug. De Civit. Dei, VII, 11.

[m] Of Carthage: became Christian about 185 A. C. died 220.

[n] Taught eloquence at Sicca, and died about 326 A. C.

[o] L. Cœlius Lactantius Firmianus, teacher of eloquence at Nicomedia, died about 330.

did not scruple to pronounce it an invention of the Devil, and a fruitful source of heresy [p].

226. Nevertheless the party which favoured such pursuits gradually acquired strength; and the Fathers came to make use, on the *Eclectic* system, of the philosophy of the Greeks [q]. Accordingly Julian thought that he was taking an effectual method of obstructing the Christian religion when he interdicted to its followers the study of that philosophy. Yet *all* the schools of the ancients were far from meeting with a like acceptation on the part of the Fathers. Those of Epicurus, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics were little considered, on account of the doubtful manner in which they had expressed themselves with regard to the immortality of the Soul, the existence of a Supreme Being, and his Providence; or the opposition which existed between their views and those of Christianity. The Platonic system, on the other hand, from the degree of affinity they affected to discover in it to the Jewish and Christian Revelations, was held in high esteem [r]. Nay, the earliest Fathers themselves belonged to the school of Alexandria [s]. *Justin* Martyr,

[p] Ern. Sal. Cypriani Diatribe Academica, qua expenditur illud Tertulliani: Hæreticorum Patriarchæ Philosophi, *Helmst.* 1699, 4to.

Ad. Rechenbergeri Diss. an Hæreticorum Patriarchæ Philosophi, *Lips.* 1705, 4to.

Chr. Gottfr. Schütz, Progr. de Regulâ Fidei apud Tertullianum, *Jen.* 1781, 4to.

E. W. P. Ammon, Cœlii Lactantii Firmiani Opiniones de Religione in Systema redactæ, *Erl.* 1820, 8vo.

Tertullian. Apologia, c. 47; De Præscript. Hæres., c. 7; Adv. Marcion. V, 19; Lactant. Div. Instit. IV, 2; passim. De Falsa Sap. lib. III, c. 1, § 10, sqq.; Clem. Alex. Strom. I, p. 278. 309; VII, p. 755. Basilius adv. Eunomium. I, Chrysostomi Homilia in Matthæum.

[q] Clem. Alex. Strom. I, p. 288; Lactant. Div. Inst. VII; Augustin. de Doctr. Christ. II, 11. 39.

[r] Cf. the work of Stäudlin, referred to above § 135.

[s] † Souverain, Platonism unveiled, or an Essay concerning the Platonic λόγος, *Cologne*, 1700, 8vo. Translated into German, with a Preface and Remarks by J. Fr. Lœffler, second edition, *Züllichau* and *Freystadt*, 1792 8vo.

affirmed that the λόγος previously to His incarnation had revealed Himself to the philosophers of antiquity[t]. *Clement* of Alexandria enlarged on the same idea, and professed to consider Pagan philosophy as an Introduction to Christianity. To these may be added *Athenagoras** of Athens, and *Tatianus* the Syrian[u], the Apologists, who both discovered, as they thought, many points of resemblance between the Christian Religion and Platonism. *Origen*[x] the disciple of Clement and the adversary of Celsus, pronounced, with his master, that happiness consists in the contemplation, (θεωρία) of the Divinity; and drew a distinction between the popular acceptation of Religion, and the same when thus explained by the learned[y]; (on which account he came to be considered by some as the first who hinted at the Philosophy of Christianity[z]). To the same class also belonged *Synesius* of Cyrene[a], a pupil of Hypatia; *Æneas* of Gaza[b], and even, —in some respects, *St. Augustine*, (§ 232).

In this manner the Church gradually became reconciled to philosophy; especially after the discussions on

† Baltus, Defence of the Fathers against the Charge of Platonism, *Paris*, 1711, 4to.

J. Laur. Mosheim, Comment. de Turbatâ per recentiores Platonicos Ecclesiâ. In Diss. Hist. Eccl. tom. I, p. 85.

† J. A. Cramer, On the Influence of the Alexandrian School on the Progress of the Christian Religion; (in his continuation of Bossuet, II, 268).

Cas. Aug. Theoph. Kiel, Exercitationes de Doctoribus veteris Ecclesiæ culpâ corruptæ per Platonicas sententias Theologiæ liberandis, *Lips.* 1793, sqq. 4to. Comment. I—XIV.

Henr. Nic. Clausen, Apologetæ Eccl. Christianæ Ante-Theodosiani Platonis ejusque Philosophiæ arbitri, *Hafn.* 1817.

[t] Justin Martyr was born of heathen parents at Flavia Neapolis in Palestine, A. D. 89: died a Christian 165. Apol. II, p. 83.

* [I have not thought it necessary to add the works, and editions of the works, of the Fathers, as they only incidentally belong to the subject of this Manual. *Transl.*]

[u] Both he and Athenagoras were originally heathens, and both flourished about 170 A. D.

[x] Of Alexandria, born 185, died 253.

[y] Περὶ ἀρχων, lib. I, 1.

[z] Ibid. Præf. § 3. See § 230.

[a] Flourished about 410.

[b] Flourished about 487: see § 218.

the Arian heresy had taught them the necessity for a more subtile Logic. Nemesius[c], bishop of Emesa, in his Essay on Man, followed Aristotle (§ 230), and *Boethius* the Roman (§ 234), translated and commented on several of his works on Logic (§ 235).

227. Philosophy was at first employed as an auxiliary to the Christian Religion, to assist in winning over the more cultivated of the Greeks to whom it was addressed; subsequently it was turned to the refutation of heresies; and lastly applied to the elucidation and distinct statement of the doctrines of the Church. Through all these successive gradations the relations of Religion and Philosophy continued always the same: the former being looked upon as the sole source of knowledge, the most exalted and the only *true* philosophy; the latter being regarded as merely a handmaid to the former, and a science altogether earthly,—*scientia mundana*[d]. Logic was exclusively devoted to Polemics.

228. The prevailing system therefore of the Fathers is a Supernaturalism more or less blended with Rationalism. The former daily acquired additional predominance, in consequence of the perpetual disputes with the heretics, who were inclined to place Reason side by side with Revelation: and in consequence also of the resolution of some Christian teachers to put a severe restraint on the waywardness of human interpretation as applied to the Scriptures. Revelation came to be regarded not only as the source of all Christian belief, but as the fountain also of all knowledge, speculative and practical.

Observation. The labours of the Fathers in the discussion of the doctrines of Christianity doubtless belongs to the History of

[c] Flourished about 380.

[d] Tertull. De Præscript. Hæret., c. 7. Lactant. Div. Instit. I, 1; V, 1; III, 1. Salvianus, De Gubernat. Dei Præfat. Euseb. Præp. Evang. IV, 22. Damasceni Dialectice, c. 1, sqq. Didymus in Damasceni Parallelis, p. 685.

Religion, on account of their dependency on *Revelation*, and their connection with various articles of the Christian creed. Nevertheless, a review of the philosophical tenets which were involved, and a sketch of the system of Augustine, appear necessary for the elucidation of the opinions of following ages. (See MÜNSCHER, Handb. der Christl. Dogmengesch. I and II parts).

§ 229.

CHR. FRIED. RÖSLER, Philosophia veteris Ecclesiæ de Deo, *Tubing.* 1782, 4to. Idem: Progr. Philosophiæ veteris Ecclesiæ de Spiritu et de Mundo, *ibid.* 1785, 4to.

ALB. CHR. ROTH, (præs. Jo. BEN. CARPZOV), Trinitas Platonica, *Lips.* 1693, 4to.

JO. WILH. JANI, Diss. (præs. J. G. NEUMANN), Trinitas Platonismi verè et falsò suspecta, *Viteb.* 1708, 4to.

See also the work of SOUVERAIN, § 226, s.

The Deity—and the Relation in which the world and mankind stand to God, are the principal subjects of the speculations of the Fathers; and in these we may observe an evident appeal to the judgment and the understanding.

I. *The Deity.* There are three ways in which God may be known: by His image; from external nature; and by immediate revelation. We find different proofs of the existence of a God drawn from mixed Physics and Theology, from Cosmology[e] and Ontology[f], noticed by the Fathers; though in general they treat it rather as a matter of faith than knowledge, and appear to have considered the idea of a Divinity as innate, because universal. The nature of God[g] is not capable of being known by the unassisted understanding[h]; at least by any conceptions of our own, without Divine revelation[i]. Some of the Fathers do not express themselves so posi-

[e] GREG. NAZ. Orat. XXXIV, Opp. ed. *Colon.* 1690, tom. I, p. 559. JOH. DAMASCENUS, De Fide Orthod., lib. I, 3.

[f] AUGUST. De Libero Arbitrio, II, 5—15. See also lib. VIII, 3; de genesi ad litt., lib. VIII, cap. 14.

[g] "God has not so much revealed what He is as what He is not" was the sentiment of Clemens (Strom. V, p. 689).

[h] DAMASCEN. de Orth. Fid. I, 4.

[i] DIONYS. Areop. Ep. 5; et De Mysticâ Theol., c. 4, sqq.

tively on this head, inasmuch as they admit the possibility of the application to this great subject of our unassisted ideas and understanding. The greater part of them at first represented the Deity as associated with Space and Time, like a corporeal being[k]: but gradually they corrected these notions, and reduced them to those of Immateriality, or something very nearly approaching to it[l]. Their reflections were more profound than those of the Heathen philosophers respecting the attributes of the Deity, but were not altogether free from the charge of inconsistency.

230. II. *Relation of God to the World.* The Fathers, in opposition to the Manicheans and Gnostics, maintained the Scriptural doctrine of the Creation of the world by the will of God, and its formation out of non-existence. On this a question was moved: Did the Creation take place within the limits of Time? (which St. Athanasius, Methodius, and St. Augustine affirmed); or from all Eternity? (as thought Clement of Alexandria and Origen)[m]: and to what end was it created?

The Fathers admit a general and particular Providence[n]: assert the maintenance and government of the world by the ministry of angels[o]; or, some of them, *without* their ministry[p]. They opposed the fatalism of the astrologers and Stoics[q], in order to maintain the doctrine of Free-will, and sometimes pushed their speculations on this head farther than, it is probable, they themselves intended[r]. They endeavoured to reconcile the doctrine of the omniscience of God with that of the free-agency of man[s]; and entered largely into the discussion of the origin of physical and moral Evil. Most of them taught

[k] TERTULL. Adv. Prax. c. 7. ARNOB. Adv. Gent., lib. I, p. 17.
[l] AUGUSTIN. De Div. Q. XX, Ep. 57.
[m] Περὶ ἀρχων, III, 5.
[n] LACTANT. De Irâ Dei, c. 30. NEMESIUS, De Nat. Hom. c. 42, 44.
[o] Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Augustine, John of Damascus.
[p] NEMESIUS, l. l.
[q] NEMES. 68. 34. AUGUSTIN. De Civ. Dei, V, 9.
[r] NEMES. l. l. c. 38.
[s] AUGUSTIN. l. l.

that it was unavoidable[t], and maintained that it took place neither with nor in opposition to the will of God; in other words, that it was simply *permitted* by Him. They attributed it in part to human agency, in part to the influence of evil Spirits[u].—They asserted the existence of spiritual beings endowed with a subtile essence[x], who minister to the Deity in the government of the world. On the origin of evil spirits are found some superstitious and extravagant notions in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite[y], and Psellus[z].

Anthropology. Is man composed of two, or of three essential elements, Body, Soul, and Spirit?—as Justin and all the Fathers his immediate successors (all of whom inclined to Neoplatonism), asserted. The human Soul was at first thought material; subsequently however it was pronounced immaterial and spiritual, by the Platonist Fathers: as also by Nemesius and St. Augustine[a]. As to the origin of souls, they were conceived to be created, by some immediately, by others mediately. (Perpetual creation, or pre-existence of souls). The immortality of the soul was thought by some (St. Augustine) inseparable from its essence; by others, (Justin, Arnobius), a peculiar gift of God, either bestowed on all, or specially on the elect.

§ 231.

† Barbeyrac, Treatise on the Morality of the Fathers of the Church, *Amsterd.* 1728, 4to. (French). See also his, Introduction to his translation of the Natural Law of Pufendorf.

† Ceillier, Defence of the Ethics of the Fathers of the Church, *Paris*, 1718, 4to.

[t] Lactant. Div. Instit. II, 8. 12; V, 7.

[u] Of the Devil. Tertull., August. See § 232.

[x] Orig. Περὶ ἀρχ. I, 6. Jo. Damasc. De Orth. Fid. II, 3.

[y] De Hierarchiâ Cœlesti.

[z] De Dæmonibus.

[a] August. De Quantitate Animæ. c. 1; et al.: Claudianus Mamertinus, a presbyter of Vienne in Gaul, composed, about 470, a treatise, De Statu Animæ, libb. III; ed. P. Mosellanus, *Bas.* 1520, 4to. and subsequently Cas. Barth, *Cygn.* 1655, 8vo.

† (BALTUS), Opinions of the Fathers on the Ethics of the Heathen Philosophers, *Strasb.* 1719, 4to. (French).

† J. D. MICHAELIS, Morals, part ii, *Götting.* 1792, 8vo.

CAR. FRED. STÄUDLIN, Progr. de Patrum Ecclesiæ Doctrinâ Morali, *Gotting.* 1796. † The same: Hist. of Christian Morals, *ibid.* 1799, 8vo.

† Essay towards a History of Christian Morals, Asceticism, and Mysticism, with a review of all the works on these subjects. vol. i, *Dortmund*, 1798, 8vo.

III. *Ethics, or relation of Man to God.* The Ethics of the Fathers of the Church are deficient in systematic character; but in detail they are of uncompromising strictness, and tend to elevate man above the dominion of the senses. Their fundamental principle is the will of God, and on the part of man, obedience to that will. The means of becoming acquainted with it are the Scriptures and Reason; the latter subordinate to the former. According to some, God requires the fulfilment of His will in virtue of His almighty power[b]; according to others, with a view to the eternal welfare and felicity of man[c]. According to a third theory, God is at the same time the Sovereign legislator and the Supreme Good, and End, of all reasonable beings. To be united to Him is the height of happiness[d]. To this was appended the doctrine of Duty and Conformity to His will, or Virtue. Sincerity, disinterested love of our neighbour, patience, and chastity, are virtues pre-eminently commended by the Fathers; the three last especially being enforced with peculiar strictness. Free-will, which was at first more largely admitted as a condition of moral action, came to be afterwards limited, and in a manner annulled (§ 232, 253).

A species of ascetic Mysticism subsequently usurped the place of this Morality.

§ 232.

Augustini Confessiones, etc. Opp. tom. i.

[b] TERTULL. De Pœnitentiâ, c. 4.

[c] LACTANT. Institut. Divin. lib. III, c. 11, sqq.

[d] AUGUSTIN. De Libero Arbitrio, I, 6; II, 19.

Possidii Vita Augustini, ed. Jo. Solinas, *Rome*. 1731, 8vo. In the Acta Sanctorum, tom. V, p. 213, sqq., and in the Benedictine edition of the Works of Augustine, *Paris*, 1677—1700, 11 vol. fol.; 1700—3, 12 vol. fol.

St. Augustine was one of the greatest luminaries of the Latin church[e]. After having studied the Scholastic philosophy, and become an ardent disciple of the Manicheans, he was converted to the orthodox faith by the powerful eloquence of St. Ambrose, at Milan, (A. D. 387), and subsequently, (A. D. 405), was appointed bishop of Hippo, and distinguished himself as a zealous preacher, a champion against Heresy, and a copious writer. He employed his philosophical acquirements, and his great and versatile powers in reducing to the form of a system the doctrines of Christianity; and ultimately produced a theory by which it was associated with much of Platonism. According to him, God, the most perfect and exalted of essences, exists of necessity (§ 229): He is the creator of the world (§ 230); Eternal Truth and Eternal Justice; of whom man has certain innate notions, by means of a faculty of intuition superior to the evidence of the senses[f]. God is the supreme good of the Spiritual world, to whom we labour to reunite ourselves[g]. He has called all reasonable beings to the enjoyment of happiness through the practice of virtue; and to that end has endowed them with reason and free-will (§ 231). The use of this free-will is committed to the option of the agent, who, according to his employment of it, approaches to or withdraws himself from God, and renders himself more worthy, or more unworthy, of felicity. Moral evil is negative, and has not any *positive* cause. Evil men are necessary to complete the sum of the Universe, which is perfect; and which would not be perfect without them, inasmuch as it supposes the existence of all possible classes of beings, in all possible

[e] Aurelius Augustinus, born at Tagaste in Africa, A. D. 354: died 430.

[f] De Quantit. An. c. 20.

[g] De Civit. Dei, X, 3. De Verâ Relig., c. 55.

degrees[h]. Such was the system of Augustine respecting the Divine Government. In his latter years he rejected this for another: that man, since the fall, has lost immortality, and free-will, as far as the doing of good is concerned, but not as affects the commission of evil; from which principle he deduced the doctrine of absolute Predestination and Irresistible Grace[i]. He was led to this system by a literal adherence to some expressions of Scripture to which he had occasion to refer in his dispute with Pelagius, a British monk; who, with his friend Cœlestius, came out of Ireland into Africa, and asserted the free-will of man to do good[k]. St. Augustine likewise originated several new ideas respecting the soul and its faculties, the senses, and the five degrees of Intellectual Power, which have been often revived[l].

233. The authority of St. Augustine's name contributed to render his latter system the text-book of Dogmatic Science in the West. The destruction of the Roman Empire by the inroad of barbarians, and the obliteration of the remains of ancient literature, contributed to repress the spirit of original inquiry, which had on many subjects been superseded by Revelation. Under such circumstances, the writings of the Fathers were beneficial to philosophy also; as preserving some vestiges of ancient discussions. This was especially true of the works of Augustine, and applies to the treatises on Logic, falsely imputed to him[m]; and which were recommended during the middle ages by the stamp of his name.

[h] De Libero Arbitrio, I, 14; II, 1. 19, 20; III, 9; lib. 3. Qu. 41.

[i] De Civ. Dei, XIV, 10; XV, 21; XXI, 12; XXII, 30. De Nuptiis et Concupiscentiâ, II, 34; De Natura et Gratiâ; De Gestis Pelagii, contra duas Epp. Pelagianorum, contra Julianum de Corruptione et Gratiâ, de Gratiâ et Libero Arbitrio, de Prædestinatione Sanctorum.

[k] † PHIL. MARHEINECKE, Dialogues on the Opinions of Augustine, with respect to Free-will and Divine Grace, *Berl.* 1821, 8vo.

† G. F. WIGGERS, Essay towards an Historical Statement of Augustinianism and Pelagianism, etc., *Berl.* 1821, 8vo.

[l] De Quantit. An. n. 70, sqq.

[m] Principia Dialecticæ: et: Decem Categoriæ, vol. I, edit. Bened.

Boethius, Cassiodorus, and other Eclectics.

234. Besides the dry abstract of what were called the Seven liberal arts, by *Marcianus Capella*[n], we remark among the works which served as text-books to the ages following, and took a rank intermediate between the ancient and modern philosophies, the works of two Patricians of the kingdom of the Ostrogoths, Boethius and Cassiodorus, the last champions of classical literature in the West. Both were Eclectics, and endeavoured to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. *Boethius*[o†] lived at the court of the Gothic king Theodoric, who caused him to be beheaded under a false suspicion of high treason[p]. By him principally was preserved in the West some faint knowledge of the system of Aristotle. He translated some treatises of that philosopher on Logic, and wrote a commentary on the translation of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry by *Victorinus*, which was looked upon as a preparation for the study of Aristotle. He also composed, in his prison at Pavia, his treatise *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, which became a great favourite with following ages. His contemporary *Cassiodorus*[q†], also preserved, especially in his work *De Septem Disciplinis*, some relics of Grecian philosophy; and encouraged the monks to transcribe the ancient MSS.

[n] Marcianus Minæus Felix Capella, flourished about 474. His work entitled, Satyricon, has been frequently printed, (see Fabric. Bibl. Lat. tom. I, p. 638), and lastly by J. A. Goez, *Norimb.* 1794, 8vo.

[o] Anicius Manlius Torquatus Severinus Boethius, born A. D. 470.

[†] Gervaise, History of Boethius the Roman senator, *Paris*, 1715.

His works: *Basil.* 1570, fol.; De Consolatione, published by Pertius, *Lugd. Bat.* 1671, 8vo. *Lips.* 1753, 8vo. Ed. et Vitam Auctoris adjecit Jo. Theod. Bj. Helfrecht, *Hof.* 1797, 8vo.

[p] Between 524 A. D. and 526.

[q] Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus, born at Squillacci about 480; died, in a convent, 575.

[†] Fr. D. de Sainte-Marthe, Life of Cassiodorus, *Paris*, 1695, 12mo. Buat, Life of Cassiodorus among the Dissert. of the Acad. of Sciences of Bavaria, vol. I, s. 79.

Cassiodori Opera Omnia op. et stud. Garetii, *Rotomag.* 1679, 2 vols. fol.; et *Venet.* 1729.

In Spain, under the dominion of the Visigoths, *Isidorus*, archbishop of Seville (*Hispalensis*), rendered a real service to learning by the composition of his useful book of reference[r]. In England and Ireland science survived longer than elsewhere. *Bede*, the Anglo-Saxon, surnamed the *Venerable*[s], enjoyed there a great celebrity: and assisted by the works above mentioned, composed his Abstracts, of which, some time afterwards, Alcuin availed himself. (See § 244, sqq).

235. In the East the pretended works, (of a mystical character), of Dionysius the Areopagite[t], believed to be the contemporary of our Lord and his Apostles, and First bishop of Athens, acquired considerable celebrity, and in the middle ages proved a rich mine to the Mystics (§ 229, 230, and 246). They embraced a sort of adaptation of the doctrine of Emanation and of Platonism in general to Christianity; and are generally supposed to belong to the third or fourth century; though some, as Dallæus, refer them to the sixth[u]. It is true that literature in general still survived in the Grecian Empire, but without spirit or originality. It owed its existence to the Aristocratic constitution which still subsisted in the Greek Church, (differing in this respect from the Latin, which fell under the dominion of Papacy), and to the degree of attention still bestowed on the Greek philosophers.

[r] Died A. D. 636.

Isidori Hispalensis Originum seu Etymologiarum libri XX. *Aug. Vind.* 1472, fol. c. not. JAC. GOTHOFREDI in Auctorib. Lat. p. 811: and in the edition of his Opp. ed. JAC. DU BREUL, *Paris*, 1601, fol. col 1617.

[s] Born 673, died 735.

Bedæ Opera Omnia, tom. I, III, *Paris.* 1521 et 1544; *Colon.* 1612 and 1688, 8 vols. fol.

[t] De Cœlesti Hierarchiâ, de Divinis Nominibus, de Ecclesiasticâ Hierarchiâ, de Mysticâ Theologiâ. DIONYS. Areop. Opp. Gr. *Bas.* 1539; *Ven.* 1558; *Paris.* 1562, 8vo.; Gr. et Lat. *Paris.* 1615, fol.; *Antverp.* 1634, 2 vols. fol.; and with Dissertations on the Author, *Paris*, 1644, 2 vols. fol.

[u] The most recent inquires on this subject are those of: Jo. GE. VITAL. ENGELHARDT, Diss. de Dionysio Areopagitâ Plotinizante, præmissis Observationibus de Historiâ Theologiæ Mysticæ rite tractandâ, § I et II, *Erl.* 1820, 8vo. L. FRID. OTTO BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS, Progr. de Dionysio Areopagitâ, *Jen.* 1823, 4to.

In the sixth century, *John Stobæus*, who was inclined to the doctrines of Neoplatonism (§ 221); and subsequently, in the ninth, the patriarch *Photius*[x], formed valuable collections of extracts from different ancient authors. Aristotle also was better appreciated in this part of the empire. *James of Edessa*, the Monophysite, caused the dialectic treatises to be translated into Syriac. *John of Alexandria*, surnamed *Philoponus*[y] (an Eclectic), distinguished himself by his Greek Commentaries on Aristotle; from whom, nevertheless, he differed on the question of the eternity of the world (§ 220); and after him *John of Damascus*[z], not only gave to the East for the first time a system of Theology (§ 229, 230); but by his works[a] continued to direct public attention to the study of the Aristotelian philosophy, which was not extinguished till the downfal of the Greek Empire (§ 254).

[x] Born A. D. 858, died 891.

Μυριοβιβλίον, ed. Hoeschel, *Aug. Vind.* 1601.

[y] Died about 608.

His Commentaries—On the Analytics (First and Second), on the Physics, Metaphysics, De Animâ, and other works of Aristotle, appeared, for the most part, at Venice, in the sixteenth century.

[z] Died about 754; also known by the name of Chrysorrhoas.

[a] Ἔκθεσις τῆς ὀρθοδόξης πίστεως.—Opera ed. Le Quien, *Paris.* 1712, 2 vols. fol.

PART THE SECOND.

SECOND PERIOD.

HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES,

OR, THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM; FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE NINTH TO THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

Attempts of the Understanding towards the cultivation of Science, under the influence of an extraneous principle and positive laws.

History of the Philosophy of the Middle Ages and of the Schoolmen. (From 800 to the Fifteenth Century).

236. The spirit of philosophical curiosity which had possessed so much influence throughout the preceding period, dwindled to a very slender thread, and influenced in a very inferior degree the public mind during the days of barbarism and ignorance, on which we are about to enter. At the same time a new System and new Method were contained in embryo in the precious remains of old philosophy, and acquired the name of the *Scholastic;* because it was principally formed in the schools founded since the time of Charlemagne[a]. That great monarch,

[a] See the Work of Launoy, § 243; and J. M. Unold, de Societate Literaria a Carolo M. instituta, *Jen.* 1752, 4to.

It must not be forgotten, however, that such studies were cultivated at a still earlier period in Great Britain. See Murray, De Britannia atque Hibernia Sæculo a sexto inde ad decimum literar. domicilio; in the Nov. Comment. Soc. Gott. tom. II, part II, p. 72.

o astonishingly superior to the age in which he lived, ery properly began the work of civilization by esta- lishing elementary schools for the clergy, where were aught, in the jejune sketches of *Marcianus Capella*, *Cassiodorus*, and *Bede*, the Seven Liberal arts, or, as hey were termed by Boethius, the *Trivium* and *Quadri- ium*. Charlemagne founded likewise an Academy at- ached to his court, as well as a school for the instruc- ion of those destined for public affairs; and for the im- provement of the latter he invited, principally from Eng- land, several men of eminent merit. (See *Alcuin*, § 244). His successors also encouraged the establishment and maintenance of Schools for the clergy, in the convents and episcopal sees.

237. In these schools, and still more in the universities which were subsequently formed, especially in that of Paris, the model of all the rest, a degree of zeal for science, as considerable as could be expected from the informa- tion and circumstances of the ecclesiastics for whom these seminaries had been principally designed, gradually un- folded itself. An alliance was now formed between Faith, which implicitly received the doctrines which the hie- rarchy of the Romish church maintained, and Reason, which laboured to investigate the principles of the same truths. The means employed were Logic and Metaphy- sics, or Dialectics. This was the origin of the scholastic philosophy, which was engaged in the application of Dialectics to Theology, (such as it was established by St. Augustine), and an intimate association of these two sciences.

238. The Human mind thus endeavoured at once, with- out any substantial knowledge or previous discipline, to grapple with the greatest of all questions, the Nature of the Divinity; and by a course the reverse of that pursued by Grecian philosophy, beginning with this great prin- ciple, sought in its descent to embrace the circle of all ac- quired knowledge. The impulse was given by Theology;

which always continued to be the principal moving power, as well as object. At first nothing more was designed than the confirmation of certain isolated doctrines by the authority of an appeal to Reason as well as Revelation; subsequently men were desirous of binding together into a sort of system, the results of these reasonings; in the end it was their endeavour to consolidate, confirm, and define the sphere of knowledge which by such means they had extended.

239. Revelation had already supplied the great results of such inquiries on the most important particulars. All that remained, and all they attempted, was to invest those results with the formalities of a science. All that could be obtained by investigation had been already defined, and was strictly maintained by the Church; nor were the means employed—Dialectics—less absolutely fixed by usage. The circle of mental activity was consequently confined; and a spirit of minute subtilty began to prevail, more especially in establishments cut off from large communication with the great world, which amused the inquisitiveness of the human mind by the discussion of puerile formularies, and a sort of intellectual see-saw applied to ideas instead of realities.

240. Philosophy at first dwindled into a mere logical skeleton after the manner of Boethius and Cassiodorus; and more recently, in conformity to the sketch of Bede (§ 234), which was adopted as his model by Alcuin; and finally, after the system attributed to St. Augustine (§ 233). It became indeed somewhat more enlarged after they had acquired from the Arabs some slight acquaintance with the Aristotelian philosophy, by means of rude translations from the Arabic and Greek. In spite of the opposition it at first encountered, and the imputation of heresy, this philosophy became daily more prevalent, and ultimately of universal influence, in consequence of being allied to Theology.

241. It is not possible to define with accuracy the du

ation of the empire of scholastic philosophy. It began ı the ninth century[b], and has in some degree survived ɔ our own days; but the revival of classical literature and he Reformation deprived it for ever of that unlimited uthority which it possessed before.

242. Four epochs may be defined in the history of this hilosophy, deducible from the history of the question oncerning the *Reality* of Ideas; and the relations of Philosophy to Theology. *First period*, down to the eleventh century:—A blind *Realism*[c], with attempts to apply the elements of Philosophy to Theology.—*Second period*, from *Roscellin* to *Alexander* of *Hales*, or *Alesius*, at the commencement of the thirteenth century.—The first appearance of Nominalism and of a more liberal system of inquiry, quickly repressed by the ecclesiastical authorities, which established the triumph of Realism. A more close alliance was consequently brought about between philosophy and theology.—*Third period*, From *Alexander* and *Albert*, surnamed the Great, to *Occam*:—thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. During this period, Realism had exclusive dominion: the system of instruction adopted by the Church was consolidated by the introduction of the Aristotelian system; and philosophy became still more closely connected with theology.—The age of *St. Thomas Aquinas* and *Scotus*.—*Fourth period*, From *Occam* to the sixteenth century.—A continued contest between Nominalism and Realism, wherein the former obtained some partial successes. Philosophy was gradually detached from Theology, through the renewal of their old debates. Some other disputes grew out of the attempt to introduce reforms in the systems of both.

Observation. Three different relations subsisted between Philosophy and Theology during these periods: 1st. Philosophy

[b] The origin of Scholastic philosophy is often referred to the epoch of Roscellin, about the end of the eleventh century; or to the twelfth century; or lastly, (as Tiedemann does), to the commencement of the thirteenth.

[c] [Realism supposes our *ideas* to have a *real essence*: Nominalism the contrary. Transl.]

was considered merely *subordinate:* as the *Ancilla Theologiæ:* 2dly. It was associated with the latter on a footing of equality: 3dly. They were mutually separated and divorced.

243. In examining the philosophy of these ages we ought, (making due allowance for the circumstances of the times, and not appreciating what was effected then by what might be achieved now), to allow all their merit to superior minds without laying to their charge the faults of their age and their contemporaries; and to show ourselves sensible to the good as well as to the evil of the Scholastic system. Among its good results were an increased ability in the management of doctrinal metaphysics, a great subtilty of thought, and a rare sagacity in the development and distinction of ideas, with individual efforts on the part of several men of genius, notwithstanding the heavy bondage in which they were held. The ill effects were, the dissemination of a minute and puerile spirit of speculation, the decay of sound and practical Reason, with a neglect of the accurate and real sciences and of the sources whence they are to be derived, that is:—Experiment, History, and the Study of Languages. To these must be added the prevalence of the dominion of Authority, and Prescription; Bad Taste; and a rage for frivolous distinctions and subdivisions, to the neglect of the higher interests of science.

General Treatises on the History of Scholastic Philosophy.

Lud. Vives, De Causis Corruptarum Artium; (in his Works) *Bas.* 1555, 2 vols. 8vo.

History of the Decline of the Arts and Sciences, to their Revival in the XIV and XV Centuries: serving as an Introduction to a Literary History of these two Centuries, *Lond.*

Cæs. Egassii Bulæi Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, etc *Paris.* 1665-73, 6 vols. fol.

† J. B. L. Crevier, History of the University of Paris, from its foundation, etc. *Paris,* 1761, 7 vols. 12mo.

Joh. Launojus, De Celebrioribus Scholis à Carolo M. instauratis, *Par.* 1672. Idem: De Variâ Aristotelis Fortunâ in Aca

demiâ Parisiensi, *Par.* 1653, 4to.; accessere J. Jonsii Diss. de Historiâ Peripateticâ et editoris de variâ Aristotelis in Scholis Protestantium Fortunâ Schediasma, *Vitemb.* 1720, 8vo.

Chph. Binder, De Scholasticâ Theologiâ, *Tub.* 1614, 4to.

Herm. Conring, De Antiquitatibus Academicis Dissertt. *Helmst.* 1659-1673, 4to. Curâ C. A. Heumanni, *Gott.* 1739, 4to.

Ad. Tribbechovii De Doctoribus Scholasticis et Corruptâ per eos Divinarum et Humanarum rerum Scientiâ liber singularis, *Giss.* 1665, 8vo.; ed. II cum Præfat. C. A. Heumanni, *Jen.* 1719, 4to.

Jac. Thomasius, De Doctoribus Scholasticis, *Lips.* 1676, 4to.

† J. A. Cramer, Continuation of Bossuet, part V, tom. II, sqq.

† Schröckh, Ecclesiastical History, part XXII—XXXIV.

Fabricii Biblioth. Lat. Mediæ et Infr. Ætatis.

F. Bruckeri De Naturâ Indole et Modo Philosophiæ Scholasticæ, in his Hist. Philos. Crit., tom. III, p. 709, and his Hist. de Ideis, p. 198.

† Tiedemann, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, parts IV and V.

† Buhle, Manual of the History of Philosophy, tom. V and VI.

† Tennemann, History of Philosophy, tom. VIII, sqq.

† W. L. G. Baron von Eberstein, Natural Theology of the Schoolmen, with Supplements on their Doctrine of Free-will, and their Notion of Truth, *Leips.* 1803, 8vo.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

I. *Absolute Realism down to the commencement of the Eleventh Century.*

Alcuin.

244. The attempts of a spirit of Philosophy at this period were feeble and imperfect, but they might have been more successful but for the constraint imposed by the Hierarchy. Such a state of things permitted the existence of only a small number of superior writers, who shed a doubtful light amid the general gloom of igno-

rance, and laid the foundations of the Scholastic system. The first of these, in the order of time, was the Englishman *Alcuin* or *Albinus*[d], whom Charlemagne brought with him from Italy to his court. This learned writer (for the times in which he lived) wrote upon the *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*[e] (§ 240). His pupil *Rhabanus Maurus* introduced his dialectics into Germany[f].

Johannes Scotus Erigena.

† Johannes Scotus Erigena, or an Essay on the Origin of Christian Philosophy, and its sacred character, by PEDER HJORT, *Copenh.* 1823, 8vo.

245. *John Scotus*, an Irishman (hence his surname of Erigena), belonged to a much higher order: a man of great learning, and of a philosophical and original mind; whose means of attaining to such a superiority we are ignorant of. He was invited from England to France by Charles the Bald, but subsequently obliged to quit the latter country; being persecuted as a heretic. At the invitation of Alfred the Great he retired to Oxford, where he died about 886.

His acquaintance with Latin and Greek (to which some assert he added the Arabic); his love for the philosophy of Aristotle and of Plato, his translation, (exceedingly esteemed throughout the West), of Dionysius the Areopagite (§ 235); his liberal and enlightened views (which the disputes of the day called upon him to express), respecting predestination[g], and the eucharist,—all these entitle him to be considered a phenomenon for the times in which he lived. Add to this, that he regarded philosophy as the Science of the Principles of all

[d] Born at York 736, died 804.

[e] In his work De Septem Artibus. See his Opp. Omnia de novo collecta et ed. cur. FROBENII, *Ratisb.* 1777, 2 vols. fol.

[f] Born at Mentz 776; died archbishop of that city 856.

[g] See on this subject his treatise, De Divinâ Prædestinatione et Gratiâ, in GILE. MANGUINI Vett. Auctt. qui IX. Sec. de Prædestinatione et Gratia scripserunt, Opera et Fragmenta, *Paris*, 1650, tom. I, p. 103, sqq.

things, and as inseparable from religion; and that he adopted a philosophical system[h], (a revived Neoplatonism), of which the foundation was the maxim: That God is the essence of all things; that from the plenitude of His nature they are all derived, and to Him ultimately return (*Primordiales causæ—natura naturata*). His labours, enlightened by so much learning and suggested by so much talent, might have accomplished more if they had not been blighted by the imputation of heresy.

Berenger and Lanfranc.

Oudini Diss. de Vitâ Scriptis et Doctrinâ Berengarii, in Commentatt. t. II. p. 622.

G. E. Lessing, Berengarius Turonensis, *Bruns.* 1770, 4to. † See Historical and Literary Miscell., extracted from the library of Wolfenb., V. vol. (Complete Works of Lessing, t. XX).

Berengarius Turonensis, Dissert. by C. F. Stäudlin, in his Archives of Ancient and Modern Ecclesiastical Hist. (publ. with Tzchirner), vol. II, fasc. 2, *Leips.* 1814. The same: Progr. Annuntiatur editio libri Berengarii Turonensis adversus Lanfrancum; simul omnino de ejus scriptis agitur, *Gott.* 1814, 4to.

Milonis Crispini Vita Lanfranci, apud Mabillon Acta Sanctor. Ordin. Bened. Sæc. VI, p. 630; and his Opp. ed. Luc. Dacherius (D'Achery), *Paris*, 1648, fol.

246. Next in order comes *Gerbert*, a monk of Aurillac, who afterwards became pope Sylvester II.[i], and acquired, at Seville and Cordova, extraordinary information, for that time, in the mathematics and Aristotelian philosophy of the Arabs, which he disseminated in the schools or monastaries of Bobbio, Rheims, Aurillac, Tours, and Sens[k]. After him appeared *Berenger* of Tours[l], who was distinguished for his talents, his learning, and his

[h] De Divisione Naturæ libri V, ed. Th. Gale, *Oxon.* 1681, fol. (scarce). Extracts from Erigena are to be found in Heumanni Acta Philos. tom. III, p. 858; and in Dupin, Auctt. Eccles. tom. VII, p. 79.

[i] Born in Auvergne; pope A. D. 999; died 1003.

[k] His Dialectic treatise, De Rationali et Ratione Uti, is to be found in the Thesaur. Anecdot. Pezii, t. I, part 2, p. 146: and his Letters in Duchesne, Hist. Franc. Scriptt., t. II, p. 789, sqq.

[l] Con. Berengarius, born about the commencement of the eleventh century, died 1088.

freedom of opinion, by which he drew upon himself some severe persecutions, in consequence of discussions on the subject of transubstantiation*. His opponent *Lanfranc*[m], as well as the cardinal Peter *Damianus*, or *Damien*[n], brought to perfection the art of Dialectics as applied to Theology: and his skill therein gave to the former (in the opinion of his contemporaries), the advantage over Berenger. This discussion, which was subsequently revived, had the effect of tightening still more the bonds of Papal authority.

St. Anselm of Canterbury.

ANSELMI Cantuariensis Opp. lab. et stud. D. G. GERBERON, *Paris.* 1675; second edition, 1721; *Venet.* 1744, 2 vols. fol.

EADMERI Vita S. Anselmi, in the Acta Sanctorum Antw., April, t. II, p. 685, sqq., and in the edit. of the Works of Anselm above.

† A. RAINERI, Panegyrical Hist. of St. Anselm, *Modena*, 1693—1706, 4 vols. 4to.: and Jo. SARISBURIENSIS De Vitâ Anselmi, WHARTON's Anglia Sacra, part II, p. 149.

247. *St. Anselm*, the pupil and successor of Lanfranc (whom we must not confound with the schoolman his contemporary, Anselm of Laon)[o], was born at Aosta in 1034: became prior and abbot of the monastery of Bec, and died, archbishop of Canterbury, 1109. He was a second Augustine; superior to those of his age in the clearness of his understanding and powers of Logic; and equal to the most illustrious men of his day for virtue and piety. He planned a system of religious philosophy, to be effected by combining the results of controversies on such subjects, in accordance, for the most part, with the views of St. Augustine. For this purpose, he composed his *Monologium sive Exemplum Meditandi de ratione Fidei;* in which he endeavoured to state systematically the great truths of religion on principles of common reason, but at

* Liber BERENGARII Turonensis adversus Lanfrancum ex Cod. Mscpt Guelpherbit. edit. a STÄUDLINO, *Gott.* 1823, 4to. (Progr. III.)

[m] Born at Pavia 1005; died, archbishop of Canterbury, 1089.

[n] Of Ravenna; born 1001, died 1072.

[o] Died A. D. 1117.

the same time presupposing the more solid foundation of religious conviction. To this he added his *Proslogium*, otherwise called, *Fides quærens Intellectum;* where he seeks to prove the existence of God from the fact of our idea of an Almighty power. A monk of *Marmoutier*, named *Gaunilon*, ably attacked this sort of ontological argument[p]. Anselm may be looked upon as the inventor of Scholastic Metaphysics, inasmuch as he afforded the first example of it; though other systems subsequently superseded his own, and some of his ideas were never followed up.

Hildebert of Tours.

Hildeberti Turonensis Opera ed. Ant. Beaugendre, *Paris.* 1708, fol.; and in the Biblioth. Patrum of Galland, t. XIV, p. 337, sqq.

† W. C. L. Ziegler, Memoirs towards a Hist. of the Theological Belief in the Existence of a God, with an Extract from the first Dogmatical System (in the *West*) of Hildebert, archbishop of Tours, *Gött.* 1792, 8vo.

248. *Hildebert* of Lavardin, archbishop of Tours[q], and, as is probable, the disciple of Beranger, was equal to Anselm in sagacity and ability as a logician; and possessed the advantage of a more popular style, and more various information. To an acquaintance with the Classics and other accomplishments, rare in his age, he added independence of mind, a practical understanding, and a degree of taste which preserved him from falling into the vain and puerile discussions of his contemporaries. His *Tractatus Philosophicus*[r] and his *Moralis Philosophia*, are the first essays towards a popular system of Theology. Othlo and Honorius, two monks of the same period, opposed themselves to the Logicians, and shut themselves up in impregnable mysticism.

[p] Gaunilonis liber pro insipiente adversus Anselmi in Proslogio ratiocinantem; together with Anselmi Apologeticus contra insipientem. (In the works cited above).

[q] Born between 1053 and 1057; died about 1134.

[r] Part of this treatise is comprised in the works of Hugo de St. Victor.

SECOND PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

II. *Disputes between the Nominalists and Realists, from Roscellin (end of the Eleventh Century) to Alexander of Hales.*

Jac. Thomasii Oratio de Sectâ Nominalium; Orationes, *Lips.* 1683 et 86, 8vo.

Chph. Meiners, De Nominalium ac Realium initiis; Commentatt. Soc. Gott., t. XII, p. 12.

Lud. Frid. Otto Baumgarten-Crusius, Progr. de Vero Scholasticorum Realium et Nominalium discrimine et sententiâ Theologicâ, *Jen.* 1821, 4to.

Joh. Mart. Chladenii Diss. (res. Jo. Theod. Kunneth) de Vitâ et hæresi Roscellini, *Erlang.* 1756, 4to. See also Thesaurus Biog. et Bibliographicus of Geo. Ern. Waldau, *Chemnit.* 1792, 8vo.

Roscellin.

249. The practice of Dialectics, and the questions arising out of a disputed passage in Prophyry's Introduction to the Organum of Aristotle (περὶ πέντε φωνῶν), respecting the different metaphysical opinions entertained by the Platonists and Peripatetics of the nature of General Ideas,—Such were the causes which led to the division between the Nominalists and Realists, the latter adhering to Plato, the first to Aristotle: disputes which stirred up frequent and angry debates in the schools, without any other result than that of sharpening their powers of argumentation[s]. This long discussion was begun by John *Roscellin* (or Roussellin), a canon of Compiègne[t], who, (on the testimony of his adversaries), maintained that the ideas of Genus and Species were nothing but mere words and terms *(flatus vocis)*, which we use to designate qualities common to different individual objects[u]. He

[s] Joh. Sarisburiensis Metalog., c. II, 16, 17.

[t] About 1089.

[u] See the treatise of Anselm De Fide Trinitatis, seu De Incarnatione Verbi, c. 2: and John of Salisbury.

was led on by this doctrine to some heretical opinions respecting the Trinity, which he was ultimately compelled to retract at Soissons, A. D. 1092. It is certain that Roscellin is the first author who obtained the appellation of a Nominalist, and from his time the school previously established, which held the creed that Genus and Species were real essences, or types and moulds of things, (*Universalia ante rem* according to the phrase of the Schoolmen), was throughout the present period perpetually opposed to Nominalism, whose partisans maintained that the *Universalia* subsisted only *in re*, or *post rem:* nor was the difficulty ever definitively settled.

Abelard.

Petr. Abelardi et Heloïsæ Opera nunc prim. edita ex MSS. codd. Fr. Amboesii, etc. stud. Andr. Quercetani (And. Duchesne), *Paris.* 1616, 4to. Idem: In Historiâ Calamitatum Suarum.

† (Gervaise), Life of P. Abeillard, *Paris*, 1720, 2 vols. 12mo.

John Berington, The History of the Lives of Abelard and Heloïse, etc., *Birm.* and *Lond.* 1787, 4to.

† F. C. Schlosser, Abailard and Dulcin. Life and Opinions of an Enthusiast and a Philosopher, *Gotha.* 1807, 8vo.

J. H. F. Frerich, Comment. Theol. Crit. de P. Abelardi Doctrina Dogm. et Morali, (prize comp.), *Jen.* 1827, 4to.

250. A celebrated discussion took place in the School of Paris on the nature of General Ideas and their connection with their subject-matter, between *William de Champeaux*[x], a renowned Logician, and *Peter Abelard*, or Abeillard, his pupil and opponent. Abelard, who by some has been considered the first in point of time of the Scholastic philosophers, employed in the debate none but negative arguments; but proved himself to be endowed with some qualifications superior to the narrow dispute in which he was engaged. He was born at Palais, a village near to Nantes, A. D. 1079, and possessed rare abilities which were sedulously cultivated. To great talents as a

[x] G. Campellensis: he died bishop of Châlons, A. D. 1120.

logician, he added an extensive acquaintance with Grecian philosophy; borrowed, it is true, from St. Augustine and Cicero. The perusal of the Classics had imparted to his mind a certain elegance as well as elevation, which set off his style in teaching and writing, and which at this period was rare, and proportionably admired. He evinced even greater boldness than Anselm in his attempts to re-state on general principles the grand doctrines and mysteries of Christianity, particularly that of the Trinity[y]. He also attempted, as Hildebert had done before him (§ 248), to explain, on philosophical principles, the chief points of Theological Morality, as, for instance, the ideas of Vice and Virtue. He made *both* to consist in the mental resolution, and denied that our desires in themselves are of the nature of sin[z]. His talents as a teacher attracted an immense crowd of admirers from among the young men at Paris, and increased the celebrity of its university; but at the same time, his reputation drew upon him the envy of others, which, backed by his ill-fated passion for Eloisa, and the zeal of theologians rigidly attached to the doctrines of the Romish church, and in particular the jealousy of St. Bernard, embittered the remainder of his life; and diminished the influence his talents would otherwise have possessed. He died at Clugny, 1142.

251. In spite of the persecutions of Abelard a great number of men of talents were willing to tread in his steps, and attempted, with various success, to associate Philosophy with Theology. The principal were *G. de Conches*[a], and *Guilb. de la Porrée*, born in Gascony, and bishop of Poitiers[b]; *Hugh de St. Victor*, of Lower

[y] In his Introductio ad Theol. Christian., libb. III. seu De Fide Trinitatis, libb. III: see his Works, p. 973 sqq.: and in the larger Treatise: Theologia Christiana, libb. V, given by Edm. Martene, Thes. Nov. Anecdot., t. V.

[z] Ethica, seu liber dictus Scito te ipsum, in Pezii Thes. Noviss. Anecdotorum, t. III, part 2, p. 625.

[a] Died 1150.

[b] On that account surnamed Pictaviensis. Died 1154.

Saxony or Flanders[c]; *Robert (Folioth?) of Melun*[d]; *Robert Pulleyn*, the Englishman[e]; *Peter*, surnamed *Lombardus*, bishop of Paris, born in a village near Novara, in Lombardy, and died 1164. To these must be added the disciple of the latter, *Peter of Poitiers*[f]; *Hugh of Amiens*[g]; *Richard de St. Victor* the mystic[h]; *Alain de Ryssel*[i], etc. The most distinguished was *Lombardus*, in consequence of his *Libri Sententiarum*, which procured him the additional appellation of *Magister Sententiarum*[k]. In these he put together extracts from the Fathers on different points of faith, without adding any solution of the difficulties that occurred; supplying an abundant treasury of disputation for the logicians of his time. His works became popular—a sort of storehouse and armoury for ecclesiastical polemics; though others of those we have mentioned possessed more real merit; for instance, the two mystics, *Hugh de St. Victor*, surnamed the Second Augustine, a man of an elegant and philosophical mind; and his pupil *Richard de St. Victor*, who to his mysticism added considerable acuteness. Pulleyn also was the author of a clear and enlarged account of the correspondence of Doctrines with the principles of Reason; and finally, *Alain de Ryssel* applied to these matters the exactness of a mathematical method.

[c] Born 1096, Died 1140.

Ejusd.: Opera stud. et industr. Canonicorum Regiorum Abbat. St. Vict. *Rothomag.* 1618, 3 vols. fol.

See C. Gfr. Derling, Diss. (præs. C. Gfr. Kenffel), de Hugone a St. Victore, *Helmst.* 1745, 4to.

[d] Melidunensis, died 1173 A. C., according to the Literary History of France, tom. XIII, p. 1164.

[e] Pullus, died between 1150 and 1154.

[f] Pictaviensis; died archbishop of Embrun, 1205.

[g] Died archbishop of Rouen, (hence called Rothomagensis), 1164.

[h] A Scotchman, died 1173. Opera, *Venet.* 1506, 8vo. *Par.* 1518.

[i] Called also Alain de l'Isle, and Alanus ab Insulis. Died 1203.

Carl. de Visch, Oratio de Alano, in the Works of Alain, ed. by Visch, *Antwerp.* 1653, fol.

[k] Petri Lombardi libri IV Sententiarum: frequently published, particularly *Ven.* 1477, fol.; *Colon.* 1576, 8vo. See Bossuet and Cramer's Hist. part. VI, § 586.

252. *John of Salisbury* (J. parvus Sarisburiensis[l]), a pupil of Abelard, and a man of classical erudition, in spite of his predilection for Aristotle clearly perceived the faultiness of the philosophy of his age, and the futility of that Logic which he attacked with considerable ability[m]. Dialectics came in the end to be employed both for and against the system of the Church, as was shown by the example of *Simon de Tournay* (Tornacensis), of *Amalric* (or Amauric de Bene, in the district of Chartres, who died 1209); and by his pupil *David de Dinant*. Besides a great number of paradoxical doctrines, the last taught a species of Pantheism, borrowed it is probable, from J. Scot Erigena[n]. These heretics justly turned into derision the School Dialectics. In the midst of the absurdities of the age, a certain independence of Thought manifested itself; very rude indeed as yet, but prepared to offer some opposition to dogmatising authority. By means of persecutions, anathemas, and interdictions, the adverse party succeeded in subduing it, for the time.

The most distinguished leaders of the latter were St. Bernard*, abbot of Clairvaux (born 1091, died 1153), and Walter, abbot of St. Victor.

THIRD PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Exclusive dominion of Realism; Complete alliance between the Church and the Aristotelians, from Alexander of Hales to Occam.

J. LAUNOJUS, De Variâ Aristotelis Futurâ. (Above, at the head of § 244).

253. It was precisely at the time when every thing ap-

[l] Died bishop of Chartres 1180.

[m] In his POLICRATICUS, sive de Nugis Curialium et Vestigiis Philosophorum, libb. VIII; et METALOGICUS, libb. IV, *Lugd. Bat.* 1639, *Amst.* 1664, 8vo.; and in his CCCI Epist., *Paris.* 1611, 4to.

[n] GERSON, De Concordiâ Metaphysicæ cum Logicâ, part. IV. THOMAS AQ. Lib. Sent. II, dist. 17, Qu. I, a. I. ALBERTI Summa Theol. part I. Tract. IV, Qu. 20.

* Best edition of his works by MABILLON, *Paris*, 1690, 6 vols.

peared to have a tendency to discard the philosophy of Aristotle from all interference with the doctrines of the church, that it acquired the greatest ascendancy. About the year 1240 men began to be better acquainted with his works *collectively*, in consequence of being brought into contact with the Greeks, who had never altogether deserted him[o]; and still more through the Arabians. The very circumstance that the perusal of these works was prohibited in 1209, 1215, and 1231, increased the avidity with which they were read to such a degree, that the Dominicans and Franciscans, the staunchest maintainers of orthodoxy, who had recently assumed authority in the University of Paris, eagerly devoted themselves to the same study.—The following question appears of interest: How was it that the works of Aristotle came to be known in the West? From the East by the way of Constantinople, or by the way of Spain through the Arabs[p]? From this question is to be excepted the *Or-*

[o] In the eleventh century appeared in the Greek empire the philologist Michael Constantine Psellus, born 1020 died about 1100: the author of Commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry; Paraphrasis Libri Arist. de Interpretatione, Gr., with the Commentaries of Ammonius and Magentinus, about 1503. Compendium in Quinque voces Porphyrii et Aristotelis Prædicamenta, Gr., *Paris.* 1541; and σύνοψις εἰς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους Λογικήν Gr. et Lat., *Aug. Vind.* 1597; besides Introductio in sex Philos. Modos, etc., Gr. c. Lat. vers. Jac. Foscarini, *Ven.* 1532, *Paris.* 1541, 12mo.; and a book on the Opinions of the old Philosophers respecting the Nature of the Soul, Gr. et Lat., with, Originis Philocalia, *Paris.* 1618 and 1624, 4to., subsequently reprinted. To Psellus succeeded Eustratius, metropolitan of Nicæa, in the beginning of the twelfth century, (Fabric. Bibl. Gr. lib. III, c. 6, p. 151, sqq. note a.), and other writers of the thirteenth century, who abridged the Logic of Aristotle; such as, Nicephor. Blemmydes (flourished about 1254), and Geor. Aneponymus (Nicephoræ Blemmydæ Epitome Logicæ Doctrinæ Aristotelis, Gr. et Lat. *Aug. Vindel.* 1606, 8vo.; Georgii Aneponymi Compendium Philos. siv. Organi Aristot. Gr. et Lat. *Aug. Vind.* 1600); Geor. Pachymerus, who survived till 1310, author of a Paraphrase of the Philosophy of Aristotle in general, of which extracts have been published, (Gr. et Lat. *Oxon.* 1666, 8vo., Epitome Philos. *Bas.* 1560, Lat. fol.); and Theod. Metochites, who survived till 1332, and commented on the works of Aristotle relating to Physics (Fabric. Bibl. Gr. vol. IX).

[p] See Buhle, Manual of the History of Philosophy, part. V, p. 247. Heeren, History of the Study of Classical Literature, vol. I, p. 183. This question has been thoroughly discussed, and decided in favour of a Saracenic

ganum, which was known as early as the time of Charlemagne; having been sent as a present to him from Constantinople.

Arabians.

254. The Arabians, originally devoted to Sabeism, had received a fresh impulse from the doctrines of Mahomet, which suited well their ardent temperaments and inquisitive minds. He died 632; but the flame was kept alive by the fiery zeal of his successors, who insisted more and more on his pretended mission from on High. In a short time they had subjected to their belief a large portion of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Their relations with the conquered nations, especially the Syrians, Jews, and Greeks; the progress among them of luxury, and all its consequences; the demand for foreign physicians and astrologers, and the influence acquired by the latter, engendered among them an ardent emulation for the sciences, which was encouraged in every way by the caliphs of the house of the Abassides, Al Mansour [q], Al Mohdi [r], Haroun al Raschid the contemporary of Charlemagne [s], Al Mamoum [t], and Motassem [u]; who caused the Greek authors to be translated into Arabic, founded schools, and collected valuable libraries [x].

origin, in the following prize composition of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, at Paris: Critical Inquiry respecting the Age and Origin of the Latin Translations of Aristotle, and the Greek or Arabic Commentaries employed by the Schoolmen, etc., by M. JOURDAIN, *Paris*, 1819, 8vo. On this work see Götting. Gel. Anz. 1819, No. 142.

[q] Reigned from 753 to 775.

[r] Died 784.

[s] Reigned from 786 to 808.

[t] From 813 to 833.

[u] Died 841.

[x] ABULFEDÆ Annales Moslemici Arab. et Lat. Opera REISKII, etc. ed. J. G. C. ADLER, *Havn.* 1789, sqq. tom. I—V, 4to.

G. ELMACINI, Historia Saracenica, ed. T. ERPEN, *Lugd. Bat.* 1625, fol.

† K. E. OELSNER, Mahomet: Influence of his Religion during the Middle Ages: prize composition of the Institution, 1809; translated and enlarged by E. D. M., *Francf.* 1810, 8vo.

OLAI CELSII Hist. Linguæ et Eruditionis Arabum, *Upsal*, 1694, 8vo.

RICHARDSON, Dissertation on the Languages, Manners, and the Literature

§ 255.

Chph. Chr. Fabricii (resp. J. Andr. Nagel), De Studio Philosophiæ Græcæ inter Arabes, *Altd.* 1745, 8vo.; id.: in the Frag. Hist. Philos. of Windheim, p. 57.

Car. Solandri Diss. de Logicâ Arabum, *Ups.* 1721, 8vo.

Eusebii Renaudoti De Barbaricis Aristotelis Librorum Versionibus Disquisitio, in Fabric. Biblioth. Gr. tom. XII.

† Tiedemann, Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. IV, and Brucker, Hist. Philosophiæ, tom. III.

† Jos. von Hammer, A Brief History of Arabian Metaphysics, and an Article of the Leipz. Lit. Gaz. 1826, No. 161—163.

Aristotle and his commentators down to J. Philoponus, were almost the only philosophers who found favour with the Arabians. The body of his philosophy they received indeed only through the doubtful medium of Neoplatonism, and by means of inadequate translations[y]. To the study of these they added Mathematics, Natural History, and Medicine. But many obstacles were in their way. In the first place the Koran, which opposed limits to the free exercise of their understandings: the opposition also of a formidable party who pretended to maintain the orthodox belief: the difficulty of understanding Aristotle himself: and the absolute supremacy they presently accorded to him: lastly, their national tendency to exaggeration and superstition. All therefore they effected was to interpret, and very frequently to misinterpret, the system of that philosopher, without ever ad-

of the Eastern Nations; prefixed to his Persian, Arabic, and English Dictionary, *Oxford*, 1777, fol.

J. Gottl. Buhle, Commentatio de Studii Græcarum Literarum inter Arabes initiis et rationibus. Comment. Soc. Gotting. vol. XI, p. 216.

Jo. Leo. Africanus, De Viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabes Libellus; in Fabric. Bibl. Gr., tom. XIII.

Chr. Friedr. Schnurrer, Bibl. Arabicæ Specimen, part. I—V, *Tub.* 1799—1803, 4to.; et Bibliotheca Arabica, *Hal.* 1811, 8vo.

Henrici Middeldorpii Commentatio de Institutis Literariis in Hispaniâ, quæ Arabes auctores habuerunt, *Gott.* 1811, 4to.

[y] See the works of Jourdain and Buhle mentioned above.

vancing beyond him; attempting to apply his principles to their own blind faith. The consequence was, an abundant harvest of futile refinements. To such a philosophy was superadded, accidentally, a sort of mysticism; especially among the Pantheistic sect of the *Sofis* or *Ssufis* (*Sofismus*, *Sufismus*), founded before or during the second century of the Hegira, by *Abou Said Abul Cheir;* a sect which continues to survive in sufficiently large numbers in Persia and India[z].

After all, the records of Arabic philosophy have been too little investigated to enable us to speak of them with sufficient certainty.

256. The principal Arabian philosophers (for the most part exclusively devoted to the system of Aristotle), were:

1. *Alkendi,* or Alkindi[a], of Basrah, a physician and philosopher, the master of copious and various learning, and well versed in the Sciences. He flourished, A. D. 800, under the reign of Al Mamoum. 2. *Alfarabi*[b] of Balah, in the province of Farab, who died A. D. 954; a man of superior parts; and styled the *second* teacher of intellectual knowledge. His Logic, as well as his treatise on the origin and subdivision of the Sciences, was greatly in vogue with the schoolmen. 3. *Avicenna*[c], born about 980, at Bochara: died 1036. He devoted himself especially to Logic and Metaphysics (which he thought the first of the Sciences, inasmuch as it has for its subject Being in the Abstract); as well as to Medicine and Alchemy. He manifested an original vein of thought in his

[z] Ssufismus sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica, quam e MSS. Biblioth. Regiæ Berol., Persicis, Arabicis, Turcicis eruit atque illustravit FRIEDR. AUG. DEOFIDUS THOLUCK, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo. The opinion of this author is, that Sofism had its origin neither in India nor Persia, but in the religion of Mahomet itself. His hypothesis is controverted by the author (Qu. M. HAMMER?) of a critique in the Lit. Gaz. of Leipsic (1822, Nos. 252—258), on an important work relative to Oriental Mysticism, entitled, Reschati Ainol Hajat, etc.

[a] Otherwise called Abu Yusuf (Jacob) Ebn Eschak (Isaac) Al Kendi.

[b] Abu Nasr Mohammed Ebn Tarchan Al Farabi.

[c] Abu Ali Al Hosain Ebn Sina Al Schaüch Al Raus.

commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle[d]. He there asserts that it is no more possible to assign a definition of Absolute Being, than it is to give one of *the Necessary, the Possible,* and *the Real.* From the abstract notion of Necessity, he concludes that what is necessary is without an efficient cause; and that there is only one Being existing of Necessity. 4. *Algazel* of Tus[e], an acute Sceptic, who proved himself able to defend the cause of a Supernatural revelation with ability in opposition to the doctrine of Emanation, as well as that of the harmony of causes, and the materiality of the Soul; with many others of the opinions of the Aristotelians and Neoplatonists. He maintained the infallibility of the Koran, and asserted the miracles of Mahomet to be incontestible proofs of his mission. 5. *Thophail,* or *Abubekr*[f], of Cordova; died at Seville 1190. He was distinguished for his philosophical romance *Hai Ebn Yokdan,* or the Man of Nature[g]; in which he sets forth with ability the enthusiastic doctrine of the Neoplatonists respecting intuition.

Averroes.

Commentary of Averroes on the Arabic trans. of Aristotle: in various editions of the Works of Aristotle, *Ven.* 1562; vol. II. Besides his work: Destructio destructionis Philosophiæ Algazelis, in the Latin translations, *Venet.* 1497, and *Venet.* 1527, fol. See Fabricii Bibl. Gr. XIII, p. 282, sqq.

257. 6. *Averroes*[h], the disciple of Tophail, was born at Cordova, and died at Morocco, 1206 or 1217. He was the most celebrated of the learned men of his nation, and the close and almost servile follower of Aristotle. He was styled, by way of eminence, *the Commentator;* and,

[d] Metaphysica per Bernard. Venetuni, *Venet.* 1493. Opera, *Ven.* 1523, 5 vols. fol.; *Bas.* 1556, 3 vols.

[e] Abu Hamed Mohammed Ebu Mohammed Ebn Achmed Al Gazali, born 1072, died 1111.

[f] Abn Dsafar Ebn Thophail.

[g] Philosophus Autodidactus, trad. Lat. per Ed. Pocoke, *Oxon.* 1761, 4to.

[h] Abul Walid Mohammed Ebn Achmed Ebn Mohamed Ebn Rashid.

in spite of the great number of his secular employments, was a most copious writer. His treatment of Aristotle ought to be appreciated by a reference to the state of opinions in his day. Though he professed to do no more than interpret him, he imputed to him many opinions which in reality were not his: blending with his system the Alexandrian doctrine of Emanation, in order to assign a living First-principle to account for all contingent things. His theory of an active Intelligence is a necessary consequence of this manner of interpreting the doctrine of Aristotle. The great Primal Essence produces all the various modifications of things, not by the way of Creation, (because—ex nihilo nihil fit) but by uniting matter and form, or by developing the form involved and contained in the matter[i]. Thought, as well as sensible Perception, supposes three things: a material, and, as it were, a formal understanding; the one being impressed, the other receiving the impression; as well as a power to communicate the impression. There exists an Universal—Active Intelligence, in which all mankind partake equally, and which is derived to us from without: its principle being, perhaps, the same which influences the moon[k]. Averroes was a man of a clear-sighted enlightened mind, who believed in the authority of the Koran, but regarded it as a sort of exoteric doctrine, the foundation of which he sought to place on scientific grounds[l].

Sects of Arabian Philosophers.

258. Speaking generally, the Arabian philosophers were divided into two parties; viz. the philosophers simply so called (Idealists), who, according to the belief of the Platonists of Alexandria, held that the world was eternal, and endeavoured to unite this belief to their own prescribed religion; to which school belonged also the As-

[i] Averroes, lib. XII, Metaphys.

[k] Averroes, De Animæ Beatitudine. Epitome Metaph. Tract. IV. Cœl. Rhodog. Ant. Lect. lib. III, c. 2.

[l] See M. Hammer's work, cited above, for a list of several Arabian philosophers of more recent date, and less reputation.

cetics or Sofis (§ 255): and, secondly, the *Medabberins* (Dialectic philosophers, or reasoners), who took their ground on the positive doctrines of the Koran; endeavoured to explain, on philosophical principles, the origin of the world; and combated the Idealists[m]. We are not as yet perfectly acquainted with these two sects. A third likewise is mentioned, that of *Assariah*, or falalists, who referred every thing to the will of God.

Jews.

259. The doctrines of the Arabians were communicated to the Christian world principally through the medium of the Jews, who imported them from Egypt, where the sciences had been prosecuted with great ardour. The Jews themselves took a prominent part in philosophical researches, and were distinguished for more than one philosopher. Of this number was *Moses Maimonides*[n]: born at Cordova, A. D. 1139, and brought up under Theophail and Averroes, and inclined to the study of Aristotle; but for these reasons persecuted by the fanatical part of his own countrymen, up to the period of his death; which happened in 1205. In his work entitled *More Nevochim* (*Doctor Perplexorum*[o]), he manifests an acute and enlightened understanding in the exposition of certain doctrines, and in the philosophical principles which he assumes. As a proof, he resists his inclination for the Arabic-Aristotelian system so far as to call in question many of its hypothesis, e. g. that of the Intelligences of the spheres, and of the Active Universal Intelligence.

It may be observed, that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Jews acted as interpreters between the Saracens and the Western nations, by their frequent translations into Hebrew of the works of the Arabians;

[m] Averroes in Metaph. lib. XII, c. 18. Moses Maimonides More Nevochim, lib. I, c. 71, p. 133—135.

[n] Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon.

[o] Translated into Latin by J. Buxtorf, *Basil.* 1629, 4to.

which were re-translated from the Hebrew, (a language then better known than the Arabic), into Latin; very imperfectly indeed, but pretty generally.

260. The consequence of this dissemination of the Aristotelian philosophy from an Arabian source, was the increased reputation of that philosopher, who was in a manner installed the sovereign and infallible arbiter of truth and falsehood in all matters of science. The circle of the sciences and the field of inquiry was enlarged, new ideas and new combinations were developed to the advantage of Dialectics, the exercise of which they called forth. Philosophy came to be less and less confounded with the sciences, and was allowed to retain a place distinct from them. One of the principal co-operating causes was the formation of the University of Paris, and of similar institutions in other cities. Out of this arose a sort of polemical contest between Theology and Philosophy, in which the former obtained the ascendancy; the latter being depressed to an inferior position, and a distinction established between Theological and Philosophical truths. To this succeeded an attempt to reconcile and associate the two, which was for some time successful.

Alexander of Hales and his Contemporaries.

261. The first author who turned to account the works of the Arabians was *Alexander of Hales (Alesius)*, so called from a convent in Gloucestershire, and surnamed *Doctor Irrefragabilis*. Tiedemann makes him the first Schoolman. He taught Theology at Paris, and in his *Summa Theologiæ*[o] enlarged upon the Manual of Lombardus, (§ 251), by a rigorous syllogistical statement of the different opinions contained in his book. *William* of *Auvergne*[p] devoted himself to the statement

[o] *Ven.* 1475, fol. *Norimb.* 1481. *Ven.* 1576, 4 vols. fol.

[p] Guillielmus Arvernus, and Parisiensis, because bishop of Paris, died 1249. Opera, *Ven.* 1591, fol. *Aurel.* 1674, 2 vols. fol.

and discussion of philosophical questions respecting Morals and Metaphysics, with less general views. *Vincent* of *Beauvais*[q], in his books of reference (*Specula*), gave a picture of the state of the Sciences at this period, particularly of moral philosophy, and has enlightened us with respect to the discordant opinions of the Nominalists and Realists. *Michael Scott* (was living at Toledo A. D. 1217) translated the works of Aristotle, *De Cœlo et de Mundo*, and *De Animâ*, as well as the *Historia Naturalis*; according to the Arabian arrangement: a labour in which he was assisted by a Jew named Andrew. He commented on Aristotle, and availed himself of his Logic. *Robert Grosseteste*, or *Greathead*, (*Robertus Capito*), who taught at Paris and Oxford, and died bishop of Lincoln A. D. 1253, besides other treatises composed some Commentaries on Aristotle.

Albert the Great.

Rudolphus Noviomagensis de Vitâ Alberti M. libb. III, *Colon.* 1499, et: Alberti M. Opera ed. Pet. Jammy, *Lyon.* 1651, 21 vols. fol.

262. *Albert* of *Bollstädt*, or *the Great*, was the first who gave a decided direction to the general tendency in favour of the Aristotelian system. He was born at Lauingen in Swabia, A. D. 1193 or 1205, and studied at Pavia, where he entered the order of the Dominicans, and by his great application to study, especially to that of Natural History, (a department then very generally neglected), he acquired so great a mass of information that he came to be looked upon as a prodigy, and a sort of enchanter. He lived principally at Cologne and Paris: in 1260 was made bishop of Ratisbon, but subsequently resigned that dignity, in order to devote himself

[q] Bellovacensis, died about 1264. Speculum Universale, *Argent.* 1473, fol. Speculum quadruplex Opera et stud. Theologor. Bened. *Duaci*, 1624, 4 vols. fol. See Vincent de Beauvais, etc., by Fr. Chph. Schlosser, *Francf. a. M.* 1819, 2 vols. 8vo.

to study. He died in his convent at Cologne 1280. He was rather a learned man and a compiler of the works of others, than an original and profound thinker. He wrote commentaries on most of the works of Aristotle, in which he makes especial use of the Arabian commentators, and blends the notions of the Neoplatonists with those of his author. Logic, Metaphysics, Theology, and Ethics, were rather externally cultivated by his labours than effectually improved. With him began those minute and tedious inquiries and disputes respecting Matter and Form, Essence and Being (*Essentia* or *Quidditas* and *Existentia*, whence subsequently arose the farther distinction of *Esse Essentiæ*, and *Existentiæ*). Rational Physiology and Theology are indebted to him for many excellent hints. The latter science he treated in his *Summa Theologia*, as well according to the plan of Lombardus as his own. He described the soul as a *totum potestativum*, and asserted that General Ideas belonged partly to the mind, partly to external objects. In his Theology he laboured to define our rational knowledge of the Nature of God, (excluding from such inquiries the mystery of the Trinity), and enlarged upon the metaphysical idea of Him, as a necessary Being, (in whom Essence and Being are identical), endeavouring to develop in this manner His attributes. These inquiries are often mixed up with idle questions and dialectic absurdities, and involve abundant inconsistencies; as for instance, when he would account for the creation by the doctrine of Emanation, (*causatio univoca*), and nevertheless denies the Emanation of souls:—he insists upon the universal intervention of the Deity in the course of Nature, and yet asserts the existence of natural causes, defining and limiting His operations. He considered Conscience to be the highest law of Reason. All virtue which is acceptable to God is infused by Him into the hearts of men. His scholars were distinguished by the name of Albertists.

Bonaventura.

† Abridged History of the Life, Virtues, and Religious System of St. Bonaventura, etc. *Lyon*, 1749, 8vo. and: Bonaventuræ Opera, *Argent.* 1482, fol. Idem: Jussu Pii V, *Romæ.* 1588-96, 7 vols. fol. (best edition).

263. The contemporary of Albert, *John* of *Fidanza* or *Bonaventura*[s], surnamed *Doctor Seraphicus;* was possessed of less extensive learning than the other, but of more talent; and a pious frame of mind, tinctured with mysticism. It was his endeavour to reconcile the views of Aristotle and the Alexandrians. In his commentary on Lombardus[t] he contracts the sphere of speculation, and studies to employ the principles of Aristotle and the Arabians, not so much for the satisfaction of a minute and idle curiosity, as for the resolution of important questions, and to reconcile opposite opinions; especially in the important inquiries respecting Individuality and Free-will. Occasionally he rests his arguments rather on the testimony of human experience than that of theory: for instance, respecting the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul. The Supreme Good he affirms to be Union with the Deity; by which alone mankind can attain a perception of Truth, and the enjoyment of happiness. This leads him to ascribe[u] all knowledge to Illumination from on high; which he distinguishes into four species: Exterior—Inferior—Interior—and Superior. He defines also[x] six degrees whereby man may approximate the Deity; and refers to these six as many distinct faculties of the Soul: an ingenious idea and copiously detailed, but in a great degree arbitrary and forced.

Finding speculation insufficient for the ideal attainment of the Supreme Good, he abandoned himself with all his heart to mysticism.

[s] Born at Bagnarea 1221, died 1274.
[t] Comment. in Magistrum Sententiarum.
[u] Reductio Artium ad Theologiam.
[x] Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. See his works above.

Thomas Aquinas.

Thomæ Aq. Opera Omnia, stud. et curâ VINC. JUSTINIANI et THOMÆ MANRIQUEZ, *Rom.* 1570-71, 18 vols. fol., (best edition). Idem: curâ Fratrum ord. prædicat. *Par.* 1636-41, 23 vols. fol. (containing the dubious works, but less correct). Opera Theologica curâ BERN. DE RUBEIS, *Ven.* 1745, sqq. 20 vols. 4to.

BERN. DE RUBEIS (de' Rossi), Dissertatt. Criticæ et Apologeticæ de Gestis et Scriptis ac Doctrinâ S. Thomæ Aquinatis, *Venet.* 1730, fol. Idem (prefixed to the above edition).

† A. TOURON, Life of St. Thomas Aquinas, with an account of his Doctrines and Works, *Par.* 1731, 4to.

LUD. CARBONIS A COSTACIARIO Compendium Absolutissimum totius Summæ Theologicæ S. Thomæ Aquinatis, *Venet.* 1587, 8vo.

Thomæ Aquinatis Summa Philosophiæ per S. CAS. ALEMANNIUM. *Par.* 1640, fol.

Summa S. Thomæ Hodiernis Academiarum Moribus accommodata, sive cursus Theologiæ Operâ CAROLI RENATI BELLUART, *Ultraj.* 1769, 8vo.

PLACIDI RENTZ, Philosophia ad Mentem D. Thomæ Aquinatis explicata, *Colon.* 1723, 3 vols. 8vo.

PET. ZORN, De Variâ Fortunâ Philosophiæ Thomæ Aquinatis. Opusc. Sacr. tom. I.

264. Nearly at the same time with Bonaventura, St. Thomas Aquinas (or *ab Aquino*), obtained a celebrity which eclipsed that of almost every writer of his age. He was born A. D. 1224, in the castle of Rocea Sicca in the kingdom of Naples, of a great feudal family; and in opposition to the wishes of his parents, was determined by his ardent love for study to enter the order of the Dominicans, (1243). The same attachment to letters carried him to Paris, and to Cologne, to profit by the lessons of Albertus, and caused him to decline all offers of advancement in his order, beyond that of *Definitor;* while it procured him the reputation of the greatest Christian philosopher of his century, and the appellations of *Doctor Universalis* and *Angelicus.* He died 1274, and, as well as Bonaventura, was canonised. Thomas Aquinas was endowed with a genius truly philosophical; had amassed

great knowledge; and cherished an ardent zeal for the advancement of rational knowledge. He rendered real service to the Aristotelian philosophy by the pains he took to effect a translation of the works in which it was contained, and by his commentaries on them. He was a Realist[y], and considered the abstract idea of things to be their original essence. This system he endeavoured to place on a firmer basis by extending the theory of Thought propounded by Aristotle, to which he superadded somewhat of the system of Plato and of the Alexandrians. With this is connected his explanation of the ideas of Matter and Form, as Elements of compound objects. The intellectual Soul, the nature of which he discusses after Aristotle's system, is the Substantial *Form* of man, immaterial and indestructible. But his meditations were principally devoted to the study of Theology, which he endeavoured to reduce to a systematical form by enlarging upon its principles in the manner of the Aristotelian and Alexandrian Schools. Such was the design of his Commentary on Lombardus, of his work Against the Heathens[z], and of his *Summa Theologiæ*. The latter is the first attempt at a complete system of Theology comprehending one of Ethics, and is enriched with many solid and wise observations, without the observance of any rigorous order in its details. Its principles are not laid down with sufficient precision, and the different sources of information are not clearly distinguished. He taught that Evil, or the negation of Good is necessary to the completion of the Universal system, and that God is only the accidental cause of it. We may observe in this system (as well as in St. Augustine, from whom he derived them), many of the principal features of that of Leibnitz respecting the Divine Government. He treats the subject of Morals, which he divides into General and Special, in part according to the views of The-

[y] The terms Realist and Idealist may, in this treatise be considered synonymous: both are opposed to Nominalist, and signify a believer in the *reality* of Generic and Specific Ideas.

[z] Summa Catholicæ Fidei adversus Gentiles, *Burdig.* 1664, 8vo.

ology, and partly after those of Aristotle: and although his ideas are not very clearly defined or largely developed, that science is much indebted to his labours. He continued to be for a long time the highest authority in matters of Religion and Philosophy, and had a large number of disciples, (especially among the Dominicans and Jesuits), who called themselves by his name. Among these we remark *Ægidius Colonna*, a Roman, *Hervæus* (§ 267), *Thomas de Vio Cajetanus*, *Gabr. Velasquez*, *Petrus Hiertadus de Mendoza*, *P. Fonseca*, *Domenic* of *Flanders* (died 1500), and *Fr. Suarez* (died 1617).

Contemporaries of Thomas Aquinas.

265. Other contemporaries of Thomas deserve to be briefly mentioned; for instance, *Petrus Hispanus*, of Lisbon, afterwards pope, under the style of John XXI, and who died 1277. He distinguished himself by his *Summulæ Logicales*, an abridgment of the Scholastic Logic: and it is to him we probably owe the ingenious arrangement of the different forms of argument, so often republished[a]. To him must be added *H. Goethals* of Muda, near Ghent, better known under the name of *Henricus Gandavensis*, surnamed *Doctor Solemnis*, who became a professor at Paris, and died archdeacon of Tournay, 1293[b]. He was endowed with great sagacity of understanding, attached to the system of the Realists, and blended the Ideas of Plato with the formularies of Aristotle: attributing to the first a real existence, independent of the Divine Intelligence. He suggested some new opinions in Psychology, and detected many speculative errors, without however suggesting corrections of them, owing to the faultiness of the method of the Philosophy of his time. He frequently opposed Thomas

[a] † Joh. Tob. Köhler, Complete Account of Pope John XXI, celebrated as a Physician and Philosopher under the name of Petrus Hispanus, *Götting.* 1760, 4to.

[b] Henr. Gandavensis Quodlibeta in IV libb. Sententiar. *Par.* 1518, fol. Summa Theologiæ, *ibid.* 1520, fol.

Aquinas himself. To these we may add *Richard de Middleton, (Richardus de Mediâ Villâ)*, surnamed *Doctor Solidus, Fundatissimus*, and *Copiosus*, who died a professor at Oxford, A. D. 1300, and was a skilful interpreter of Lombardus.

Duns Scotus.

Joh. Dunsii Scoti Opera Omnia collecta, recognita, Notis et Scholiis et Commentariis illustrata (ed. Ludov. Wadding), *Lugd.* 1639, 12 vols. fol.

Hugonis Cavelli Vita Joh. Duns Scoti; prefixed to Quæstiones in Sententias, *Antwerp.* 1620.—Apologia pro Joh. D. Scoto adversus Opprobria, Calumnias et Injurias quibus P. Abr. Bzovius eum onerat, *Par.* 1634, 12mo.

Lud. Wadding, Vita Joh. Duns Scoti, *Mont.* 1644, 8vo. (Id. in his edition above).

Mathæi Veglensis Vita Joh. Dunsii Scoti, *Patav.* 1671, 8vo. Id.: in the Thesaurus Biog. Bibliographicus of Waldau, part I, p. 75, sqq.

J. G. Boyvin, Philosophia Scoti, *Par.* 1690, 8vo. The same: Philosophia quadripartiti Scoti, *Par.* 1668, 4 vols. fol.

Joh. Santacrucii Dialectica ad Mentem Eximii Magistri Johannis Scoti, *Lond.* 1672, 8vo.

Fr. Eleuth. Abergoni Resolutio Doctrinæ Scoticæ, in quâ quid Doctor Subtilis circa singulas, quas exagitat, quæstiones sentiat, etsi oppositum alii opinentur, brevibus ostenditur, in subtilium studiosorum gratiam, *Lugd.* 1643, 8vo.

Joh. Duns Scotus (Doctor Subtilis) per Universam Philosophiam, Logicam, Physicam, Metaphysicam, Ethicam contra adversantes defensus, Quæstionum novitate amplificatus, ac in tres tomos divisus. Autor Bonaventura Baro, *Colon. Agr.* 1664, fol.

Joh. Arada, Controversiæ Theologicæ inter S. Thomam et Scotum super quatuor libros Sententiarum, in quibus pugnantes Sententiæ referuntur, potiores difficultates elucidantur, et Responsiones et Argumenta Scoti rejiciuntur, *Colon.* 1620, 4to.

Joh. Lalemandet, Decisiones Philosophicæ, *Monach.* 1644-1645, fol.

Crisper, Philosophia Scholæ Scotisticæ, *Aug. Vindel.* 1735; et Theologia Scholæ Scotisticæ, 4 vols., *ibid.* 1748, fol.

266. *John Duns Scotus*, born at Dunston in Northumberland (about 1275 ?), became a Franciscan, and was sur-

named *Doctor Subtilis* which he deserved by the pregnancy of his parts. He studied at Oxford and Paris, and died prematurely, A.D. 1308. His celebrated attack on the system of Thomas Aquinas drew this skilful reasoner very frequently into vain and idle distinctions, but in all his dialectic disputes he maintained a steady zeal for the promotion of real knowledge. He endeavoured to ascertain some certain principle of knowledge, whether intellectual or sensible, and applied himself to demonstrate the truth and necessity of Revelation. As a Realist he differed from Thomas, by asserting that the Universal is contained in the Particular not merely *in posse* but *in actu:* that it is not created by the Understanding but communicated to it: that the nature of things is determined to particular or universal by a higher principle: with other opinions too obscure to be satisfactorily detailed in a compendium like the present. In Psychology he opposed the belief that the faculties of the soul were distinct, and maintained the freedom of the will. In Theology he endeavoured to fortify the Cosmological proof of the existence of the Deity, and to demonstrate the Divine Attributes. He asserted the Supreme power of the Divine Will in all things, even in the establishment of the laws of Morality; which he deduced from that alone. Occasionally he expressed doubts respecting the admissibility of a Theology founded on principles of Reason.

Duns Scotus was the founder of a school, The Scotists, who distinguished themselves for subtilty of disputation, and for incessant disputes with the *Thomists.* These disputes were so frequently mixed up with human passions, that Science derived from them little benefit; and it very frequently happened that the points in question instead of being elucidated were obscured through their controversies.

Disciples of Thomas; or, Thomists.

267. Among the Thomists of the thirteenth century

we may remark: 1. *Ægidiu Colonna* a Roman[c], a consistent Realist; according to whom, Truth resides in the understanding as well as the object. His principal merit was that he unravelled with perspicuity certain metaphysical problems, and endeavoured to reconcile discordant opinions respecting the questions of Being, Form, Matter, and Individuality. 2. *Hervæus*[d], whose learned but abstruse logic was even yet more unintelligible than that of his predecessors.

Scotists.

268. The most celebrated contemporary disciples of Scot were, *Fr. Mayronis* a Franciscan[e], who first set the example of disputes in the Sorbonne (*Actus Sorbonici*), and wrote esteemed commentaries on Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Lombardus, etc.:—*Hier. de Ferrariis, Antonius Andreæ*[f], *Walter Burleigh* (§ 272). To these may be added the Franciscan *Pet. Tartaretus* (in the fifteenth century), *J. B. Monlorius* (flourished about 1569), and *Major.*

269. At this period also appeared two men highly remarkable for the reformation which they attempted, but were not able to effect, in the philosophy of the age. The first of these, *Roger Bacon* a Franciscan, was born at Ilchester, 1214; and acquired great celebrity by his knowledge of Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, and the Languages; as well as by the fertility of his original ideas and inventions. He was surnamed in consequence *Doctor Mirabilis;* but unhappily, also, was accused of witchcraft, and imprisoned by command of the general of his

[c] Ægidius Columna Romanus, surnamed Doctor Fundatissimus s. Theologorum Princeps, born 1247, died 1316.

[d] Herve Noel, or Hervæus Natalis, born in Bretagne; at first a monk then general of the order of the preachers; professor of Theology, and rector of the university of Paris. Died at Narbonne, 1323.

[e] Franciscus de Mayronis, *Doctor Illuminatus et Acutus, Magister Abstractionum.* Died at Placentia, 1325.

[f] *Doctor Dulcifluus*, born in Arragon. Died about 1320.

order. He had the perspicacity to detect the false principles of the philosophical system of his time, and instead of the frivolous distinctions then established, was desirous of opening new paths to inquiry through the study of Nature and the Languages. Unfortunately the monkish spirit of the time repressed his investigations, and the influence they would have insured to him. He taught at Oxford A. D. 1210, and died 1292 or 1294[g]. *Raymond Lulli* (*Lullus*, or *Lullius*, born at Palma in the isle of Majorca 1234), was distinguished in his mature days for a devout piety, as he had been notorious in his youth for his love of pleasure. He devoted himself to the conversion of the Mahometans and Pagans; pretending to have received to this intent illumination from above, and the gift of the Great Art (*Ars Magna*[h]). His endeavours not being as successful as he had hoped, he devoted this Great Art to the reformation of Philosophy and the Sciences. His art was nothing more than a Mechanical Logic, calculated to solve all questions without any study or reflection on the part of him who should use it. He added thereto some hints borrowed from the philosophy of the Arabians and the Cabbala, which he appears to have been the first Christian author to cultivate. In his numerous works and those of his School we frequently discover more clear and elevated views of Morality, though he was not able to escape canonical censure on this head. He died 1315. His followers (*Lullists*), disseminated a superstitious enthusiasm, together with the belief he entertained in the possibility of making gold; but occasionally struck out new and valuable ideas. Long

[g] See his Opus Majus ad Clementem IV, Sam. Jebb, *Lond.* 1733, fol.; and the Biographia Britannica, IV, 616, sqq.

[h] Jacobi Custerer, De Raimundo Lullio Dissertatio in Actis SS. *Antwerp.*, tom. V, p. 697.—† Perroquet, Life of Raymond Lulle, *Vendôme*, 1667, 8vo.

Raymundi Lulli Opera Omnia, ed. Salzinger, *Mogunt.* 1721—42, 10 vols. fol. Et: Opera ea quæ ad Inventam ab ipso Artem Universalem pertinent, *Argent.* 1598, 8vo.

See also J. H. Altstädtii Clavis Artis Lullianæ et Veræ Logicæ, *Argent.* 1609, 8vo.; and Bruck. Hist. Phil. p. 1353, sqq.

He obtained the appellation of *Doctor Illuminatissimus*.

after his death the *Ars Magna* of Raymond Lulli found admirers among men of talent, (e. g. Giordano Bruno).

At this period also appeared *Petrus ab Apono* (or *Abano*), near Padua, born 1250, died 1315 or 1316; a physician, attached to the Arabian doctrines, and author of a book entitled, *Conciliator Differentiarum Philosophicarum et Præcipue Medicorum*[i]:—and *Arnold de Villanova*, who died in 1312, a zealous fellow-labourer with the former, and inclined to the opinions of Raymond Lulli[k].

FOURTH PERIOD OF THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE.

III. *Disputes between the Nominalists and Realists renewed by Occam, in which the former gain ground.* (*From the Fourteenth Century to the end of the Fifteenth.*)

270. About the close of this century a man of great merit contributed much to the downfal of Realism, and the cessation of these endless logical disputes, by resolving difficulties after a clearer and more precise manner, and establishing the foundations of a more exact knowledge of properties of the Object and Subject. This was *G. Durand de St. Pourçain*[l]. He was at first a Thomist, but subsequently became a candid adversary of that School[m].

Occam.

Joh. Salaberti Philosophia Nominalium vindicata, or, Logica in Nominalium Viâ, *Lut. Par.* 1651, 8vo. (very scarce). Some extracts are to be found in Cramer, Continuation of Bossuet, VII, p. 867.

Ars Rationis ad Mentem Nominalium, *Oxf.* 1673, 12mo.

Guil. Occam, Quæstiones et Decisiones in IV libb. Sententiar. *Lugd.* 1495, fol. Centiloquium Theologicum, *ibid.* 1496, fol. Summa Totius Logicæ, *Par.* 1488; *Oxf.* 1675, 8vo.

[i] *Ven.* 1471—1483, fol. His life is to be found in the *Quartalschrift* of Canzler and Meissner, second year, No. IV, fasc. 1.

[k] Opera Omnia cum Nic. Taurellii Annotatt., *Bas.* 1585, fol.

[l] Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Doctor Resolutissimus*, born in Auvergne; bishop of Meaux. Died 1332.

[m] Launoii Syllabus Rationum, quibus Durandi causa Defenditur, in Opp., tom. I, p. 1. See his Comment. in Magistr. Sentent. *Par.* 1508.

271. *William of Occam* (or *Ockham*), an Englishman, born in Surrey, and surnamed *Doctor Singularis, Invicibilis et Venerabilis Inceptor*, a disciple of Scot, and, like him, a Franciscan; began a new era in philosophy and history by his talents, and the courage with which he opposed himself most zealously to the despotism of the prevailing dogmata. He was a teacher at Paris at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and having defended the rights of the king of France and the emperor against the usurpations of the Pope, died, persecuted but not subdued, at Munich in 1347 or 1343. He proposed to effect no more by his Logic than a better demonstration of common opinions; refused to submit implicitly to authority; and closely following the principles of more rational Dialectics, and in particular the dictum that—*Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem:* he demonstrated the absurdity of Realism; refuted it in a variety of particulars, and directed the attention of others to the doctrine of the Nominalists. He denied that Ideas had any other real existence than what they possess in the understanding, by which they are contemplated; because such an hypothesis is not necessary either for the purposes of science or philosophy, and because it leads to extravagant consequences: on the contrary, such Ideas are the *figmenta* of the mind itself by the process of Abstraction, which it employs to designate classes of external objects[n]. He did but *sketch* the principles of a philosophy afterwards completed; but his labours sufficed to withdraw the attention of his followers from the all-engrossing question of the principle of *Individuality*, and directed them rather to the acquirement of fresh knowledge. In his theory of knowledge, Occam receded still farther from the opinions of the Realists, and by maintaining that Thought was Subjective, afforded a greater handle to Scepticism and Empiricism than possibly he himself might have intended. Though too absolutely laid down, such a proposition, was, nevertheless,

[n] Comment. in Lib. I, 2, Quæst. 4 and 8.

in the circumstances of the times, serviceable to the cause of philosophy. William of Occam, by controverting established Dogmata, by his Scepticism, and by the new ideas he started, impaired the authority of existing principles, and gave occasion to more extended inquiries. On the same ground, he endeavoured, in Theology, to circumscribe the subjects of investigation, and rejected the established Scholastic proofs of the Existtence, Unity, and Omnipotence of the Divinity; as also of His Wisdom; asserting that all these are to be derived from Religion alone. Nevertheless, he departed so far from his own principles as to offer a proof of the existence of God, derived from the preservation of all things in their original state; asserting that for such preservation some active efficient cause must be assigned, which can be no other than the First Creative Principle. With respect to the possibility of forming an adequate idea of God, he offers many excellent observations, but not altogether conclusive. In Psychology he threw out some ingenious notions respecting the Soul, the diversity of its faculties, and their relations to their objects. He refuted at length the hypothesis of Objective Images (Species); up to this time regarded as necessary to a theory of Perception and Thought. On many points Occam adhered to the opinions of his master, Scotus; for instance, respecting Free-will, and the origin of Moral distinctions in the Will of God.

Opponents of Nominalism.

272. Occam in his turn was opposed by the partisans of Realism, though in a much more feeble manner, and among others by his fellow-student *Walter Burleigh*[p], *Burlæus* (*Doctor Planus et Perspicuus*), born 1275; at first a professor in England, then at Paris, and lastly at Oxford, and who died about 1337. The debates between

[p] He composed Commentaries on Aristotle and a Biography of the Philosophers: De Vitâ et Moribus Philosophorum et Poetarum, *Colon.* 1427, 4to. *Nuremb.* 1777, reprinted. See Heumann, Acta Philos., No. 14, p. 282, sqq.

the two schools appear now to have been mainly confined to oral disputation. With regard to the writings of *Thomas de Bradwardine*[q], and *Thomas de Strasburg*[r], we need only remark that the former resisted the tendency to Pelagianism contained in the theory of Scotus, and the second did but reproduce what had been already taught by Ægidius Colonna. *Marsilius of Inghen*[s] appears to have been a moderate Realist, according to the principles of Occam and Scotus, as respected the theory of Volition.

Nominalists.

273. The most celebrated Nominalists who succeeded, were *John Buridan* and *Peter D'Ailly*. John Buridan of Bethune, professor of philosophy and theology at Paris[t], was looked upon by his contemporaries as one of the most powerful adversaries of Realism, and distinguished himself also by his rules for finding the Middle Term in Logic; a species of contrivance denominated by some the *Ass's Bridge;* as well as by his inquiries concerning Free-will, wherein he approached the principles of Determinatism[u], maintaining that we necessarily prefer the greater of two goods. As for the celebrated Illustration, which bears his name, of an Ass dying for hunger between two bundles of hay, it is not to be found in his writings.

[q] Of Hertfield; died archbishop of Canterbury 1339. Wrote De Causâ Dei contra Pelagium et de Virtute Causarum lib. III, ed. HENR. SAVILE, *Lond.* 1618, fol. Thomas de Bradwardine was also celebrated for his Mathematical works.

[r] Thomas Argentinensis, died prior-general of the order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, A. D. 1357: composed Comment. in Magistr. Sententiarum, *Argent.* 1490, fol.

[s] Surnamed *Ingenuus:* He taught at Paris and Heidelberg, which latter university he helped to form. Died 1396. He composed Commentt. in IV libb. Sententiarum, *Hagen*, 1497, fol.

DAN. LUD. WUNDT, Commentatio Historica de Marsilio ab Inghen, primo Universitatis Heidelberg. Rectore et Professore, *Heidelb.* 1775, 8vo. The same, in the Thesaurus Biog. et Bibliographicus of WALDAU.

[t] In the year 1358 he was still living at Paris.

[u] See his Quæstiones in X libb. Ethicorum Aristot. *Paris*, 1489, fol.; *Oxf.* 1637, 4to. Quæst. in Polit. Arist. *ibid.* 1500, fol.; Compendium Logicæ, *Ven.* 1499, fol. Summula de Dialecticâ, *Paris*, 1487, fol. See BAYLE'S Dict.

Peter D'Ailly, a cardinal (died 1425)[x], assisted to mark still more broadly the limits between Theology and Philosophy, and opposed the abuses of the Scholastic system. His opinions respecting the degree of certainty belonging to human knowledge, and his examination of the proofs advanced of the existence and unity of God deserve particular attention[y]. The other partisans and supporters of Nominalism were *Robert Holcot*, an Englishman (died 1349), *Gregory of Rimini*[z], *Richard Suisset* (or *Swinshead*), an Englishman and a Cistercian monk (taught at Oxford about 1350), *Henry of Oyta*, and *Henry of Hesse*[a], *Nicolas Oramus*[b], *Matthew of Cracow*[c], and *Gabriel Biel*, who died 1495, and was the author of a brief and luminous exposition of the principles of Occam[d]. Almost all were celebrated as professors, and men of cultivated parts, but without any true philosophical talent, though *Henry of Hesse* distinguished himself by some discoveries in Mathematics and Astronomy.

274. Up to this time the disputes between the two sects continued to be pursued with the like animosity, and with equal admixture on both sides of human passions. Though Nominalism had been proscribed at Paris[e], it nevertheless made good its ground, and even

[x] Peter de Alliaco, styled *Aquila Galliæ*, born 1350 at Compiègne: chancellor of the university of Paris, 1389, bishop of Puy and Cambrai, and finally a cardinal.

[y] Petri de Alliaco Cardinalis Cameracensis Vita, by Dupin, in 1st vol. of Opp. Gersoni, p. 37.

Petri de Alliaco Questiones super IV libb. Sententiarum, *Arg.* 1490, fol.

[z] Greg. Ariminensis, died at Vienna 1358. A distinguished divine, and general of the Augustine order.

[a] Both Germans; the latter died 1397.

[b] Or Oresmius, died bishop of Lisieux, 1382.

[c] Or Chrochove, in Pomerania, died 1410.

[d] Born at Spires, provost of Aurach, and professor of theology and philosophy at Tübingen.

Epitome et Collectarium super IV libb. Sententiar. *Tub.* 1495, 2 vols. fol.; Epitome Scripti Guil. Occam Circa duos Priores Sententiarum.

Hieron. Wiegand Biel, Diss. (præs. Gottlieb Wernsdorf) de Gab. Biel celeberrimo Papista Antipapista, *Viteb.* 1719, 4to.

[e] In 1339, 1040, 1409, 1473.

gained from day to day fresh adherents; nay, it more than once obtained, even at Paris, as well as in the universities of Germany, the pre-eminence, but without completely defeating the opposite party. The same scenes were perpetually acting on both these theatres of contention: the nature of Ideas not being the only point of dispute, but combined with a complete diversity of opinions in general. On the part of the Nominalists might be noticed the gradual increase of a spirit of independence, and a tendency to more liberal principles, though asserted by very imperfect philosophical Methods. This spirit especially manifested itself in opposition to the theses of the Idealist *Nicolas of Autricuria* (bachelor of Theology at Paris, 1348), and of *John de Mercuria* (about the same year [f]), yet eventually proved abortive, and the customary opinions of the age resumed their sway.

275. The ultimate consequence of these repeated discussions was a diminution of the credit and influence of the Scholastic system, and at the same time a diminished regard for philosophy, especially for Logic, of which in his time Gerson already saw reason to complain; and this induced a disposition to Mysticism, arising out of a feeling of disgust for unmeaning verbal disputes. Mysticism was accordingly preached with ardour by *John Tauler*, who died at Strasburg 1361, and more especially by the celebrated *John Charlier de Gerson* of Rheims, born 1363, the disciple of Peter D'Ailly, and his successor as chancellor of Paris, in 1395; died almost in exile in 1429, at Lyon. He devoted his principal attention to discussing the obligations of Practical Christianity, which procured for him the appellation of *Doctor Christianissimus;* and reduced all philosophy to a mystical doctrine which he founded entirely on the occult impressions of Inspiration [g]. He nevertheless opposed himself to enthusiastic extravagancies, retaining the use of Logic,

[f] See BOULAY, Hist. Univ. Paris, tom. IV, p. 308, sqq.
[g] De Mysticâ. Theol. Consideratt. II.

and employing it after a new method[h]. Next to him we must place *Nicolas de Clemange (de Clemangis)*, a courageous thinker; who opposed the narrow subtilties of the Schools[i]. He was rector of the university of Paris (1393), and died about 1440. But the man who, as a religious writer, possessed the greatest influence in his own and succeeding ages was *Thomas Hamerken* (Malleolus), styled *Thomas à Kempis*[k], from the name of a village, Kempen, in the archbishopric of Cologne, where he was born A. D. 1380. He died 1471. Another eminent mystic* was *John Wessel*, surnamed Gansford, or Gœsevôt (Goose-foot)[l], styled by his contemporary admirers *Lux mundi et magister contradictionum.* He was at first a Nominalist, and an opponent of the dogmatism of the Schoolmen. The same dislike of the same system may be observed in the Natural Theology of *Raymond de Sabonde* (or Sebunde), who taught at Toulouse in the first half of the fifteenth century, about 1436. He asserted that man has received from the Almighty two books, wherein he may discover the important facts which concern his relation to his Creator,—namely, the book of Revelation and that of Nature: the latter he affirmed to be the most universal in its contents, and the most perspicuous. He endeavoured by specious rather than solid arguments to deduce the theology of his age, even in its more peculiar doctrines, from the

[h] Centilogium de Conceptibus, liber de Modis Significandi et de Concordiâ Metaphys. cum Logicâ.

J. G. Engelhardti Commentationes de Gersonio Mystico, part I, *Erl.* 1822, 4to.

Gersonis Opera, *Bas.* 1488, vol. III, fol.; ed. Edm. Richer, *Paris*, 1606, fol., et Lud. Ellies Dupin, *Antverp.* 1756, 5 vols. fol.

[i] Opera ed. Jo. Mart. Lydius, *Lugd. Bat.* 1613, 4to.

[k] Especially by his well-known book De Imitatione Christi. A good edition of his Works by Sommel, *Antwerp.* 1600—1607, 4to.

* [The terms *Mystic* and *Mysticism* are used in the present work in a semewhat restricted and peculiar sense. *Transl.*]

[l] Born at Gröningen, 1409; died 1489. He must not be confounded with his contemporary, the Nominalist, *John Burchard von Wessel.* See Götze, Comment. de J. Wesselo, *Lut.* 1719, 4to. J. Wesselii Opera, ed. Lydius, *Amst.* 1717, 4to.

contemplation of Nature and of Man. His attempt deserved, for its just observations on many subjects, especially on Morals, greater success than it met with; until Montaigne directed to it the attention of his contemporaries [m].

Observation. It cannot be expected that a minute account should have been rendered of the respective opinions, in detail, of each Schoolman; involved as they are in endless disputes and distinctions respecting the same subjects:—Such a specification, if it had been possible, would, in an abridgment like the present, have been superfluous. The Sentences of Lombardus and the works of Aristotle were the constant subjects of their discussions from the time of Albert the Great; respecting which their commentaries and disquisitions were as minute as they were voluminous and unprofitable.

[m] Montaigne has translated, under the title of Natural Theology, his Liber Creaturarum sive Naturæ. The Latin editions are *Francof.* 1635, and *Amstel.* 1761. See Montaigne's Observations in his Essays, L. II, c. 12.

PART THE THIRD.

THIRD PERIOD.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM OPPOSED BY A RETURN TO, AND BY NEW COMBINATIONS OF, FORMER SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY.

From the Fifteenth Century to the end of the Sixteenth.

276. The exclusive system we have been considering which, grounded in authority, pretended to establish a philosophy maintained by logical definitions and combinations, contained within itself the elements of its own destruction. The disputes of the two adverse sects into which its supporters were subdivided, gradually loosened its hold on the public mind, and the Nominalists in the end openly attacked its authority; so that men became more and more awakened to the necessity (though as yet imperfectly understood), of consolidating Science, and strengthening its foundations, by a more accurate and renewed observation of Nature, and by increased study of the Languages. The party of the Mystics especially, animated as they were by a more profound sentiment of zeal, religious and moral, were dissatisfied with the meagre and pedantic forms, which were as yet their only support. Nevertheless it was from another quarter that the revolution was destined to commence.

277. The human mind had too long lost the true path of Science, to be able immediately to recover it. In consequence of its long subjection to prescriptive ideas,

we find that it continued for some time to labour to unravel the consequences of those it had inherited, rather than apply itself to the legitimate objects of inquiry—the principles of Knowledge, and of its own operations. From want of skill to detect the concatenation of different branches of knowledge, and from the habit of confounding notions derived from very different sources, the human mind was unable to discover the faultiness of its own method, and the influence of the old system was necessarily prolonged. Other circumstances contributed to the same result: the inveterate reverence for Aristotle's authority —the want of real and accurate knowledge—the bad Taste of the age, and the low state of Classical learning—added to the redoubtable authority of the Papal Hierarchy, and the jealous zeal with which the guardians of the ancient Dogmatism protected their errors;—all these auxiliary circumstances long continued to make it difficult to shake off the intolerable yoke, against which some bolder spirits had already begun to rebel.

278. Nevertheless certain political events in Europe gradually prepared the way, though at first distantly, for a complete change in its civil and ecclesiastical constitution,—shook the supports of the old philosophy; and, by ultimately destroying it, helped to produce a revolution in the literary world, rich in important consequences. These were: The Crusades—The Invention of Printing—The Conquest of Constantinople—The discovery of the New World—and the Reformation; with the direct or indirect results of these events; such as the formation of a Middle Class of citizens—the influence acquired by public opinion —the increase of the Temporal at the expense of the Spiritual Power—the consolidation of civil authority on firmer and better-established bases—the advancement of experimental knowledge and the sciences—the acquisition of models for imitation and sources of instruction in the recovery of the authors of antiquity—and, lastly, the improvement and cultivation of the languages of Modern Europe. The human mind became sensible of its need of

instruction and of the imperfection of its present systems, and demanded a better philosophy; but, too weak as yet to support itself without such assistance, it leaned upon the authors of antiquity for guidance and support. The cultivation of this study brought with it an improved spirit of refinement and moral improvement, and at the same time showed by reflection the evils of that state of mental subjugation to which so many centuries of mankind had been reduced, and awakened in those who prosecuted it a desire to liberate themselves from such thraldom.

279. At the same time that these circumstances from without operated, or contributed to operate, so great a change in the fortunes of Philosophy, a strong disposition prevailed among many to derive all true knowledge and wisdom from no other source but Revelation; and, consequently, to the devout study of the Bible was added also a Cabbalistical spirit of inquiry, which appears to have been derived by the Fathers from the Jews; and which was in part kept alive and recommended by the constant disputes and uncertainties of a vast number of contending sects, into which the Philosophical world was soon divided.

280. The consequence of all these different causes was that a variety of systems of greater or less validity began to prevail; knowledge was cultivated and improved;—the limited horizon, which before bounded the views of all, was enlarged: some of the Grecian systems of philosophy were cultivated and adopted; discussions were set on foot with regard to their respective merits, and the attempt was made to combine them (either partially or entirely); and to reconcile them with Christianity. The systems themselves were consequently submitted to examination, attempts were made to extend the dominion of Science, more especially in the department of Natural History (as yet so imperfectly cultivated), though accompanied with a thirst for occult and mysterious science.

Lastly came the desire to combine in one system not only Theology and Philosophy, but in like manner to unite the Intellectual and Experimental theories;—the doctrines of Plato and those of Aristotle.

Revival of Greek literature in Italy: with its immediate consequences.

281. When the Greeks, who had always retained a certain degree of attachment for letters, derived from their renowned ancestors, (§ 253), came to solicit in Italy assistance against the Turks; and, after the capture of Constantinople, sought there a safer residence than in their own country, they brought with them a rich fund of various arts and literary treasures, and infused a new energy into the minds of the Western nations, who were already in a state to profit by such acquisitions[a]. Among these precious remains of Ancient Greece were the works of Aristotle and Plato in their original form: the knowledge of which was presently disseminated through Europe with remarkable celerity. The Greeks who respectively supported the two systems of those great philosophers, (such as *George Gemisthus Pletho*[b],

[a] To this age belong the poets *Dante Alighieri*, *Petrarca*, and *Boccaccio*, who contributed much to the general diffusion of a literary taste, though not immediately and directly to that of philosophy.

For the learned Greeks who were instrumental in bringing about this revival of Classical literature, (*Emmanuel Chrysoloras*, *Th. Gaza*, *George of Trebisond*, *John Argyropulus*, etc.), see HUMPHR. HODIUS, De Græcis illustribus Linguæ Gr. Literarumque Humaniorum restauratoribus, *Lond.* 1742, 8vo. HEEREN, Hist. of the Study of Class. Lit. CHPH. FR. BÖRNER, De Doctis Hominibus Græcis Literarum Græcarum in Italia restauratoribus, *Lips.* 1750, 8vo. CHPH. MEINERS, Biography of celebrated Men.

[b] Of Constantinople: came to Florence 1438.

GEO. GEMISTHI PLETHONIS, De Platonicæ atque Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ Differentiâ, Gr., *Ven.* 1540, 4to.

Among his Philosophical Works: was

Libellus de Fato, ejusd. et Bessarionis Epist. Amœbœæ de eod. Argumento cum Vers. Lat. H. S. REIMARI, *Lugd. Bat.* 1722, 8vo. De IV Virtutib. Cardinalib. Gr. et Lat. ADR. OCCONE interprete, *Bas.* 1522, 8vo., et al. De Virtutibus et Vitiis, Gr. Lat. ed. ED. FAWCONER, *Oxon.* 1752, 8vo. See FABRIC. Bibl. Gr. tom. X, p. 741.

on the one side, a partisan of the Neoplatonic doctrine; and on the other *George Scholarius*, subsequently called *Gennadius*, *Theodore Gaza*[c], and more especially *George* of *Trebisond*[d], all Aristotelians), engaged in a warm dispute respecting the merits of their favourite systems[e], which it required all the moderation of cardinal Bessarion[f] in any degree to temper.

Attack on the Scholastic System.

282. The first result of all these circumstances was a conflict with the Scholastic system, which, besides the inherent causes of its barbarous style, bad taste, and narrow views, was occasioned also by the recent discovery of the great difference between the Aristotelian theory as taught in the Schools, and the same as it was discovered to exist in the writings of Aristotle himself. The philologists *Hermolaus Barbarus*[g], the translator of Aristotle, of Themistius, and Dioscorides, and *Angelus Politianus*[h], were the first to enter the lists with its champions: *Laurentius Valla*[i], and *Rodolph Agricola*[k] the German, en-

[c] Came into Italy about 1430; died about 1478. He was born at Thessalonica.

[d] Born 1395, in the isle of Crete; professor of Greek literature in various places in Italy; died 1484 or 86.

Besides several commentaries, he wrote the dissertation styled, Comparatio Aristotelis et Platonis, *Ven.* 1523, 8vo.

[e] On this subject see a Dissert. of Boivin in the Mem. of the Acad. of Inscript., tom. II, p. 775, sqq.

See his work: In Calumniatorem Platonis libb. IV, *Ven.* 1503 et 1516, directed against the Aristotelians. Ejusd.: Epist. ad Mich. Apostolicum de Præstantiâ Platonis præ Aristotele, etc., Gr. c. vers. Lat. Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript., tom. III, p. 303.

[f] Born in 1395, at Trebisond, came to Florence in 1438, died in 1472.

[g] Hermolao Barbaro, of Venice; born 1454, died 1493.

[h] Properly Angelo Ambrogini, or Cino; surnamed *Poliziano*: born at Monte Pulciano 1454; died 1494.

[i] Lorenzo Valla of Rome; born 1408, died 1457.

Laurentii Vallæ Opera, *Basil.* 1543, fol. De Dialecticâ contra Aristoteleos. *Venet.* 1499, fol. De Voluptate et Vero Bono libb. III, *Basil.* 1519, 4to. De Libero Arbitrio, *ibid.* 1518, 4to.

[k] Rudolph Husmann or Hausmann; born at Baffien, near Gröningen, 1443, died 1485.

deavoured, by removing the rubbish with which the field of Dialectics was encumbered, to render them more available for useful purposes: then succeeded *H. Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim* (see § 287), *Ulrich von Hutten*[l], *Erasmus*[m], and his friend *J. L. Vives*[n], *Philip Melanchthon* (§ 292), *Jacobus Faber*[o], *Marius Nizolius*[p], *Jac. Sadoletus*[q], and *Jac. Acontius*[r]. The methods pursued by these learned men in their attacks on the system of the Schools were very dissimilar, according to the different lights in which they viewed that system, and the different objects which engrossed their attention.

Renewal of the Ancient Systems.

283. In consequence of these pursuits the systems of the Grecian and Arabian philosophers were brought into discussion, and the opposition to the Scholastic system reinforced. The doctrines of Aristotle and Plato were the first which thus regained their place; (the sort of knowledge then cultivated favouring their reception); and, sub-

Rudolphi Agricolæ De Inventione Dialecticâ lib. III, *Colon.* 1527, 4to. Ejusd.: Lucubrationes, *Basil.* 1518, 4to.; et Opera, curâ Alardi, *Colon.* 1539, 2 vols. fol.

[l] Born 1488, died 1523. Opera (ed. Münch) tom. I—V, *Berol.* 1821-5, 8vo.

[m] Desiderius Erasmus, born at Rotterdam 1467, died 1536.

Des. Erasmi Dialogi et Encomium Moriæ. Opera ed. Clericus, *Lond.* 1703, 11 vols. fol.

[n] Born at Valencia 1492, died 1540.

Ludovici Vives De Causis Corruptarum Artium, *Antverp.* 1531; and, De Initiis, Sectis et Laudibus Philosophiæ. Idem: De Animâ et Vitâ libb. III, *Bas.* 1538. Opera, *Basil.* 1555, 2 vols. fol.

[o] J. Lefevre, of 'Etaples in Picardy; died 1537.

[p] Of Bersello; died 1540.

Jac. Nisolii Antibarbarus, seu de Veris Principiis et Verâ Ratione Philosophandi contra Pseudo-Philosophos libb. IV, *Parma.* 1553, 4to. Ed. G. W. Leibnitz, *Francf.* 1674, 4to.

[q] Of Modena; died 1547.

Jac. Sadoleti Phædrus seu de Laudibus Philosophiæ libb. II. In Opp. *Mogunt.* 1607, 8vo. *Patav.* 1737, etc.

[r] Born at Trent; died 1566.

Methodus s. Recta Investigandarum tradendarumque Artium ac Scientiarum ratio. *Bas.* 1558, in 8vo.

sequently, other theories allied to theirs. In this manner the Cabbalistic and Theological systems were mixed up with the theories of the Platonists; and the Ionian and Atomistic doctrines with the Aristotelian. The Stoic and Sceptic systems at first had few defenders: nevertheless, as it is impossible that any of the ancient theories should give entire satisfaction in an age so different from that in which they first appeared, and as their defects were of course gradually brought to light, it followed that attempts were occasionally made to *combine* different views, while at other times they were separately attacked with Sceptical objections. In their choice of a sect, and their efforts to establish or destroy a theory, men were influenced by two sets of considerations; according as they proposed to themselves to establish a Theological system, or to promote discoveries in Natural Science.

I. *Revival of Platonism: The Cabbalistical, Magical, and Religious Philosophies.*

Besides the works mentioned § 282, see the Sketch of the History of Philosophy by Buhle.

Ludw. Dankegott Cramer, Diss. de Causis Instauratæ Sæc. XV, in Italiâ Philosophiæ Platonicæ, *Viteb.* 1812, 4to.

284. The Platonic philosophy which was eagerly received in Italy by men of fanciful minds was fostered at Florence by the two Medici, Cosmo and Lorenzo[s], and excited there a vivid enthusiasm; though wearing rather the character of the Neoplatonic school than of the Academy. Among the recommendations it possessed in their eyes was one which in fact was purely gratuitous, viz. that it was derived, as some of the Fathers believed, from the Jewish philosophy and religion; and hence its reputation of being allied to Christianity[t]. A similar preju-

[s] Will. Roscoe, The Life of Lorenzo dè Medici, *Liverp.* 1795, 2 vols. 4to.
[t] Joh. Pici Heptaplus, p. 1, *Franc.* Pici Epist. lib. IV, p. 882.

dice caused them to connect with Platonism the Cabbalistical and Mosaical doctrines. In addition to this, Platonism continually acquired fresh adherents in consequence of the meagre logical system of the Schools, and its inaptitude to satisfy the human mind when awakened to inquiry. It presently allied itself to Mysticism, and engaged in the rational defence of doctrines derived from a higher source; supported by argument the Immortality of the Soul; and served to balance the Naturalism of the mere Aristotelians; but also unfortunately in some respects favoured superstition, especially by the doctrine of the Intervention of Superior Beings in the government of the world[u]. An honourable exception must be made in the case of Astrology, which it uniformly rejected.

§ 285.

C. HARTZHEIM, Vita Nic. de Cusâ, *Trevir.* 1730, 8vo.

Among the first of those who bade adieu to the Scholastic creed was the *Cardinal Nicolas Cusanus*[x]; a man of rare sagacity and an able mathematician; who arranged and republished the Neoplatonic System, to which he was much inclined, in a very original manner, by the aid of his Mathematical knowledge. He ventured upon some philosophical explanations of the mystery of the Trinity not easy to be understood nor defended, but of which so much may be stated, that he presumed the Almighty to be Unity, and the Father of Equality, and of that which associates and unites Equality to Unity; (by which he dared to signify the Son and the Holy Ghost). According to him, it is impossible to know directly and immediately this Absolute Unity (the Divinity); because we can make approaches to the knowledge of Him only by the means of Number or Plurality. Consequently he allows us only the possession of very imperfect notions of God, and

[u] FICINI, Præfatio in Plotinum; POMPONATIUS De Incantationibus, c. I.

[x] Nicolaus Chrypffs of Kuss-or Kusel (hence called Cusanus) in the archbishopric of Treves; born 1401, died 1464.

those by the aid of Mathematical symbols. Absurd and worse than absurd as many of these ideas are, and inconsistent as he is both in other particulars, and inasmuch as he appears to have fallen into the grievous error and sin of identifying, in his theory of the Universe, the Creator and the Created;—obscure as he also is in his manner of stating these reveries, they contain nevertheless[y], several profound observations imperfectly expressed, respecting the faculties of the understanding for the attainment of knowledge. For instance, he observes, that the principles of knowledge possible to us are contained in our ideas of Number *(ratio explicata)* and their several relations; that absolute knowledge is unattainable to us *(præcisio veritatis inattingibilis,* which he styled *docta ignorantia),* and that all which is attainable to us is a *probable* knowledge *(conjectura).* With such opinions he expressed a sovereign contempt for the Dogmatism of the Schools.

§ 286.

Ficini Opera in II tomos digesta, *Bas.* 1561, *Par.* 1641, fol.

Commentarius de Platonicæ Philosophiæ post renatas Literas apud Italos restauratione, sive Mars. Ficini Vita, auctore Joh. Corsio ejus familiari et discipulo. Nunc primum in lucem eruit Angelus Maria Bandini, *Pis.* 1772.

J. G. Schelhorn, Comment. de Vita, Moribus, et Scriptis Marsilii Ficini. In the Amænitatt. Literar. tom. I.

† Life of J. Picus, Count of Mirandola, in Meiner's Lives of Learned Men, 2 vols. and: Pici Opp. *Bonon.* 1496, fol. Opera utriusque Pici, *Bas.* 1572-3 et 1601, 2 vols. fol.

The examples of Pletho and Bessarion (§ 281) were improved upon by *Marsilius Ficinius*[z], a Florentine physician, who engaged with zeal and ability in the defence of the Platonic philosophy; both by his translations of Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, etc.; and also his original productions, devoted to the commendation of that system. Cosmo de' Medici, (who died 1464), availed

y Nicolai Cusani Opera, *Paris.* 1514, 3 vols. fol.; *Basil.* 1565, 3 vols. fol. De Doctâ Ignorantiâ, tom. III. Apologia Doctæ Ignorantiæ lib. I. De Conjecturis libb. II. De Sapientiâ libb. III.

z Born at Florence 1433, died 1499.

himself of his services in the foundation of a Platonist Academy, about 1460[a]. But Ficinus was a Neoplatonist, who added to the system of the Academy some Aristotelian doctrines, and regarded the Hermes Trismegistus of the Alexandrians as the inventor of the theory of Ideas. In his *Theologia Platonica* he displayed ability in the statement of certain arguments to establish the Immortality of the Soul[b], and opposed the doctrine imagined by Averroes, and maintained by the Aristotelians, of an Universal Intelligence (257). The object he proposed to himself was to apply his views of the Platonic system to the defence and explanation of Christianity. His enthusiasm won over John Picus, count of Mirandola[c], a learned man of superior parts, but extravagant imagination. He had studied the Scholastic philosophy and imbibed the notion that the philosophy of Plato was derived from the books of Moses, whence he was inclined to deduce all the arts and sciences[d]. In consequence of such a persuasion, he devoted himself to the study of the Oriental languages and Cabbalistical books; from which he drew a large proportion of the theses which he proposed to maintain in a public disputation as announced by him at Rome, but which never really took place[e]. From the same sources he drew the materials of his Essay towards a Mosaical philosophy, in his Heptaplus. He held in great esteem the Cabbalistical writings, to which he was tempted to ascribe a divine origin, and considered necessary to the explanation of the Christian religion; at the same time that he asserted their entire accordance with the philosophical systems of Pythagoras and Plato[f]. His favourite design, which however he not live to realise, was to prove the consistency of the Aristotelian and Pla-

[a] † R. SIEVEKING, History of the Platonist Academy of Florence, *Götting.* 1812, 8vo.

[b] Theologia Platonica s. de Immortalitate Animorum ac Æternâ Felicitate libb. XVIII. Idem: in Opp. tom. I, *Paris.* 1641, fol.

[c] Count and prince of Concordia, born 1463, died 1494.

[d] Heptaplus, part. I, *Basil.* 1601.

[e] Conclusiones DCCCC, *Rom.* 1486, fol.; *Col.* 1619, 8vo.

[f] Apol. p. 82. 110. 116.

tonic systems[g]. In his maturer age when he had emancipated himself from many of the common prejudices of his time, he composed an able refutation of the superstitions of the astrologers. The reputation of the Count of Mirandola, his works, and his numerous friends, contributed to establish the credit of the Platonic and Cabbalistical doctrines. His nephew *J. Fr. Picus* of *Mirandola* (killed 1533), followed his steps, without possessing his abilities; but more exclusively devoted than his uncle to Revealed philosophy[h], he opposed at the same time the Heathen and the Scholastic systems.

Cabbalistic and Magical Systems.

† Buhle, History of Cabbalistic Philosophy, in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century, in his History of Modern Philosophy, II, 1, 360, sqq.

287. *John Reuchlin*[i], a zealous restorer of philosophy and classical literature, travelled into Italy, where his intimacy with Ficinus and Picus inclined him to the Pythagorico-Platonic doctrine, and to the study of Cabbalistic writings[k]; which he disseminated in Germany by means of his works, *De Verbo Mirifico*[l], and *De Arte Cabbalisticâ*[m]. The extravagant performance of the Franciscan monk *Franc. Giorgio Zorzi*[n], *De Harmoniâ Mundi istius, cantica tria*, Venet. 1525, doubtless was thought

[g] Joh. Pici Epist. ad Ficin., tom. I, p. 753.

[h] He wrote: De Studio Divinæ et Humanæ Sapientiæ, edid. J. F. Buddeus, *Hal.* 1702, 8vo. Examen Doctrinæ Vanitatis Gentilium; De Prænotionibus. In the Opp. utriusque Pici, (see above): Epp. ed. Cuph. Cellarius, *Jen*, 1682, 8vo.

[i] Called also *Capnio*. He was born 1455, at Pforzheim, was professor at Tübingen, and died 1522.

[k] Life of Reuchlin, in the work of Meiners already quoted, part I, No. 2. S. F. Gehres, Life of John Reuchlin, etc., *Carlsruhe*, 1815, 8vo.

[l] Libri III, *Bas.* fol., (1494).

[m] Libri III, *Hagen.* 1517—1530, fol.

[n] Franciscus Georgius, surnamed Venetus; because a native of that city. He flourished in the beginning of the sixteenth century.

too full of daring reveries, and was far from possessing the influence enjoyed by the works of *H. Cornelius Agrippa* of Nettesheim[o]. The latter united to great talents universal information; but his greediness of reputation and money, and his fondness for occult sciences, imparted a character of indecision and inconsistency to his life as well as to his works. At Dôle he gave with the greatest success public lectures on the work of Reuchlin, *De Verbo Mirifico;* and at the suggestion of *Tritheim*, the most celebrated adept of his time, he composed his treatise, *De Occultâ Philosophiâ*[p], a system of extravagant chimeras, in which Magic, the Complement of Philosophy, as he terms it, and the key of all the secrets of Nature, is represented under the three forms, of Natural, Celestial, and Religious or Ceremonial; agreeably to the threefold division of the Corporeal, Celestial, and Intellectual Worlds. He there enumerates, with a show of scientific classification purely superficial, the hidden powers which the Creator has assigned to the different objects of the Creation, through the agency of the Spirit of the World. It was natural that Agrippa should become a partisan of Raymond Lulli (§ 269), and accordingly he wrote a commentary on his Ars Magna. Nevertheless his caprice sometimes inclined him to opinions directly the reverse; and in such a mood he rejected all dependence on human knowledge, and composed his *Cynical* treatise, as he terms it, *De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum*[q]. This work, which had great reputation in its day, occasionally presents us with sophistical arguments; occasionally with admirable remarks on the uncertainty and vanity of all scientific pursuits[r]. Agrippa and his follower *John Wier*[s], were of service to philosophy by opposing the

[o] Born at Cologne 1486.

[p] Lib. I, 1531; lib. III, *Colon.* 1533, 8vo.

[q] *Cologne*, 1527; *Paris*, 1529; *Antwerp*, 1530, 4to.

[r] On this writer consult MEINERS, Lives, etc.; and SCHELHORN, in the Amænitat. Litt., tom. II, p. 553.

Ejus Opera in duos tomos digesta, *Lugd. B.*, without date, 8vo; republished 1550 et 1600.

[s] Born at Grave in Brabant, 1515; died 1588.

belief in witchcraft. After an adventurous life, Agrippa died 1535, at Grenoble.

Theosophy.

288. The physician and theosophist *Aureolus Theophrastus Paracelsus* (such were the names he assumed [s]), blended Chemistry and Therapeutics with the Neoplatonic and Cabbalistic mysticism. He was an ingenious and original charlatan, with much practical information, and a sufficiently penetrating spirit of observation, who though destitute of scientific information, aspired to the character of a reformer in Medicine. To effect this he made use of the Cabbalistic writers, whom he endeavoured to render popular, and expounded with a lively imagination. Among the principal mystic notions which he enlarged upon without method or consistency (very frequently so as scarcely to be intelligible), were those of an internal illumination,—an emanation from the Divinity,—the universal harmony of all things,—the influence of the stars on the sublunar world,—and the vitality of the elements, which he regarded as spirits encased in the visible bodies presented to our senses. His grand principle was a pretended harmony and sympathy between Salt, the Body, and the Earth: between Mercury, the Soul, and Water; between Sulphur, Spirit, and Air. His extravagancies found a good number of partisans [t]. As a mystic and theosophist *Valentine Weigel* [u]

[s] His real names were Philip Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim; born at Einsiedeln in Switzerland, 1493; died at Salzbourg, 1541.

[t] † J. J. Loes, Theophrastus Paracelsus von Hohenheim, a Dissertation in the *Studien* of Creuzer and Daub., tom. I. Cf. Sprengel, Hist. of Medicine, part III. Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Physicians of the close of the Sixteenth and commencement of the Seventeenth Centuries, published by Thad. Anselm. Rixner, and Thad. Siber, fasc. I. Theophrastus Paracelsus, *Sulzbach*, 1819, 8vo.

Phil. Theophrasti Paracelsi Volumen Medicinæ Paramirum, *Argent.* 1575, 8vo. and, Works of Paracelsus, published by Joh. Huser, *Bas.* 1589, 10 vols. 4to. *Strasb.* 1616—18, 3 vols. fol.

[u] Born at Hayne in Misnia, 1533; was a Lutheran minister at Tschopau in Misnia, and died 1588.

followed the steps of Paracelsus and Tauler (§ 275); but the doctrines of the former were especially propagated by the society of the *Rosy-Cross*, formed in the seventeenth century, probably in consequence of a satiric poem[x] of the theologian *Valentine Andreæ* (born at Würtemberg, 1586, died 1654).

§ 289.

Cardanus de Vitâ Propriâ; in the first part of his Works, *Lugd.* 1663, 10 vols. fol.—See BAYLE's Dictionary. His Life, by W. R. BECKER. in the *Quartalschrift* of CANZLER and MEINERS, year 3rd, 3 qu. fasc. V. Id.: In his Lives and Opinions of celebrated Physicians, etc., fasc. II, *Sulzbach*, 1820, 8vo.

Jerome Cardan[y], a celebrated physician, naturalist, and mathematician, resembled Paracelsus in his eccentricities; but was greatly superior to him in information. During his youth, a delicate constitution and tyrannical treatment retarded his progress, and the prejudices of the day in favour of astrology, and the imagination of a familiar spirit, gave a misdirection to his studies, to be traced in his writings; which treat of all sorts of subjects, and without any systematic order[z]. Sometimes he supports, sometimes he opposes the superstitions of the Astronomers and Cabbalists, and mixes up profound observations and ingenious and elevated ideas with the most capricious absurdities. The Theologians of his day, who

HILLIGER, De Vitâ, Fatis, et Scriptis Val. Weigelii; and FÖRTSCH DE WEIGELIO, in the Miscell. Lips. tom. X, p. 171.

Weigelii Tractatus de Opere Mirabili; Arcanum Omnium Arcanorum; † The Golden Touch, or, the Way to learn Infallibly all Things, etc. 1578, 4to., and 1616. Instruction and Introduction to the Study of German Theology, Philosophy, Mysticism, etc., 1571. Studium Universale; nosce te ipsum s. Theologia Astrologizata, 1618.

[x] † The Chymical Marriage of Christian Rosenkreutz, 1603. The same (ANDREÆ); Universal Reformation of the World by means of the *fama fraternitatis* of the Rosy-Cross, *Ratisb.* 1614, 8vo.

[y] Geronimo Cardano, born at Pavia, 1501; died 1576.

[z] See especially his treatises: De Subtilitate, et Rerum Varietate.

condemned him as heterodox, have accused him, without sufficient grounds, of atheism.

II. *Revival of the System of Aristotle.*

Opponents of the same.

See the work of J. Launoy, De Variâ Aristot. Fort., etc., mentioned § 243.

W. L. G. Baron von Eberstein, On the Logical and Metaphysical System of the Peripatetics, properly so called, *Halle*, 1800, 8vo.

290. Nevertheless, the theories of Aristotle had many defenders. The Scholastic system had long nourished in the minds of men a profound veneration for the author of the *Organum;* and the education of the age inclined men to the reception of his ideas. When his works came to be known in their original form, they were eagerly studied, explained, translated, and abridged. Among the theologians, and physicians in particular, was formed a numerous school of his adherents. The latter especially, who were inclined to Naturalism, were enabled to restate on his authority certain doctrines belonging to Natural religion and philosophy. The distinction they drew between philosophical and religious Truth, served to protect them from the censures of some zealous theologians. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Aristotelians were divided into two sects: the *Averroists*, attached to the commentary of Averroes (§ 257), and the *Alexandrists*, or successors of Alexander Aphrodisiensis (§ 183). These two parties drew upon themselves so much notice by the acrimony of their disputes on the principles of Thought, and the Immortality of the Soul, that in 1512 the Lateran council endeavoured to cut short the dispute by pronouncing in favour of the more orthodox party.

Italian Peripatetics.

291. Among the most renowned Peripatetics of Italy, we may remark *P. Pomponatius*[a], of Mantua. His de-

[a] Born 1462, died 1525 or 1530.

Petri Pomponatii De Naturalium effectuum admirandorum Causis seu

votion to the doctrines of Aristotle did not prevent his originating many of his own, and detecting the weak points of his master's system. He endeavoured to arouse his contemporaries to more profound investigations, discussing with singular force and acuteness various subjects, such as: The Immortality of the Soul,—Free-will,—Fate,—Providence,—and Enchantment, or Demonology (or to express it more fully)—the question whether the phenomena of nature which bear the appearance of being marvellous, are produced by the agency of Spirits (as the Platonists pretended), or that of the constellations. Having asserted that, according to Aristotle there is no certain proof to be adduced of the Immortality of the Soul, Pomponatius drew upon himself a violent and formidable controversy, in which he defended himself by asserting the distinction to be maintained between revealed and natural religion. Many superior men were formed in his School, such as *Simon Porta* or *Portius*[b], *Paulus Jovius*[c], *Julius Cæsar Scaliger*[d], who subsequently opposed Cardan[e]; the cardinal *Gasparo Contarini*, and *Augustus Niphus*[f] (who became his adversaries): the Spaniard *J. Genesius Sepulveda*[g]; and lastly, the paradoxical free-

de Incantationibus liber. Ejusdem: De Fato, Libero Arbitrio, Prædestinatione, Providentia Dei, libb. V, in quibus difficillima capita et quæstiones Theologicæ et Philosophicæ ex sana Orthodoxæ Fidei Doctrina explicantur et multis raris historiis passim illustrantur per auctorem, qui se in omnibus Canonicæ Scripturæ Sanctorumque Doctorum judicio submittit, *Basil. Ven.* 1525—1556—1567, fol.

Ejusdem: Tractatus de Immortalitate Animæ, *Bonon.* 1516, etc. The latest edit., publ. by CIPH. GOTTFR. BARDILI, contains an account of the life of Pomponatius. See also; JO. GFR. OLEARII Diss. de Petro Pomponatio, *Jen.* 1709, 4to.

PORTA De Rerum Naturalibus Principiis de Anima et Mente Humana, *Flor.* 1551, 4to.

[b] Sim. Porta, died 1555.

[c] Paolo Giovio, born at Como 1483, died 1552.

[d] Della Scala, born at Ripa 1484, died 1559.

[e] In his Exercitationes de Subtilitate.

[f] Born 1473, died 1546. Libri VI, De Intellectu et Dæmonibus, *Ven.* 1492, fol. Et: Opera Philos., *Ven.* 1559, 6 vols. fol. Opusc. Moralia et Politica, *Paris.* 1645, 4to.

[g] Born 1491, died 1572.

thinker *Lucilio Vanini*[h], burnt at Toulouse in 1619. Besides Pomponatius (who was the head of the school of Alexandrists), this sect boasted other learned men who were not among his disciples; such as, *Nicolas Leonicus*, surnamed *Thomæus*[i]; *Jacobus Zabarella*[k], who differed on some points from Aristotle; *Cæsar Cremoninus*[l], and *Francis Piccolomini*, etc. On the side of the Averroists, with the exception of *Alexander Achillinus* of Bologna[m] (who was styled the second Aristotle); *Marc Antony Zimara*[n], of San-Pietro in the kingdom of Naples; and the famous Aristotelian *Andrew Cesalpini*[o], we find no names of great celebrity. Cesalpini turned Averroism into an absolute Pantheism, by daring to represent the Deity not only as the cause, but as the subject-matter and substance of the world: and identified with the Universal Intelligence the minds of individual men, and even of animals. He asserted the immortality of the soul and the existence of Dæmons.

German Peripatetics.

See the Dissertation of Elswick, quoted § 243.

† A. H. C. Heeren, A few words on the Consequences of the Reformation as affecting Philosophy. In the *Reformations-almanach* of Kayser, 1819, p. 114, sqq.

[h] Lucilio, or Julius Cæsar Vanini, was born at Naples, about 1586.

Amphitheatrum Æternæ Providentiæ, etc., *Lugd.* 1615, 8vo.

De Admirandis Naturæ, Arcanis, etc. libb. IV, *Paris.* 1616, 8vo.

Life, Misfortunes, Character, and Opinions of Lucilio Vanini, an Atheist of the Seventeenth Century, etc., by W. D. F., *Leips.* 1800, 8vo.

[i] Born at Venice 1457, died 1533.

[k] Born at Padua 1532, died 1589. De Inventione Primi Motoris, *Fef.* 1618, 4to. Opp. Philosophica, ed. J. J. Havenreuter, *Fef.* 1623, 4to.

[l] Cesare Cremonini, born at Centi, in the duchy of Modena, A. D. 1552, died 1630.

Cæs. Cremonini liber de Pædiâ Aristotelis. Diatyposis Universæ Naturalis Aristotelicæ Philosophiæ. Illustres Contemplationes de Animâ. Tractatus tres de Sensibus Externis, de Internis et de Facultate Appetitivâ.

[m] Alessandro Achillini, died 1512.

[n] Died 1532.

[o] Born at Arezzo 1509, died 1603.

Andreæ Cesalpini Quæstion. Peripateticæ libb. V, *Venet.* 1571, fol. Dæmonum Investigatio Peripatetica, *Ven.* 1593, 4to.

292. Although *Luther* and *Melanchthon*[p], in the beginning of the Reformation entertained unfavourable sentiments towards the Aristotelian philosophy, on the same principle that they denounced the system of the Schoolmen, both, nevertheless, lived to renounce this prejudice, and Melanchthon especially, not only asserted the indispensabilty of philosophy as an auxiliary to theology, but recommended especially that of Aristotle, without confining this praise to his logic[q]. In Ethics, however, he maintained the principle of Morality to be the will of God. On one occasion only was war afterwards declared against philosophy (about 1621), by *Dan. Hoffmann*, professor of Theology at Helmstädt; and his two disciples, *J. Angelus Werdenhagen* (§ 321, note), and *Wenceslaus Schilling*[r]. The philosophy of Aristotle, disencumbered of the subtilties of the Schoolmen (though these were speedily succeeded by others), owed the favour which it enjoyed in the Protestant universities, to the authority of Melanchthon; and a swarm of commentaries and abridgments of this system presently appeared, which at all events served to keep in practice those attached to such studies. Among such we may particularise *Joachim Camerarius*, who died at Leipsic 1574.

The credit of Aristotle became in this manner re-established, and so continued till about the middle of the seventeenth century; nor was it materially affected by the desertion of a few, who like *Nicolaus Taurellus*[s], the op-

[p] Born at Bretten 1497, died 1560.

[q] MELANCHTHONIS Oratio de Vitâ Aristotelis, habita a. 1537, tom. II, Declamatt., p. 381, sqq.; et tom. III, p. 351, sqq.; Dialectica, *Viteb.* 1534. Initia Doctrinæ Physicæ, 1547; Epitome Philosophiæ Moralis, *Viteb.* 1589; De Animâ, 1540, 8vo.; Ethicæ Doctrinæ Elementa, *Viteb.* 1550. These different works have been frequently republished, and were edited with his works at large by CASPAR PEUCER, *Viteb.* 1562, 4 vols. fol.

[r] DAN. HOFMANN, Qui sit Veræ ac Sobriæ Philosophiæ in Theologiâ Usus? *Helmst.* 1581. See CORN. MARTINI Scriptum de Statibus controversis, etc. Helmstadii agitatis inter Dan. Hofmannum et quatuor Philosophos, *Lips.* 1620, 12mo.

[s] Born at Mümpelgard 1547, died 1606.

NIC. TAURELLI Philosophiæ Triumphus, *Basil.* 1573, 8vo. Alpes Cæsæ (against Cesalpini), *Fcf.* 1597, 8vo. Discussiones de Mundo adv. Fr. Pic-

ponent of Cesalpini, seceded a little from the prevailing doctrines.

Opponents of the Aristotelian Philosophy.

293. Notwithstanding, the adversaries of the Aristotelian system daily increased in number. Without touching upon other Schools more or less opposed to his (whose universality of system impeded *their* progress), we may enumerate, besides *Nicolaus Taurellus* just mentioned, *Franc. Patrizzi*, *Bruno*, *Berigard*, *Magnenus*, *Telesius*, and *Campanella:* (all of whom we shall have occasion to mention hereafter); with *Peter Ramus*[t], one of the ablest opponents of the Peripatetic System, and a distinguished mathematician. He engaged in the dispute from a disgust for the technicalities of the Schools, and laboured to give popularity to a more accessible kind of philosophy, but was deficient in a true philosophical spirit, and without an adequate comprehension of the principles of Aristotle; which he attacked without measure or moderation; asserting that they were a tissue of error. Logic was the point he first objected to[u]; asserting that it was altogether factitious, without order, and without perspicuity; at the same time that he composed a new one[x], more adapted to practical use, which he wished to substitute for that of Aristotle. He defined it to be, "Ars bene disserendi," and considered Rhetoric to be an essential branch of it. Notwithstanding the attacks of his many enemies, who

colominium, *Amb.* 1603, 8vo.; *Marb.* 1603, 8vo. Discussiones de Cœlo, *Amb.* 1603, 8vo. See Jac. G. Feuerlin, Diss. Apologetica pro Nic Taurello, De Rerum Æternitate, *Norimb.* 1734, 4to. With the Synopsis Aristotelis Metaphysices.

[t] Properly called P. de la Ramée, of a poor family in Picardy; born 1515; killed at Paris in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, 1572.

Joh. Thom. Freigii Vita Petri Rami, at the end of Audomari Talæi Orationes, *Marb.* 1599. Besides the works of Ramus mentioned § 143 and 146; see the following notes.

[u] Animadversiones in Dialecticam Aristotelis, libb. XX, *Paris.* 1534, 4to.

[x] Institutiones Dialecticæ, lib. II, *Paris.* 1543, 8vo., 1548; Scholæ Dialecticæ in Liberales Artes, *Bas.* 1559, fol. Orationes Apologeticæ, *Paris.* 1551, 8vo., et al.

were by no means temperate in their animosity, he attracted some partisans (called after him *Ramists*), especially in Switzerland, England, and Scotland. Among others, *Audomar Talæus*[y] (*Talon*), his two disciples *Thom. Freigius* of Fribourg[z], and *Franc. Fabricius; Fr. Beuchus; Wilh. Ad. Scribonius; Gasp. Pfaffrad*[a]; *Rud. Goclenius*[b], who gave his name to a species of Sorites; an Eclectic and able psychologist[c]; and *Otto Casmann*, a pupil of the latter, who laboured to complete a system of metaphysics relative to the human mind[d]. To these may be added the celebrated English poet *Milton*. The principal opponents of Ramus were, *Ant. Govea*, *Joach. Perionius*, and *Charpentier*, the Aristotelian, (see bibliography at the head of §§ 140, 141, 143); who also was his murderer on the day of St. Bartholomew. In Germany the principal were, *J. Schegk*[e], *Nic. Frischlin, Phil. Scherbius*[f], and *Corn. Martini*[g].

III. *Revival of Stoicism.*

294. The Stoic doctrines during this period were not altogether without partisans and supporters; but notwithstanding all the advantage they may be supposed to have derived from the dissemination of the works of Cicero and Seneca, and their seeming consistency with the Christian Morals, they did not gain as many adherents as some other philosophical systems. This is ascribable in part to the peculiar theories (in physics and morals) of the

[y] The friend of Ramus. Died at Paris in 1562.

[z] Died 1583.

[a] Died 1622.

[b] Born at Corbach 1547, died at Marbourg 1628.

[c] Ψυχολογία, h. e. De Hominis Perfectione, Animâ et Imprimis Ortu, etc., *Marb.* 1590—1597, 8vo. Ejusd.: Isagoge in Org. Aristotelis, *Fef.* 1598, 8vo. Problemata Log. et Philos., *Marb.* 1614, 8vo. Cf. § 129.

[d] Psychologia Anthropologica sive Animæ Humanæ Doctrina, *Hanau.* 1594, 8vo.

[e] Professor of Natural Philosophy at Tubingen; died 1587.

[f] Died 1605.

[g] Died 1621.

Stoics, and partly to the influence of the prevailing spirit of the age, and the established forms of instruction. The writer who principally attached himself to these doctrines, at the period of which we are treating, was *Justus Lipsius* (Joost Lipss[h]). Originally he favoured the Scholastic system, which he abandoned for the cultivation of Classical literature; particularly the works of Cicero and Seneca. Celebrated as a critic and philologist, he became (though never in the proper sense of the word, a philosopher), an able expositor of the Stoic system. All that he wanted to make him a true Stoic, (as he himself has confessed), was Constancy and Consistency. He seems rather to have aimed at preparing the minds of his readers for the study of these doctrines, especially as given in Seneca, than to have attempted the restoration of the system. *Casp. Scioppius* (*Schoppe*)[i], a man of equivocal character, published extracts from the works of Lipsius. *Thom. Gataker*, an Englishman[k], occupied himself with the historical department of this system, as well as *Cl. Salmasius*, and *Dan. Heinsius*[l].

ORIGINAL ESSAYS AND PARTICULAR COMBINATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

I. *Various Essays.*

295. In the midst of these attempts to re-establish the theories of antiquity; while the old and the new doctrines were brought into constant competition, and the established system not only endeavoured to repulse the attacks which were constantly levelled at it, but to acquire

[h] Born at Isea, near Brussels, 1547; died 1606.

Justi Lipsii libb. II. De Constantiâ, *Francof.* 1591, 8vo. Ejusd.: Opera, *Antverp.* 1637, 4 vols. fol.

[i] Born 1576; died 1649.

[k] Born 1574; died 1644.

[l] Dan. Heinsii Oratt. In the Works of Scioppius and Gataker, consult the Bibliog. § 158 and 163.

fresh credit by reconciling its discordant doctrines[m]; might be remarked from time to time some superior spirit who had the courage to quit the beaten track, and attempt a new one of his own; though unhappily, from the want of well-established principles for his guidance, he too usually fell into considerable errors. Among these we must reckon the German, *Nic. Taurellus*, already mentioned (§ 292), who laboured to draw a still stronger line of demarcation between philosophy and theology, and looked upon Reason as the proper source of philosophic knowledge. Of the Italians, *Cardan* (§ 289), and *Vanini* (§ 291), and of the French *P. Ramus*, who meditated a reform of philosophy. As by this time the old established Scholastic method of drawing all knowledge from abstract ideas, was insufficient to satisfy men's minds, they attempted to attain more certain conclusions by the way of experiment. This principle was especially followed up by the Political writers and Naturalists. Among the former *Niccolo Macchiavelli*[n], a statesman, matured by the study of the Classics and by knowledge of the world, had in his *Principe* (1515) given with great ability a picture of Political men, such as he had generally found them: and *John Bodin*[o], having in his *Republic* discarded the opinions of Plato and Aristotle, had endeavoured to explain the principles of a form of government neither a Monarchy nor a Democracy, and regulated by mixed principles of strict justice and accommodating policy.

II. *Telesius.*

FR. BACO, De Principiis et Originibus Secundum Fabulas Cupidinis et Cœli, sive de Parmenidis et Telesii et Præcipue De-

[m] A writer who particularly distinguished himself on this side was the *Thomist* FR. SUAREZ, (died 1617); by his Disputationes Metaphysicæ, *Mogunt.* 1614.

[n] Born at Florence 1496; died 1527.

JOH. FR. CHRISTII De Nic. Macchiavello libb. III, *Lips.* et *Hal.* 1731, 4to. Opere 1550, 4to., etc., *Milan.* 1805, 10 vols. 8vo.; *Flor.* 1820, 10 vols. 8vo.

[o] (*Bodinus*), born at Angers, about 1550; died 1596.

De la République, *Paris*, 1576, fol. and 1578. In Latin 1586, fol.

mocriti Philosophiâ Tractatâ in Fabulâ de Cupidine. Opp. tom. III, ed. Elz., p. 208.

Jo. Ge. Lotteri Diss. de Bernardini Telesii Philosophi Itali Vitâ et Philosophiâ, *Lips.* 1726-1733, 4to.

† Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Physicians at the end of the Sixteenth and beginning of the Seventeenth Centuries. Published by Th. Aug. Rixner and Siber; fasc. III, *Sulzb.*

296. A Reformation was attempted in Natural Philosophy by *Bernardinus Telesius.* Born 1508, at Cosenza in the kingdom of Naples, he received a Classical education from an uncle at Milan, and subsequently, at Rome; and at Padua devoted himself with ardour to philosophical and mathematical studies, and from which he imbibed a disinclination for the doctrines of Aristotle. At a more advanced age he published with great success his work *De Naturâ juxta Propria Principia*[p]. He became a teacher of Natural Philosophy at Naples, and founded an academy named after him, *Telesiana* and *Consentina;* which was intended to demolish the Aristotelian philosophy. He was compelled by the persecutions he underwent from the monks to retire to Cosenza, where he died 1588. His system is one of pure Naturalism, and bears some resemblance to the views of Parmenides (§ 99). His chief objection to those of Aristotle is, that he laid down as principles mere abstractions, (*abstracta et non entia*). He himself maintained the existence of two incorporeal and active principles, Heat and Cold; and a corporeal passive principle, Matter; on which the other two exercise their influences. He derived the heavens from Heat, and the earth from Cold; and attempted, in a very unsatisfactory manner, to account for the origin of secondary natures by a supposed perpetual conflict between the Heavens and Earth. Having attributed sensation to his two incorporeal principles, he went on to assign souls to plants and animals in general. He drew however a broad

[p] The two first books appeared at Rome 1565, in 4to. The entire work was published at Naples in 1586 and 1588.

distinction between the immortal soul of Man, and that of other animals, and asserted that it was the immediate gift of God at the time of conception[q]. He maintained that Sensation was not absolutely passive, but a perception of changes operated in the mind itself[r]. Knowledge acquired by means of inference he described as a species of imperfect *Sensation*. Independently of these theories Telesius was an Experimentalist and Materialist. His adversaries *Marta* and *Chiocci* were, in their turn, attacked by Campanella[s], (infra).

III. *Franc. Patrizzi*, or *Patritius*.

† Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Physicians, etc.; published by RIXNER and SIBER; fasc. IV: FR. PATRIZZI, *Sulzb.* 1823, 8vo.

297. *Fr. Patrizzi*[t], the author of a new theory of emanation, borrowed the materials of it from all quarters, but principally from the Neoplatonists, and the pretended records of Primitive Mysticism collected by them; as well as from the system of Telesius. He commenced this undertaking by an elaborate refutation of Aristotle[u]. Nevertheless he attempted[x] a theory of light, according to the Aristotelian method. He affects to divide his subject into four parts, viz.: *Panaugia*, *Panarchia*, *Pampsychia* and *Pancosmia:* and cites to support his theories a number of apocryphal mystic books[y]. Wisdom he defines to be Universal Science. Light is in all things the primal object of knowledge. Philosophy, therefore, or the investigation of Truth, ought to begin with the

[q] De Rer. Nat., lib. V, c. 1, sqq.

[r] Ibid. VIII, 21.

[s] Campanellæ Philosophia Sensibus demonstrata, etc., *Neap.* 1590, 4to.

[t] Born at Clisso in Dalmatia, 1529; professor of the Platonic philosophy at Ferrara and Rome; where he died 1593.

[u] Discussiones Peripateticæ, published at first separately, *Ven.* 1571—1581, 4 vols. See above, § 139.

[x] Nova de Universis Philosophia in quâ Aristotelicâ Methodo non per Motum sed per Lucem et Lumina ad primam Causam ascenditur, etc., *Ferrar.* 1591, fol., *Ven.* 1593, *Lond.* 1611.

[y] Attributed to the ancient Persians.

contemplation of Light. 1. All Light is derived from the first source of illumination—God. 2. God is the highest principle of all things. 3. The universe is animated. 4. It is endowed with the qualities of unity and individuality by means of Space and Light; both of them incorporeal essences.

Such are among the principal ideas which Patrizzi follows up in the work above mentioned. It may be observed that this was not the last occasion when by metamorphosing material forms into Spiritual Essences, an alliance was attempted between the dreams of the Neoplatonists and the philosophy of Aristotle.

IV. *Giordano Bruno.*

† For Giord. Bruno, see Brucker, tom. IV: and Buhle, History of Modern Philosophy, tom. II, p. 703, sqq. Fülleborn, *Beitræge*, etc. fasc. VI. Heumann, Acta Philos. fasc. III—IX. XV.

Car. Steph. Jordani Disquisitio Historico-Literaria de Jordano Bruno Nolano, *Primislaviæ* (no date), 8vo.

Fr. Christ. Lauckhard, Diss. de Jordano Bruno, *Hal.* 1783, 4to.

† Biographical Memoir of Giord. Bruno, by Kindervater; In the Memoirs of Cæsar, relative to the Philosophical World, tom. VI, No. 5.

† Biography of Bruno, in Adelung; History of Human Folly, I vol.

Fr. Jacobi, Letters to Mendelssohn, on the Doctrine of Spinosa; second edition, *Breslau*, 1789, 8vo. Suppl. I.

† Heydenreich, Appendix to the History of Revolutions in Philosophy, by Cromaziano, p. 257, tom. I.

† Lives and Opinions of the most celebrated Physicians, etc.; (see prec. §).

298. One of the most extraordinary writers of this age was another Italian named *Giordano Bruno (Jordanus Brunus);* remarkable for his history, as well as his learning and great abilities. He was endowed with a vigorous and versatile capacity, united to a fruitful imagination; of an elevated but restless and passionate cha-

racter; and greedy of fame. He possessed considerable knowledge of the ancient systems of philosophy, the mathematics, physics, and astronomy; and his taste was refined by the influence of classical literature. He was born at Nola, in the kingdom of Naples, about the middle of the sixteenth century. Little is known of his early life. He professed himself a Dominican, but the year and place of his noviciate are not known. Some religious doubts, and bold strictures on the monkish orders, obliged him to quit Italy, probably in 1580. He retired to Geneva, where his love for dispute and paradox brought him into trouble with the adherents of Calvin. Thence he retreated to Paris; where he gave public lectures on the Ars Magna of Raymond Lulli. After a visit to London, he returned to Paris, 1585; and there openly announced himself the adversary of Aristotle, which procured him a great number of enemies. In 1586 he became a private teacher of moral philosophy and mathematics at Wittemberg; afterwards he took up his abode at Prague, at Helmstädt, (where he taught as professor of philosophy), and at Francfort on the Maine. In 1592 he returned once more to Padua, it is not known for what reason; and, after having passed some years in tranquillity, was arrested, (in 1598), by the Inquisition; sent to Rome, and there, on the seventeenth of February 1600, burned as a heretic, and apostate from his religious vows.

299. Bruno was formed by the character of his mind to reject the dry system which had prevailed under the sanction of Aristotle's name. He was naturally inclined to the study and cultivation of the Classics, and in particular was carried away by the bold and comprehensive views of the Eleatæ and Alexandrian Platonists; which at that time found in Italy many minds disposed to receive them. He dived deep into their mysteries, and transfused them into his own writings with talent and originality. He assumed the appellation of *Philotheos*, and under that name in various writings, composed with considerable fancy as well as learning,—occasionally with

wit, and always with ability—he maintained that the Divinity is the internal principle and substantial essence of all things, and that in Him power and activity—the Real and the Possible, form at all times one indivisible whole. He added to these notions many more, for instance, that of carrying to perfection the art of Lulli, whom he looked upon as the harbinger of his own reform in philosophy; and while he availed himself of the bold discoveries of Copernicus, (which possibly first inclined him to doubt the prevailing system), he associated with the truth of these the prejudices of his age in favour of Astrology and Magic. His ardent imagination and restless temper were less fitted for expressing with systematic precision such reveries, than for detailing them with an exuberance of fancy.

His books (especially those in Italian), are extremely scarce: Fülleborn and Buhle have been at the pains to make a complete list of them. It is sufficient to enumerate here the principal.

Jordani Bruni Acrotismus seu Rationes Articulorum Physicorum adversus Peripateticos Parisiis propositorum, etc. *Viteb.* 1588, 8vo.

Philotheus Jordanus Brunus Nolanus de Compendiosâ architecturâ et complemento Artis Lullii, *Paris*, 1582, 12mo.

De Umbris Idearum, *Par*, 1582, 8vo.; part II is entitled Ars Memoriæ.

Idem: Della Causa, Principio ed Uno, *Venice*, (more probably *Paris*), 1584, 8vo. An extract from it is to be found in the letters already mentioned of Fr. Jacobi.

Idem: Dell' Infinito Universo e Mondi, *Venet.* (probably *Paris*), 1584, 8vo.

Spaccio della bestia trionfante, *Paris*, 1584, 8vo.

Degli Eroici furori, *ibid.* 1585, 8vo.

Jordani Bruni Explicatio Triginta Sigillorum ad omnium Scientarum et Artium Inventionem, Dispositionem et Memoriam quibus adjectus est Sigillus Sigillorum.

Idem: De Lampade combinatoriâ Lullianâ ad infinitas Propositiones et media inveniendâ, *Viteb.* 1587, 8vo. De progressu et Lampade venatoriâ Logicorum, etc. *ibid.* eod. De Specierum scrutinio et Lampade combinatoriâ Raym. Lulli, *Prag.* 1588.

Articuli CLX adv. hujus tempestatis Mathematicos atque Philosophos, item CLXXX Praxes ad totidem Problemata, *ibid.* eod. De Imaginum, Signorum et Idearum compositione ad omnia Inventionum, Dispositionum et Memoriæ genera libb. III, *Francof. ad M.* 1591, 8vo. De Triplici, minimo et mensurâ ad trium Speculativarum Scientiarum et multarum activarum Artium Principia libb. V, *Francof.* 1591, 8vo. De Monade, numero et figurâ liber consequens (libros) quinque de minimo magno et mensurâ. Item de Innumeralibus, Immenso et Infigurabili, seu de Universo et Mundis libb. VIII, *Francof.* 1591, 8vo.

300. The principal points of what may be termed his Theology are the following: God--the First Principle, is that which all things are, or may be. He is *One*, but in Him all essences are comprehended. He is the substance also of all things, and at the same time their Cause —(Final, Formal, and Creative):—Eternal without limit of duration; *Natura Naturans.* As the first Efficient Cause, He is also the Divine and Universal Intelligence which has manifested Itself in the form and fashion of the Universe: He is the Soul of the Universe, which permeates all things, and bestows upon them their forms and attributes. The end contemplated by this Great Cause is the perfection of all things, which consists in the development of the various modifications of which the different parts of Matter are susceptible. To be—to will—to have the power—and to produce, are identical with the Great Universal Principle. He is incomprehensible to us because Absolute and Uncompounded. His substance and his creative energies are determined by his Nature; He cannot act otherwise than he acts; His will is necessity; and this necessity, at the same time, the most perfect freedom. The Divinity, as the first and vital energy, has revealed Himself from all eternity in a variety of productions; yet continues always the same; Infinite, Immeasurable, Immoveable, and Unapproachable by any similitude. He is in all things, and all things in Him; because by Him and in Him all things live, act, and have their increase: He pervades the smallest portions of the Universe, as well as its infinite expanse: He influences every atom of it as well as the Whole. It follows, that all

hings are animated; all things are good; because all hings proceed from a Being essentially good.

301. Bruno follows the same train of ideas in his eflections on the world, (*Universum*, or *Natura naurata*), which he represents as One, Infinite, Eternal, nd Imperishable. Nevertheless the world, in its external nature, and as containing the development of ll things, is but the shadow of the Supreme Principle. Its element is *Matter*, originally formless; but, as united to, and identified with, the primitive and eternal Form, it virtually contains all possible modifications of form. He maintained that none had better expressed than Pythagoras, in his theory of Numbers, the manner in which all things are derived from the Infinite Being as Unity: towards which the human mind perpetually aspires. By the multiplication of its own Unity the First Principle causes the production of multifarious beings; but at the same time that It is the source of species and individuals beyond all calculation, It is Itself unlimited, and unconfined by Number, Measure, or Relation. It remains always One, and in every respect Indivisible; at once Infinitely Great and Infinitely Little. Inasmuch as by It all things are animated; the Universe may be represented as a Living Being: an immense and infinite animal, in which all things live and act in a thousand and a thousand different ways.

Bruno endeavours to establish by a variety of proofs this eternity of the world; from the immortal destiny of Man; from the infinitude of the Creator's power, which must be productive of like infinite effects; from the goodness also of the Divine Being; as well as by metaphysical arguments drawn from our ideas of Infinite space; and the impossibility of finding a Central Point; which last proof he ingeniously applies to the defence and confirmation of the Copernican system: refuting the opposite theories, especially that of the Peripatetics. As the material world is but a shadow and reflection of the First Principle, so our knowledge alto-

gether consists in the perception of Similitudes and Relations; and as the First Principle, descending from Its elevation, produced, by multiplication of Itself, the infinite diversity of natural objects; so do we gradually acquire the idea of Unity, by combining the multifarious objects presented to our senses. The end of all philosophy is this recognition of Unity existing in Contraries. —In Every individual the Soul assumes a particular form; inasmuch as its nature is simple and uncompounded it is immortal,—without limits to its energies, —and, by extension and contraction, it forms and fashions its own body.

To be born is the consequence of such expansion of the Centre; Life consists in the maintenance of a Spherical shape, and Death is the contraction into the same Centre. The highest end of all free-agents is the same with that of the Divine Intellect; namely, the perfection of the Whole.

Bruno's system is nothing more than that of the Eleatæ and Plotinus corrected and extended: a sort of Pantheism †, by many misunderstood as a system of Atheism; set forth with a persuasive eloquence springing from the author's own conviction, and with great richness of Imagination; and engaging the attention by a multitude of striking and noble ideas. The system of Bruno continued long neglected, or misunderstood, till the theories of Spinoza and Schelling directed towards it a degree of revived attention.

V. *Sceptical writers.*

302. Many combined causes now gave birth to a new species of philosophical scepticism in certain calm and vigorous minds, which manifested itself according to the peculiar characters and habits of each. These causes

† [Pantheism, it will be remembered, presumes the whole Universe to partake of the Divine Nature; or, in other words, that the Divine Nature is extended to all parts of the Creation, and animates them all. *Trans.*]

were, the renewed study of the old philosophers; the awakened spirit of original investigation; the extended sphere of experimental observation; with the craving which began to be felt for more certain knowledge and better established principles; with all the discussions and theories which these causes set in motion, diversified according to the characters of their respective authors.

Montaigne.

Essais de Michel de Montaigne, *Bordeaux*, 1580; *Lond.* 1724; *Paris.* 1725, 3 vols. 4to; *Lond.* 1739, 6 vols. 12mo, etc.

Eloge de Mich. de Montaigne, Couronné à l'Acad. de Bordeaux en 1774 (par L'Abbe de Talbert), *Par.* 1775, 12mo. Eloge Analytique et Historique par De la Dixmerie, *Par.* 1781, 8vo.

303. *Michel de Montaigne*, or *Montagne*[z], was the first of his age who inclined to the philosophy of Doubt. With a mind highly cultivated by the study of the Ancients, and of History; with great knowledge of the World and Men, he contemplated human life as it is presented to us, in its multiplicity and inconsistency; without analysing these discrepancies so as to arrive at unity and consistency. His acute observation of the disagreement existing between all philosophical theories produced in him a way of thinking akin to positive Scepticism in matters of philosophy; and he pronounced the *uncertainty of human knowledge* and the *feebleness of human reason* to be the grand conclusions to which all his observations had led him; reposing with a sincere faith on the authority of Divine Revelation. The uncertainty which he ascribed to all human science he extended even to matters of practice, without however denying the truth of practical obligations. His opinions are expressed with admirable candour and modesty in his delightful *Essays*, the originality and graces of which will always make the book a favourite with men of taste; though his philosophy has been very differently estimated by different

[z] Born in a castle of the same name in Perigord, 1533; died 1592.

critics. Though his own character and conduct were free from the reproach of immorality and irreligion, his work has unquestionably the defect of not doing justice to its author's real sentiments; nay, even of encouraging the contrary.

Pierre Charron.

† De la Sagesse; trois livres, par P. CHARRON, *Bordeaux*, 1601; edit. expurg. *Par.* 1604.

Eloge de P. Charron, par G. M. D. R. (GEORGE MICHEL DE ROCHEMAILLET), prefixed to the Works of Charron, *Par.* 1607. See BAYLE.

304. Montaigne had great influence over two distinguished authors of his own day: *Etienne Boëtie* (died 1563), Counsellor of the parliament of Bourdeaux; who in his *Discours de la Servitude Voluntaire*, set forth with considerable talent his republican principles: and *Pierre Charron* (born at Paris 1541), a celebrated preacher, and a man of ability and estimable character; but who in consequence of his intimacy with Montaigne, having unhappily contracted a habit of Scepticism, indulged in some unwarrantable speculations on religious topics. According to him, Wisdom (La Sagesse), is the free investigation of what is common and habitual. The desire of knowledge is natural to man; but Truth resides with God alone, and is undefinable by human reason. On this principle he grounds another, of distrust and indifference with regard to all science; a bold disbelief of Virtue (or the appearance of it); and even of great doctrines of Religion (particularly the immortality of the Soul); alleging that its external history did not correspond with its divine original, and the ideas he was pleased to form of God, and the worship of God. On the other hand he insisted upon the obligations of a certain Internal Religion connected with Virtue, and founded in the knowledge of God and Self, and exhorted to the practice of moral duties derived from a certain everlasting and imperishable law of Nature, which has

been implanted in the understanding by God Himself, and contains the highest Good of Man. This crude theory he expressed with some eloquence, and died 1603, decried by many as an atheist; which he did not altogether deserve.

305. We perceive that the human mind had, in the period of which we are treating, attempted many paths, already opened, to the mysteries of knowledge, by the ways of Revelation, Reason, and Experiment[z]. None of them had been pursued far enough; because, occupied with the pursuit of results and conclusions, men had omitted to begin by examining themselves, and their own faculties, instead of the objects contemplated by the latter. They had not yet inquired in what respects Revelation may be justly expected to supply information: nor had the pretensions of Experiment and Reason to be severally the fountain-heads of knowledge been balanced, or adjusted. A sort of Scepticism, grounded on experiment and observation, discouraged the pride of human reason, without having the effect of silencing its inquiries; and rather busied itself with diving again into the exhausted mines of ancient disputes, than attempted any fresh proofs of the Certainty of Knowledge. A species of intellectual anarchy and chaos seemed for a time to prevail: the more exact knowledge derived from the writings of the ancients contributing rather to increase than to still the commotion; till it ended in something like an universal *fermentation*, which slowly defecated. An immense mass of unorganised knowledge and misdirected views contended together, till the necessity came to be gradually felt of more systematic and better-founded inquiries; and to attain this end gigantic efforts were made, which became continually more effectual and more universal.

[z] [Reason and Experiment: the first is meant to imply the principle of the Rationalists: the latter of the Experimentalists, or Empirics. *Transl.*]

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO OUR OWN TIMES.

A free and progressive spirit of inquiry into the principles, the laws, and limits of human knowledge; with attempts to systematise and combine them.

306. It was time that the human understanding should assume confidence in itself, and, relying on its own powers, force its way through the deep labyrinth of knowledge. Many causes which we have already enumerated combined to stimulate its exertions; and among the most powerful were the desire of elucidating the grounds of Religious and Moral knowledge; and the wish to reconcile and associate the Empiric and Rational systems. The philosophical systems of the Greeks continued to be examples of what might be effected, though they were no longer adhered to as models. The improvement in social habits, and the clearer views of moral duties, which Religion and established forms of Government had promoted, brought with them the necessity for a more perfect system of Ethics than was to be found in the theories of the Ancients; while the Scholastic system was found less and less capable of satisfying the demands of an increasing curiosity. The improvement effected in the Mathematical Sciences by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Toricelli, awakened a like enthusiasm among philosophers of another class; which the analogy subsisting between their pursuits tended to promote. The grand question which began to influence such speculations was, the Origin and the Certainty of Knowledge; with inquiries as to the ultimate grounds of Moral Right—Moral Obligation, etc.

Bacon and *Descartes* long exercised the most important influence over succeeding philosophers, and caused

their respective principles to become for a time universal. The spirit of inquiry had been first awakened in Italy; but, being repressed there, had acquired a much more extensive dominion in England, France, and Germany. The researches of these two great men were intended to complete the fabric of philosophy; but too impatient to arrive at the conclusion, they neglected to lay with sufficient care and accuracy a perfect foundation. Their followers felt themselves at liberty to consult their several tastes, and rushed either into a rashness of *demonstration*, which could end only in futility; or devoted themselves to perpetual *experiment*, unallied to any hypothesis: while sober investigation of the powers of the mind itself, as the source of knowledge was, for a long time, neglected by both parties. The factions too of the Speculative and Practical philosophers came to be opposed to each other: and, as each had much to object to the other, and much to say for themselves, they were successful in keeping up an interminable dispute, without any other result of their labours, but that of prejudicing the cause of philosophy in the minds of others. The Casuists and disciples of Thomas Aquinas on the one hand, and the Aristotelians (who preserved their authority among the Protestants, by whom Thomas was rejected) on the other, had long confined the attention of their disciples principally to Speculative questions; and Practical philosophy had been almost entirely resigned into the hands of theologians. Gradually it became the practice to confirm the decrees of Civil Legislation by arguments derived from Revelation or from Reason: and as this caused philosophy to become more practical, so the habit of deducing all duties and all moral obligation from the will of God, as their ultimate source, gradually exalted it to speculation; and brought about an union between the two systems, on the important subject of Morals.

The improvements effected in the present period may be described as consisting in:

A separation and distinction of Moral Philosophy from

Science at large, and the assignment to it of an appropriate and peculiar domain of its own:—A better perception of the essential requisites of a system of knowledge, in its whole extent, and in its details:—A clearer discernment of the respective provinces and claims of Theology and Natural Reason:—The advancement of knowledge both in the materials collected and the manner in which they were arranged:—And an improvement in the *method* of philosophy.*

307. This period may be subdivided into two: the first extending to the end of the eighteenth century, and capable of being distinguished into smaller epochs by the names of the great men who illumined it: the efforts at knowledge then made being principally of a Dogmatic character. The latter period commences with the concluding years of the eighteenth century, and embraces the labours of the Critical School, with the results to which they have led.

* [In the above sketch I have omitted, as well as altered, much that is to be found in the original; but which appeared to me more likely to weary by repetition, or confuse by its obscurity, than to instruct the reader.

In consequence of the omission here made, the *numbers* of the *sections* from this place to the end of the volume, differ from those of Tennemann; (308 Transl.—316 Orig.); which, however, can occasion no difficulty to any one who may desire to refer to him, as the *names of the philosophers* will be a sufficient guide. *Transl.*]

FIRST PERIOD.

FROM BACON TO KANT.

FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH.

Fresh and independent Essays of Reason, with a more profound and Systematical Spirit of investigation.

ATTEMPTS TO GROUND PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE ON EXPERIMENT.

I. *The Empirism of Bacon.*

Mallet's Life of Bacon, prefixed to his Works.

Rawlay, the same; and R. Stephen, Letters and Remains of Lord Chancellor Bacon, *Lond.* 1734, 4to.

For the services rendered by Bacon to Philosophy, see Heydenreich, in his transl. of Cromaziano, vol. I, p. 306 (Germ.).

† Sprengel, Life of Bacon, in the (Halle) Biographia, vol. VIII, No. 1.

308. *Francis Bacon,* lord Verulam, appeared in England as a reformer of Philosophy; a man of a clear and penetrating judgment, great learning, great knowledge of the world and men, but of a character not free from reproach. He was born in London A. D. 1561: attained the highest offices in the state, which he ultimately lost through his failings, and died 1626. In his youth, he studied the Aristotelian system of the Schools, and the Classics. The latter study, as well as the practical pursuits to which he presently devoted himself, taught him the poverty and insufficiency of the former. In his maturer age he applied himself to consider the means of reforming the Method

of Philosophy, to which end he composed some works[b], which by the new principles they developed had even greater influence over the fortunes of Philosophy than if he had completed an entire system of his own.

309. Bacon chose a new path, altogether diverging from the beaten one: instead of the *syllogistic* proof by *argument*, taking that of *experiment* by *Induction*: (which had been already imperfectly attempted by Telesius § 295), and proposing to re-construct the edifice of Human knowledge. Although his views may be said to be in some degree partial, yet he deserves the highest admiration and praise for his triumphant attacks on the School-philosophy; for having applied for information to Nature and Experiment; for having referred the question of Final Causes to Metaphysics rather than Physics; for the clear development of certain points in the Science of Mind, e. g. that of the Association of Ideas; as also by his well-digested refutation of some of the superstitions of his age, and the composition of his *Organum* as a new method of attaining to the knowledge of Nature; (B. I, Aphor. 19, sqq.); and by his book, De Augmentis Scientiarum, which contains a masterly review of the Sciences, with his views for their enlargement and improvement[c]. To show how far Bacon was from being a mere experimentalist, it is sufficient to refer to his expressions relative to the science and object of Moral Philosophy. Science, he says, is nothing more than the image of Truth, inasmuch as Truth in Reality, and Truth in Knowledge, only differ as a direct ray of light does from a refracted one[d]. The object of Philosophy is threefold,

[b] De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (Latin) 1623: (English), *Lond.* 1605.

His Works, *Amsterd.* 1663, 6 vols. 12mo., with a Life by W. RAWLAY: *Lond.* 1740, fol. 4 vols. by MALLET: and 1765, 5 vols. 4to.

Novum Organum Scientiarum, *Lond.* 1620, fol.

[c] It is very likely that the works of Bacon suggested to J. BARCLAY his Treatise, called Icon Animorum, *Lond.* 1614, 8vo. We shall have occasion to speak of Cumberland and Hobbes presently.

[d] De Augm. Sc., I, col. 18.

God—Nature—Man. Nature presents itself to our comprehension, as it were, by a *direct* ray of light, while God is revealed to us only by a reflected one[e].

II. *Philosophical system of Campanella.*

Thomæ Campanellæ, De Libris propriis, et rectâ ratione studendi Syntagma (ed. Gabr. Naudæus), *Par.* 1642, 8vo.; *Amstel.* 1645; *Rotterd.* 1692, 4to. See also Crenii, Collectio Tractatuum de Philologiæ studiis, liberalis Doctrinæ Informatione et Educatione Literariâ, *Lugd. Bat.* 1696, 4to.

Ern. Sal. Cypriani, Vita et Philos. Thomæ Campanellæ, *Amstel.* 1705, 8vo.; ed. II, 1722, 8vo.

Consult *German Museum*, 1780, No. XII, p. 481; and Schröckh, Biogr., etc. tom. I, p. 281 (Germ.).

Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ, id est, Dissertationis de Naturâ Rerum Compendium secundum Vera Principia ex Scriptis Th. Campanellæ præmissum (per Tob. Adami), *Francof.* 1617, 4to.

† Doctrine of Campanella on Human Knowledge, with some Remarks on his Philosophical System, by Fulleborn, Collect. Fasc. VI, p. 114.

We have already had occasion (§ 295) to mention one work of Campanella, to which we may add these, at present sufficiently rare:

De Sensu Rerum et Magiâ, *Francf.* 1620. Philosophiæ Rationalis et Realis partes V, *Paris.* 1638, 4to. Universalis Philosophiæ sive Metaphysicarum Rerum juxta propria Dogmata partes tres, *Paris.* 1638, fol. Atheismus Triumphatus, *Romæ*, 1631, fol. Ad Doctorem Gentium de Gentilismo non retinendo et de Prædestinatione et Gratiâ, *Paris*, 1636, 4to. Realis Philosophiæ Epilogisticæ partes IV: hoc est, De Rerum Naturâ, Hominum Moribus, Politicâ, cui Civitas solis adjuncta est, Œconomica cum Adnotationibus Physiologicis a Tobia Adami, nunc primum edita, *Francof. ad M.* 1623, 4to. Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ. Civitas Solis, *Ultraj.* 1643, 12mo.

Scelta d'Alcune Poesie Philosophiche di Septimano Squilla, 1632 (sine loco).

310. The contemporary of Bacon, *Thomas Campanella*, (born at Stilo in Calabria, 1568), made a like attempt to

[e] De Augm. Sc. III, cap. 1.

deduce all knowledge from experiment. Endowed with superior talents, and carefully brought up, he entered the order of Dominicans, and pursued his philosophical studies as a noviciate in the convent of Cosenza; but when, by his own reflections as well as in consequence of the objections of Telesius*, he was led to suspect the universal authority of Aristotle, he shook off the prejudices of his education, and endeavoured to satisfy his doubts by studying the remains of other ancient philosophers. But finding that these, as well as the remarks of Telesius himself, who attracted him by the freedom of his inquiries, were insufficient to set his mind completely at rest, he attempted knowledge by a path of his own. He admitted the existence of two sources, and only two, of all knowledge, *Revelation* and *Nature:* the first the origin of *Theology*, the last of *Philosophy:* in other words, the Histories of God and of Mankind. Scepticism, with Campanella, was but a transitory state of the mind: he was too eager to supply its place by a dogmatic edifice of his own; without having cleared his way to it by previous inquiry. He attempted too great a diversity of pursuits, and aspired to effect a reformation in every art and science, without having acquired a sufficient command of the necessary details. The adversities of his life contributed much to impede his progress as a philosophical reformer: for having been accused of disloyalty to the Spanish government, he was kept twenty-seven years in strict confinement; and when at last, in 1626, acquitted and set at liberty, was obliged to remove for security to Paris, where he died 1639.

311. Campanella had a clear and philosophical understanding, and extensive knowledge; with a genuine love of Truth; which last he asserted to be the proper foundation of all philosophy. *He* also proposed a new arrangement of the Sciences. His views were often just

* [It will be remembered that Telesius was born at Cosenza, where he died 1588. *Transl.*]

and clear, but his hasty and impatient Spirit prevented his bringing them to perfection. His principal efforts were directed to the construction of a system of Metaphysics containing the principles of Theology, Natural History, and Morals. He looked upon the Metaphysics of Aristotle (so called) as nothing more than a sort of Logic, and a Vocabulary. Metaphysics is a *necessary* science, because our senses convey to us only that which is contingent and individual, without informing us as to the general relations of things and their real nature. Logic is not a science of that which is *real* and *necessary*—God and His creation—; but an art of language adapted to philosophy (Phil. Rat. II, 2). The only avenue to knowledge is by the Senses;—Sensation is the source of Knowledge (*Sentire est Scire*). Consistently with this theory he resolved into Sensation all the operations of the mind (such as Memory, etc.), and asserted that Thought itself is nothing but a combination of the results of Sensation; which combination itself is presented to us by means of Sense.

312. The object which Campanella had most at heart was the completion of a system of Dogmatism, which might be successfully opposed to Scepticism; and of which he gave a sufficiently accurate outline in his Metaphysics (lib. I). He either replies to the causes of doubt assigned by the Sceptic school, or invalidates them, or their consequences. He appeals to the natural desire felt by man to *know*, and to ascertain the *grounds* of knowledge. It is impossible even to deny the certainty of knowledge, without some ascertained principles of knowledge, which the Sceptic himself is compelled to refer to. He lays down certain incontestible principles of this kind drawn from general consent. Our senses inform us, That we are, and that we are possessed of power, knowledge, and will: That our power, knowledge and will are limited: That even as we ourselves enjoy these faculties, so are they enjoyed by others also. Campanella did not advance beyond these first principles, be-

cause he was satisfied that the external world was a Revelation afforded by the Divine Being (*operando*), which, when compared with the *Word* of God, afforded the only satisfactory means of knowledge.

313. The great Metaphysical problem is, to give an account of external objects, and their existence. To solve this Campanella begins with the axiom, That external objects exist and are presented to our senses. These appearances must be either true or false; agreeably to the obvious rule that a thing must either be, or not be; and to the laws (*Primalitates*) of existence and non-existence. The *Primal laws* of existence are, Possibility or Power, (*Potentia*); Knowledge (*Sapientia*), and Sympathy or Love (*Amor*). What can be—is: what is—must be. Every thing must possess sensation, and be the object of it; otherwise it would not exist to us. Every thing has its principle of self-preservation, and abhors annihilation; without which it could not endure, nor energise, nor exist. The *Primal laws* of *non-existence* are Impossibility (*Impotentia*); Ignorance (*Insipientia*); and aversion (*odium Metaphysicum*). The three objects of the Primal laws of existence are, Being, Truth, and Good, of which the outward token is Beauty. These principles conduct the argument up to the consideration of God; the highest Essence, or the highest Unity (Metaph. VII, 1, sqq.). Campanella then describes the attributes and operations of the Divine Unity: Necessity is the result of Power, Destiny of Knowledge, and Harmony of Love. He built his system of Cosmology on Theology, as well as his contemplations respecting Psychology, etc., in which he followed the ideas of the Neoplatonists and Cabbalists, as well as those of Telesius. He recognised in the world an Unity of Life, *(Mundum esse Dei vivam statuam);* and deduced his system of Divine Justice and the laws of necessity and chance, from certain considerations on the connection between Necessity and Existence; and Non-existence and Accident. He maintained the Existence of an Incorporeal world, and of Spirits, which

put in motion the stars. The Soul is a corporeal spirit, which can recognise its own nature to be subtile, warm, and light. From its efforts after felicity, (unattainable in this life), he argued its immortality.

In his *practical* system, which he grounded on the other, he brought forward several new ideas. The Infinite Being is the Supreme Good, the object and end of all things. Religion has revealed Him to us; and points out the way by which we may pass from the sensible to the invisible world, and to the highest attainable perfection. It consists in the obedience to God, the love of Him, and the contemplation of things earthly and Divine. Some striking ideas are disclosed respecting Natural and Revealed religion, Internal and External, Innate and Acquired.

314. The system of Campanella is to be praised rather for its negative than its positive qualities. He displayed a genuine love of knowledge and of truth in the contest he sustained with the Aristotelian System of the Schools, with Atheism, and the false Politics of Macchiavelli; as well as in the manner in which he asserted the right of the Understanding to attempt fresh and untried paths of Science; but he has shown himself unable to solve the grand problems of philosophy, by the inadequacy of his principles, the want of coherence in his system, and the slender union that subsists between his own ideas and those he has associated with them of others. It ought not, however, to be forgotten, that he had the merit of having first distinctly proposed such problems for solution, and attempted to effect the same, with views favourable to rational Knowledge and Religion.

(See his Treatise, De Gentilissmo non Retinendo.)

III. *Modifications of the Ionic and Atomistic Schools.*

Basso, Berigard, Magnenus, Sennert, Gassendi.

315. When the Aristotelian system was laid aside as confessedly deficient, particularly with respect to Natural History, an attempt was made to revive the Ionic and Atomistic doctrines. After *Sebastian Basso's*[f] attack on the Physics of Aristotle (see Bibliography § 143) many others came forward to revive ancient doctrines or propose new ones. *Claude de Guillemert de Bérigard*[g] advanced a theory, on the Eclectic plan, borrowed partly from the Ionians, and partly from the Atomic philosophers, and maintained that it was conformable to the Christian system, while he opposed the Aristotelian hypothesis of an original Matter[h]. Another Frenchman, *Jean-Chrysostôme Magnenus*[i], recommended the system of Nature of Democritus, as affording an adequate solution of natural phenomena. *Dav. Sennert*[k] also attempted to remodel Physics on the principles of Democritus[l]. He maintained that Form and Matter are independent of each other, and asserted that Souls were created by the Divine Being out of Nothing; which brought him into a dispute with *J. Freitag*, (a professor at Groningen) in which he was defended by his disciple *J. Sperling*. *Pietro Gassendi*[m], styled by Gibbon "the most learned of the philosophers of his age, and the most philosophical of the learned," undertook to defend and review with im-

[f] About 1621.

[g] Or Beauregard, born at Moulins 1578; died at Padua 1667, or later.

[h] CIRCULI PISANI, seu de Veterum et Peripateticâ Philosophiâ Dialogi, *Udin.* 1643—47, 4to. *Patav.* 1661.

[i] Born at Luxevil, and professor of Medicine at Pavia, the author of Democritus Reviviscens, sive Vitâ et Philosophia Democriti, *Ticini*, 1646, 12mo. *Lugd. Bat.* 1648; et *Hag. Com.* 1658, 12mo.

[k] Born at Breslau 1572, died 1637.

[l] DAN. SONNERTI Hypomnemata Physica de Rerum Naturalium Principiis, *Francof.* 1635-36, 12mo. Physica, *Viteb.* 1618, 8vo. Opera Omnia, *Venet.* 1641; *Lugd. Bat.* 1676, 6 vols. fol.

[m] Petrus Gassendus; born at Chartansier in Provence 1592; died at Paris 1655.

partiality the system of Epicurus[n], which he asserted had not yet been done. He distinguished himself by his discoveries in Mathematics, Physics, and Philosophy, in all of which he displayed great judgment and learning; and was a redoubtable adversary of Aristotle[o], Fludd[p], and Descartes[q]. With a laudable love of truth he drew a true picture of the life and character of Epicurus[r], and illustrated his philosophy, without concealing the faults he had committed in respect of Theology and the doctrine of Final Causes. He endeavoured to erect upon Epicurism a philosophical system of his own[s]. *Em. Maignan* (or *Maignanus*[t]), who attempted to revive the dreams of Empedocles, excited less attention.

IV. *Law of Nations of Grotius.*

316. But philosophy now began to extend her researches from External Nature to the questions of Civil Right. *Hugo Grotius*, (properly *Hugo de Groot*[u]) a dis-

[n] Sam. Sorberii Diss. de Vitâ et Moribus Petri Gassendi, prefixed to his Syntagma Philos. Epicuri.

[t] Bernier, Abrégé de la Philosophie de Gassendi, *Paris*, 1678, 8vo. *Lugd. Bat.* 1684, 12mo.

Bugerel, Vie de P. Gassendi, *Paris*, 1737, 12mo. See also Lettre Critique et Historique à l'auteur de la Vie de P. Gassendi, *ibid.* 1737, 12mo.

Petri Gassendi Opera Omnia, *Lugd.* 1658, 6 vols. fol. et *Flor.* 1727.

[o] Exercitationes Paradoxicæ adversus Aristoteleos, libb. I, *Gratianopl.* 1624, 8vo.; libb. II. *Hag. C.* 1659, 4to.; (and the Answer of Engelcke); Censor Censurâ Dignus; Philosophus Defensus, *Rostock.* 1697. With Disput. adv. Gassendi, lib. I, Exercitationum V, *ibid.* 1699.

[p] Examen Philosophiæ Rob. Fluddi.

[q] Dubitationes et Instantiæ ad. Cartesium.

[r] Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri cum refutationibus Dogmatum quæ contra Fidem Christianam ab eo asserta sunt; præfigitur Sorberii Dissert. de Vitâ et Moribus P. Gassendi, *Hag. Com.* 1655-59, 4to.; *Lond.* 1668, 12mo. *Amst.* 1684, 4to.

[s] Syntagma Philosophicum, Oper. vol. I.

[t] Born 1601; died 1671.

Maignani Cursus Philosophicus, *Tolosæ*, 1652, 4 vols. and *Lugd.* 1673, fol.

[u] Born at Delft 1583; died at Rostock 1645.

Vita Hugonis Grotii, *Lugd. Bat.* 1704, 4to. (P. Ambr. Lehmann), Grotii Manes ab iniquis Obtrectationibus Vindicati, *Delft.* 1721; *Lips.* 1732, 8vo.

tinguished Philologist, Theologist, Jurist, and Statesman, of great learning, and a clear and sound judgment, opened the way to a new study, that of International Law, by his celebrated work on the Rights of Peace and of War [x], the first example of a philosophical statement of National Law. Some learned men had indeed prepared the way by similar labours, among others, *J. Oldendorp* [y], *Nicolas Hemming* [z], *Bened. Winkler*, and *Alb. Gentilis* [a]. The humane and exalted mind of Grotius was led to this undertaking by the Christian wish to diminish, if possible, the frequency and the horrors of war. He took as the foundation of his argument the elements of Natural Right, and applied his immense erudition to show the universal assent paid by all nations to the principles of Right and Justice. His mode of proof was obviously a species of Induction, which he may have borrowed from his contemporary Lord Bacon. Grotius is sometimes carried away, by the abundance of his learning, from the course of his argument, but nevertheless distinguished himself above any of his predecessors by his superiority to prejudice, and prescription. He considers our idea of Right to be the result of a moral faculty, and derives its first principles from the *love of society (socialitas)*; hence the obligation of defending that society *(societatis custodia)*; and distinguishes between *natural Right and Law, (Dictamen rectæ rationis)*, and *positive (Jus voluntarium)*, whether of Divine or Human original; fre-

Life of Grotius, by GASP. BRAND, and ad. V. CATTENBURG. *Dordr.* 1727-32, 2 vols. fol. (Dutch).

† Vie de M. Hugo Grotius, par M. DE BURIGNY, *Paris*, 1752, 2 vols. 12mo.

† Hugo Grotius, his Life, etc. by H. LUDEN, *Berl.* 1807, 8vo. (Germ.).

[x] De Jure Belli et Pacis, *Paris*, 1625, 4to. cum Commentario W. VAN DER MUELLEN et aliorum, *Amstelod.* 1696—1703, 3 vols. fol. Best edition, *Lausanne*, 1751, 4 vols. 4to. Grotius illustratus Op. H. et S. DE COCCEJI, *Wratislv.* 1745-52, 4 vols. fol.

[y] Born 1506; died 1567.

[z] Born at Laland 1513; died 1600.

[a] Born 1551 at Castello di San Genesio, in the March of Ancona, died 1611.

De Jure Belli Libri tres, *Hanau*, 1589, 8vo; *ibid.* 1612.

quently tracing *positive* law up to Revelation as its immediate source. He draws a distinction also between perfect and imperfect Right: between legal and moral obligation. Although Grotius did but lay open this rich mine of inquiry, we are indebted to him not only for having suggested the pursuit, but for having contributed towards it a valuable stock of materials. His work has formed an era in literature, and been the subject of numerous, and often contradictory, commentaries. *Selden*[b], by his Natural Law of the Hebrews, which was followed up by *Zentgrave*[c] and *Alberti*[d], authors of the Natural Law of Christianity,—pursued a totally different system, and derived Right from the conditions of a state of Innocence.

V. *Materialism of Hobbes.*

Thomæ Hobbes, Angli Malmesburiensis Vita, (Auct. J. Aubery), *Carolopoli*, 1681, 12mo.

Fr. Casp. Hagemii Memoriæ Philosophorum, Oratorum, *Baruthii*. 1710, 8vo.

Rettwig, Epistola de Veritate Philosophiæ Hobbesianæ, *Brem.* 1695, 8vo.

316. The influence of Bacon's philosophy was, as might have been expected, especially felt in England. *Thomas Hobbes*, a friend of his, entered into some of his views, from which he deduced a system of Materialism. He was born in 1588, at Malmsbury. Like Bacon he had contracted from the study of the Classics a contempt for the philosophy of the Schools; and his travels and intimacy with his illustrious countryman, as well as with Gassendi and Galileo, had led him to think for himself. But the

[b] Born at Salvington in Sussex, 1584; died 1654.

Jo. Seldeni De Jure Naturali et Gentium juxta Disciplinam Ebræorum libb. VII. *Lond.* 1640, fol. *Arg.* 1665, 4to.

[c] Born at Strasbourg 1643, died 1707.

Joach. Zentgravii De Jure Naturali juxta Disciplinam Christianorum libb. VIII. *Strasb.* 1678, 4to.

[d] Valent. Alberti Compendium Juris Nat. Orthodoxæ Theologiæ conformatum, *Lips.* 1676, 8vo.

practical direction which he laboured to give to his speculations, had the effect of limiting them. When the civil wars broke out, he proclaimed himself by his writings a zealous advocate of unlimited monarchy, as the only security for public peace. He died 1679; having published several mathematical and philosophical Essays, which have drawn upon him the reproach of fondness for paradox, and the stigma of Atheism.

His works: Opera, *Amstelod.* 1638, 4 vols. 4to. Moral and Political Works, *Lond.* 1750, fol. Elementa Philosophica de Cive, *Par.* 1642, 4to.; *Amstel.* 1647, 12mo. Leviathan, sive de materiâ, formâ et potestate Civitatis Ecclesiasticæ, et Civilis, (English *Lond.* 1651, fol.), Lat. *Amstel.* 1668, 4to.; Appendix, *Amstel.* 1668, 4to. Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, *Lond.* 1650, 12mo. Elementorum Philosophiæ sectio prima de corpore (Engl. *Lond.* 1658, 4to.), Lat. *Amstel.* 1668, 4to. De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law, Moral and Political, *Lond.* 1659, 12mo. Quæstiones de Libertate, Necessitate et Casu, contra Doctorem Bramhallum. (Engl. *Lond.* 1656, 4to.). Hobbes's Tripos, in Three Discourses, *Lond.* 1684, 8vo.

317. Hobbes appears to have aimed, above all things, at freedom and solidity in his speculations, and, rejecting every thing hypothetical, affected to confine himself to the *tangible*, or in other words, to the phenomena of Motion and Sensation. He defines philosophy to be the knowledge, on accurate principles, of phenomena resulting from present causes; or vice versâ the ascertaining of possible causes by means of known effects[e]. Philosophy embraces as an object every body capable of producing an effect, and presenting the phenomena of composition and decomposition. Taking the term *Body* in its widest extent, he divides its meaning into Natural and Political, and devotes to the consideration of the first his *Philosophia Naturalis*, comprehending the departments of Logic, Ontology, Metaphysics, Physics, etc.; and to that of the second his *Philosophia Civilis*, or *Polity*, comprehending Morals. All knowledge is derived from the senses: but our per-

[e] De Corp. p. 2.

ceptions are nothing more than the effect of external objects operating on the brain, or setting in motion the vital spirits. *Thought* is *calculation (computatio)*, and implies addition and subtraction. Truth and Falsehood consist in the relations of the terms employed. We can become acquainted only with the Finite: the Infinite cannot even be imagined, much less known: the term does not convey any accurate knowledge, but belongs to a Being of whom we can form an idea only by means of Faith. Consequently, religious doctrines do not come within the compass of philosophical discussion, but are determinable by the laws of Religion itself. All, therefore, that Hobbes has left free to the contemplation of philosophy is the knowledge of our natural bodies, of the mind, and polity. His whole theory has reference to the External and Objective, inasmuch as he derives all our notions from the senses, and describes the soul itself as something corporeal though of extreme tenuity. Instead of a system of pure metaphysics, he has thus presented us with a history of mind and its phenomena, deficient it is true in general depth, but which with some narrow and limited doctrines, contains occasionally others more enlightened and correct.

318. His *practical* philosophy, however, attracted more attention than his speculative. In this also, Hobbes pursued an independent course, and altogether departed from the line of the Schoolmen. His grand object was to ascertain the most durable posture the Body Politic could assume, and to define Public Right. An ideal form of government and state of morals had been imagined by Plato in his Republic, by *Sir Thomas More*[f] in his Utopia[g], by *Campanella* in his Civitas Solis[h], and by *Harrington*[i] in his Oceana[k]. Hobbes, on the con-

[f] Born at London, 1420; beheaded 1535.
[g] *Basil.* 1558; besides many other editions.
[h] See above bibliography of § 310.
[i] Born at Upton, 1677.
[k] *Lond.* 1656. With his works, 1700 and 1737.

trary, assumes the existence of certain elements of Natural Right, which he supposes to have prevailed in a state of Nature anterior to civilization, contemplated according to the experimental method[1]. Agreeably to the lowest law of Nature man, if he does not aim at the injury of his neighbour, grasps at every thing which can contribute to his own well-being, and shuns every thing that can cause the contrary. Self-preservation is the highest object of his pursuit, just as death is of his avoidance. All that tends to this end, and to the removal of pain, is conformable to reason, and therefore lawful. Right is the liberty of employing our natural powers agreeably to reason. Man has therefore the right of self-preservation and self-defence; and consequently of using the means to this end: and he is himself the judge and arbiter of these means. But the consequence of these individual rights, in a state of nature, must be an universal collision of all; who must be perpetually brought into opposition with one another, to the destruction of all repose and security, and even of the power of self-preservation. Self-love, therefore, (or Reason), and the love of quiet, produce a new state of things, under the form of a civil compact, *(status civilis)*, in which a portion of the individual liberty of each is resigned by him, and intrusted to one, or more. With this epoch commences that of external, obligatory Right. Absolute power on the part of the government, and implicit submission on the part of the governed, are necessary to the well-being of a state; and the best of all forms of government is therefore the monarchical.

Self-love is the fundamental law of Nature, and Interest the rule: the law of Nature is also the law of Morals *(lex moralis)*. Hobbes has the audacity to refer to the Bible for confirmation of such doctrines, deduced from arguments of his own.

His success was not great, and the little which he had was principally among foreigners. Of the number of his

[1] In his treatise De Cive.

impartial judges, was the Dutchman *Lambert Velthuysen*[m]: and of his adversaries *Richard Cumberland*[n], and *Robert Scharrock*[o].

VI. *Lord Herbert of Cherbury.*

319. Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury[p], followed a course exactly the reverse of that pursued by Hobbes, but equally opposed to the principles of true religion. He defended the notion of innate ideas, and derived our knowledge not from the understanding nor the senses, but from a certain *instinctive reason*[q] to which he made the former subordinate. Instead of tracing our acquaintance with religion (according to his ideas of it) to historical tradition, as Hobbes had done; he derived it from a supposed *internal illumination* afforded to all mankind. Agreeably to these views, he pursued his researches on the Rational instead of the Empiric method, particularly with respect to the nature of Truth; on which subject he published a separate work[r]. He described the soul not as a *tabula rasa*, but as a *closed book*, which opens only when Nature bids it. It derives from itself its knowledge of general truths *(communes notitiæ)*; which are so far common to all men; and ought to remove doubts and differences in philosophy and theology. He maintained the existence of what he was pleased to call an Intellectual Religion, and claimed for this religion of his own the right to ex-

[m] Lamberti Velthuysen de Principiis Justi et Decori, Dissertatio Epistolica, continens Apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbesii de Cive, *Amstelod.* 1651, 12mo.

[n] To be mentioned afterwards.

[o] De Officiis secundum Jus Naturale, *Oxon.* 1660, 8vo.

[p] Born 1581; died 1648.

[q] *Naturalis instinctus.*

[r] Tractatus de Veritate prout distinguitur a Revelatione, a verisimili, a possibili, et a falso, *Lut. Paris.* 1624 et 1633; *Lond.* 1645, 4to.; 1656, 12mo. (With the Essay, De Causis Errorum). De Religione Gentilium Errorumque apud eos Causis, *Lond.* 1645, 8vo. Part I, completed 1663, 4to. and 1670, 8vo.

amine and *verify* all other pretensions to revelation[s]. The obscurity of his own thoughts and expressions, and the dominion at that time enjoyed by the experimental system of philosophy, caused him to be but little noticed in his day. He was however justly attacked by Divines, as an enemy to Revealed religion.

VII. *Mystical Naturalists and Theosophists of this period.*

320. J. Baptist *van Helmont*[t] about this time united a study of the phenomena of Nature to a degree of mysticism. He had been taught at Louvain the Scholastic system, by the Jesuit Martin del Rio; and had imbibed from the study of Kempis, Tauler (§ 275), and Paracelsus, a degree of enthusiasm which he carried into his art, that of medicine. With many fanciful notions of his own, he nevertheless detected errors in others, and started several good ideas. In order to effect by means of Alchemy and Philosophy a reformation in his own art, he devoted himself to the investigation of the *Universum*. With such a design, he attached himself principally to the doctrines of Paracelsus, and derived all knowledge from direct and immediate revelation. He maintained that all Nature is animated; but, at the same time, asserted that nothing earthly partakes of the Divine Nature, which is incommunicable. All corporeal beings are replete with spirits, which by means of air and water, the only true elements, and their mutual fermentation, produce every thing else. Such were the principles of his spiritual Physiology[u]. His son, *Fr. Mercurius van Helmont*[x], endeavoured to enlarge our knowledge of "The divine Science"—(Theosophy); and

[s] De Veritate, p. 265, sqq.; 282, sqq.

[t] Born at Brussels, 1577; died at Vilvoorden near Brussels, 1644.

[u] † J. J. Loos, J. Baptista van Helmont, *Heidelberg*. 1807, 8vo. See also B. ab Helmont. Opera, *Amstel*. 1648, 4to.; and *Francf*. 1659, 3 vols. fol.

[x] Born 1618: spent his life in travelling in Germany and England; and died 1699.

by a new division of the different orders of Beings and their relations to Unity, sought to compose a system which might combine the doctrines of the Platonists and Cabbalists with those of Christianity. He taught especially the theory of an universal Sympathy of all things, with many strange notions about the relations of the soul to the body, and of the body to the soul, asserting that they differed not in essence but in form, and stood in the relation of Male and Female. To this he added a sort of Metempsychosis, combined with a belief in the necessity of a future judgment after death[y]. *Marcus Marci von Kronland*[z], set forth a system of Cosmology of his own, in which he blended the Ideas of Plato with the Forms of Aristotle, and endeavoured to destroy the *qualitates occultæ* of the Schoolmen to make way for his *ideæ seminales*, which he affected to consider more intelligible. These *Ideas* are the Powers of Nature which, with the aid of light, create and form all things. Nay, the very constellations operate on the sublunary world by means of light, and by the agency of the Ideas[a].

321. In England the enthusiastic system of Paracelsus found a patron in the learned physician *Robert Fludd*[b], who sought to ally it to the Mosaic history of the creation[c]. He was answered by *Gassendi*. In Germany a like enthusiasm laid hold on the pious and inquisitive

[y] Paradoxical Discourses, *Lond.* 1690. Seder Olam, sive Ordo Sæculorum, hoc est Historica enarratio Doctrina Philosophicæ per unum in quo sunt omnia, 1693, 12mo.

[z] Died 1676.

[a] Joh. Mac. Marci a Kronland, Idearum Operatricium Idea sive Delectio et Hypothesis illius Occultæ Virtutis, quæ Semina fœcunda et ex iisdem Corpora Organica producit, *Prag.* 1035, 4to. Philosophia Vetus restituta, in quâ de mutationibus quæ in Universo sunt, de Partium Universi Constitutione, de Statu Hominis Secundum Naturam et Præter Naturam, et De Curatione Morborum, etc. libb. V, *Prag.* 1662, 4to.

[b] Robert Fludd, or De Fluctibus; born at Milgate in Kent, 1574; died 1637.

[c] Historia Macro-et Microcosmi Metaphysica, Physica et Technica, *Oppenh.* 1717. Philosophia Mosaïca, *Gudæ.* 1638.

temper of the shoemaker of Görlitz, *Jacob Böhm*[d], who with a mind highly excited by the study of the Scriptures, to which he added the natural philosophy of Paracelsus and his contemporaries;—with a peculiar depth of thought, disfigured by a rude unscientific manner and a barbarous style, (partly composed of the terms of Chemistry then in use),—gave vent to his speculations, (often unintelligible and often profound), respecting the Deity and the Origin of all things. He affected to deliver these as something oracular, and wrote in his native language, whence his appellation of *philosophus Teutonicus*. His mysticism gained disciples in Germany, and even abroad, being adopted in France by *Poiret*, and in England by *H. More*, and *John Pordage* a physician; who even wrote a commentary on him. Of all these hereafter. In more recent times *St. Martin* has given as it were a new and able version of this species of Theosophy.

322. Böhm and Fludd had endeavoured to find authority in the Bible for their own extravagancies. The like attempt was made by others, particularly by *Jo. Amos Comenius*[e], who in his *Synopsis Physices ad lumen Divinum reformatæ*[f], detailed more clearly the opinions of Fludd and others. He supposes three elementary principles of all things; Matter, Spirit, and Light. The first is the corporeal essence, the second is subtile, self-existing, invisible, imperceptible, dispensed by the Divine Being to all living creatures, to animate and possess them. Light is the plastic spirit; an intermediate essence, which penetrates matter and prepares it for the

[d] Born at Alt-Seidenberg, near Görlitz, 1575; died 1624.

† Jacob Böhm, a Biographical Essay, *Dresden*, 1802, 8vo.

† Works of J. Böhm, *Amsterd.* 1620, 4 vols. 8vo. etc.; 1780, 10 vols. 8vo. Selections from his Works, *Amst.* 1718; *Francf.* 1801, 8vo.—Translated into Dutch and English.

[e] Of the village of Comna, near Prerau in Moravia; born 1592, died at Amsterdam 1671.

[f] *Lips.* 1632, 8vo; 1663, 8vo.

admission and reception of spirit, investing it at the same time with a form. He has also originated some remarkable ideas on philanthropy, in which he followed Val. Andreæ[g]. *J. Baier*, the successor of Comenius[h], and some others, have bequeathed works to the same effect.

VIII. *Sceptics.*

323. Scepticism was revived and extended by *Fr. Sanchez* (Franc. Sanctius), a Portuguese[i], who taught medicine and philosophy at Toulouse with considerable reputation, up to the time of his death, which happened in 1632. He was obliged by his office to teach the Aristotelian system, and not venturing openly to controvert it, assailed it under cover of his Scepticism; and having proved by means of arguments already brought forward, but to which his lively manner imparted an air of novelty, the uncertainty of human knowledge, he undertook to give in another work a method of his own for attaining to certainty. This promised work, however, never made its appearance. *François de la Mothe le Vayer*[k], an author of great learning, talent, and judgment, enlarged upon the grounds of Scepticism, with a reference to Science and even to Religion. He denied the existence of any common rational foundation for the

[g] See several articles in the *Tageblatt des Menschheitlebens*, published by Ch. Christ. Fr. Crause, 1811, No. XVIII, sqq., on a work of Comenius, entitled, General Observations on the Improvement of Human Nature, etc., *Halle*, 1702.

[h] About 1606.

[i] Born 1562 at Bracara, in Portugal.

Francisci Sanchez Tractatus de multum Nobili et Primâ Universali Scientiâ quod nihil scitur, *Lond.* 1581, 4to. et 12mo; *Francf.* 1618, 8vo, with the remarks of Dan. Hartnack, entitled, Sanchez aliquid Sciens., *Stettin.* 1665, 12mo. Tractatus Philosophici, *Rotterd.* 1649, 12mo.

[k] Born at Paris 1586; died 1672.

Cinq Dialogues faits à l'Imitation des Anciens, par Horatius Tubero (par François de la Mothe le Vayer), *Mons*, 1671, 12mo; 1673, 8vo. and an Answer by M. Naille, *Berl.* 1744, 8vo. Œuvres, *Paris*, 1654 et 1667—1684, 3 vols. fol.

latter, in consequence of the diversities of belief that have always prevailed, and maintained that reason in theology must give place to faith, a superior faculty, and conferred immediately by Divine Grace. In other respects he showed himself a decided unbeliever; representing life as a miserable farce, and virtue as almost a dream.

RATIONALISM OF DESCARTES, AND THE SYSTEMS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE.

I. *Descartes.*

Baillet, La Vie de R. Descartes, *Par.* 1690, 4to; abrégée, *Paris*, 1693, 12mo.

God. Guil. Leibnitii Notata circa Vitam et Doctrinam Cartesii in Thomasii Historiâ Sapientiæ et Stultitiæ, tom. II, p. 113, and in the 3rd vol. Epistolarum Leibnitii ad Diversos, p. 388.

Réflexions d'un Académicien sur la Vie de Descartes, envoyées à un Ami en Hollande, *A La Haye*, 1692, 12mo.

Eloge de René Descartes, par Gaillard, *Paris*, 1765, 8vo; par Thomas, *Paris*, 1761, 8vo; par Mercier, *Genève et Paris*, 1765, 8vo.

Joh. Tepelii Historia Philosophicæ Cartesianæ, *Norimb.* 1672, 12mo. De Vitâ et Philos. Cartesii, *ibid.* 1674.

Recueil de quelques Pièces curieuses concernant la Philosophie de M. Descartes (par Bayle), *Amsterd.* 1684, 12mo.

Petri Dan. Huetii Censura Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, *Paris*, 1689, 12mo. Philosophiæ Cartesianæ adversus Censuram Pet. Dan. Huetii vindicatio, aut D. A. P. (Augusto Petermann), *Lips.* 1690, 4to. Réponse au Livre qui a pour titre: P. Dan. Huetii Censura, etc.; par P. Silvain Regis, *Par.* 1692, 12mo. Huet answered by his (anonymous) Nouveaux Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire du Cartésianisme; par M. G. *Paris*, 1692, 12mo.

Admiranda Methodus Novæ Philosophiæ Renati Descartes, *Ultraj.* 1643, 12mo.

Balth. Bekkeri de Philosophiâ Cartesii Admonitio candida et sincera, *Wesel.* 1668, 12mo.

Ant. le Grand, Apologia pro Cartesio, contra Sam. Parkerum, *Lond.* 1672, 4to; *Norimb.* 1681, 8vo.

P. de Villemandy. See § 139.

324. René Descartes (Cartesius), was born 1596, at La Haye, in the Touraine, and attempted a reformation in the philosophy of his country by a method opposed to the Experimental, on the principles of pure Rationalism. His system was favourable to independent research, and met with equally violent opponents and partisans, attracting, as it did, universal attention. In the school of the Jesuits at La Flèche he early distinguished himself by the quickness of his parts, and his love of knowledge. Fired with this passion and eager to satisfy it by study, he devoured without a plan a multitude of books, which working upon his own ardent temper, left him more uncertain than he was at first; his subsequent travels instead of curing contributing to increase the malady. Presently his adventurous spirit conceived the plan of erecting a philosophy of his own; no part of which should be borrowed from others. With this view he repaired to Holland, where he trusted to find leisure and freedom, and where he composed the greater part of his works[1]. He presently attracted great attention, became involved in controversies, especially with theologians, and after maintaining an extensive and learned correspondence, was invited into Sweden by Queen Christina, and died there shortly after in 1650.

His works: Opera, *Amstelod.* 1692-1701, 9 vols. 4to. Opera Philosophica, *Francf. ad M.* 1692, 4to. Principia Philosophiæ, *Amstel.* 1644-1656, 4to. Meditationes de Primâ Philosophiâ, etc., *ibid.* 1641, 4to. Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire la Raison et chercher le Vérité dans les Sciences. Plus, la Dioptrique, les Météores, et la Géométrie, etc. *Par.* 1637, 4to.; a Latin translation (by Courcelles) revised by Descartes, 1644, Specimina Philosophiæ seu Dissertatio de Methodo, Dioptrice, etc. *Amstel.* 1656, 4to. Meditationes. Tractatus de Passionibus Animæ, *ibid.* 1656, 4to. Tractatus de Homine et de Formatione Fœtûs, cum Notis Lud. de la Forge, *ibid.* 1677, 4to. Epistolæ (translated), *ibid.* 1688, 4to.

325. Descartes was not merely a metaphysical philoso-

[1] Between 1629 and 1649.

pher: he was distinguished as a mathematician, an astronomer, and a physiologist. His very reputation and success as a philosopher, was in a great measure owing to the discoveries he effected in those sciences. His object was to constitute philosophy a demonstrable science; but he rushed too eagerly from the state of doubt, which he considered a necessary preparation for all knowledge, to knowledge itself. He begins with the experimental observation of Consciousness and Thought: and from this concludes the existence of the thinking subject—*(cogito: ergo sum)*—of the soul; which thus distinguishes itself from material substances, and consequently is independent of them. Its essence consists in *thought*, and is on that account more easy to be recognised than that of the body. Clearness and distinctness he regarded as the criteria of truth. The soul does not contemplate all subjects with equal distinctness, which proves its nature to be imperfect and finite. It possesses, nevertheless, the idea of an Absolute, Perfect Being, or Spirit; the first and necessary attribute of whom is existence[m]; and as such ideas cannot be derived from the Imperfect Soul, they must flow from the Perfect Being to whom they relate, and consequently must be innate. On this recognition of the existence of an All-perfect Being, the evidence and certainty of all absolute knowledge is grounded; on the principle that the Divine Being will not suffer us to fall into error while lawfully employing the faculties for knowledge bestowed by Him. The

[m] SAM. WERENFELS, Judicium de Argumento Cartesii pro Existentiâ Dei, petito ex ejus Ideâ; in his Dissertatt. var. Argument. Pars. II; and, on the other side, JACQUELOT, Examen d'un Ecrit qui a pour titre, Judicium de Argumeto, etc. Many articles on the subject appeared in the Journal des Savans, 1701; the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, 1700, 1701, and the Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, 1701, 1702, et 1703.

ANDR. RICHTER, Diss. (resp. Jo. FOUBIN) de Religione Cartesii, *Gryphis.* 1705, 4to.

CHR. BREITHAUPT, Dissert. De Cartesii Theologiâ Naturali et Erroribus in eâ commissis. *Helmstad.* 1735, 4to.

LUD. FR. ANCILLON, Judicium de Judiciis circa Argumentum pro Existentiâ Dei ad Nostra usque tempora Latis, *Berol.* 1792, 8vo.

essence of the body consists in expansion. The body and the thinking essence,—(the body, that is, and the soul,—are essentially opposed to each other.

326. God, as the Infinite Being, is the author of the universe, which is infinite; but the material and intellectual parts of which it is composed are imperfect and finite. The assistance or co-operation of the Divinity (*assistentia sive concursus*) is necessary to the very preservation and maintenance of these[n]. Descartes did not distinguish between Matter and Space, and consequently found no difficulties to oppose the application of his theory of *vortices*, (which he described as deriving their immediate impulse from God), to account for the phenomena of Creation.

The Soul he asserted to be simple in its nature, or in other words, purely *immaterial*, (spiritualism of Descartes), but intimately connected with the body. The pineal gland may be supposed to be its seat, because it there appears to energise in immediate connection with the vital spirits. From the immateriality of the soul he deduced its immortality; and lest he should be obliged by his argument to extend the same properties to other animals, he pronounced these to be *living machines*. The soul is free, because it feels itself to be so; and in its freedom consists its liability to error. He drew a distinction between the passive impressions and the active decisions *(passiones et actiones)* of the soul. The operations of the Will, the Imagination, and Thought, belong by their nature to the latter class. He constituted three classes of Ideas, those which we acquire, those which we create, and those which are born with us. The first are derived from external objects, by means of impressions communicated to our organs. Vital warmth and motion do not proceed from the Soul, but from the Animal

[n] This doctrine was converted by Geulinx and others into one of *Occasionalism*. See § 328.

Spirits. He accounts for the communion existing between the Soul and Body by his doctrine of *Assistentia*. The Soul determines the direction of the Vital Spirits.

327. Notwithstanding the confusion Descartes made between Thought and Knowledge,—the want of solidity in his principles, and of conclusiveness in his inferences, as well as the many contradictions they imply, which would have become more apparent if he had treated the subject of Morals also, we cannot shut our eyes to the great effect produced by his philosophy. His discussions awakened men to independent thought, both by their matter and their manner,—the form as well as the substance of his doctrines, no less than by their bold and striking character. Men were impelled to investigate the principles of Thought and Knowledge, and the differences which exist between them; efforts were made to decide the controversy between Experimentalism and Speculative philosophy, between Rationalism and Supernaturalism; at the same time that he gave the last blow to the Scholastic system, and introduced into the philosophical world a new life and energy, animating to the pursuit of Truth and the detection of Error. His doctrines presently attracted the notice of a great number of distinguished thinkers. In *Hobbes*, *Gassendi* [o], *P. Dan. Huet* [p], *Gabr. Daniel* [q], etc., he encountered able adversaries, who subjected his leading principles to a severe, but at the same time calm and philosophical examination; but he was attacked in a more intemperate manner by several schoolmen and theologians, such as

[o] GER. DE VRIES, Dissertatiuncula Historico-Philosophica de Renati Cartesii Meditationibus à Gassendo impugnatis, *Ultraj.* 1691, 8vo.

[p] Censura etc. (see bibliography § 324). This work called forth several answers.

[q] See his Romance: Voyage du Monde de Descartes, *Paris*, 1691, 12mo. Iter per Mundum Cartesii. *Amstelod.* 1694, 12mo. Nouvelles Difficultés proposées par un Péripatéticien, *Amst.* 1694, 12mo. Idem en Lat. Novæ Difficultates, etc. *ibid.*

Gisbert Voetius[r], *Martin Schoock*[s] the Eclectic, *Cyriac Lentullus* the Jesuit, *Valois*, and others, who taxed him with Scepticism and Atheism. A number of talented persons were formed in his school, or attached themselves to his system; and in spite of the interdictions levelled against it in Holland by the Synod of Dort (1656), and also in Italy (1663), it gained ground in the Netherlands and France. In England, Italy, and Germany, it made less progress, though it produced an effect on all departments of Moral Philosophy, Logic, Metaphysics, and Morals[t], nay even on Theology[u].

328. Among the partisans of the philosophy of Descartes we may specify his friend *De la Forge*[x], a physician at Saumur; *Claude de Clerselier* (died 1686), the editor of his posthumous works; *Jacques Rohault* (died 1675); *Pierre Sylvain Regis*[y], a pupil of the latter, and an able commentator on Descartes; with many Jansenists of the Port Royal[z] who opposed a more rigid morality to

[r] Born at Heusden 1589; died 1676.

[s] Born at Utrecht, 1614; died 1665. See Bibl. 324.

[t] L'Art de Vivre Heureux, *Paris*, 1692, 8vo. In Lat.: Ethica Cartesiana sive ars Bene Beateque Vivendi, *Hal.* 1776, 8vo.

[u] Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres (by L. Meyer, a physician and friend of Spinosa), *Eleutheropoli*. 1666, 4to. third edition by Semler, *Hal.* 1776, 8vo.

Valentini Alberti Tractatus de Cartesianismo et Coccejanismo, *Lips.* 1678, 4to. *Viteb.* 1701 4to.

[x] L. de la Forge, Traité de l'Esprit de l'Homme, *Paris*, 1664, 4to. In Lat. Tractatus de Mente Humanâ, ejus Facultatibus et Functionibus, *Amstelod.* 1669; *Brême*, 1673, 4to.; *Amst.* 1708, 8vo.

[y] Born 1632; died 1707.

P. Sylvain Regis, Système de la Philosophie, contenant la Logique, la Métaphysique, la Physique, et la Morale, *Paris*, 1690, 3 vols. 4to. Réponse
x Réflexions Critiques de M. Duhamel sur le Système Cartésien de la ilosophie de M. Regis, *Paris*, 1692, 12mo. see Bibl. of § 324. L'Accord
la Foi et de la Raison, *Paris*, 1734, 4to.

[z] Among other distinguished works, this society has produced, l'Art de nser, *Paris*, 1664, 12mo. Translated into Lat. by J. C. Braun, with a eface of Fr. Buddeus, *Hal.* 1704, 8vo. (This treatise has been sometimes improperly ascribed to Arnauld).

the doctrines of the Jesuits. Among these were *Ant. Arnauld*[a], *Blaise Pascal*[b], *Nicole*[c], and also, *Father Malebranche* (see § 331), *Antoine Le Grand*[d] a physician at Douai, *J. Claubery*[e], *Adrian Heerebord*, and more particularly *Arnold Geulinx* of Antwerp[f]. From the principles of Descartes, the last derived the doctrine of Occasional Causes (*Systema causarum occasionalium—Occasionalismus*) which supposed the Deity to be the actual cause of the motions of the body and affections of the mind, the soul and the limbs merely affording the means of their development. This notion was extended and explained by *Balthazar Becker*, *Volder*, *Malebranche*, and *Spinosa*. Geulinx added to this strange doctrine a pure system of morality, and maintained that the main defect of Ancient and Modern systems of Ethics was the encouragement afforded by them to Self-love;

[a] Born 1623; died 1694. His works, *Lausanne*, 1777, 30 vols. 4to.

[b] Born at Clermont 1623; died 1662 (§ 332).

PASCAL, Pensées sur la Religion, *Amst.* 1697, 12mo. *Paris*, 1720, 12mo. Lettres Ecrites par Louis de Montalte (PASCAL) à un Provincial de ses Amis, avec Notes de Guill. Wendrock (NICOLE), *Cologne*, 1657, 12mo. et 1684, 8vo.; *Leyde*, 1771, 4 vols. 12mo. Translated into Lat. by NICOLE.

[c] Died 1695. Essais de Morale, *Paris*, 1671, 6 vols. 12mo. Instructions Théologiques et Morales, *Paris*, 1709, 12mo. Œuvres, Paris, 1718, 24 vols. 12mo.

[d] ANT. LE GRAND, Philosophia Veterum e Mente Renati Descartes, *Lond.* 1671, 12mo. Institutio Philosophiæ Secundum Principia Renati Descartes Nova Methodo adornata, *Lond.* 1672, 8vo.; 1678, 4to. Dissertatio de Careutiâ Sensus et Cognitionis in Brutis, *Norimb.* 1679, 8vo.

[e] Professor at Duisburg; born at Chartres 1665; died 1665.

JOH. CLAUBERGII Opera Philosophica, *Amstelod.* 1691, 4to. Logica Vetus et Nova. Ontosophia, de Cognitione Dei et Nostrî, *Duisb.* 1656, 8vo. Initiatio Philosophi, seu Dubitatio Cartesiana, 1655; *Mulh.* 1667, 12mo.

[f] Born at Antwerp about 1625; died 1669.

ARNOLDI GEULINX, Logica Fundamentis suis, a quibus hactenus collapsa fuerat, restituta, *Lugd. Bat.* 1662, 12mo.; *Amstelod.* 1698, 12mo. Metaphysica Vera et ad Mentem Peripateticorum, *Amstelod.* 1691, 12mo. Γνῶθι σεαυτόν, sive Ethica, *Amstel.* 1665, and *Lugd. Bat.* 1675, 12mo. Ed. Philarethus, *Amstel.* 1696, 12mo.; 1709, 8vo. Annotata præcurrentia ad R. Cartesii Principia, *Dordraci.* 1690, 4to. Annotata Majora ad Principia Philosophiæ R. Descartes, accedunt Opuscula Philosophica ejusdem Auctoris, *Dordraci.* 1691, 4to.

and made Virtue to consist in a pure love of—(*amor effectionis non affectionis*),—and devotion to the injunctions of practical Reason; or, in other words, in obedience to God and to Reason, for the sake of Reason itself. The characteristics of Reason thus contemplated he pronounced to be attention *(diligentia)*, docility *(obedientia)*, conformity to moral obligations *(justitia)*, and a disregard of all other goods *(humilitas)*. Though his ideas on Morals were often admirable for their truth and refinement, they did not meet with much success; partly because they were entangled with his doctrine of Occasionalism; and partly because the foundations on which they should rest were not perfectly established; added to which they prescribe nothing but a blind submission to the Divine will, to such a degree as almost to take away the free exercise of Reason. *Balthasar Becker*[g], taking for his ground the doctrines of Occasionalism, and the Spiritualism of Descartes, denied that men were capable of being influenced by the agency of Spirits; and in particular attacked the opinions then prevalent in favour of sorcery and witchcraft; which cost him his employment. On the other hand *Pierre Poiret*[h], at first a Cartesian, then a Mystic, affected to deduce from the principles of Descartes, a proof of the immediate agency of God and of spiritual beings on the mind of man. Several theologians and philosophers endeavoured to reconcile the Cartesian system to Revealed Religion, and defended or explained it in writings partly didactic and partly polemical. Among others may be enumerated *J. Cocce-*

[g] Born in West Friesland, 1634; died 1698.

Besides the work of his already mentioned (bibliography § 324); he wrote the *Betoverte Wereld*, or Enchanted World (Dutch), *Leuwarden*, 1690; *Amsterd.* 1691-93, 4 vols. 4to. Wilh. Heinr. Becker, Schediasma Critico-literarium de Controversiis B. Bekkero ob librum *die bezauberte Welt* motis, *Königsb. et Leipz.* 1721, 4to. See the Life, Opinions, and Fortunes of B. Becker, by J. M. Schwager, *Leipz.* 1780, 8vo.

[h] Born at Mentz, 1746; died 1719 (See §§ 331, 333).

P. Poiret. Economie Divine, 1647, 7 vols. 8vo. Cogitationes de Deo, Animâ et Malo, *Amstelod.* 1677-1685-1715, 4to.

jus[i], *Christopher Wittich*[k], *Gerard de Vries*[l], *Hermann Alex. Roëll*[m], and *Ruard Andala*[n].

II. *Spinoza.*

His works: Benedicti de Spinoza Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophiæ pars prima et secunda More Geometrico demonstratæ. Accesserunt ejusdem Cogitata Metaphysica, in quibus difficiliores, quæ tam in parte Metaphysicæ generali quam speciali occurrunt Quæstiones breviter explicantur, *Amstel.* 1663, 2 vols. 4to. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus continens Dissertationes aliquot, quibus ostenditur Libertatem Philosophandi non tantùm Salvâ Pietate et Reipublicæ Pace posse concedi, sed eamdem nisi cum Pace Reipublicæ ipsâque Pietate tolli non posse, *Hamb. (Amsterd.)* 1670, 4to. Under various fictitious titles: Dan. Heinsii Operum Historicum collectio prima. Ed. II, priori multo emendatior et auctior, *Lugd. Bat.* 1675, 8vo. Henriquez de Villacorta, M. D. a cubiculo Philippi IV, Caroli II, Archiatri Opera Chirurgica Omnia sub auspiciis potentissimi Hispaniarum Regis, *Amstel.* 1673, 8vo.; 1697, 8vo. In

[i] Died 1669.

[k] Born at Brieg 1625; died 1687.

Christopher Wittich. Consensus Sanctæ Scripturæ cum Veritate Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, *Neomag.* 1659, 8vo. Theologia Pacificata, *Lugd. Bat.* 1675, 4to. Annotationes, in quibus Methodi celeb. Philosophi succincta notitia redditur, *Dordr.* 1688, 4to. Anti-Spinoza seu Examen Ethices Bened. de Spinoza, *Amstel.* 1690, 4to.

[l] Ger. de Vries (see § 327, note [o]). Exercitationes Rationales de Deo Divinisque perfectionibus nec non Philosophemata Miscellanea, *Traj.* 1685, 4to. Edit. Nova ad quam præter alias accedit Diatribe singularis gemina, altera de Cogitatione ipsâ mente, altera de Ideis rerum Innatis, *Ultraj.* 1695, 4to.

[m] He was professor of Theology at Franeker and Utrecht, and died 1718.

Herm. Alex. Roël Dissert. de Religione Naturali, *Franeq.* 1686, folio. Disputationes Philosophicæ de Theologiâ Naturali duæ, de Ideis Innatis una, Ger. de Vries Diatribæ oppositæ. fourth edit. *Franeq.* 1700, 8vo. *Ultraj.* 1713.

[n] Born in Friesland 1665; professor of Theology at Franeker; died 1727.

Ruard Andala Syntagma Theologico-Physico-Metaphysicum, *Franeq.* 1710, 4to. Cartesius verus Spinozismi eversor et Physicæ Experimentalis Architectus, *Ibid.* 1719. In answer to J. Regius, Cartesius verus Spinozismi Architectus: *Leovard.* 1718. Exercitationes Academicæ in Philosophiam Primam et Naturalem, in quibus Philosophia Cartesii explicatur, confirmatur et vindicatur, *Franeq.* 1709, 4to. Examen Ethicæ Geulinxii, *Ibid.* 1716, 4to. Questiones Physicæ, 1720. Apologia pro Verâ et Saniore Philosophiâ, etc.

French; La Clef du Sanctuaire, par un savant homme de notre siècle, *Leyde*. 1678, 12mo. Traité des Cérémonies superstitieuses des Juifs, tant Anciennes que Modernes, *Amsterd*. 1678, 12mo. Réflexions Curieuses d'un Esprit désintéressé sur les Matières les plus importantes au Salut, tant public que particulier, *Cologne*, 1678, 12mo.

Annotationes Ben. de Spinoza ad Tractatum Theologico-Politicum, ed Chr. Theoph. de Murr, *Hag. Com.* 1802, 4to.

Bened. de Spinoza Opera Posthuma, *Amstel.* 1677, 4to. (containing: Ethica, Tractatus Politicus, de Intellectus emendatione, Epistolæ).

Bened. de Spinoza Opera quæ supersunt Omnia, ed. H. Eberh. Gottlob Paulus, *Jen.* 1802, 1803, 2 vols. 8vo., with a Biography.

Works on Spinoza and his Doctrines.

John Colerus, Life of Spinoza, etc., etc. Originally published in Dutch, *Utrecht*, 1697; in French, *The Hague*, 1706, 8vo.; in German, *Francof.* and *Leips.* 1733, 8vo.

Réfutations des Erreurs de Benoit de Spinoza, par M. Fenelon, par le P. Lamy, et par le Comte de Boulainvilliers, avec la Vie de Spinoza, écrite par M. Jean Colerus, augmentée de beaucoup de particularités tirées d'une Vie Manuscrite (from the next book), de ce Philosophe; faite par un de ses amis, *Bruxelles*, 1731, 12mo.

La Vie et l'Esprit de M. Benoit de Spinoza, *Amsterd.* 1719, 8vo. The author was a physician named *Lucas*, or *Vraese*, councillor of the Court of Brabant at the Hague. Only seventy copies of a very limited edition were offered for sale, at a very high price; which caused a number of MS. copies to be taken. The second part was burnt, but the biographical part, (also very scarce), was published under this title: La Vie de Spinoza par un de ses Disciples, nouvelle édition non tronquée, etc., *Hamb.* 1735, 8vo.

H. Fr. v. Dietz Ben. von Spinosa nach Leben und Lehren, *Dess.* 1783, 8vo.

M. Philipson Leben Ben. von Spinosa, *Brannschw.* 1790, 8vo. (nach Colerus).

Jariges über das System des Spinosa und über Bayle's Erinnerungen Dagegen in der Histoire de l'Acad. des Sciences de Berlin a. 1740, und in Hissmann's Magazin 5. Bd. S. 5 ff.

Fr. H. Jacobi über die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an Hrn. Moses Mendelssohn, *Bresl.* 1785; second aufl. 1789, 8vo. und in Jacobi's Schriften, 4 B., I. Abth. Moses Mendelssohn Mor-

genstunden (see § 367, etc.): An die Freunde Lessing's, ein Anhang zu Jacobi's Briefwechsel, *Berl.* 1786, 8vo. F. H. Jacobi wider M. Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, *Leipz.* 1786. (Math. Claudius) zwei Recensionen in Sachen Lessing, M. Mendelssohn und Jacobi, *Hamb.* 1786. Ueber Mendelssohn's Darstellung der Spinozistischen Philosophie in Cäsar's Denkwürdigkeiten, 4 B. K. H. Heydenreich Animadversiones in Mosis Mendelii filii Refutationem placitorum Spinosæ scripsit, *Lips.* 1786, 4to. Derselbe: Natur und Gott nach Spinosa, 1 B. (mit Auszugen aus der oben angegebenen Vie von Lucas), *Leipz.* 1789, 8vo.

Gott. Einige Gespräche von J. G. Herder, *Gotha*, 1787, 8vo.

D. G. S. Francke Preisschr. über die neuern Schicksale des Spinozismus und seinen Einfluss auf die Philosophie überh. und die Vernunfttheologie insbesondere, *Schleswig.* 1812, 8vo.

Ern. Stiedenroth nova Spinozismi delineatio, *Gott.* 1817, 8vo.

Lud. Boumann Explicatio Spinozismi. Diss. inaugural. *Berol.* 1828, 8vo.

Car. Rosenkranz De Spinozæ Philos. Diss. *Hal. et Lips.* 1828, 8vo.

329. The Jew *Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza*, or *Spinosa*, entered into the speculative views of the Cartesian School with all the originality of a profound and penetrating genius. He was born at Amsterdam, 1632, and even in his childhood distinguished himself for his ardent love of knowledge. His doubts with respect to the authority of the Talmud, and his frame of mind, devout, but free from superstition, rendered him indifferent to the ceremonial part of his own faith, and were the means of bringing upon him many persecutions. Concealed in the houses of some charitable Christians, he applied himself to the study of Latin and Greek, Mathematics and Metaphysics, especially those of Descartes, the clearness and simplicity of whose system attracted his attention, without being able to satisfy his judgment. After having devoted his life to contemplation, pursued in retirement, he died at the Hague, A. D. 1677, with the reputation of an estimable man, and distinguished philosopher. Spinoza made it his principle to admit nothing to be true, the

grounds of which he could not distinctly recognise; and endeavoured to found his system of Ethics, (as he termed it), on something like Mathematical demonstrations of the principles of Moral Life, founded on the knowledge of God. These speculations carried him into the highest region of Metaphysics, and gradually led him to the remarkable theory proposed also by Descartes°, which asserts the existence of only one Absolute Essence,—(the Deity),—Infinite Being, with Infinite Attributes of Expansion and Thought, reducing all finite beings to the state of Apparent Essences, and limitations or *modi* of those Attributes. *Substance* is not an individual being, but the foundation and substratum of all individual beings: It never has begun to be, but exists *per se* and of necessity, (see Eth. P. I, prop. 5). Nothing can be said to have a beginning but finite objects, or the mutable limitations of the Attributes of Infinity: in this manner from the Attribute of Expansion arises the modification of Motion and Repose: from that of Thought those of the Understanding and Will. Infinite Expansion is, on the same principle, the ultimate Element of all finite corporeal objects; and Absolute or Infinite Thought, of all finite thinking beings. The primordial Elements—Infinite Expansion and Infinite Thought—are mutually related, without having been produced the one by the other. All finite things (e. g. Body and Soul) exist in the Deity: The Deity is their *inherent Cause*, *Natura Naturans*. He himself not finite, though from him all finite things have necessarily proceeded; there is no such thing as Accident, but an universal Necessity; which in the case of the Deity is united to Liberty: because the Deity alone is not circumscribed by the existence or operations of any other being. He operates according to the *internal necessity* of His own nature; and His will and knowledge are inseparable. There is no free Causality

° H. C. W. Sigwart über den Zusammenhang des Spinozismus mit der Cartesianischen Philosophie, *Tübing*. 1816, 8vo.

H. Ritter über den Einfluss des Cartes. auf die Ausbildung des Spinozismus, *Leipz*. 1816, 8vo.

of Ends and final Causes; but only the Causality of Necessity and natural Causes. The immediate and direct conception or idea of any real and present object is called the Spirit or Soul (*Mens*) of such object; and the thing itself, or the direct and immediate object of such idea or conception is called the *Body* of such Spirit. United, they compose one and the same individual object; which may be apprehended in a twofold relation, under that of the Attribute Thought, or the Attribute Expansion. All ideas, as far as they have a relation to the Deity, are true: because all ideas which exist in the Divine mind are perfectly correspondent to their respective Objects; and consequently every idea of our own which is absolute and corresponds with its object, is true also[p]; and the understanding contemplates things according to their true nature inasmuch as it contemplates them with a view to their eternal and necessary properties[q]. Falsehood has its origin in the negation of Thought; and the admission of irregular and imperfect notions[r]. Every idea of a real object embraces at the same time a conception of the eternal and infinite essence of God, (Prop. 45); and consequently by a knowledge of the first we may attain to an adequate comprehension of the Divine nature. The human mind can therefore indisputably apprehend the nature of God[s]. On the other hand, the knowledge we are able to acquire of individual objects is necessarily imperfect. In the lively contemplation of the Deity consists our greatest happiness: Since the more that we know of God, the more inclined we are to live according to his will[t]; in which consists at the same time our happiness and our free-will:—Deo parere summa

[p] Prop. 43. Sicut lux se ipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est.

[q] E naturâ rationis non est, res ut contingentes, sed ut *necessarias* contemplari (et) sub quâdam eternitatis specie percipere. Propos. 44.

[r] Eth. P. II, Propos. 32—34 sqq.

[s] Prop. 46, 47.

[t] Amor Dei non nisi ex cognitione ejus oritur; Tract. Theol. cap. IV, p. 42.

libertas est. Nevertheless our Will is not absolutely free, inasmuch as the mind is directed to this or that end by some external cause, which cause is dependent on another, and so on in perpetual concatenation. In like manner no other faculty of the mind is altogether absolute and uncontrolled (P. II, prop. 48).

330. The rude materials of his system Spinoza had amassed in the course of his early study of the Rabbinical writings, and the theory of Descartes had only supplied him with a scientific form. He draws all his conclusions, after the mathematical method, by a regular deduction from a small number of axioms, and a few leading ideas, which he assumes to be self-evident, such as those of Substance and Causality. His conclusions have all an appearance of mathematical strictness, but appear to labour in this respect, that it may be questioned how the infinitude of finite objects is a necessary result of the infinite attributes of the Deity. The grand defect of his theory is, that all Individuality and Free-will is lost in subordination to the Divine Essence, and that his system of Ethics is made one of mere Physics, because all finite things are made necessarily subject to the Divine Nature, and appertain to it as modifications of its attributes, forming parts of an universal system of absolute Causality[u]. The profoundness of his ideas; the syllogistic method of his reasoning; the hardihood of his attempt,—to explain things *finite* by *infinite*,—give an air of obscurity to the whole system, and make it difficult to be apprehended in true sense: it does not, however, deserve the appellation of an atheistic theory, which has been liberally bestowed upon it ever since its first appearance, rather in consequence of the passions of the disputants, than from any thing contained in the work itself. It may rather be called a system of Pantheism (not *material* like that of the Eleatæ, but *formal*), which embraces and illustrates a noble idea of the Divinity, as the

[u] Ep. 62. See Tract. Theol.-Polit. cap. XVI.

Primal Cause of Being, so far as it may be investigated by speculations purely ontological. Nevertheless, such a conception does not satisfy the understanding, and contradicts the principles of Theism, especially in their *practical* relations and application.

331. Spinoza's character was no less misrepresented than his doctrines. Few at first dared to profess themselves his friends and adherents[x]. His first opponents, either from not having understood his system, or from some secret attachment to it which they were at pains to conceal, allowed him to have the advantage, and contributed to his reputation. Of this number were: *Fr. Cuper*[y], *Boulainvilliers*[z], *Chr. Wittich*[a], (who answered him the most fully of them all), *P. Poiret*[b], *Sam. Parker*, (§ 333), *Isaac Jacquelot*[c]. Those who undertook the conflict with more sincerity (such as *J. Bredenburg*[d]), found

[x] Of these we may mention, J. Oldenburg, who nevertheless, on many points, differed from Spinoza. The following writers have, perhaps improperly, been designated as Spinozists: the physicians, L. Meyer and Lucas, the first the author of a work entitled, Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ interpres: see § 327, note; Z. Jelles, Abr. Cufaeler, who defended and explained Spinozism in two treatises: Specimen Artis Ratiocinandi Naturalis et Artificialis ad Pantosophiæ Principia Manuducens, *Hamb.* (*Amst.*) 1684; et: Principiorum Pantosophiæ, P. II. et P. III, *Hamb.* 1684; J. G. Wachter, Concordia Rationis et Fidei, etc., *Amstel.* (*Berol.*), 1692, 8vo.; and Theod. Lud. Law: Meditationes de Deo, Mundo, et Homine, *Francof.* 1717, 8vo.; et: Meditationes, Theses, dubia Philosophico-Theologica, *Freystadt.* 1719, 8vo.

[y] Arcana Atheisme Revelata; a work severely censured by H. More, Opp. Philos. tom. I, p. 596, and by Jæger: Fr. Cuperus mala Fide aut ad minimum frigidè Atheismum Spinozæ oppungans, *Tub.* 1710.

[z] The Comte de Boulainvilliers; born 1658, died 1722. See bibliography of § 328.

[a] See § 328.

[b] See § 328. Poiret, Fundamenta Atheismi eversa, in his Cogitata de Deo, etc.

[c] Born in Champagne, 1674; died 1708.

Isaac Jacquelot, Dissertations sur l'Existence de Dieu, etc., par la Réfutation du Système d'Epicure et de Spinoza, *La Haye*, 1697. See § 325, note.

[d] Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-Politici una cum Demonstratione Geometrico ordine disposita Naturam non esse Deum, *Roterod.* 1675, 4to.

themselves involved in contradictions, being unable to refute the sophistry of Spionza, and not enduring to admit its validity.

It is only of late that the talents and opinions of Spinoza have been better appreciated; at the same time that the *Critical* method of the rationalists has enabled them to detect the weak side of his system[e].

The most recent philosophical system approaches in many respects that of Spinoza.

III. *Malebranche. Fardella.*

Fontenelle, Eloge de Malebranche, dans le tom. I. de ses Eloges des Académiciens, *A la Haye*, 1731, p. 317.

Nic. Malebranche, De la Recherche de la Vérité, *Paris*, 1673, 12mo.; seventh edit. 1712, 2 vols. 4to., or 4 vols. 12mo. In Lat. by Lenfant, De Inquirenda Veritate, *Genev.* 1691, 4to.; 1753, 2 vols. 4to.

Nic. Malebranche, Conversations Chrétiennes, 1677. De la Nature et de la Grâce, *Amsdt.* 1680, 12mo. Méditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques, *Cologne (Rouen)*, 1683, 12mo.

Malebranche, Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion, *Rotterd.* 1688, 8vo. Entretiens d'un Philosophique Chrétien et d'un Philosophe Chinois, sur la Nature de Dieu, *Paris*, 1708. Réflexions sur la Prémotion Physique, etc. *Paris*, 1715, 8vo.; Œuvres, *Paris*, 1712, 11 vols. 12mo.

332. Nicole Malebranche[f], one of the Fathers of the Oratoire, whose disadvantageous person concealed a profound genius, and indisputably the greatest metaphysician that France has produced, developed the ideas of Descartes, and imparted to them a fresh originality, and greater clearness and vivacity: but his views of religion

[e] Christian Wolff, for instance, and Bayle; the first of whom has refuted the system of Spinoza in his † Translation of his Ethics, *Francf.* and *Hamb.* 1744, 8vo. See also Jariges, quoted at the head of § 329. The dispute between Jacobi and Mendelssohn on the Spinozism of Lessing, was the occasion of a great number of writings respecting the tenets of Spinoza. See the same section. The † Translation of the Ethics of Spinoza by Ewald (*Gera*, 1791—93, 8vo.), also contains a refutation of Spinozism, on the principles of the Critical system.

[f] Born at Paris 1638; died 1715.

led him to superadd some tenets of his own inclining to mysticism. He has been peculiarly successful in discussing the theory of knowledge, the sources of error, (especially those which have their origin in illusions of the Imagination), as well as in his examination of the proper Method for the investigation of Truth. He described the understanding as *passive;* maintained *extension* to be the characteristic of Body; the soul to be an essence simple in its nature, and therefore distinct from its body; and represented the Deity as the only source of all thought and all existence. These opinions led him to controvert, by acute arguments, the doctrine of Innate Ideas, and gave rise to the extraordinary assertion, that it is *in* and *through* the Divinity that we apprehend all things, which are comprehended *intellectually* in His essence; that the Divinity is the Intellectual World; Infinite and Universal Reason, and the abode of Spirits: in these respects making near approaches to Spinozism. The doctrine of Occasionalism (which he enlarged and extended) is closely connected with such speculations; by which he was farther led to assign to the Soul and Body a sort of Passive activity, and to represent the Deity as the original cause of all their operations: a species of *Idealism,* half religious and half mystical. We may trace in it the consequences of a blind devotion to Demonstration, as the only method of attaining Truth. The *Abbé Foucher*[g] opposed to his system one of scepticism.

[g] SIMON FOUCHER, Critique de la Recherche de la Vérité.

Among the authors who discussed and opposed the theory of Malebranche, we may mention FATHER DU TERTRE (who did not understand it): Réfutation du nouveau Système de Métaphisique composé par le Père Malebranche, *Paris,* 1718, 3 vols. 12mo.; and ANT. ARNAULD: Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées contre ce qu'enseigne l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité, *Cologne,* 1683, 8vo. To the latter work Malebranche replied by his: Réponse de l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité au livre de M. Arnauld, des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, *Rotterdam,* 1684. Défense de M. Arnauld contre la Réponse au livre des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, *Cologne,* 1684, 12mo.; Trois Lettres de l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité, touchant la Défense de M. Arnauld contre la Réponse, *Rotterd.* 1685, 12mo. The dispute was prolonged in some other writings; by LOCKE, in the second vol. of his Miscell. Works.

Michael-Angelo Fardella[h], in his Logic[i], employed in the defence of Idealism the same arguments which had been used by Malebranche, namely, that the existence of the material world is incapable of demonstration, and can only be maintained on the grounds of religious belief.

IV. *Supernaturalists and Mystics of this period.*

333. The dissensions of the Empirical and Speculative Schools, brought once more upon the stage the opposite factions of the Supernaturalists, the Mystics, and the Sceptics. Among these by far the most distinguished was *Blaise Pascal;* who, in consequence perhaps of his early devotion to Mathematics, imbibed a distrust of philosophical speculation, and in the latter part of his life, when his bodily sufferings increased, devoted himself to a sort of asceticism. *Theophilus Gale* (Galeus) was a thinker of a different stamp. He was a presbyterian minister[k], and maintained that all true philosophy is contained in the revealed word of God, made known immediately to the Jews, and from them at various epochs and in various ways, derived to other nations. Consequently, philosophy is subordinate to theology. He recommended for these pursuits the study of the Neo-platonic writers[l]. *Ralph Cudworth*[m] pursued the same system, but (with greater originality) turned it against the Materialists and Atheists, in defence of Revealed Religion. He collected proofs of the existence of God (Syst. c. V. § 101—102), and of the Creation out of Nothing; and maintained the doctrine of an Intellectual system of know-

Amsterd. 1732, 8vo. and by Leibnitz, in the second vol. of a Collection of Philosoph. Pieces, by Leibnitz, Clarke, Newton, etc., second edit. *Amst.* 1740, 8vo.

[h] Died at Padua, 1718.

[i] *Venice*, 1696.

[k] Born 1628; died 1677.

[l] Theoph. Gale, Philosophia Universalis, *Lond.* 1676, 8vo. Aula Deorum Gentilium, *Ibid.* 1676, 8vo.

[m] Born in the county of Somerset, 1617; died a Professor at Cambridge, 1688.

ledge, founded on Innate Ideas, according to the views of Plato. The *Plastic Nature*[n], which he supposes may account for the conformity of created things to their uses, is nothing more than the *intellectual world* of Plato; to make room for which he denies the existence either of blind chance, of mechanical necessity, or of an immediate and continual creation on the part of God. He reproached Descartes for having excluded from Physics the doctrine of Final Causes. He derives the principles of Moral Good and Rectitude from certain *Moral Ideas*, which are copies of the Divine Wisdom, and not from notions acquired by experience[o]: on many other points also, adopting the principles of Plato. *Henry More*[p], a member of the same university, followed the same line of argument. He was a learned man, and of an acute understanding, who finding the Peripatetic system insufficient to satisfy his doubts, which had carried him so far as to question his own Individuality, embraced the Neoplatonic theory, borrowed principally from the works of Ficinus, studying also the Cabbalistic writings; which he defended in several of his compositions, but without moulding these different materials into an uniform system (see § 321). He derived all philosophical knowledge from intellectual intuition, and maintained that all the truths of philosophy are deducible from Revelation, and have reference to Man and his destiny. In his metaphysics—the subject of

[n] Cap. III, § 25, sqq.

[o] RALPH CUDWORTH, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, *Lond.* 1678, folio: 1743, 2 vols. 4to.: 4 vols. 8vo. with Life by Birch, *Oxford*, 1830. Systema Intellectuale hujus Universi, etc., Lat. vert. J. L. MOSHEMIUS; with a Life of Cudworth, *Jen.* 1733, folio, cum Correctionib. Posth. *Lugd. Bat.* 1773, 2 vols. 4to. Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, *Lond.* 1731.

[p] Born 1614; died 1687.

HENRICI MORI Opera Philosophica Omnia, *Lond.* 1679, 2 vols. fol.

EJUSD. Conjectura Cabbalistica in tria prima capita Geneseos. Defensio Cabbalæ Triplicis. Apologia contra SAM. ANDREÆ Examen Generale Cabbalæ Philosophicæ. Trium Tabularum Cabbalisticarum decem Sephiroth. Questiones et Considerationes in Tractatum primum libri Druschim. Catechismus Cabbalisticus, sive Mercavæus, fundamenta Philosophiæ, sive Cabbalæ Ætopædomelisseæ Enchiridium Metaphysicum, *Lond.* 1674, 4to. Enchiridium Ethicum, *Lond.* 1660—1668—1672, 8vo.

which is Immaterial nature—he endeavoured to establish the existence of an immoveable space, distinct and separate from moveable matter; and affected to deduce from this principle the laws of all motion, and of all matter liable to motion. He attributes to this space a real existence, and even some of the attributes of the Deity; describing it as the universal circumscription of the Divine presence. He maintains that the nature of the souls of men and other animals is simple, but supposes them to possess a certain *extent*. He pointed out the faults of the systems of Descartes and Spinoza, at the same time expressing great respect for their talents. In Ethics he blended the principles of Aristotle and Plato. The contemporary of the two former, *Sam. Parker*[q], bishop of Oxford, criticised the atomistic theory of Descartes, and his proof of the existence of the Deity; and defended theology (whence he derived his proofs of the existence of God) against Atheism[r]. The physician and preacher *John Pordage*[s], declared himself the advocate of a mystical Supernaturalism. He endeavoured to systematize the theosophic enthusiasm of *Jacob Böhm* (see § 321), and pretended to have been assured of the truth of his reveries by special revelation[t]. His pupil *Thomas Bromley*, disseminated the same notions. In France, *Pierre Poiret*, originally a Cartesian (§ 328), devoted himself altogether to a mystical supernaturalism, which denied to the mind all independent agency; and declared war against speculative philosophy[u].

[q] Died 1688.

[r] A Free and Impartial Account of the Platonic Philosophy, *Oxford*, 1666, 4to. Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo, *Lond.* 1669, 8vo. 1673. Disputationes de Deo et Providentiâ, *Lond.* 1678, 4to.

[s] Born about 1625; died in London 1698.

[t] Metaphysica Vera et Divina, *Francf. et Leips.* 1725, 3 vols. 8vo. Sophia seu Detectio Cœlestis Sapientiæ de Mundo interno et externo, *Amst.* 1699. Theologia Mystica sive Arcana Mysticaque Doctrina de Invisibilibus, Æternis, etc., non Rationali Arte sed Cognitione Intuitivâ Descripta, *Amst.* 1691.

[u] De Eruditione triplici, Solidâ, Superficiariâ et Falsâ, *Amst.* 1629—1706, 1707, 2 vols. 4to. Fides et Ratio collatæ ac suo utraque loco redditæ adversus Principia Jo. Locke, *Amst.* 1707, 8vo. Opera Posthuma, *Amst.* 1721, 4to., and elsewhere. See § 331, note.

V. *Sceptics.*

334. Scepticism was propagated in France by two disciples of Le Vayer, *Simon Sorbière*[t] and *Simon Foucher* (§ 332). The first translated the Sketch by Sextus Empiricus of the Pyrrhonean philosophy (§ 151, bibliogr.). The latter employed himself upon the history of the Academic system (see at the head of § 166), and opposed Scepticism to the speculations of Descartes and Malebranche. On the other hand appeared, as opponents of Scepticism, *Peter Mersenne*[u], *Martin Schoock* (§ 327)[x], and *Jean de Silhon*[y]. In England the preacher *Joseph Glanville*[z] endeavoured to moderate by a degree of Scepticism the unbounded extravagancies of Dogmatism, (particularly of the Aristotelians and Descartes), with the hope of promoting the cause of philosophy[a]. He enlarged with ability on the causes of doubt, and applied them to the different departments of science; more particularly, the discoveries in physics effected in his own time. His remarks on causality, in which he coincides with those of Algazel (§ 256) and appears to have forestalled Hume, deserve especial attention. We do not, says he, detect the existence of any cause by intuition, nor immediately, but by reflection and therefore by inference, which may be erroneous[b].

[t] Born 1615; died at Paris 1670.

[u] Died 1648.

P. MERSENNE, La Vérité des Sciences contre les Sceptiques, *Paris*, 1625, 8vo.

[x] MART. SCHOOCKII De Scepticismo pars prior, libb. IV, *Groning.* 1652, 8vo.

[y] Died 1666.

JEAN SILHON, De la Certitude des Connaissances Humaines, etc. *Paris*, 1661, 8vo.

[z] Died 1680.

[a] JOS. GLANVILLE, *Scepsis Scientifica*, or Confessed Ignorance the Way to Science; in an Essay of the vanity of dogmatizing and confident opinion. With a reply to the exceptions of the learned THOMAS ALBIUS, *Lond.* 1665, 4to. De Incrementis Scientiarum inde ab Aristotele ductarum. *Lond.* 1670. HENR. STABIUS has published a Dissertation in answer to the latter work.

[b] Scepsis Scient., p. 142.

Jerome Hirnhaym[c] also allied Scepticism to Supernaturalism. Declaiming with considerable ability against literary presumption, and the arrogance of the learned, and maintaining that all knowledge is delusive, and that every axiom (so esteemed) of Reason had been annulled by Revelation, he insisted that Revelation from God, Supernatural Grace, and an internal Divine illumination, are the only true sources of certain knowledge. His Scepticism led him to recommend an enthusiastic Asceticism.

It may be remarked in general, that about this period Scepticism was called in to support the Catholic religion, whose advocates endeavoured by the use of it to recall Protestants to the pale of the church.

PROGRESS OF SCEPTICISM IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

I. *Sensualism of Locke.*

An Essay concerning the Human Understanding, in four books, *Lond.* 1690, fol. tenth edit. *Lond.* 1731, 2 vols. 8vo.

Thoughts on Education, *Lond.* 1693; *Lond.* 1732, etc.

Posthumous Works, *Lond*, 1706. The Works of John Locke, 1714, 3 vols. fol. third edit. 1727. Collection of Several Pieces of John Locke, *Lond.* 1720, 8vo.

On his Philosophical System consult:

Jean Le Clerc, Eloge Historique de Feu M. Locke, en avant du tom. I. des Œuvres Diverses.

Tennemann's Abh. über den Empirismus in der Philosophie, vorzüglich den Lockischen in d. III. Th. d. Uebersetzung.

Darstellung und Prüfung des Lockischen Sensualsystems, in

[c] A monk of the order of Præmonstratenses, and Doctor of Theology at Prague; died 1679.

Hieronymus Hirnhaym, De Typho Generis Humani, sive Scientiarum Humaniorum inani ac ventoso tumore, difficultate, labilitate, falsitate, jactantiâ, præsumtione, incommodis et periculis, tractatus brevis in quo etiam vera sapientia a falsa discernitur, et simplicitas mundo contempta extollitur, idiotis in solatium, doctis in cautelam conscriptus, *Prag.* 1676, 4to.

G. E. SCHULZE's Kritik der Theoretischen Philosophie I B, S. 113; II B, S. 1.

CHRISTLIEB GOTTWALD WABST, Diss. (resp. Jo. GODOFR. SCHÜLER) Jo. Lockii de Ratione Sententias Excutit, *Viteb.* 1714, 4to.

335. John Locke, (born at Wrington near Bristol, 1632; died 1704), renounced the intricacies of Scholastic philosophy for the more congenial study of the classics. The writings of Descartes inspired him with fresh ardour, particularly for the cultivation of Medicine and Metaphysics. He rejected indeed many of his master's notions, more particularly that of Innate Ideas; but was not the less captivated by his love of perspicuity and distinctness. The endless disputations of the learned led him to suspect that they had their origin in an improper use of words and want of precision in our ideas; which he proposed to rectify by ascertaining the grounds and extent of human knowledge, through investigation of the properties of the human understanding. This was the origin of his renowned work by which he justly acquired the greatest distinction for the modesty and tolerance of his way of thinking, and the clearness and rectitude of his understanding, evinced in the course of a correspondence with the most accomplished men of his day. He so far adopted Bacon's principles that he pursued the method of experiment and observation, in preference to that of speculation; applying it principally to metaphysical subjects. His method has many advantages, but at the same time some great defects; especially that of avoiding the great obstacles and difficulties in the course of science instead of directly encountering them. Notwithstanding, the opposition which he encountered was not so much the consequence of this radical fault, as of certain deductions from his system. (See § 333 note, and 337 note). By his treatises on Toleration and Education, Locke has rendered indisputable and undisputed services to mankind.

336. Locke's great object and merit, was the investigation of the origin, reality, limits, and uses of knowledge.

He contested the hypothesis of Innate Ideas, throwing great light on one side of the question, and endeavoured to prove by an induction which was necessarily incomplete, that all our notions are acquired by experience. The two ultimate sources of all our knowledge are the Senses and Reflection (or the perception of the operations of our minds); which has caused his system to be called one of Sensualism; since he gives even to Reflection the appellation of an Internal Sense. Our ideas are partly simple, partly compound: among the first are those of Solidity, Space, Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest: those of Thought and Will: those of Existence, Time, Duration, Power, Enjoyment, and Pain. Our simple ideas have an objective, or absolute and independent reality. The soul, like a piece of white paper (tabula rasa), merely receives their impressions, without adding any thing thereto of her own. They represent partly primary, partly secondary qualities or properties: among the first are Extension, Solidity, Figure, Number, etc.: among the latter, (which are *deduced* and *derived* as the first are *direct* and *original*),—Colour, Sound, Scent. Compound ideas are deduced from simple ones by an operation of the mind, for instance by Connection, Opposition, Comparison, or Abstraction. The ideas so acquired are those of Accident, Substance, and Relation. The understanding either applies Experiment and Observation to the formation of compound ideas, or by a totally different course, develops simple and absolute ones, such as those belonging to Mathematics and Ethics.

Locke has also suggested some admirable ideas on Language, and the abuses to which it is liable.—He defines knowledge to be the perception of the Connection and Agreement or the want of Connection and Disagreement of certain ideas, which may be deduced from four sources; Identity or Discrepancy—Relation—Co-existence or necessary connection, and Real Existence[d]. As relates to the *mode* of this perception, knowledge becomes either

[d] Essay, B. IV. ch. I, § 1—3.

Immediate or Mediate: Immediate, if the result of intuition, and Mediate if produced by demonstration: to these must be added a third class relating to particulars ascertained by *sensible* proof. It must be remarked, however, that his observations on the limits and use, etc. of knowledge do not penetrate far enough, nor, by any means, exhaust the question; he may even be said to have pronounced judgment against the reality of knowledge, before he had detailed his theory on the subject. His reasoning is far from being satisfactory on the subject of the principles of thought and knowledge, all of which, (even that of contradiction), he describes as *derived* and secondary. His analysis only embraces the material, without extending to the formal part of knowledge; and unravels only a few of the least intricate of our compound ideas. He deduces all knowledge from experiment, yet nevertheless proposes to support and confirm the latter by various inadequate proofs; and in this manner he maintains the possibility of a demonstrative knowledge of the Existence of God[e], and the Immortality of the Soul; and endeavours to erect a system of Metaphysics on the sandy foundation of experimental knowledge.

337. It was the object of Locke to liberate philosophy from vain disputations and unprofitable niceties; but his work had the effect of discouraging, by the facility and accommodating character of its method, more profound investigation; at the same time that he gave a *popular* air to such inquiries, diminishing the interest they excited, and affording advantages to Ecclecticism and Materialism. In Morals he adopted the principles of Experiment and a theory of Eudæmonism[f]. On the other

[e] In Books IV. X. he develops his *Cosmological* proof.

[f] On the faults of Locke's Empiricism consult Lord Shaftesbury: Letters written by a Nobleman to a young man at the University, *Lond.* 1716.

Two inconsiderable works in answer to Locke were published by HENRY LEE (Anti-Scepticism) and by JOHN NORRIS, *Lond.* 1704, 8vo. That by BP. BROWN: The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding,

hand his system promoted the knowledge of Metaphysics on the grounds of Experience, and contained a variety of admirable rules relative to *Method*, as well as many valuable hints on points up to that time neglected. His theory gained a great number of adherents in England, France, and the Netherlands, where *J. Le Clerc* [ε] and *Gravesande* embraced his principles. Thence it gradually extended its influence into Germany. A great number of eminent men became his partisans, and deduced from his Experimentalism its direct or remote consequences, such as the hypothesis of a peculiar sense for the apprehension of Truth in matters of speculation and practice (Reid, Beattie, Rüdiger); the attempt to establish the *objective* Reality of knowledge, (Condillac, Bonnet, D'Alembert, Condorcet); the analysis of the faculties of the Soul, (Hartley, Condillac, Bonnet); the farther development of excellent rules for the investigation of Truth, (Gravesande, Tschirnhausen); an inadequate view of Metaphysics considered as nothing more than Logical reasonings on given facts (Condillac); the increase of Materialism and Atheism (La Méttrie, Système de la Nature; and Priestley); and lastly the conversion of Morality into interested calculation (La Rochefoucauld, Helvetius).

II. *Isaac Newton.*

Works: Naturalis Philosophiæ Principia Mathematica, *Lond.* 1687, 4to. Augmented, 1713; edid. Lesueur et F. Jaquier, *Geneva*, 1760, 3 vols. 4to.

Treatise of Optics, etc., *Lond.* 1704, 4to. Optica Lat. reddita a Samuel Clarke, *Lausann.* 1711, 4to.

Lond. 1729, 8vo. second edit., made more noise, and was continued under the title of Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human, etc. *Lond.* 1733. (Against the First Part Berkeley composed his Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher). To these must be added: Two Dissertations concerning Sense and Imagination, with an Essay on Consciousness, *Lond.* 1728, 8vo.

ε Clericus; born at Geneva 1657; died 1736.

Joh. Clerici Opera Philosophica, *Amst.* 1692 et 1693. Œuvres Complètes, 1710, 4 vols. 4to. et 1722. See § 343.

Opera, Comment. illustr. SAM. HORSLEY, *Lond.* 1779, 5 vols. 4to.

A View of Newton's Philosophy by HENRY PEMBERTON, *Lond.* 1726, 4to.

GUILL. JAC. S. GRAVESANDE, Physices Elementa Mathematica Experimentis confirmata; s. Introductio ad Philosophiam Newtonianam, *Lugd. Bat.* 1720, 2 vols. 4to.

VOLTAIRE, Elémens de la Philosophie de Newton, mis à la portée de tout le Monde, *Amst.* 1738; and, La Métaphysique de Newton, ou Parallèle des Sentimens de Newton et de Leibnitz, *ibid.* 1740, 8vo.

† Comparison between the Metaphysics of Newton and Leibnitz, in Answer to M. de Voltaire, by L. M. KAYLE, *Gött.* 1740, 8vo.

† MACLAURIN, Statement of the Discoveries of Newton, 1748: translated into Lat. by GR. FALCK, *Vienna*, 1761, 4to.

338. The tendency in favour of Experimental philosophy, which had already become prevalent in England, was confirmed by the authority of Newton[h]. This illustrious philosopher, whose great discoveries in Physics, (e. g. the theory of Colours and the laws of Gravitation), achieved by the calm prosecution of experimental observations, naturally inclined him to recommend to others the same career, was so far from giving any encouragement to hypothetical speculation, that he made it his maxim, that "Physics should be on their guard against Metaphysics." Nevertheless he himself occasionally indulged in such inquiries; for instance, when he suggested that Infinite Space, in which the celestial bodies revolve, might possibly be the *sensorium* of the Deity. He supposed the existence of certain properties inherent in bodies—e. g. that of weight in atoms—and even presumed that when Natural Philosophy should have completed her course of Experiment, she might contribute to the perfection of Moral Philosophy; inasmuch as a more adequate knowledge of the First Great Cause, and of our relations to Him,

[h] Born at Wolstrop in Lincolnshire 1642; Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge 1669; died 1727.

may assist us in acquiring a fuller sense of our duties towards Him[i].

III. *English School of Moral Philosophy, and Reaction excited against the Empiricism of Locke.*

339. A school was formed in England, whose object was to establish the principles of Moral Philosophy on the basis of natural reason, and who to this end adopted the experimental method of Bacon. They sought for our first ideas of moral obligation not in the Understanding itself but in a peculiar and separate sense, (*Moral Sense*); inasmuch as it is by the senses that we acquire all knowledge of real objects. With the desire of opposing the selfish system of Hobbes (see § 316), and with the hope of exposing some of his inconsistencies, *Richard Cumberland*[k] endeavoured to establish the existence of a principle totally different—of Benevolence towards man and devotion to God; and proceeded to prove by reasoning that such a principle was the legitimate foundation of all our duties and of our highest happiness[l].

These new views were carried still farther by a memorable character—*Antony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury*[m]; the friend of Locke, but whose penetration detected the consequences which might be deduced from a system of exclusive Experimentalism (see § 337). He made virtue to consist in the harmony of our social and selfish propensities, and in the internal satisfaction which is the result of disinterested actions, accompanied necessarily by the happiness of the individual[n]. Like Plato he was inclined to identify the Beautiful and the Good.

[i] Optic. lib. III, Qu. xxxi, p. 330.

[k] Born 1632; died 1719.

[l] Richard Cumberland, De Legibus Naturæ Disquisitio Philosophica, in quâ, etc., Elementa Philosophiæ Hobbesianæ cum Moralis tum Civilis considerantur et refutantur, *Lond.* 1672, 4to. Trad. Franç. avec des Remarques de Barbeyrac, *Amsterd.* 1744, 4to.

[m] Born at London, 1671; died at Naples 1713.

[n] Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Man, *Lond.* 1733, 3 vols. 12mo. An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, 1699. And The Moralists.

See Memoirs towards a Life of the Earl of Shaftesbury, drawn from the

The ingenious *W. Wollaston*[o] maintained that Truth is the Supreme Good, and the source of all pure Morality; laying it down as the foundation of his argument that every action is a good one which expresses in act a true proposition.

340. The consequences of the Empiricism of Locke had become so decidedly favourable to the cause of Atheism, Scepticism, Materialism, and Irreligion[p], that they induced the celebrated *Dr. Sam. Clarke*[q], after Locke and Newton, the most distinguished of the English philosophers, to enter the lists as a redoubtable adversary of the new opinions[r]. Admitting the existence of a necessary

Papers of Mr. Locke, and collected by LE CLERC, in the second volume of the Miscell. Works of Locke.

[o] Born 1659; died 1724.

W. WOLLASTON, The Religion of Nature Delineated, *Lond.* 1724—1726—1738.

Examination of the notion of Moral Good and Evil advanced in a late book entitled: The Religion of Nature Delineated, by JOHN CLARKE, *Lond.* 1725, 8vo.

J. M. DRECHSLER, On Wollaston's Moral Philosophy, *Erlang.* 1801, and 1802, 8vo. second edition.

[p] We may here refer to many writings which arose out of a dispute on the Immateriality of the Soul, between WILLIAM COWARD, a physician, who denied it in several works (from 1702 to 1707), and his opponents J. TURNER, J. BROUGHTON, etc. To these may be added the controversy excited by H. DODWELL, who had maintained that it was mortal.

[q] Born at Norwich 1675;—the pupil of Newton—died 1729.

[r] In opposition to the opinion of Dodwell, already referred to, he endeavoured to deduce the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul from our ideas of Immaterial existence: A Letter to Mr. Dodwell, wherein all the arguments in his Episto'ary Discourse against the Immortality of the Soul are particularly answered, etc. *Lond.* 1706, 8vo. The noted Freethinker ANT. COLLINS, (a disciple of Locke, born at Heston 1676; died 1729), pointed out the defects of this answer in his Letter of the learned Mr. H. Dodwell, containing some Remarks on a pretended demonstration of the Immateriality and natural Immortality of the Soul in Mr. Clarke's Answer to his late Epistolary Discourse, *Lond.* 1708, 8vo., which gave occasion to several writings exchanged between Collins and Clarke. See the collection mentioned in bibliogr. § 346, and, Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty, *Lond.* 1715; with Supplements, 1717, 8vo. etc.

Clarke's Natural Theology is contained in his various Sermons, under this general title: A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, *Lond.*

connection between natural and revealed religion, Clarke endeavoured to prove, by a new method, the existence of God. He described the Deity as the subject or *substratum* of infinite space and time, and asserted that space and time were His accidents: alleging some insufficient reasons for moral free-will; and sinking virtue into a compliance with *propriety*[s]. On the other hand, the Scepticism of Bayle induced the archbishop of Dublin, *William King*[t], to publish a system of Divine Justice, prior to that of Leibnitz; which was republished under another and more extended form by *John Clarke* (the brother of Samuel), who did not hesitate to make Self-love the principle of Virtue[u]. The naturalists *John Ray*[x] and *William Derham*[y] took part in these disputes by publications half physical and half theological. *Collier*[z] and

1705 et 1706, 2 vols. 8vo. And Verity and Certitude of Natural and Revealed Religion, *Lond.* 1705. The collection to which we have referred, contains also the compositions of Clarke relative to his dispute with Leibnitz, on the subject of Space and Time, etc. (See also the Collect. of Polz mentioned § 38, II, *c.*)

The Works of Sam. Clarke, *Lond.* 1738—42, 4 vols. fol. Hoadley has written his Life.

[s] Sam. Clarke, Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, *Lond.* 1708. In answer to this appeared: The foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice considered in an Examination of Dr. Sam. Clarke's opinion concerning the original of Moral Obligation; as also of the notion of Virtue advanced in a late book entitled: An Inquiry into the original of our ideas of Beauty and Virtue by John Clarke, *York* (without date).

[t] De Origine Mali, authore Guilielmo King, etc., *Lond.* 1702, 8vo. Subsequently translated into English. Leibnitz in his System of Divine Justice frequently has an eye to this work, which Bayle has combatted in his, Réponse aux Questions d'un Provincial.

[u] An Inquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil, etc., *Lond.* 1720—21, 2 vols. 8vo.

[x] *John Ray*, or *Wray*; born 1628; died 1705.

Three Physico-Theological Discourses, *Lond.* 1721, 8vo.; and, The Wisdom of God in the Works of Creation, sixth edition, *Lond.* 1714.

[y] Died 1735.

Will. Derham's Physico-Theology, etc. *Lond.* 1713, 8vo. Astro-Theology, etc. *ibid.* 1714.

[z] *Clavis Universalis*, or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility, by Collier, *Lond.* 1713, 8vo.

Berkeley[a] followed a course completely different. The last, in particular, a profound and judicious thinker, animated by a spirit of genuine benevolence, and venerable for his personal character, was shocked by the evil consequences which the prevailing theory of Experimentalism had produced. He was led to imagine that the fruitful source of all such aberrations was the unfounded belief in the reality and existence of the external world; and adopted a system of absolute *Idealism* as the only means of correcting such hallucinations. Berkeley has evinced no little sagacity in the arguments he adduces to show the difficulties attendant on the ordinary belief, and the obscurity of our ideas of Substance, Accident, and Extension; maintaining that our senses convey to us none but sensible impressions, and do not afford us any proof of the existence or substantiality of their objects; and that consequently the existence of an external world independent of our sensations may be nothing more than a Chimæra. Consequently none but Spirits exist: man can contemplate nothing but his sensations and ideas; but as he certainly is not the cause to himself of these, it is no less certain from their multiplicity and variety, as well as their harmony and consistency, that they are communicated by a Spirit, (as none but spirits exist), and by a Spirit of infinite perfections—GOD. Though dependent on God for knowledge, man is nevertheless endowed with absolute free-will, and the cause to himself of his own

[a] Born at Kilkrin, in Ireland, 1684; bishop of Cloyne 1734; died 1753.

Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, *Lond.* 1710, 8vo.; 2nd ed. 1725. Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, *ibid.* 1713, 8vo. Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, *ibid.* 1732, 8vo.; 1734, 2 vols. 8vo. Theory of Vision, *ibid.* 1709, 8vo. The Works, *ibid.* 1784, 2 vols. 4to.

Attached to his works is a life of the author by ARBUTHNOT; probably the same which appeared separately under the title of, An Account of the Life of G. Berkeley, *Lond.* 1776, 8vo.

A work has been published by † J. C. ESCHENBACH, *Rost.* 1756, 8vo., which contains a statement of the opinions of all the philosophers, (particularly of Collier and Berkeley), who have denied the existence of their own bodies and of the external world; with notes in refutaton of the text.

errors and crimes. Collier's work never attained the celebrity enjoyed by the elegant dialogues of the Bishop of Cloyne, but both, with a laudable wish to preserve from decay the elements of natural Ethics, alike attempted to demonstrate the necessity of Idealism, on principles first advanced by Malebranche; and trusted that they had destroyed to the root Scepticism and Atheism. Their doctrines, however, had little influence over the fortunes of the English School of philosophy.

Berkeley's remarks on the Theory of vision are also of interest.

341. The system we have referred to (§ *339*), of *Benevolence*, was more fully developed by a new philosopher. *Francis Hutcheson*[b], who has been looked upon as the founder of the Scottish School, placed in a still stronger light than his predecessors the contradiction existing between Self-love and Virtue. He allows the appellation of Good to those actions alone which are disinterested and flow from the principle of Benevolence. The last has no reference to expediency nor personal advantages, nor even to the more refined enjoyments of moral sympathy, the obligations of Reason and Truth, or of the Divine Will. It is a distinct and peculiar principle; a moral sentiment or instinct of great dignity and authority; and the end of which is to regulate the passions, and decide, in favour of Virtue, the conflict between the interested and disinterested affections. On this foundation Hutcheson erected all the superstructure of the Moral duties.

His inquiries are valuable also as tending to illustrate the principles of the Fine Arts.

[b] Born in Ireland, 1694; became a professor at Glasgow 1729; died 1747. Francis Hutcheson, Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, *Lond.* 1720. Essay on the Nature and Guiding of Passions and Affections, with illustrations on the Moral Sense, *ibid.* 1728. System of Moral Philosophy, in three books, etc., to which is prefixed some account of the life, writings, and character of the author, by Will. Leechmann, *ibid.* 1755, 2 vols. 4to.

IV. *French Moral Philosophers.*

342. In France Moral philosophy took nearly the same *experimental* direction. The Jesuits having endeavoured to render popular the species of morality which favoured their ends by founding it on looser principles of obligation[c], the fathers of the Oratoire or Port-Royal, *Arnauld, Pascal, Nicole, Malebranche* (§§ *328, 332, 333*), opposed to theirs a rigid system of Ethics, but which, being occasionally mystical and enthusiastic, was not likely to be permanently established. François Duc de la Rochefoucauld[d] on the other hand painted human nature as he had found it; representing it as directed solely by Self-love; and supplying a convenient sort of Morality for the use of the most corrupted portion of the upper classes. *Bernard de Mandeville*[e] went so far as to assert that Virtue is nothing more than the artificial effect of Policy and Ostentation, and that private vices are public benefits: a detestable doctrine, which removed all fundamental distinction between right and wrong, justice and injustice[f].

[c] See La Morale des Jésuites, etc. *Mons*, 1669, 8vo.

[d] Born 1612; died 1680.

Réflexions, ou Sentences et Maximes Morales de M. de La Rochefoucauld, *Paris*, 1690, 12mo.; *Amsterd.* 1705, 12mo. Avec des Remarques par AMELOT DE LA HOUSSAYE, *Paris*, 1714. Maximes et Œuvres complètes, *Paris*, 1797, 2 vols. 8vo.

[e] He was born at Dort, 1670, of a French family, and lived in London, where he practised as a physician. Died 1733.

[f] See his celebrated fable of the bees, which he published in 1706: The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turned Honest. Eight years afterwards he published, with illustrations: The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices made Public Benefits, *Lond.* 1714. To defend his doctrine, he composed six dialogues, which form the second volume of the entire work in the edit. of 1728, and in those which followed. To these he added: An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, sixth edit. 1732, 2 vols. 8vo. It has been already remarked, that the Alciphron of Berkeley is principally directed against this author. He was answered also by other writers, particularly by W. LAW: Remarks upon a book: The Fable, etc., in a letter to the author, *Lond.* 1724; second edit. 1725. And (BLUET) Inquiry whether a general practice of Virtue tends to

V. *Sceptics of this Period.*

343. Scepticism had been employed by Nicole and by Bossuet[g], and by several other writers, as the means of bringing back the Protestants to the pale of the Catholic Church; and of exalting its authority by setting forth the incertitude and fallibility of human reason[h]. Two individuals, however, of comprehensive and liberal minds, undertook still farther to defend the cause of Scepticism for its own sake. The first was the prelate *P. Dan. Huet*[i], one of the most learned men of his day, and versed in almost every department of Science. He had in his youth embraced the Cartesian system, but became dissatisfied with it on studying the work of Empiricus (see § 327); and renounced Gassendi's theory, because adverse to religion. In this manner he fell into philosophical Scepticism, which in his later writings he made public. He admits that Truth must doubtless exist, but asserts that it can be known only to God. The Human understanding has so many obstacles to encounter in its progress towards knowledge, that it cannot hope to attain it, nor can it be assured of the complete correspondence of its perceptions with their objects. *Faith* alone can impart certainty, but this is not attainable on Sceptical principles,

the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People, etc., *Lond.* 1725, 8vo.

Mandeville, Free Thounhts on Religion, the Church, Government, etc., *Lond.* 1720.

[g] Bishop of Meaux; born 1617; died 1704.

[h] Franc. Turretini Pyrrhonismus Pontificius, *Lugd. Bat.* 1692.

[i] Born at Caen 1630; died 1721.

Petri Dan. Huetii Commentarius de Rebus ad eum pertinentibus, *Hag. Com.* 1718, 12mo.

Demonstratio Evangelica, *Amstel.* 1679, 8vo. 1680, 8vo.

Censura Philosophiæ Cartesianæ; and other works. (§ 324).

Questiones Alnetanæ de Concordiâ Rationis et Fidei, *Cadom.* 1690, 4to.; *Lips.* 1693—1719, 4to.

Traité de la Faiblesse de l'Esprit Humain, *Amst.* 1723, 12mo. In answer to this: Ant. Muratori, Trattato della Forza dell' Intendimento Umano, Ossia il Pirronismo confutato, *Venet.* 1745; third edit. 1756, 8vo.

because it does not spring from Reason, but from a higher principle, and has reference to a Truth absolute in itself, and the subject of a distinct revelation.

Pierre Bayle[k] appears not to have been so intimately convinced as Glanville (§ 334) of the possibility of a True Philosophy, although he contributed more than the other had done to open a way to the discovery of it, by his ingenious attacks on the Dogmatic Systems, and by showing that Scepticism cannot be the ultimate end of our inquiries. This great scholar and honourable man possessed not so much a profound spirit of philosophical research, as a quick sagacity and critical judgment. These talents, improved by extensive reading (particularly of Plutarch and Montaigne) and the study of the various philosophical systems and religious tenets of his time, had the effect of forming in him a sceptical way of thinking, and encouraging a spirit of historical criticism, of which up to that time there had been no example. He was born at Carlat in the county of Foix, 1647, his father being a reformed minister, and after many vicissitudes which befel his party in the Church, held a professor's place at Sedan, and afterwards at Rotterdam (1681); became embroiled in many controversies, and died in a fortunate state of independence A. D. 1706. He was a quick-sighted spirit, who employed against Prejudice, Error, and Dulness, but still more against Superstition and Intolerance, the arms of a lively wit, various learning, and equal acuteness. At first he embraced the Cartesian system, but having compared it with others, and accustomed himself to Sceptical discussions, he ceased to

[k] PIERRE BAYLE, Pensées sur les Comètes, 1681, *Amsterd.* 1722—1726, 4 vols. 8vo.

Dictionnaire Historique et Critique.

Réponses aux Questions d'un Provincial, *Rotterd.* 1704, 5 vols. 8vo. Lettres, *Rotterd.* 1712; *Amst.* 1729, 8vo. Œuvres Diverses, *La Haye*, 1725—1731, 4 vols. fol.

DES MAIZEAUX, La Vie de P. Bayle, *Amst.* 1730, 12mo.; *La Haye*, 1732, 2 vols. 12mo.; et en avant du Dictionn. édit. d'Amsterd. 1730 et 1740; et *Bâle*, 1741.

C. M. PFAFFII Dissertationes Anti-Bælianæ tres, *Tubing.* 1719, 4to.

confide even in the possibility of knowledge, and brought himself to believe, *That Reason was clear-sighted enough to detect error, but not sufficiently so, without external aid, to attain to Truth.* In short, that without a Revelation from above she cannot but err. With such views he applied himself constantly to detect the weak sides of every sect and system, which nevertheless had had their supporters: particularly insisting on the difficulties which belong to the questions of the attributes of the Deity,—Creation—Providence—Evil, Moral and Physical—Immateriality—Free-will, and the reality of our knowledge of an external world. At the same time that he availed himself of Revealed Religion as a beacon in the discussion of such subjects, he did not fail to point out whatever, in the Christian doctrine or morals, he chose to consider at variance with Reason; stimulating the minds of men to inquiries still more sceptical. In his discussions on Providence carried on with *Jean Le Clerc*[1] (§ 337), with *Isaac Jacquelot* (§ 331), and with *Leibnitz*, on the origin of Evil (§ 350), and others, he always preserved the calmness and dignity of a philosopher. His works have greatly contributed to the dissemination of knowledge, and unfortunately also to the propagation of an unsettled spirit of free-thinking. *Jean-Baptiste de Boyer, Marquis d'Argens*[m] also appeared as a Sceptic.

[1] Le Clerc wrote in answer to Bayle: Défense de la Providence contre les Manichéens, dont les Raisons ont été proposées par M. Bayle dans son Dictionnaire Critique (dans le t. I, des Parrhasiana, p. 303). This work is composed on the principles of Origen. Le Clerc also undertook the defence of Cudworth's System, especially of his hypothesis of *Plastic Natures:* the discussion produced a multitude of writings on both sides, and finally led Le Clerc to accuse Bayle of Atheism.

Jacquelot attacked the theological opinions of Bayle in his work, Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, ou Défense de la Religion contre les principales Difficultés Répandues dans la Dictionnaire Historique et Critique de M. Bayle, *Amst.* 1705, 8vo. Bayle replied to him in his, Réponses aux Questions d'un Provincial. Jacquelot then published an Examen de la Théologie de M. Bayle; and the latter rejoined by, Entretiens de Maxime et de Thémiste, ou Réponse à l'Examen de la Théologie de M. Bayle, par M. Jacquelot. This work appeared at Rotterdam in 1707, after the death of the author. Jacquelot replied to it by another.

[m] Chamberlain of Frederick the Great; died at Aix, his native town, 1770.

The Sceptical School was attacked, but not overcome, by *P. de Villemandy*[n], *J. P. de Crouzaz*[o], and *Formey*[p].

PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY.

Pufendorf.

344. About the middle of the seventeenth century philosophy acquired in Germany renewed energies, though these were at first confined to a limited sphere. *Samuel Fr. Baron von Pufendorf* reduced Natural Law to the forms of a science. He was born 1632, at Flöke, near Chemnitz; and having studied the Cartesian philosophy at Jena, became in 1661 professor of the Law of Nature and Nations, at Heidelberg, afterwards at Lund, and died historiographer of the House of Brandenburg, at Berlin, 1694. He attempted to reconcile the opinions of Hobbes and Grotius, and discussed Natural Law as a separate question, independent of the obligations of Revealed Religion or Positive Civil Law. The philosophers of the Theological school became in consequence his enemies; particularly Valent. Alberti and Joachim Zentgrave.

Pufendorf first gave a currency to the principle of Sociability, which Grotius had started; and maintained that in virtue of this motive, which is allied to Self-love, man desires the society and co-operation of his fellow-men; but that at the same time through the corruption of his nature, (the state of Nature described by Hobbes), and in consequence of the multiplicity of his desires, and the impossibility of easily satisfying them, as well as the instability of his natural disposition, he is no less inclined to do injury to others, and is furnished with the means of doing so in his address and cunning. From these

[n] PETRI DE VILLEMANDY, Scepticismus Debellatus seu Humanæ Cognitionis Ratio ab imis Radicibus explicata, etc. *Lugd. Bat.* 1697, 4to. See § 139.

[o] See the works mentioned § 124.

[p] Ibid.

considerations he infers, on the principle of Self-love, the first law of society, that we should each individually labour to maintain the social compact, which derives its authority directly from God, as the Creator of mankind. From this origin Pufendorf deduces the laws of Morality and Jurisdiction. He does not indeed discriminate between Natural and Moral Right, and frequently recurs to Christianity for positive precepts; yet he may be said to have laid the foundations of an Universal philosophy *of practice*. The multifarious disputes in which he was engaged, particularly with Alberti (§ 315), were of little service to the cause of philosophy. He has perhaps been as much encumbered by his commentators as his adversaries.

Sam. Pufendorf, Elementa Jurisprudentiæ Universalis, *Hag. Com.* 1660; *Jen.* 8vo.

De Jure Naturæ et Gentium libb. VIII, *Lund.* 1672; *Francof.* 1684, 4to.; cum Notis Hertii, Barbeyraci, et Mascovii, *Francof. et Lips.* 1744, 1749, 2 vols. 4to., and other editions. De Officio Hominis et Civis libb. II, *Lund.* 1673, 8vo., and other editions. Cum Notis Variorum, *Ludg. Bat.* 1769, 2 vols. 8vo. Eris Scandica, *Francof.* 1686. On the Natural Law of Pufendorf, see Leibnitz. (Cf. § 350, note.)

I. *Leibnitz.*

Fontenelle, Eloge de M. de Leibnitz, dans l'Histoire de l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences de Paris, 1716. † The biography it contains was founded on a Memoir communicated by J. G. von Eccard, which has been published by Von Murr, in the Journal of the History of the Arts, etc., part VII, *Nürmb.* 1779.

Bailly, Eloge de M. de Leibnitz, qui a Remporté le Prix de l'Académie de Berlin, 1769, 4to.

Leben und Verzeichniss der Schriften des Herrn v. Leibnitz in Ludovici's Ausführlichem Entwurf einer Vollständigen Historie der Leibnitzschen Philosophie im ersten Bande, *Leipz.* 1737, 8vo.

Lamprecht Leben des Hrn. v. Leibnitz, *Berlin*, 1740, 8vo.

Geschichte des Hrn. von Leibnitz, a. d. Franz. des Ritter v. Jancourt, *Leipz.* 1757, 8vo.

A. G. Kästners Lobschrift auf Leibnitz, *Altona*, 1769, 4to.

MICH. HISSMANN Versuch über das Leben des Freiherrn von Leibnitz, *Münster*, 1783, 8vo.

A Life of Leibnitz, by REIHERG, is to be found in the † Hanoverian Magazine, 1787, year 25; and another among the † Lives and Characters of distinguished Germans, by KLEIN, 1 vol.; as well as a third in the † German Pantheon, by EBERHARD.

345. The comprehensive genius of *Gottfried William Leibnitz* embraced the whole circle of philosophy, and imparted to it, in Germany at least, a new and powerful impulse. All that can interest or exercise the understanding was attemped by his great and original mind, more especially in the Mathematics and Moral Philosophy. He was ignorant of no one branch of learning, and in all he has shown the fertility of his mind by the discoveries he suggested or attempted. He was the founder of a school in Germany which distinguished itself for the solidity of the principles it embraced, and the systematic manner in which these were developed—a school which effected the final overthrow of the Scholastic system, and extended its influence over the whole range of the sciences. Leibnitz, by his example and his exertions, laid the foundations of this great revolution, by combining the philosophical systems which had prevailed up to his time: by his extraordinary learning: the liberality of his mind: and that spirit of toleration which led him always to discover some favourable point of view in what he criticised —something, even in the most obscure systems, which might suggest matter for research. To this must be added the harmony which prevailed in his own system, and the infinitude of bright ideas, hints, and conjectures, which were perpetually, as it were, scintillating from his brilliant mind, though he left to others the task of collecting and combining them.

He was born June 21, 1646, at Leipsic, where his father was professor of moral philosophy, and studied the same science under J. Thomasius (born 1622, died 1684), applying himself at the same time to the Mathematics[p]

[p] Under Erh. Weigel, at Jena, (who died 1690).

and the study of Natural Law; read the Classics in the original tongues, particularly Plato and Aristotle, whose doctrines he endeavoured at an early age to combine. The cultivation of his mind was advanced, and the versatility and address of his natural parts promoted, by immense reading and a multifarious correspondence: by his early independence of mind: by his travels, particularly to Paris and London: and by his acquaintance with the most distinguished statesmen, and most illustrious sages of his time. He died, November 14, 1716, at Hanover, of which state he was a privy councillor, and keeper of the library; scarcely less honoured after his death than during his life, as is testified, among other things, by a monument recently erected to him.

§ 346.

Works: His Dissert. de Principio Individuationis, *Lips.* 1664. Specimen Quæstionum Philosophicarum ex Jure Collectarum, *ibid. eod.* Tract. de Arte Combinatoria, cui subnexa est Demonstratio Existentiæ Dei ad Mathematicam certitudinem exacta, *Lips.* 1666; *Fref.* 1694. The first Philosophical Treatises of Leibnitz are to be found in the Acta Eruditorum, from 1684; and in the Journal des Savans, from 1691.

Gottfr. W. Leibnitii Opera, studio Lud. Dutens, *Genev.* 1768, 6 vols. 4to.

To this collection must be added:

† The Philosophical Works of the late M. Leibnitz, published by M. Rud. Erich Raspe, with a preface by M. Kästner, *Amsterd. and Leips.* 1765, 4to. The German edition contains Remarks and Additions, by J. H. F. Ulrich, *Halle*, 1778—1780, 2 vols. 8vo.

A Collection of Papers, which passed between the late learned M. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, in the years 1715 and 1716, relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion; published by Samuel Clarke, *London*, 1717, 8vo.

Leibnitii Otium Hanoveranum, sive Miscellanea G. W. Leibnitii ed. Joach. Fr. Feller, *Lips.* 1718, 8vo.: et, Monumenta varia inedita, *Lips.* 1724, 4to. Epistolæ ad Diversos, ed. Chr. Korthold, *Lips.* 1734, 1742, 4 vols. 8vo.

Commercium Epistolicum Leibnitianum, ed. Jo. Dan. Gruber, *Hanov. et Gotting.* 1745, 2 vols. 8vo.

Commercii Epistolici Leibnitiani typis nondum evulgati selecta specimina, ed. JOH. GE. H. FEDER, *Hanov.* 1805, 8vo.

† Comparison between the Metaphysics of Leibnitz and Newton (§ 338, bibliogr.), by L. MART. KAHLE, *Götting.* 1741; translated into French, *The Hague*, 1747, 8vo. A similar work (French), by BEGUELIN, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Berlin, 1756.

Recueil de Diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie, la Religion, etc., par MM. Leibnitz, Clarke, Newton (publ. par DESMAIZEAUX, *Amsterd.* 1719, second edit. 1740, 2 vols. 8vo.)

Leibnitz, Essai de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme, et l'Origine du Mal, *Amsterd.* 1710, 8vo.; 1712-14-20-48, (Lat.): *Colon.* 1716, 8vo.; *Francf.* 1719, 2 vols. 8vo. Leibnitii Tentamina Theodicæ de Bonitate Dei, Libertate Hominis, et Origine Mali. Versionis novæ editio altera cum Præf. AUG. FR. BOECKHII, *Tubing.* 1771, 2 vols. 8vo. (Several German editions).

† Doctrine of Leibnitz, etc., translated from the French by J. H. KÖHLER, *Francf.* 1720, 8vo.; new edition by HUTH, *Francf.* 1740, 8vo.

Ejusd.: Principia more Geometrico demonstrata cum excerptis et Epistolis Philosophi et Scholiis quibusdam ex Historiâ Philosophicâ, auctore MICH. GOTTL. HANSCHIO, *Francf. et Lips.* 1728, 4to.

Leibnitz was led to the composition of his philosophical system by various causes; by the acute comparison he was induced to make of the most celebrated of former systems with a reference to the exigencies of his own time; by a capacity fruitful in ingenious hypotheses and in improvements or accommodation; as well as by his great mathematical acquirements. His object was so completely to reform Philosophy that it might possess a strictness of demonstrations analogous to that of the Mathematics, and to put an end to all disputes betwen its factions, as well as all differences supposed to exist between it and Theology[q]; with the hope of diminishing the principal difficulties belonging to some great questions, and, at the same time, the causes of dispute by improving the *method* of philosophy, and ascertaining, i possible, some positive and invariable principles. It wa

[q] Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison (in the Théodicée.)

his opinion that the same course should be pursued as in the Mathematics, which led him to prefer the method of Demonstration and the system of Rationalism; such as it had been embraced by Plato and Descartes; without entirely concurring with either. The *method* thus adopted induced him to appreciate even the labours of the Schoolmen. *There are certain necessary Truths* (such was his opinion), *belonging to Metaphysics as well as Mathematics, the certainty of which cannot be ascertained by Experiment, but must be sought within the Soul itself.* This is the corner-stone of the Rationalism of Leibnitz; who endeavoured to liberate the Cartesian system from its attendant improbabilities; without, however, effecting any accurate discovery of the principal conditions of philosophical knowledge, or any complete definition of its method or limits. The Rationalism of Leibnitz is especially apparent in his Theory of Knowledge, essentially opposed to that of Locke. Leibnitz interested himself in the investigation of the possibility of a *Characteristic* or Universal Language: which might represent the discoveries in Art and Science in the same way that arithmetical and algebraic signs express the proportions of numbers. (Œuvres Philosophiques, p. 535, sqq.; Princip. Philos. § 30, 33, 35, 37).

347. According to Leibnitz necessary Truths are innate: not that we are from our birth actually conscious of them, but are born with a capacity for them. Our perceptions however differ by being clear or obscure, distinct or confused. *Sensible* perceptions are indistinct; *all precise knowledge being the property of the understanding.* The criterium of Truth, which Descartes laid down (§ 325) is inadequate: the rules of Logic, which are the same in substance with the laws of the Mathematics, are more appropriate to the purposes of Philosophy. All our conclusions must be founded on two grand principles: 1st. That of Indentity and Contradiction. 2ndly. That of a Sufficient Cause. These two principles are as applicable to necessary as to contingent truths. Necessary

truths are discoverable on the principle of Contradiction, by the analysis of compound objects into their simple elements: accidental truths, on the other hand, are ascertained by virtue of the Sufficient Cause, which conducts us to an ulterior and independent truth, beyond the range of what is contingent[r]. The ideas which relate to objects *without* the soul, must have a correspondency with such objects; otherwise they would be mere illusions. The ultimate ratio of innate and necessary truths resides with the Deity, as the source of all necessary and absolute Truth, which is dependent on the Divine Understanding (not the Divine *Will*.)

LEIBNITII Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis; in the Acta Eruditorum, 1684.

Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain par l'Auteur de l'Harmonie pré-établie; in the Œuvres Philosophiques, published by RASPE.

348. His *Monadologia* is the central point of the system of Leibnitz, by which he believed himself to have ascertained the ultimate grounds of all knowledge. Plato's theory, and possibly the notions of the physician *Francis Glisson*[s], led him to these speculations, by which he also believed himself to have found a way of reconciling the Aristotelian and Platonic systems. Experience proves to us the existence of compound objects; consequently, we are led to believe in the existence of *simple* ones *(Monades)* of which the other are compounded[t]. Our senses cannot apprehend these, inasmuch as they present to us objects in their confused and compound state, the understanding alone contemplating them with precision. That which is Simple is the elementary principle of the Compounded, and as the former cannot be directly appre-

[r] Princ. Philos. § 31—46. Théodic. p. 1, § 44.

[s] Died 1677.

Tractatus de Naturâ Substantiæ Energiticà, s. de Vitâ Naturæ ejusque tribus facultatibus perceptivâ, adpetitivâ et motivâ auct. FRANC. GLISSONIO, *Lond.* 1672, 4to.

[t] Princip. Philos. p. 1.

hended by the Senses, it is multiplied and confused in our perceptions. The *Monades* cannot be influenced by any change from without, their principle of modification being internal to themselves, and inasmuch as all real substances must have their internal properties, by which they are mutually discriminated[u], and as there is no other internal property but that of perception, it follows that the *Monades* are *Spiritual powers and faculties,* which are continually labouring to change their condition (or perceptions) God is the *Monas Monadum:* The necessarily existing Essence. Every real essence is a *fulguration* from His; modified by the limited nature of the being in which it is contained. The Essence of God is absolute Perfection; it embraces all possible Realities without limitation; none of them conflicting with the rest. He is the absolute and sole cause of the *actuality* of the world and the existence of all things: the all-sufficient cause, unlimited by action or condition: the original source of all knowledge and being. There exists therefore an infinite and original or primordial Monade, and also secondary, finite, and limited Monades, which latter are distinguished from one another by the properties of their phenomena. Some Monades are without Perception (Inert bodies):—some possess it (souls):—some are endowed with an obscure consciousness (the inferior animals): some possess a clear and perfect one. Distinct perceptions are the sources of Action: obscure and confused ones of Passion and Imperfection. Every simple substance, or Monade, forming as it were the Central-point of a compound substance (for instance that of an animal), is the nucleus of an infinitude of other Monades, which constitute the external body of the first; and agreeably to the affections of these aggregated Monades, the Central-Monade apprehends and, as it were, concentrates in it a common focus, the impressions of external objects. Furthermore, as

[u] "Because there cannot be two things which completely agree in their internal properties."

every thing in this world is connected with something else, and as all bodies affect others, and are themselves affected in the ratio of their respective distances, it follows that each individual Monade is a sort of *living mirror*, endowed with an internal activity of its own, enabling it to image forth the whole Creation, being itself constituted on the same principles as the Universe at large. There exists no immediate influence *(influxus physicus)* of one simple substance on another (e. g. Soul and Body), but merely an *ideal connection:* that is, the internal affections of each Monade harmonise with those of the Monades which are in immediate connection with the first. This gives them the appearance of being mutually influenced by each other. The cause of this correspondence is the infinite wisdom and power of God, who, at the first, so constituted all things, that there exists an universal—pre-ordained harmony, or *Harmonia præstabilita*[x]. *Space* is the arrangement of all things simultaneously existing: the phenomenon of *Expansion* is the consequence of the confused manner in which such arrangement is represented by the senses; and Time is the order of successive changes which take place in the external world. Time and Space have merely an ideal and relative existence.

The following works may be consulted:

Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce fondée en Raison, par feu M. le BARON DE LEIBNITZ; dans l'Europe Savante, 1718, Novembre, Art. VI; et Recueil, etc., tom. II. See the works mentioned § 345.

GODFR. PLOUCQUET Primaria Monadologiæ capita, *Berol.* 1748, 8vo.

Institutions Leibnitiennes, ou Précis de la Monadologie, *Lyon*, 1767, 8vo.

DE JUSTI. Dissertation qui a remporté le Prix proposé par l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences de Prusse, sur le Système des Monades, *Berl.* 1748, 4to. By the same author: † Defence of the Dissertation on Monades, etc., *Frcf. and Leips.* 1748, 8vo. (Germ.)

† Plan of a Brief Account of Works relative to Monades or Elementary Bodies, from the time of Leibnitz to our own; in the

[x] See LEIBN. dans le Journal des Savans, 1695, p. 444 et 445.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd, vols. of the Philosophical Bibliotheca of Göttingen, by Windheim, 1749.

G. Bern. Bilfinger, Commentatio de Harmoniâ Animi et Corporis Humani maxime præstabilitâ ex mente Leibnitii, *Francf. et Lips.* 1723, 8vo.; second edition, 1735, 8vo.

Ancillon (Père), Essai sur l'Esprit du Leibnitzianisme, en Franç. dans les Dissertations de la Classe Philosophique de l'Acad. des Sciences de *Berlin*, 1816, 4to.

H. C. W. Sigwart, The Doctrine of Leibnitz on Pre-established Harmony, compared with his former Doctrines, *Tubingen*, 1822, 8vo.

349. The Divine Intelligence contemplates an infinitude of *possible* worlds, from among which His wisdom and goodness have selected, and His power created *the best*, i. e. the world in which the greatest number of Realities exist and harmonise with each other. (A system of *Optimism*). Hence it follows that every thing is for the best, considered as a part of the universe with which it is connected, even although in itself it should be imperfect; nor can any thing be other than what it is[y]. Every thing is so constituted as to attain in the highest possible degree its own felicity, and to contribute in the greatest degree possible to the good of the Whole. The existence of Evil is no objection. Leibnitz distinguished Evil into Metaphysical—Physical—and Moral. Metaphysical evil is nothing but the necessary limitation of the nature of finite beings, the consequences of which are physical evil (e. g. pain), and moral (sin). Moral evil has its origin in the power of Choice intrusted to Finite beings. Freedom of will is not an Equilibrium or Indifference of inclination, nor yet a determination without a motive; but a free choice of one line of conduct in preference to others no less physically possible; influenced, but without constraint or necessity, by that, among many motives of action, which preponderates. It by no means interferes with this perfect freedom of election that God foresees all human actions, inasmuch as contingent and

[y] Principia, § lv—lx; Théodicée, i, p. 8, 9.

free-will actions only exclude the hypothesis of absolute, not that of conditional necessity. Every thing in the world is *conditionally necessary;* yet man, not foreseeing the future, is bound to act according to his judgment and reason. In these respects Leibnitz studiously opposed the system of Descartes, whose hypothesis of absolute Fate deprived even the Deity of all real influence. God does not absolutely will or ordain either physical or moral evil; but he allows the first to exist as a necessary consequence of His general laws, and as means to ulterior ends; and permits also the existence of the latter, inasmuch as it is necessarily connected with the highest degree of perfection possible in the present world: His wisdom and goodness having established a harmony between the systems of Nature and Grace; in which consists the Divine Government of the world.

Leibnitz was led (as he tells us in his Preface to the Théodicée) to these speculations on the harmony between Revelation and Reason, by the doubts and objections of Bayle.

Works to be consulted:

Fr. Ch. Baumeister, Historia de Doctrinâ de Optimo Mundo, *Gorlitii.* 1741.

Wolfart, Cuntroversiæ de Mundo Optimo, *Jen.* 1745.

(Reinhard) Dissertation qui a remporté le Prix proposé par l'Acad. Roy. des Sciences de Prusse, sur l'Optimisme, avec les Pièces qui ont concouru, *Berlin,* 1755, 4to.

† Collection (in Germ.) of Writings on the Doctrine of Optimism, *Rostoch,* 1759, 8vo. See also the work of Werdermann, mentioned § 38, II, *c.*

† Various Writings on Occasion of the Dispute between Platner and Wezel respecting the Théodicée of Leibnitz, *Lips.* 1782, 8vo.

Leibnitii Doctrina de Mundo Optimo sub examen revocatur denuo a Chr. A. Leonh. Creuzer, *Lips.* 1795, 8vo.

Robinet, in his Book on Nature, has published a System analogous to that of Leibnitz, *Amsterd.* 1761—68, 5 vols. 8vo.

Im. Kant über das Misslingen aller Philos. Versuche einer Théodicée in seinen kleinen Schriften, 3 B. Betrachtungen über den Optimismus, *Königsb.* 1759, 4to.

350. Leibnitz gives us but partial views of his Doctrine; not presenting it to us as a whole, but piecemeal. *Practical* philosophy he has touched upon but slightly[z]. For the most part his system is the imperfect result of a great talent for analysis and combination; of great ability in reconciling the difficulties and differences presented by Philosophy and Theology; embracing a partial and incomplete investigation of the faculty of knowledge. As Locke had sought the foundation of all knowledge exclusively in the senses, so did he in the understanding; and asserted that it is by Thought that the existence of external things is ascertained (a system of Rationalism). He confounds Logical possibility and actuality with Real; makes all the phenomena of perception too completely intellectual; and overlooks the important part which observation must always support in the acquisition of knowledge[a]. If his system had been well founded it would have established an absolute Determinism; incompatible with the free agency of rational beings. Nevertheless, his philosophy, abounding in bold hypotheses and splendid observations, has promoted the cause of metaphysical science, by bringing into circulation a multitude of new ideas; to which the circumstance of his composing for the most part in French has contributed.

† Detailed Plan of a Complete History of Leibnitz, by C. G. Ludovici, *Leipz.*1732, 2 parts, 8vo.

351. Leibnitz had a great number both of adherents and adversaries[b]: the former for a length of time labo-

[z] Consult: De Principiis Juris Observationes, 1700. Anonymi Sententia de Tractatu cl. viri Sam. Pufendorfii qui inscribitur de Officiis Hominis et Civis; in a Programma of J. C. Böhmer, 1709, 4to. † On Natural Law according to Leibnitz, see his Preface to Corpus Juris Gentium; and several of his Letters.

[a] See † Em. Kant: Criticism of Pure Reason, fifth edition, p. 316, sqq.

[b] Bayle (for instance), in his Dictionary: Leibnitz replied by his: Eclaircissemens des Difficultés que M. Bayle a trouvées dans le Système nouveau de l'Union de l'âme et du corps, Journal des Savans, 1698, and his Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, 1698, p. 329; with: Réponse aux Re-

riously employed themselves in fortifying the outworks of their master's system; while the latter directed their attacks rather against the consequences of his philosophy than its principles. The result was an animated conflict, which kept alive the interest of philosophical research, and insensibly introduced the habit of more profound inquiries respecting the fundamental properties of human knowledge.

The system of Leibnitz, though favourably received by many distinguished professors, failed at first to obtain great influence in Germany, from its want of a systematic form. Other obstacles impeded its progress in France and England.

Among his successors we must distinguish *M. G. Hansch*[c], and *Christian Wolf*, the most renowned advocate of this school, and the first who gave an extensive popularity to the system. He was succeeded by his pupils, *Bilfinger* and *Baumgarten* (§ 360.)

flexions dans la seconde édition de M. BAYLE, article RORARIUS, sur le Système de l'Harmonie pré-établie, dans l'Histoire Critique de la République des Lettres, tom. ii, et Recueil des Diverses Pièces, tom. ii, p, 389. SAM. CLARKE, and NEWTON also opposed Leibnitz. We have mentioned above (§ 346) the works which relate to their disputes, etc. The ABBÉ FOUCHER also wrote an article against his system of pre-established Harmony, in the Journal des Savans, année 1695, p. 638, sqq., to which Leibnitz replied in the same Journal, 1696, p. 255—259: LAMY attacked him in his Connaissance du Système, etc. tom. ii, p. 225, sqq. which was met, on the part of Leibnitz, by: Réponse aux Objections que le P. LAMY, Bénédictin, a faites contre le Système de l'Harmonie pré-établie, dans le Journ. des Sav., 1709, p. 593. We may add to the number of his opponents all who subsequently declared against the doctrines of WOLF; particularly PIERRE DE CROUZAZ (§ 357) in his Critique on Pope's Essay on Man, and in his Réflexions sur l'ouvrage intitulé: La Belle Wolfienne, *Lausanne*, 1743, 8vo. DE VATTEL defended against the last the system of Leibnitz, in his: Défense du Système Leibnitien contre les Objections et les Imputations de M. CROUZAZ, contenues dans l'Examen de l'Essai sur l'Homme, de Pope, *Leyde*, 1741, 8vo.

[c] Born near Dantzig, 1683; died at Vienna, 1752.

M. GOTTL. HANSCH, Principia Philosophiæ. See § 346, bibliogr.

Ars Inveniendi, s. Synopsis Regularum Præcipuarum Artis Inveniendi, etc., 1727 (no place mentioned). Selecta Moralia, *Hal.* 1720, 4to.

Other Contemporary Philosophers.

352. About the same time two learned men of great merit attempted, with different views, a reformation in School-philosophy still prevalent in Germany. The celebrated physician and mathematician *E. W. von Tschirnhausen*[d], who had studied at Leyden, and early attached himself to the opinions of Descartes and Spinoza, endeavoured to systematise a theory of philosophical discovery and observation, on the principle of the mathematics. *Christian Thomasius*[e] laboured to render philosophy more *popular* in its character, and to disseminate a knowledge of it in his native language[f]. In Ethics he at first attached himself to the principles of Pufendorf, whom he defended against his assailants; though subsequently he withdrew from him[g], not so much in respect of his prin-

[d] Born at Kieslingswalde in Oberlausitz, 1651; died 1708.

Chr. Walth. Tschirnhausen, Medicina Mentis, sive Artis Inveniendi Præcepta Generalia, *Amstelod.* 1687; *Lips.* 1695—1705—1753, 4to.

A biography of the author was published separately at Görlitz, 1709, 8vo. See Fontenelle, Eloges, p. 166. For an opinion of his philosophical labours, see the Collection of Memoirs of G. G. Fülleborn, Fasc. V, p. 32, (Germ.): where are to be found extracts from his Medicina Mentis.

[e] Born at Leipsic, 1655; died at Halle, 1728.

[f] Consult the article on Christian Thomasius, in the Universal Biography of Schröckh, (Germ.).

† Chr. Thomasius, his Life and Works, by H. Luden, *Berlin*, 1805, 8vo.

† G. G. Fülleborn, On the Philosophy of Chr. Thomasius, in the IV. Fasc. of his Collection of Memoirs, etc.

Chr. Thomasii Introductio in Philosophiam Aulicam, seu primæ lineæ Libri de Prudentia Cogitandi atque Ratiocinandi, *Lips.* 1688, 8vo.; *Hal.* 1702. Introductio in Philosophiam Rationalem in qua Omnibus Hominibus Via plana et facilis panditur, sive Syllogistica, Verum, Verisimile et Falsum discernendi, novasque veritates inveniendi, *Lips.* 1601, 8vo.

† Introduction to the Art of Reasoning, *Halle*, 1691, 8vo., (and other editions). † Exercise of the Art of Reasoning, *Halle*, 1710, 8vo. † Essay on the Existence and Nature of the Spirit, etc., *Halle*, 1699—1709, 8vo.

Chr. Thomasii Dissert. de Crimine Magiæ, *Hal.* 1701, 4to.

[g] Chr. Thomasii Institutionum Jurisprudentiæ Divinæ libri III, in quibus Fundamenta Juris Nat. secundum hypotheses ill. Pufendorfii perspicue demonstrantur, etc., *Francof. et Lips.* 1688, 4to.; *Hal.* 1717, 4to. (Germ.); *Halle*, 1712, 4to. Fundamenta Juris Naturæ et Gentium, ex Sensu Communi

ciples as by the distinctions he made between the Præcepta Justi—Honesti et Decori; and by limiting Natural Right to merely negative principles of external conduct. His views in these particulars procured him, in after time, as much abuse from one set of philosophers as they obtained applause from another[h]. They were maintained in a more exact and methodical manner by *Ephraim Gerard*, and still more so by *Jer. Gundling*[i]. The principle of morality which Thomasius assumed was Reasonable Love, differing from unreasonable or Self-love; of which, after all, it was a modification. The fruit of this Reasonable Love or Desire, is Happiness or repose of mind, constituting the ultimate object and supreme good of man. His successors (Gerhard and Gundling), defined still more broadly the limits between Natural Right and Morality, and treated the former as a system of perfect right and corresponding obligation, having in view a State of Nature; at the same time frequently referring to the enactments of *positive* law, especially the Roman, to which a certain degree of authority was still allowed. *Heineccius*, *The Cocceii*, and *Pütter*, have treated Natu-

deducta, *Hal.* 1705—1718, 4to. (Germ.); *Halle*, 1709. Introductio in Philosophiam Moralem cum Praxi, *Hal.* 1706.

† The Art of Living Conformably to Reason and Virtue, or, an Introduction to Morality, *Halle*, 1792—1710, 8vo. † On the Cure of Unreasonable Desire, etc., *Halle*, 1696—1704, 8vo.

FR. SCHNEIDER, Philosophia Moralis secundum Principia Thomasiana, *Hal.* 1723.

[h] They were especially attacked by G. E. SCHULZE, († On the Principles of Civil and Penal Right, *Götting.* 1813, preface, p. 1 and 17): as well as by the celebrated Jurist, HUGO; who calls this attempt to distinguish between Natural Right and Morality—a Moral System intended for the use of Cutthroats (*eine Todtschlagsmoral*).

[i] Ephr. Gerhard died 1718; he published his Delineatio Juris Naturalis sive de Principiis Justi libri III, quibus Fundamenta Generalia Doctrinæ de Decoro accesserunt, *Jen.* 1712, 8vo.

NIC. JER. GUNDLING, born at Nuremburg, 1671, died at Halle, 1729; he published: Via ad Veritatem Moralem, *Hal.* 1714, 8vo. Jus Naturæ et Gentium, etc., *Hal.* 1714, 8vo.

On the Rights of Nature and Nations, etc., *Francf. and Leips.*, 1734, 4to. See his Article in the second vol. of SCHRÖCKH, † Biography of Celebrated Literary Characters, etc.

ral Law with these views; their ideas being more fully developed by *Achenwall*[k]; who also turned his attention to National Law. Among the philosophers who adhered to Wolf, must be mentioned the Eclectic Buddeus[l].

IV. *Wolf and his School; his Adversaries, and other Contemporary Philosophers.*

Vita, Fata, et Scripta Chr. Wolfii, *Lips. et Breslav.* 1739, 8vo.

† Chr. Gottsched, Historical Eulogium of Christian Baron von Wolf, *Halle*, 1755, 4to.

Life of Wolf, in the Memoirs towards a Biography of Celebrated Men, by Busching, vol. I, p. 3—138.

Chr. Wolfii Dissertat. inauguralis; Philosophia Practica Universalis Methodo Mathematica conscripta, *Lips.* 1701, 4to.

Chr. Wolf's Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes, *Halle*, 1710, 8vo. u. öfter. Auch Lateinisch. Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, *Frankf. u. Leipz.* 1719, 8vo.; VI. Ausg. 1736. Anmerkungen dazu, *Frkf.* 1724, 1727, 1733, 8vo. Versuche zur Erkenntniss der Natur und Kunst. 3 voll. *Halle*, 1721—23, 8vo. Vernünftige Gedanken von den Wirkungen der Natur, *Halle*, 1723, 8vo. Von den Absichten der natürlichen Dinge, *Frankf.* 1724, 8vo. Von des Menschen Thun und Lassen, *Halle*, 1720. Von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen und dem gemeinen Wesen, *Halle*, 1721, 8vo. Institutiones Juris Naturæ et Gentium, *Hal.* 1750, 8vo.; *Deutsch.* 1754, 8vo. Nachricht von seinen cignen Schriften, die er in Deutscher Sprache in verschiedenen Theilen der Weltweisheit herausgegeben, *Frankf.* 1726, 8vo. Gesammelte kleine philosophische Schriften, *Halle*, 1740, 4 Th. 8vo.

Latin Works: Luculenta Commentatio de Differentia nexus Rerum Sapientis et Fatalis Necessitatis, nec non Systematis H. P. et Hypothesium Spinozæ, 1723. Oratio de Sinarum Philosophia, *Hal.* 1726, 4to. Philosophia Rationalis s. Logica Methodo Scientifica pertractata, *Frcf. et Lips.* 1728, 4to.; second edition,

[k] Born at Elbingen, 1686; died 1756.

Gottfr. Achenwall, Jus Naturæ, *Gött.* 1750, seventh edition, cum Præfat. de Selchow, 1781, 2 vols. 8vo. Observationes Juris Nat. et Gent. Spec. I—IV, *Götting.* 1754, 4to. Prolegomena Juris Nat. *Gött.* 1758, fifth edition, 1781.

[l] J. F. Budde, born 1697, died 1729.

1732. Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, *ibid.* 1730. Cosmologia Generalis, *ibid.* 1731. Psychologia Empirica, *ibid.* 1732. Psychologia Rationalis, *Frcf. et Lips.* 1734. Theologia Naturalis, 1736, 1737, 2 vols. 4to. Philosophia Practica Universalis, *ibid.* 1738, 1739, 2 vols. 4to. Jus Naturæ, 1740, 8 vols. 4to. Philosophia Moralis sive Ethica, *Hal.* 1750, 4 vols. 4to. Philosophia Civilis sive Politica, fortgesetzt von MICH. CHR. HANOVIUS, *Hal.* 1746, 4 vols. 4to. Jus Gentium, *Hal.* 1750, 4to.

† C. GÜNTHER LUDOVICI, Plan of a History of the Wolfian Philosophy, second edition, *Lips.* 1737, 3 parts, 8vo. † Fresh Developments of the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Philosophy, *Leips.* 1730, 8vo. † Collection, etc., of all the Controversial Works published on the subject of the Wolfian Philosophy, *Leips.* 1737, two parts, 8vo.

† G. VOLKMAR HARTMANN, Introduction to the History of the Leibnitzo-Wolfian Philosophy, and the Controversy excited on the subject by Professor LANGE, *Francf. and Leips.* 1737, 8vo.

† A. MEISSNER, Philosophical Lexicon adapted to the System of Chr. Wolf, and collected from his German Writings, *Bayreuth and Hof*, 1737, 8vo.

353. *Christian Wolf* was born at Breslaw, in 1679, and was formed to become one of the most profound philosophers of the Dogmatic School by the study of the Mathematics, of the Cartesian philosophy, and of the Medicina Mentis of Tschirnhausen. He was by nature possessed of less invention than powers of analysis, and talents for systemisation; with considerable powers of *popular* expression. These advantages he employed in the illustration and defence of the Leibnitzian system, with singular success. By his elementary works, in German, he completed the downfal of the Scholastic philosophy in the universities of Germany; to which Thomasius also contributed. He materially improved the habits of thought of his countrymen, by promoting their progress in science, and the cultivation of order, method, and systematic arrangement. In 1707 he became professor of Mathematics at Halle, and after a long controversy with his colleagues (among others with *J. J. Lange*, (§ 356), who accused him of Atheism), he was driven from his chair (1723), and retired to Marburg, where he taught

as professor of Moral Philosophy. He was honourably recalled to Halle (1740), by Frederic II.; and died there April 9th, 1754;—having outlived his reputation.

354. Wolf was the first philosopher who sketched out a complete Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences, and, in a great measure, filled up his outline. He divides *speculative* philosophy into Logic and Metaphysics; of which Metaphysics comprehends Ontology, Rational Psychology (to be distinguished from Empirical), Cosmology, and Theology. *Practical* philosophy he subdivides into Universal practical Philosophy, Ethics, Natural Right, and Law, and Politics. These subdivisions of Moral Philosophy, with the addition of Æsthetics, or, the Theory of Taste, are at the present day generally adopted. As for the *matter* of his Philosophy, he found it for the most part supplied by others. He adopted the views of Leibnitz, with the exception of the perceptive faculties of the Monades, which he absolutely rejected, and of the Pre-established Harmony. He may be said to have given a new edition of the Leibnitzian system, under the form of a dogmatical Dualism[m]; and filled up some of the lacunæ it contained, either by the addition of new matter of his own, or a skilful development of his master's views. His chief merit consists in the unity of plan he has preserved, and the consecutiveness of his argumentation, which is the effect of a rigorous application of what is called the mathematical method, and which he declares to be nothing more than an exact adaptation of the laws of Logic. The improvements which Wolf thus brought about, consisted in a more exact arrangement, a clearer definition of ideas, and greater precision in the *language* of philosophy. The main defects of his system were, an affectation of demonstrating every thing, an exclusive attention to the principle of Thought, a neglect of the difference between the material

[m] A Dualism it will be remembered implies the recognition of *two* elementary principles.

and formal conditions of knowledge, and a disposition to exalt *contradiction* into an universal principle of all science. It must be added that he maintained it to be impossible to discriminate between ideas derived from the intellect and those acquired by experience; limited the operations of the mind to the mere perception of impressions: and in short, overlooked the characteristics which distinguish Moral Philosophy from the Mathematics, in respect of Form and Matter. His system led him to the construction of a number of useless and tedious formulæ, which could have no other effect but that of inspiring disgust and contempt for speculative researches in general, and particularly for those of Metaphysics. His theory, like that of Leibnitz, favours the doctrine of Determinism, or moral Fatalism.

355. Wolf chiefly distinguished himself by the accuracy of his scientific method, as applied to practical philosophy. He laboured to ascertain some fundamental principle, from which he might deduce the whole system of Practice, and connect its details with his general theory; which he was the first among modern philosophers to attempt. Such a fundamental principle he believed himself to have discovered in the idea of Perfection, and thought that experiment confirmed his observation. He defined those actions to be *good* which *perfect our condition*, i. e. produce or tend to produce an unison between our condition as it was, as it is, and as it will be; and *evil* those which produce the contrary effect, or are the causes of a discrepancy and discordancy in our state at different periods. Free actions are in a certain sense necessary also, and derive their qualities of evil and good from their consequences and results, and not from an original distinction made by the Divine Will. Virtue is, consequently, the art of making perfect our condition. The grand rule of virtue is, *Perfice te ipsum:* do that which may perfect your own condition, or that of another, and avoid all that can render it imperfect. Reason suggests what will perfect or render imperfect our state,

and consequently, all moral good is dependent on knowledge, all moral evil the consequence of defective knowledge. The consciousness of our perfection, or approximation to perfection, bestows contentment: a state of contentment confers happiness; and the consciousness of a continued and uninterrupted progress towards perfection is the greatest happiness that can be enjoyed by man[n]. From these principles Wolf deduces the subordinate laws of Morals, of Natural Right (comprehending a general theory of Rights and Duties[o]), and of Polity with great apparent facility, and much display of detailed information. The unity and consecutiveness of his system gave it a prodigious advantage, to which must be added, the circumstance that he made the intellect the source of moral knowledge. Its faults were the vagueness of its leading idea, the difficulty of deducing from such a principle the obligations of morality, and the absence of an adequate *motive* for virtuous action; defects which the great abilities of many disciples of his school have not been able to palliate. In reality it is a system of Rationalism only in appearance, and from the want of a complete discussion of the question of moral consciousness, ends in one of Eudæmonism (§ 368). Nevertheless, some particular subjects have been treated by members of this school not unsuccessfully; particularly by *Thom. Abbt*[p].

[n] For Wolf's Works on Ethics see § 353; and J. Aug. Eberhard's *Sittenlehre.* See § 367, notes.

[o] In this respect he has been followed by most of the writers who have treated of Natural Law. Baumgarten (§ 360) and H. Köhler alone reduced this subject to the narrow limits to which it had been confined by Gundling (§ 352).

The principal authors who have treated the subject with the views of Wolf, are: Nettelbladt (§ 360), Darjes (§ 358), and the Jurist J. C. F. Meister, † Rudiments of Natural Law, *Francf. on Oder*, 1809, 8vo. The Eclectics Höpfner (died 1797), and Ulrich (died 1813), differed from this school only on minor questions.

[p] Born at Ulm, 1738; died 1766.

Thom. Abbt vom Tode für das Vaterland, *Bresl.* 1761, 8vo. Vom Verdienste, *Berl.* 1765, 8vo.

ADVERSARIES OF WOLF, AND ECLECTICS.

356. Jealousy of Wolf, in addition to other more justifiable motives, raised up a formidable antagonist to his system in the person of *John Joachim Lange*[q], who sounded the alarm against it, as a mass of Fatalism and Atheism, destructive alike of religion and government. His strictures presently excited the same apprehensions in other learned men, such as *Dan. Strähler*[r], *J. Fr. Müller*[s], etc. and brought about a decree against the publication of Wolf's doctrines in the Universities. The greater part of the adversaries of that philosopher were men of narrow minds, and prejudiced opinions; some few were actuated by more laudable motives, the desire of maintaining perfect freedom of discussion and hatred of party-spirit; but almost all directed their views only to the consequences of his system without ascending to its principles. A small number examined it with more enlarged views, and acquired a durable reputation, such as *Andreas Rüdiger* (following §), *J. P. de Crousaz* (the same), and more particularly *Chr. Aug. Crusius* (§ 358), and *J. G.*

[q] Born at Gardelegen 1670: professor of Theology at Halle, from 1709 to 1744.

J. JOACH. LANGE, Causa Dei et Religionis Naturalis adversus Atheismum, etc., *Hal.* 1723, 8vo. Modesta Disquisitio novi Philosophiæ Systematis de Deo, Mundo, et Homine, et præsertim harmonia commercii inter Animam et Corpus Præstabilita, *Hal.* 1723, 4to. (The author endeavours to demonstrate the agreement, in this particular, of the doctrines of Spinoza with those of Leibnitz). Placidæ Vindiciæ Modestæ Disquisitionis, *Ibid.* EOD. *Bescheidene aufpührliche Entdeckung der Falschen und Schädlichen Philosophie, Halle,* 1724, 4to. Nova Anatome seu Idea Analytica Systematis Metaphysici Wolfiani, *Francof. et Lips.* 1726, 4to.

A Complete Collection of the Works published during the Controversy between Wolf and Lange has been printed (in Germ.) at Marburg, 1737, 8vo.

[r] Objections to the Rational Thoughts of M. WOLF on God, etc. part I, *Halle,* 1723, 8vo., part II, 1724. Wolf replied by his Sure Method in answer to False and Calumnious Imputations, 1723 (Germ.)

[s] † Objections to the Rational Thoughts of WOLF on the Faculties of the Human Intellect, etc., *Giessen,* 1731, 8vo.

Darjes (the same). Most of the controversies affected less the general theory of Wolf and Leibnitz than particular doctrines, for instance, the Monadologia; the Pre-established Harmony; Free-will and Determinism. Some fine observations relative to *Method* were occasionally elicited.

357. *Andreas Rüdiger*[t] distinguished himself as an Eclectic of an original character, of great acuteness and learning; detected many imperfections inherent in the system of philosophy then prevalent, and endeavoured to reform it. He repeatedly changed, however, his own views; nor was his mind sufficiently profound to enable him to arrive at a well-founded system. He rendered considerable service to Dialectics (though he erred in confounding the province of Logic with that of Metaphysics), and particularly in his elucidation of the doctrine and theory of Probability, which in a great measure had been neglected. His thoughts on the two methods of *sensible* and *intellectual* demonstration (Mathematical and Metaphysical), contain some valuable hints, and the germs of a clear distinction between Mathematics and moral philosophy. He made sensation and reality the ultimate foundation of philosophical truth. He maintained the spirituality of the soul, yet supposed it to possess extension, like all other created essences. Elasticity he held to be the characteristic property of Body. He attacked Wolf on the subject of Pre-established Harmony, asserting that it was incompatible with the free-agency of man. As a teacher he had considerable influence[u]. *Jean*

[t] Born at Rochlitz, 1673: was the pupil of Thomasius (§ 352); and died at Leipzic, 1731.

[u] Andr. Rudigeri Disp. de eo, quod omnes Ideæ Oriantur a Sensione, *Lips.* 1704. De Sensu Veri et Falsi libri IV, *Hal.* 1709, 8vo. second edition; *Lips.* 1722, 4to. Philosophia Synthetica, *Hal.* 1707; second edition, with this title: Institutiones Eruditionis, 1711, 8vo.; third edition, corrected, 1717. Physica Divina, Recta Via, eademque media inter Superstitionem et Atheismum, etc. *Francof. ad M.* 1716, 4to. Philosophia Pragmatica, *Lips.* 1723, 8vo. † Opinions of Wolf respecting the Nature of the Soul, etc., with the Objections of Rüdiger, 1727, 8vo.

Pierre de Crousaz (§ 343) instituted a most complete examination of the system of Wolf[x]. He was an Eclectic, as was *J. F. Buddeus*[y] (§ 352), *J. G. Walch*[z], *S. C. Hollmann*[a], with several other learned men of that day. His works contain a rich fund of excellent remarks and judicious opinions.

358. *Chr. Aug. Crusius* by his acuteness as a reasoner has deserved the first place among the opponents of Wolf. He was born at Leune near Merseburg, in 1712, and having studied under Rüdiger, became professor of theology and philosophy at Leipsic; where he died in 1775. The disinclination for Wolf's system, which he

[x] J. P. DE CROUZAZ, Observations Critiques sur l'Abrégé de la Logique de M. WOLF, *Genève*, 1744, 8vo. (cf. § 351, note [b]). La Logique, ou Système des Reflexions qui peuvent conduire à la netteté et à l'étendue de nos Connaissances, *Amsterd.* 1712, 8vo.; third edition, *Amsterd*, 1725, 4 vols. 8vo. Logicæ Systema, *Genev.* 1724, 11 vols. 8vo. De Mente Humana Substantia a Corpore distincta et Immortali, Dissert. Philosophica Theologica, *Groning*, 1726, 4to. De l'Esprit Humain, *Bâle*, 1741, 4to. Traite du Beau, *Amsterd.* 1712; second edition, 1724, 2 vols. 12mo. Traité de l'Education des Infans, *La Haye*, 1722, 2 vols. 12mo.

[y] Born 1667; died 1729.

Jo. FRANC. BUDDEI Elementa Philosophiæ Instrumentalis, sive Institutionum Philosophiæ Eclecticæ, tom. I—III, *Hal.* 1703, 8vo. sixth edition, 1717. Elementa Philos. Theoreticæ, *ibid.* 1703, 8vo. and other editions. Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, *Jen.* 1717. † Thoughts on the Philosophical System of M. WOLF, *Fribourg*, 1724. † A Modest Reply to the Observations of WOLF, *Jena*, 1724, 8vo.; and, † A Modest Proof that the Difficulties proposed by BUDDEUS are well founded. Elementa Philosophiæ Practicæ, 1695, 8vo. and other editions. Selecta Jur. Nat. et Gent. *Hal.* 1704—1717, 8vo.

[z] Born at Meiningen, 1695; died 1775.

G. WALCH, † Introduction to Moral Philosophy. *Leips.* 1729, 8vo. The same in Latin, 1730, 8vo. † Philosophical Dictionary, *Leips.* 1726, and other editions.

[a] Born at Alstettin, 1696; died 1787.

He was one of the earliest antagonists of Wolf, whom he attacked in his Commentatio Philosophica de Harmonia inter Animam et Corpus Præstabilita, *Viteb.* 1724, 4to. Institutiones Philosophicæ, 2 vols. *Viteb.* 1727. Paulo uberior in omnem Philosophiam Introductio, tom. I, *Viteb.* 1734, tom. II, III, *Got.* 1737—1740, 8vo. Philosophia Prima quæ Metaphysica vulgo dicitur, *Gotting.* 1747, 8vo. Diss. de Vera Philosophiæ Notione, *Viteb.* 1728, 4to.

had imbibed from his preceptor, was confirmed by a sincere attachment to revealed religion, and by his practical temper. He endeavoured to discover a system in unison with Reason and Revelation, which might correct the errors of Wolf's theory, especially objecting to the abuse of the principle of "a Sufficient Reason." His mind, however, was not sufficiently profound nor liberal, nor his observation of the human mind sufficiently comprehensive to enable him to detect and expose the leading errors of the Dogmatism of his day. Consequently he was unable to effect any real reformation, though his views were, in many respects, more correct than those of his contemporaries. He became the author of an ingenious, well-digested, consistent, and harmonious system; but frequently lost himself in capricious hypotheses, and mystical conceptions[z]. According to him, *Philosophy is the sum of rational truths, of which the objects are durable in their nature.* It is distinguished from Mathematics by its Object and Method. It comprehends Logic, Metaphysics, and Practical philosophy (*Disciplinarphilosophie*). Instead of the principle of Contrariety or Contradiction, which Wolf had adopted as the foundation of his system, he lays down that of *Conceivability* (*Gedenkbarkeit*) which comprehends, as he asserts, the principles of Inseparability, and Incompatibility; and assigns as the proximate reason of the certainty of human knowledge, the impulse of which we are conscious, and (as it were) a sort of *internal constraint* to accept certain things as truths: referring to the Divine

[z] Christ. Aug. Crusius, Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss, *Leipz.* 1747, 8vo. Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, insofern sie den zufälligen entgegengesetzt werden, *Leipz.* 1745, 8vo. Dissertatio de Usu et Limitibus Rationis sufficientis, *Lips.* 1752. De summis Rationis Principiis, *Lips.* 1752, 8vo. Abhandl. von dem rechten Gebrauche und der Einschränkung des sogenannten Satzes vom zureichenden oder besser determinirenden Grunde, N. A. *Leipz.* 1766, 8vo. Anleitung üb. Natürl. Begebenheiten ordentlich. u. vorsichtig nachzudenken, 2 B. *Leipz.* 1774, 8vo.

Justin Elias Wüstemann Einleit. in das Lehrgebäude des Hrn. Dr. Crusius, *Wittenb.* 1751, 8vo.

Veracity as the ultimate foundation of all ascertained Truth.

In Logic he sets out with psychological observations; attributing to the soul a plurality of faculties. In metaphysics he limits and restricts the 'Sufficient Cause' of his adversaries, by distinguishing between the Essential Cause and the Causal (*Existential—und Causalursache*); and by assuming as the principle of Free-agency that of Original Activity: which theory implied that of Indifferentism. He examined with accuracy the idea of Existence, and maintained that Space and Time were Abstracts of Existence; which compelled him to consider them as attributes of God and elementary essences. He rejected the customary proofs of a Divinity, derived from the idea of a Perfect Being, because it was confounding, as he asserted, real with ideal existence: and also that deduced from the contingent objects of the material world: and, instead, attempted to draw one from the Contingency of Substances. He attributed to the Deity a supreme free-agency, infinite and unrestricted: acknowledged Him to be the sole Creator and Governor of the world: asserted His will to be the only law of reasonable beings: and His glory the final cause of the creation. He was led by these views to reject the Optimism of Leibnitz. Another Eclectic, very popular in his day, *Joach. J. Darjes*[a], resembled Crusius in many of his opinions. In Practical philosophy he more approximated Wolf.

359. In *Morals*[b], Crusius drew his conclusions not

[a] Born at Güstron, 1714; died professor of Moral Philosophy at Francfort on the Oder, 1791.

Jo. Ge. Darjes, Via ad Veritatem, *Jen.* 1755; *Deutsch.* 1776, 8vo. Elementa Metaphysices, *Jen.* 1743-44, 2 vols. 4to. Aumerkungen über einige Sätze der Wolfischen Metaphysik, *Frankf. u. Leipz.* 1748, 4to. Philosophische Nebenstunden, *Jen.* 1749—1752. 1V Sammlungen. 8vo. Erste Gründe der Philosophischen Sittenlehre, *Jen.* 1755, 8vo. Institutiones Jurisprudentiæ Universalis, *Jen.* 1745, 8vo.

See Schlichtegroll's Nekrol. for the year 1792, 2 vols.

[b] Crusius, Anweisung vernünftig zu leben, darinnen nach Erklärung des menschl. Willens die Natürl. Pflichten und die Allgem. Klugheitslehren im

from the conceptions of the intellect, but the suggestions of the will and conscience. He derived the idea of duty from moral necessity or *obligation:* He asserted the free-agency of the human mind (which he contemplated principally in a negative point of view, i. e. as uninfluenced by physical or material laws), and developed the formal conditions of our free-will actions, and the motives of them. The principle of a moral law led him to that of a moral Governor and Legislator, and consequently to the hypothesis which ascribes all moral obligations and laws to the Divine Authority, deducing, as the Schoolmen had done, the principles of Morals from the Will of God. *That what is consistent with the nature of the Divine perfections, and accords with the designs of God, is good; and becomes obligatory on all rational beings.* God demands of His rational creation, in the first place that they should be good: and also wills their happiness, as a consequence of virtue.

This system contains many excellent and true remarks, and some well-founded though imcomplete distinctions between Necessity and Duty, or Obligation—Happiness and Virtue; but founded as it is upon an external principle of obligation, and without a determinate notion of virtue, is far from the perfection necessary to the ends of science.

DISSEMINATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF WOLF AND HIS ADHERENTS.

360. In spite of all his opponents and persecutions (especially in the first quarter of the eighteenth century), Wolf had many followers, and became the founder of a School which was long the prevailing one, (especially during the second quarter of the eighteenth century), and possessed great influence through the talents of those who espoused it. The Leibnitzo-Wolfian theory was at first defended, enlarged, and applied, in a form decidedly

richtigen Zusammenhange vorgetragen werden, *Leipz.* 1744, 3. Aufl. 1767, 8vo.

Scholastic: subsequently, a greater degree of good taste and a more liberal style was adopted by its adherents, after the manner of the French and English writers [c].

The most celebrated disciples of Wolf were: *G. Bern. Bilfinger*, or more properly *Büllfinger* [d]; *L. Ph. Thummig* [e]; and among the Theologians, the provost *J. G. Reinbeck* [f]; *I. Gottl. Canz* [g]; *J. P. Reusch* [h]; and *G. H. Riebov* or *Ribbov* [i]. To these must be added the

[c] K. Günther Ludovici ausführlicher Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Wolfischen Philosophie, II. Augs. *Leipz.* 1737. III. Th. 8vo. Neueste Merkwürdigkeiten der Leibnitz-Wolfischen Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1738, 8vo. Sammlung u. Auszüge der sämmtlichen Streitschriften wegen der Wolfischen Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1737, II Th. 8vo.

[d] Professor at Tübingen; born 1693, died 1750.

Ge. Bern. Bilfinger, Dilucidationes Philosophicæ de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, et Generalibus Rerum Affectionibus, *Tubing.* 1725, 4to; 1740—1768. Præcepta Logica curante Ceph. Frid. Vellnagel, *Jen.* 1729, 8vo. Cf. Bibliog. § 349. Et: Epistolæ Amœbeæ Bulfingeri et Hollmanni de Harmonia Præstabilita, 1728. De Triplici Rerum Cognitione, Historica, Philosophica, et Mathematica, *Tubing.* 1722, 4to. Commentationes Philosophicæ de Origine et Permissione Mali, Præcipue Moralis, *Francf. et Leips.* 1724, 8vo.

[e] Born at Culmbach, 1697; died professor at Cassel, 1728.

Lud. Phil. Thümmig, Institutiones Philosophiæ Wolfianæ, *Francof. et Lips.* 1725-26, 8vo., 2 vols. (A brief account of Wolf's system). De Immortalitate Animæ ex intima ejus Natura Demonstrata, *Hal.* 1721. De Principio Jur. Nat. Wolfiano, *Cassellis*, 1724. Meletemata varii et rarioris Argumenti in unum volumen collecta.

For an account of his other works, consult Hartmann, † Introduction to the History of the Systems of Leibnitz and Wolf, (mentioned above), p. 1106.

[f] Born at Zelle, 1682; died 1741.

See his † Preface on the Advantages of Philosophy in the study of Theology, prefixed to Considerations on the Sacred Truths contained in the Confession of Augsburg, etc., *Berl. et Leips.* 1731, 4to.

[g] Born at Tübingen, 1690; died 1753.

Isr. Gottl. Canz, Philosophiæ Leibnitzianæ et Wolfianæ Usus in Theologia, *Francof. et Lips.* 1728—1734, 8vo. Disciplinæ Morales Omnes, etc., *Lips.* 1739, 8vo. Antologia, *Tubing.* 1741, 8vo.

[h] Born at Almersbach, 1691; died professor of Theology at Jena, 1757.

Joh. Pet. Reusch, Via ad Perfectiones Intellectus Compendiaria, *Isenaci*, 1728, 8vo. Systema Logicum, *Jen.* 1734, 8vo. Systema Metaphysicum Antiquiorum atque recentiorum, *Jen.* 1735, 8vo.

[i] Born near Götting., 1724; died 1774.

† Riebovius, Expansion of the Ideas of M. Wolf, respecting the Deity, etc., *Francf. et Leips.* 1726; and, Dissertatio de Anima Brutorum, (added to his edition of Rorarius), *Helmst.* 1729, 8vo.

Jurists *J. A. F. von Ickstadt*[k]; *John G. Heineccius* (born at Eisenberg, 1680; died a professor at Halle, 1741); *J. Ulr. von Cramer*[l]; and *Dan. Nettelbladt*[m]; *J. J. Schierschmidt*[n]; but especially *J. H. Winckler*[o]; *J. Chph. Gottsched*[p]; *J. A. Ernesti*[q]; *Fr. Chph. Baumeister*[r]; *Martin Knutzen*[s], (the three last distinguished themselves by useful elementary works): and, above all, *Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten*[t]. The last greatly distinguished himself by a skilful analysis of our ideas, by several new hints, and by the first attempt yet made

[k] Born 1702; died 1776.

De Ickstadt, Elementa Juris Gentium, *Wirceb.* 1740, 4to. Opuscula Juridica, *Ingolst. et Aug. Vindel.*, 1747, 2 vols. 4to.

[l] Born at Ulm, 1706; died 1776.

Jo. Ulr. Cramer, Usus Philosophiæ Wolfianæ in Jure, *Marb.*, Specimina XIII, 1740, 4to. Opuscula, *Marb.*, 1742, 4 vols. 4to.

[m] Born at Rostock, 1719; died 1791.

Dan. Nettelbladt, Systema Elementare Universæ Jurisprudentiæ Naturalis, usui Jurisprudentiæ positivæ accommodatum, *Hal.* 1749; fifth edition, 1785, 8vo.

[n] Died professor of Law at Erlangen, 1778.

[o] Born at Leipsic, 1703; died 1772.

J. H. Winckler, Institutiones Philos. Wolfianæ, etc., usibus Academicis accommodatæ, *Lips.* 1735, 8vo.

[p] Born near Königsberg, 1700; died, 1766.

J. Chph. Gottsched, † First Principles of all Philosophy, etc., *Leips.* 1734, 2 vols. 8vo.; second edition, 1735-36.

[q] Born at Tennstädt, 1707; died 1781.

[r] Born 1708; died at Görlitz, 1785.

Fr. Chr. Baumeister, Philos. Definitiva, hoc est, Definitiones Philosophicæ ex Systemate libri Baronis a Wolf in unum collectæ, *Viteb.* 1735, 8vo.; 1762.

[s] Died 1751.

Mart. Knutzen, Elementa Philosophiæ Rationalis sive Logica, *Regiomont.* 1771, 8vo.

† On the Immateriality of the Soul, *Francf.* 1744, 8vo.

Systema Causarum Efficientium, *Lips.* 1745, 8vo.

[t] Born at Berlin, 1714; died at Francfort on the Oder, 1762.

Alex. Gottl. Beaumgarten, Philosophia Generalis, edidit cum Dissert. procœmiali de Dubitatione et Certitudine, J. Chr. Förster, *Hal.* 1770, 8vo. Metaphysica, *Hal.* 1739, 8vo. Ethica Philosophica, *Hal.* 1740, 8vo. Jus Naturæ, *Hal.* 1765, 8vo. De Nonnulis ad Poëma pertinentibus, *Hal.* 1735, 4to. Æsthetica, *Francof. ad Viadrim.* 1750—58, 2 vols. 8vo.; second edition, *Francf.* 1759.

Consult G. Fr. Meier, † Life of Baumgarten, *Halle*, 1763, 8vo.

at a system of Æsthetics, (or the principles of Taste). He described philosophy as the science of properties, which can be known by other means than that of faith. *G. Fr. Meier*[u], a disciple of the former, commented on the treatises of his master, and enlarged on certain questions.

361. Gradually, (about the middle of the eighteenth century), this school lost much of its credit, and the peculiar and pedantic formalities of the Wolfians were turned into ridicule[x]. Metaphysics too, sank in the public esteem; and the minds of men became directed more to the variety and multiplicity of objects to which a principle may be applied, and less to the investigation of a simple principle itself:—to the acquisition of fresh knowledge rather than to the consolidation of that already acquired. The Empiricism of Locke daily gained ground, and in consequence of this and of the prevailing spirit of the age, and a renewed taste for the *history* of philosophy, a species of Eclecticism began to prevail, more

[u] Died at Halle, 1777.

Sam. Gotth. Lange, Leben C. F. Meier's, *Halle.* 1778, 8vo.

Ge. Fr. Meier Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst, *Halle*, 1756, 8vo. Metaphysik, *Halle*, 1756. 4 Bde. 8vo. Beweis, dass die menschliche Seele ewig lebt. II Aufl., *Halle*, 1754, 8vo. Vertheidigung desselben, *Halle*, 1753. Beweis, dass keine Materie denken könne. Beweis der vorherbestimmten Uebereinstimmung, *Halle*, 1743, 8vo. Theoretische Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen, *Halle*, 1744, 8vo. Versuch eines neuen Lehrgebäudes von d. Seelen der Thiere, *Halle*, 1756, 8vo. Gedanken von dem Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode; Beurtheilung des abermaligen Versuchs einer Theodicee; Gedanken von der Religion. Anfangsgründe der schönen Wissenschaften, *Halle*, 1748; II Aufl. 1754, III Th. 8vo. Philosophische Sittenlehre, *Halle*, 1753—1761; 5 Th. 8vo. Betrachtung über die natürliche Anlage zur Tugend und zum Laster, *Halle*, 1776, 8vo. Recht der Natur. *Halle*, 1767, 8vo. Versuch von der Nothwendigkeit einer nähern Offenbarung, *Halle*, 1747, 8vo. Untersuchung verschiedener Materien aus der Weltweisheit, *Halle*, 1768—1771, 4 Th. 8vo.

[x] The French spirit of *persiflage* contributed much to this effect. Witness the *Candide* of Voltaire, first published 1757.

See, A Complete Collection of the Controversial Writings, published in the course of the Dispute between Maupertuis and Samuel König, *Leips.* 1758, 8vo. (Germ.).

adapted to pursuits of elegance and popular utility, than to the abstract research of remote principles.

I. *Scepticism of Hume.*

362. The spirit of Experimentalism continued to retain its predominant influence in England. *David Hartley*[y], the physician, whose religious and moral character bore a considerable resemblance to that of Bonnet (§ 365), pursued the inquiries of Locke relative to the soul, on principles exclusively materialist. The Association of ideas he made the foundation of all intellectual energy; and derived it from certain vibrations of the nerves. He allowed to man only a subordinate degree of free-will, asserting that the Deity is the original cause of all the operations of Nature, and that mankind are nothing more than His instruments, employed with reference to the final end of the Universe. The morality or immorality of actions is determined by their tendency to produce happiness or misery. Presently a much more acute genius pursued the path marked out by Locke, till he arrived at a more complete and decided Scepticism. The idealism of Berkeley (§ 340), which had never been popular, instead of checking, as its author had hoped, the spirit of Scepticism, contributed to encourage it. This was what *David Hume* did not fail to remark. He was born at Edinburgh in 1711, and early forsook the study of law for that of history and philosophy, to which he devoted the remainder of his life[z]. Taking the experi-

[y] Born at Illingworth, 1704; died at Bath, 1757.

David Hartley, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations; in two parts, *Lond.* 1749, 2 vols. 8vo. Theory of Human Mind, with Essays, by Jos. Priestley, *Lond.* 1775, 8vo.

[z] The Life of David Hume, written by himself, *Lond.* 1777, 12mo. Supplement to the Life of D. Hume; (See a letter from Adam Smith to W. Strachan).

A Letter to Ad. Smith, on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend D. Hume; by one of the people called Christians, *Oxford*, 1777.

Apology for the Life and Writings of D. Hume, etc., *Lond.* 1777.

Curious Particulars and Genuine Anecdotes respecting the late Lord Chesterfield and D. Hume, etc., *Lond.* 1788.

mental principles of Locke as the foundation of his system, he deduced from them many acute but specious conclusions respecting the nature and condition of man, as a reasonable agent. He was led on by arguments, the fallacy of which is lost in their ingenuity, to the inference that there is no such thing as ascertained *objective* truth: that our views are limited to the phenomena of Consciousness,—the impressions we are conscious of, and the *subjective* relations of the latter. The investigations of Hume were recommended not only by a great appearance of logical argumentation, but by an elegance, and propriety of diction, and by all those graces of style which he possessed in so eminent a degree; and which made his scepticism more dangerous than it deserved to be. Our perceptions, according to Hume, are to be divided into impressions or sensations and ideas: the last are copies of the former, and differ from them only inasmuch as they are less forcible and vivid. All the objects which reason can contemplate are either relations of ideas (for instance, the elements of Mathematics), or facts and matters of experience. Our conviction of the reality of any fact is founded on Sensation, Reflection, and an estimate of the relations of cause and effect. Our acquaintance with the laws of Causality does not come to us by any *à priori* principles, but simply by experience. We expect from similar causes similar consequences; and the principle of this anticipation

H. D. HUME, Treatise of Human Nature, etc., *Lond.* 1738, 2 vols. 8vo.; 1739, 2 vols. 4to.

Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, *Edinb.* 1742, part I, 8vo. Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, *Lond.* 1748, 8vo.; (In the third vol. of his Essays, Hume gave a new edition of this treatise). Political Discourses, *Lond.* 1749; *Edinb. Lond.* 1749; *Edinb.* 1752, (reprinted among his Essays, vol. II.). Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, *Edinb.* 1751, 8vo. The Natural History of Religion, *Lond.* 1755, 8vo.; (See Essays, vol. IV.). Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, *Lond.* 1770—1784, 4 vols. 8vo.

Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, second edition, *Lond.* 1779, 8vo.

(On this subject consult JACOBI, † David Hume, or, An Essay on Faith, Idealism, and Realism, *Breslau*, 1787, 8vo.: published also in his Works.

Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul, *Lond.* 1789, 8vo.

is to be sought in the *habitude* of the connection of certain phenomena, and in the Association of our ideas. There exists therefore no certain knowledge independent of Experience; nor any Metaphysical science, properly so called. After all, Experience does not possess any such demonstrative evidence as do the Mathematics; but is based upon a certain instinct, which may prove deceptive. We find that instinct contradicts the conclusions of philosophy with respect to the ideas of Space, Time, and Causality; and consequently we are compelled to doubt the evidence of Experience in these particulars: unless we give the preference to Natural Instinct over philosophical Scepticism. Geometry and Arithmetic are objects of abstract Science: Criticism (in matters of Taste) and Morality are objects of Sensation, and in no respect *form part of the province of the understanding*. In *morals*, Hume asserted that merit consists in the utility or agreeableness (utile et dulce) of man's character and qualities, as relating to himself or to others: he allowed that the understanding had considerable weight in the formation of a moral judgment, but denied that it was sufficient of itself to pronounce a sentence of moral approbation or disapprobation. Consequently he was led to make the Moral Sense, which he identified with Taste, the *primum mobile* of moral action. This Sense consists in a sentiment of human happiness and misery. His theory was calculated to support that of an original Moral Sense.

As for the question whether Self-love or Benevolence preponderate in the human mind, he leaves it unanswered.

The Scepticism of Hume was originally directed against the conclusions only of Speculative philosophy, but in fact would destroy the foundations of all real knowledge. He directed, however, his objections principally against the existence of the Deity, His providence; against the reality of Miracles, and the Immortality of the Soul: asserting that all these doctrines were unsupported by sufficient evidence.

His life and character were estimable. He died, August 25th, 1776, with perfect serenity and even gaiety.

OPPONENTS OF HUME, AND OTHER PHILOSOPHERS OF THE ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH SCHOOLS.

363. The Scepticism of Hume acquired of course the greatest notoriety, attacking as it did the foundations of religious as well as moral truth. Many antagonists of his doctrines undertook to refute them, but, instead of striking at the root of his Sceptical objections, and demonstrating their fallacy, they contented themselves with appealing to *Common Sense*, which was just what Hume desired. Among his opponents we must reckon in the first place three Scotchmen; *Thomas Reid*[a], a sincere inquirer after Truth, who maintained the existence of certain principles of knowledge, independent of experience, and treated moral philosophy as the Science of the human mind, allowing it, however, no other foundation than that of Common Sense, or a species of Intellectual Instinct.

The eloquent *James Beattie*[b], espoused the same cause with greater ardour, but with less of a philosophical spirit, and laboured to vindicate the truths attacked by the Sceptics; admitting the principle of a Moral Sense. He was the author also of some elegant treatises on Æsthetics.

[a] Born 1704; became a professor at Glasgow; and died 1796.

THOM. REID, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principle of Common Sense, third edition, *Lond.* 1796, 8vo. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, *Edinb.* 1785, 4to. Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, *Lond.* 1803, 3 vols. 8vo.

[b] Born 1735; professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, and afterwards at Aberdeen. Died 1803.

Account of the Life of James Beattie, by ALEX. BOWER, *Lond.* 1804.

JAMES BEATTIE, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, *Edinb.* 1770; fifth edition, *Lond.* 1774. Theory of Language, *Lond.* 1788, 8vo. Dissertations Moral and Critical, *Lond.* 1783, 4to. Elements of the Science of Morals, tom. I, *Edinb.* 1790; tom. II, 1793.

Lastly, *James Oswald* (flourished about 1769), a Scotch Ecclesiastic, exalted the principle of Common Sense [c] into the supreme canon of all truth, and the ultimate rule in all inquiries.

These authors have demonstrated the mischievousness of speculation when it would reduce all our convictions to demonstration: but have not avoided a contrary fault, that of making the intellectual principle inert and passive.

364. The celebrated physician, *Joseph Priestley* [d], criticised at the same time both Hume and his antagonists. He may be said to have been more successful with the latter, whose *instinctive principles* he justly styled *qualitates occultæ*. In opposition to Hume he alleged a proof of the existence of the Divinity, which was untenable [e]. He was a rank Determinist, and consistently with his principles, controverted, as Hartley had done, the doctrine of free-agency, and endeavoured to establish a system of materialism like that advocated by his predecessor [f]. Next came *Edward Search* (his real name was

[c] James Oswald, Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion, *Edinb.* 1766—1772, 2 vols. 8vo.

[d] Born at Fieldhead, 1733; died 1804.

[e] Jos. Priestley, An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind; Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to the Common Sense, *Lond.* 1774, 8vo. Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever, containing an Examination of the Principal Objections to the Doctrines of Natural Religion, and especially those contained in the writings of Mr. Hume, *Bath*, 1780, Part. I, II. Additional Letters, 1781—87.; and: A Continuation of the Letters, *Northumberland-town* (*U. S.*) 1794, 8vo.

The Life of Jos. Priestley, with Critical Observations on his Works, and Extracts from his Writings illustrative of his Character, Principles, etc., by J. Carry, *Lond.* 1804, 8vo.

[f] Jos. Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, etc., *Lond.* 1777, 8vo.

Three Dissertations on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, *Lond.* 1778, 8vo.

The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated, etc., *Lond.* 1777, 8vo.

Letters on Materialism and Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, by Priestley, *Lond.* 1776, 8vo. The last called forth answers from Palmer

Abraham Tucker[g]), who, in questions of Morals, referred every thing to personal expediency. On the other hand, *Richard Price*[h], in opposition to the Experimentalists, who would derive all our ideas from Sensation, maintained that the understanding is essentially distinct from the sensual system, and the source of phenomena not to be confounded with those which originate in the senses. He investigated with acuteness and ability many important questions relative to Morals, and controverted the doctrine of a Moral Sense, as irreconcileable with the unalterable character of moral ideas, which, as well as those of Substance and Cause, he maintained to be eternal and original principles of the intellect itself, independent of the Divine Will. He has admirably illustrated the differences existing between Morality and Sensation—Virtue and Happiness; at the same time that he points out the intimate connection existing between the two last[i]. On the other hand the theory of a moral sense found a defender in *Henry Home*[k], distinguished for his Critical works; and in *Adam Ferguson*[l], who

and BRYANT; and more particularly the work of RICHARD PRICE, entitled: Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, *Lond.* 1778, 8vo.

Auszüge aus DR. PRIESTLEY's Schriften über die Nothwendigkeit des Willens und über die Vibrationem der Gehirnnerven als die Materiellen Ursachen des Empfindens und Denkens, nebst Betrachtungen über diese Gegenstände und einer Vergleichung der Vibrationshypothese mit Hrn. DR. GALL's Schädellehre, *Altona*, 1806, 8vo.

[g] ED. SEARCH, Light of Nature Pursued, *Lond.* 1769—70, 5 vols. 8vo. Free-will, Fore-knowledge, and Fate, *Lond.* 1763, 8vo.

[h] Born at Tynton, 1723; died 1791.

[i] PRICE, Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, particularly those respecting the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, Relation to the Deity, Obligation, Subject, Matter, and Sanctions, *Lond.* 1758, 8vo.; third edition, *Lond.* 1787, 8vo.

[k] Born at Edinburgh: became Lord KAIMES in 1752; died 1782.

HENRY HOME, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, *Edinb.* 1751, 8vo. Historical Law, 1759, 8vo. The Principles of Equity, 1760, fol. Elements of Criticism, *Lond.* 1762, 3 vols. 8vo.; third edition, *Edinb.* 1765, 3 vols. 8vo. Sketches on the History of Man, *Lond.* 1774, 2 vols. 4to.

[l] Born in the Highlands of Scotland, 1724; died 1816.

AD. FERGUSON, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, *Lond.* 1769, 8vo. Principles of Moral and Political Science, *Edinb.* 1793, 2 vols. 4to. Essay on Civil Society, *Edinb.* 1766, 4to.

made virtue consist in the progressive development of the powers of the Soul in its advance towards intellectual perfection. *Adam Smith*[m], a friend of Hume's, and principally celebrated for his work on the Wealth of Nations, the text-book of Political Science, maintained that Morality can only consist in actions which are of a sort to merit universal approbation; and consequently made *Sympathy* the principle of Morality. By means of this faculty we put ourselves in the situation of the agent whose conduct we are considering, and then pass a sentence, uninfluenced by personal considerations, on the *propriety* or *impropriety* of his conduct. From such judgments, repeatedly formed, are deduced, according to Smith, general rules for our own conduct. The sum of his morality is this: "So act that other men may *sympathise* with you."

Thomas Payne[n], one of the founders of the independence of the United States, astonished even the English by the furious democracy of his ravings.

In connection with the metaphysical labours of the British writers, we ought to mention essays on the principles of Taste by *Alison*, *Gerard*, and *Burke;* as well as their speculations on Language, and the History of Mankind.

II. *French Empirical School.*

† History of the French Revolution, or the Commencement, Progress, and Effects of the (so called) New Philosophy of that Country, III Parts, *Leips.* 1827-28, 8vo.

[m] Born at Kirkaldy 1723; died 1790.

Ad. Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, sixth edition, *Lond.* 1790, 2 vols. 8vo. Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, *Lond.* 1776; second edition, 1777, 2 vols. 4to. Essays on Philosophical Subjects, etc., to which is prefixed an account of the life and writings of the author, by Dugald Stewart, *Lond.* 1795, 8vo.

[n] Born in Norfolk, 1737; died in America, 1809.

Common Sense, *Philadelphia,* 1776, 8vo. Rights of Man, being an Answer to Mr. Burke's attack on the French Revolution, parts I, II, seventh edition, 1791-92. The Age of Reason, being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology, parts I, II, *Lond.* 1794.

365. Philosophical research in England constantly pursued the path of experiment, sometimes with acute and profound, at other times with narrow and superficial views; religion being throughout the principal object to which its inquiries were directed. The same tendency prevailed in France also, modified however by the character of the French nation, as well as by the influence still possessed by the clergy. The metaphysics of Descartes and Malebranche had fallen into oblivion; Gassendi and Newton having taken their place; though a still more numerous party devoted themselves to the principles of Locke. Montesquieu[o], who investigated the Laws of Nations with the genius of a true philosopher, and the mathematician and naturalist *P. L. Moreau de Maupertuis*[p], pursued the experimental method without calling in question the truth of Revealed Religion. The influence of the philosopher of Ferney was more extensive and pernicious (see the following §). *Ch. Batteux*[q], may be considered the first Frenchman who proposed a theory of the fine arts. *Etienne Bonnot de Condillac*[r], laboured to bring to perfection the system of Experimentalism, and to trace all the operations of the mind of Man, since the Fall, to Sensation, by means of the prin-

[o] CHARLES SECONDAT, Baron de Montesquieu; born in the Château de la Brède, near Bourdeaux, 1689; died 1755.

De l'Esprit des Lois, 1748; (numerous editions). Œuvres, *Lond.* 1759, 3 vols. 4to; 5 vols. 8vo. (several other editions). Œuvres Posthumes, 1798, 8vo.

[p] Born at St. Malo, 1691; died at Bâle, 1759.

Essai de Philosophie Morale, *Lond.* 1750, 8vo. Essai de Cosmologie, *Berl.* 1750, 8vo. Œuvres, *Lyon*, 1756, 4 vols. 8vo.

[q] Born at Allendhuy, 1713; died 1780.

Les Beaux Ars réduits à un même Principe, *Paris*, 1746, (several editions). Cours de Belles-Lettres, ou Principes de la Littérature, *Paris*, 1747—50, (many editions).

[r] Born at Grenoble, 1716; died 1780.

Cours d'Etudes du Prince de Parme, par M. l'Abbé de CONDILLAC, *Paris*, 1776, 16 vols. 8vo.

Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines, *Amsterd.* 1746, 2 vols. 12mo.

Traité des Sensations, *Lond.* 1754, 2 vols. 12mo.

Traité des Animaux, *Amsterd.* 1755, 2 vols. 12mo.

Œuvres Philosophiques, *Paris*, 1795, 6 vols. 12mo. (several other editions).

ciple of the transformation and modification of its phenomena. The cultivation of Language he asserted to be the medium of improvement to Science; and maintained that Language had its origin in the involuntary cries by which we express pleasure and pain. He affected to analyse all knowledge according to the mathematical method, and laboured to reduce each particular science to its most simple expression, or in other words, to an identical proposition. It may be remarked that he confounds in his theory the principles of Experimental and Speculative philosophy, and approximates the Atomical Theory of Gassendi, by enumerating among original facts that of the existence of bodies; (see the Theory of Gassendi, § 314). *Charles Bonnet*[s] also rendered considerable service to psychology. He was an admirable observer of Nature, with a mind habitually religious. *He* also derived all our ideas from sensation, by means of certain fibres and their vibrations; distinguishing the mind from the body, but allowing it to possess nothing of its own but a twofold capacity of Sensation and Impulsion. He denied the doctrine of innate ideas; deduced all the phenomena of the understanding from sensation, and was consequently led to maintain that the Soul can effect nothing but through the agency of the body; which is the source of all the modifications of which the other is susceptible. In this manner he approached Materialism, and admitted the existence of an affinity between the reason of men and of other animals. Other writers followed up the consequences deducible from the Empirical System with greater consistency and

[s] Born at Geneva, 1720; died 1793.

(Ch. de Bonnet), Essai de Psychologie, ou considérations sur les opérations de l'âme, sur l'habitude et sur l'education, *Lond.* 1755, 8vo.

Essay Analytique sur les Facultés de l'âme, *Copenh.* 1759-60, third edit. 1775.

La Palingénésie Philosophique, ou Idées sur l'état passé et sur l'état futur des êtres vivans, *Genève*, 1769, 2 vols. 8vo.

Œuvres d'Histoire Naturelle et de Philosophie, *Neufchâtel*, 1779; second edition, 1783, 8 vols. 4to.

Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Vie et des Œuvrages de M. Ch. Bonnet, par J. Trembley, *Berne*, 1794, 8vo.

boldness; plunging into the abyss of Atheism, Materialism, and Absolute Determinism, in all questions affecting the Soul and Morals. Of this number was *La Mettrie*[t], a man of infamous character, who endeavoured to account for all the operations of the mind on principles merely mechanical. *Helvetius*[u] in like manner derived all its phenomena from sensible perception, and pronounced the notion of infinitude to be simply negative. To these must be added the authors of the too-famous Système de la Nature, *La Grange*, or the *Baron D'Holbach*[x], and *Robinet*[y]. We must attribute prin-

[t] Jul. Offroy de La Mettrie, born at St. Malo, 1709; died at Berlin, 1751.

Œuvres Philosophiques de M. de La Mettrie, *Lond.* (*Berl.*), 1751, 2 vols. 4to.; *Amsterd.* 1753—64, 2 vols, 8vo. Histoire Naturelle de l'âme, *La Haye*, (*Paris*), 8vo.; (this work, by order of the Parliament, was burnt by the hands of the executioner). Traité de la Vie heureuse de Sénèque, *Postdam*, 1748. L'Ecole de la Volupté (*id.* sous le titre de l'Art de Jouir), 1750. L'Homme Machine, *Leyd.* 1748, 12mo. L'Homme Plante, *Postdam*, 1748, 8vo.

In answer to these works were published: L'Homme plus que Machine, par Elie Luzac, *Lond.* (*Leid.*), 1748; second edition, *Götting.* 1755, 12mo. De Machina et Anima Humana prorsus a se invicem distinctis Commentatio, auct. Balth. Lud. Tralles, *Breslav.* 1749, 8vo.

Godofr. Ploucquet, Dissert. de Materialismo, *Tubing.* 1750, cum Supplemento et Confutatione Libelli: L'Homme Machine, *ibid.* 1751, 4to.

[u] Claude Adrian Helvetius, born at Paris, 1715; died 1771.

De l'Esprit, *Paris*, 1758, 4to.; 2 vols. 8vo.

De l'Homme, de ses Facultés et de son Education, *Lond.* (*Amsterd.*), 1772, 2 vols. 8vo.

Les Progrès de la Raison dans la Recherche du Vrai, *Lond.* 1775, 8vo.

Œuvres complètes, *Amsterd.* 1776, 5 vols. 12mo.; *Deux-Ponts*, 1784, 7 vols. 8vo.; *Paris*, 1794, 5 vols. 8vo; 1796, 10 vols. 12mo.

Eloge de M. Helvétius, (*Genève*), 1774, 8vo. Essai sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de M. Helvétius (par Duclos?), en avant de son Poëme didactique, intitulé: Le Bonheur, *Lond.* (*Amsterd.*), 1773, 8vo.; and in his Œuvres complètes.

[x] Paul H. D. Baron von Holbach, died 1789.

Système de la Nature, ou des Lois du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral, par feu M. Mirabaud, (La Grange? le Baron d'Holbach?), *Lond.* 1770, 2 vols. 8vo.

In reply see: Bergier, Examen du Matérialisme, ou Réfutation du Système de la Nature, *Paris*, 1771, 2 vols. 8vo.

De Castillon, Observations sur le Livre intitulé: Syst. de la Nat., *Berl.* 1771, 8vo.

cipally to the influence of the French Encyclopedists the popularity which was enjoyed by a species of philosophy[z] which consisted in unfounded speculations (on the principles of Materialism) on all abstruse subjects, together with arguments from analogy pushed to an extravagant length. To this must be added, the affectation of making science of every kind popular and accessible to all; and the habit of ridiculing as pedantic all serious and profound philosophical inquiries.

366. The men who at this period were dignified in France with the title of philosophers, professed to remove the fetters in which freedom of thought was confined; but influenced by narrow and frivolous views, disseminated none but worthless doctrines which had the tendency to confound rational man with brute Nature, or on the other hand to deify the material world: pronouncing the belief in a God to be superfluous or problematical, and rejecting all *positive* or revealed religion as a device of priestcraft. The universal corruption of the aristocracy, and the puerility of a ceremonial form of worship, procured for such opinions a ready acceptance. With views like these the Encyclopedists prosecuted with zeal their

Réflexions Philosophiques sur le Syst. de la Nat., par M. Holland, (Georg. Jonath.), *Paris*, 1772, 2 vols. 8vo.; *Neufchâtel*, 1773.

(Voltaire), Réponse au Système de la Nature, *Genève*, 1772; et Encyclopédie, artic. *Dieu*.

Le Vrai Sens du Système de la Nature, (par Helvétius), ouvrage posthume; (this work is made up of extracts).

† F. X. V. Mangold, A Calm Refutation of Materialism, in answer to the author of the System of Nature, *Augsb.* 1803, 8vo.

y Jean Baptiste Robinet; born at Rennes, 1723.

Robinet, Considérations Philos. de la Gradation Naturelle des formes de l'être, ou les Essais de la Nature, qui apprend à faire l'Homme, *Amstd.* 1767, 2 vols. 8vo. Parallèle de la Condition et des Facultés de l'Homme avec celles des autres Animaux, trad. de l'Angl., *Bouillon*, 1769, 12mo. See bibliog. § 349.

z On French Empiricism, consult W. R. Bodmer, Le Vulgaire et les Métaphysiciens, ou Doutes et Vues critiques sur l'Ecole Empirique, *Paris*, 1802, 8vo.

See the works of M. M. Barante and Jay, On the French Literature of XVIII Century, (French).

pernicious plan; particularly *Diderot*[a], and *D'Alembert*[b]; aided by the popularity of Helvetius and Voltaire[c]. Others (like *Rousseau*), whose views were not altogether so objectionable, did more harm than good by a mass of declamations, well-meant in certain respects, but pernicious in their effects. In *practical* philosophy, the opinion daily gained ground that the little Morality they chose to require, ought to be founded on experimental observation of the nature of Mind. From Self-love they deduced a system of Self-expediency, at variance with the essential characteristics of morality. In this manner Helvetius attempted to deduce all meritorious actions from interested motives, and allowed them to be meritorious only as far as they contributed to the well-being of some particular society of men[d]. Others inconsistently attempted to ally the maxims of a better system of

[a] DENNIS DIDEROT, born at Langres, 1713; died 1784.

Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts, et des Métiers, par une Société de Gens de Lettres; mis en ordre et publié par M. DIDEROT, *Paris*, 1751—1763, 27 tom. folio pour le texte, 6 vols. de planches. Seconde édition, 1783—1800, 63 livraisons, 4to.

Vues Philosophiques, ou Protestations et Déclarations sur les Principaux Objets des Connaissances de l'Homme; nouv. éd. *Berlin*, 1755, 12mo. (par PRÉMONTVAL.)

DIDEROT. Pensées Philosophiques, *La Haye*, 1746, 12mo. (a work directed against Christianity, and burned by the hands of the executioner). Lettre sur les Aveugles, à l'Usage de ceux qui Voient, *Paris*, 1749. Pensées sur l'Interprétation de la Nature, *Paris*, 1754, et 1759, 12mo. Œuvres Philosophiques, 6 vols. *Amsterd.* 1772. Œuvres complètes, *Lond.* 1773, 5 vols.

See the Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de feu M. DIDEROT, by his daughter, MAD. DE VAUDEUIL, in the periodical work of SCHELLING, entitled: *Zeitschrift für Deutsche*, Fasc. I, 1813.

[b] JEAN LE ROND D'ALEMBERT, born at Paris, 1717; died, 1783.

Mélanges de Littérature, d'Histoire et de Philosophie de M. D'ALEMBERT, *Paris*, 1752, 5 vols. 12mo.; 1770, 5 vols. 8vo.

CONDORCET, Eloge de M. D'ALEMBERT, 1783.

[c] MARIE FRANÇOIS AROUET DE VOLTAIRE, born, 1694, died, 1778. See his Life by CONDORCET, and since by ANCILLON, Mélanges de Litt. et de Phil.

Lettres Philosophiques, par VOLTAIRE (burnt by the executioner). Candide, ou l'Optimisme. Œuvres, several editions.

[d] In his work De l'Esprit, mentioned above. Among other replies to this work see: CHR. WILH. FRANCH. WALCH, De Consensu Virtutis Moralis et Politicæ contra Helvetium, *Gotting.* 1759.

morality to exclusive Self-love: for instance *Mably*[e], and *Rousseau*, who had the talent to declaim about virtues which he did not practise[f]; and who, with *Robinet*[g], admitted the existence of a moral sense. The daring and short-sighted speculations of *Rousseau* respecting Nature, Education, and Polity, are sufficiently known, as well as the pernicious results to which they conducted. To this second description of French moralists Diderot also belongs[h].

It may be remarked that after the publication of Montesquieu's splendid work on Law, a great degree of attention was excited in France by the subject of Legislation; which was treated by their writers with unrivalled temerity and extravagance. Abundance of theories on this subject, as well as on the Laws of Government and Nations, appeared, professing to discuss those points with a view to the Principles of Philosophy[i].

[e] Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, born at Grenoble, 1709; died, 1785.

[f] Born at Geneva, 1712; died, 1778.

J. J. Rousseau, Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondemens de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes, *Amsterd.* 1755, 8vo. Lettres Ecrites de la Montagne, *Amsterd.* 1764, part II, 8vo. Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique, *Amsterd.* 1762, 12mo. Emile, ou de l'Education, *Amsterd.* 1762, 8vo. Œuvres complètes, *Genève*, 1782, 17 vols.

[g] In the work mentioned above, § 349. See also: Vue Philosophique de la Gradation Naturelle des formes d'être, ou les Essais de la Nature qui apprend à faire un Homme, *Amsterd.* 1767, 2 vols. 8vo.

[h] Principes de la Philosophie Morale, ou Essai sur le Mérite et la Vertu, 1745. See § 339, note.

[i] We may particularise Gasp. de Real; born at Sisteron, 1682; died, 1752. Traité complet de la Science du Gouvernement, *Paris*, 1762—64, 8 vols. 4to. Mably, De la Législation, ou Principes des Lois, *Amsterd.* 1776, 2 vols. 8vo. Doutes proposés aux Economistes sur l'Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés, *Paris*, 1766, 12mo. Œuvres, *Paris*, 1793, 12 vols. 8vo.; and also: l'Ecole des Physiocrates, ou Economistes. Quesnay, born, 1697; died, 1774. Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés Politiques; Mirabeau the father, Condorcet, Mirabeau the elder, and Emm. Sieyes.

Burlamaqui (Jean-Jacq., born, 1694, died, 1748), Principes du Droit Natur. Emmeric de Vattel, born, 1714, died, 1767. Droit des Gens (after Wolf), *Lond.* 1757, 2 vols. 4to.

III. *German Eclectics.*

367. The following authors belonging to the school of Wolf opposed themselves in part to the French philosophy. *Herm. Sam. Reimarus*[k], a Naturalist and Theologian, who united perspicuity to depth in his works on Logic, Natural Theology, and the instinct of brutes: *Gottfried Ploucquet*[l], an acute thinker, who simplified Logic, discovered a logical *calculus*, and laboured to illustrate the principal points of the doctrine of Monadologia. *J. H. Lambert*[m], a distinguished Mathematician, who applied the principles of his favourite science to the more exact demonstration of metaphysical problems.

[k] Born at Hamburgh, 1694; died a professor at the Gymnasium, 1765.

HERM. SAM. REIMARUS, † Theory of Reason, or the Method of employing Reason aright in the investigation of Truth, *Hamburgh and Kiel*, 1756, fifth edition, 1790, 8vo. † The Principal Truths of Natural Religion, *Hamburgh*, 1754. The fifth edition contains also the † Dissertation of J. A. REIMARUS, on the Existence of God and the Human Soul, 1781, 8vo.; sixth edition, 1791. † Considerations on the Instinct of Brutes, 1762, 8vo. fifth edition, with the notes of J. A. REIMARUS, 1798.

[l] Born, 1716; became professor at Tübingen; died, 1790.

G. PLOUCQUET (See preceding sect. and § 348.) Methodus tractandi infinita in Metaphysicis, *Tubing.* 1748, 4to. Methodus tam Demonstrandi directe omnes Syllogismorum Species quam vitia formæ detegendi ope unius regulæ, *Tubing.* 1763, 8vo. Principia de Substantiis et Phænomenis; accedit Methodus Calculandi in Logicis ab ipso inventa, cui præmittitur Comment. de Arte Characteristica Universali, *Francof. et Lips.* 1753, 8vo.; second edition, 1764, 8vo. Fundamenta Philosophiæ Speculativæ, *Tubing.* 1759, 8vo.; *ibid.* 1782, 8vo. Institutiones Philosophiæ Theoreticæ, *ibid.* 1772. Dernière édit., intit.: Expositiones Philos. Theor., *Stuttg.* 1782, 8vo. Elementa Philos. Contemplativæ s. de Scientia Ratiocinandi, Notionibus disciplinarum Fundamentalibus, etc., *Stuttg.* 1778, 8vo. Solutio Problematis Lugdunensis qua ex una hac Propositione concessa: existit aliquid, existentia entis realissimi cum suis attributis eruitur, *Tubing.* 1758, 4to. Commentationes Philos. Selectiones, etc., recognitæ, *Ultraj. ad Rhenum*, 1781, 4to. Variæ Questiones Metaphysicæ cum subjunctis responsionibus, *Tubing.* 1782, 4to.

† Collection of writings referring to the Logical Calculus of professor Ploucquet, with fresh additions, published by A. F. BÖCK, *Francf. and Leips.* 1766. Republished since.

[m] Born at Mühlhausen in Sundgau; died at Berlin, 1777. J. H. LAMBERT, † New Organon, or, Thoughts on the Right Method of determining the Characters of Truth, etc., *Leips.* 1764, 2 vols. 8vo. † Treatises on Logic and Moral Philosophy (edited by J. BERNOUILLI), vol. I, *Dessau*, 1782, 8vo.

368. It contributed to the impression which the works of Hume at first excited in Germany, that men had become in a manner weary of long and profound investigations of which they had seen so many unsuccessful instances; and had tacitly adopted the conviction that Truth is not to be attained by any single system, but, like a ray of light, is refracted and dispersed through many. In the place therefore of laborious research succeeded a species of Eclecticism[n] which contented itself with adopting whatever had an appearance of probability to recommend it, more especially if it seemed likely to prove of popular utility. *J. G. Sulzer*[o], a clear-sighted and talented inquirer, who united powers of observation to those of speculation, hesitated between the views of Wolf's school and those of the British metaphysicians, and in his investigation respecting the fine arts, which have done him honour, made it his object to discover a *moral* principle to account for their influence. He directed the attention of his countrymen to the speculations of Hume. Hitherto Eclecticism had proved a species of rampart against the overwhelming influence of particular systems; but at the epoch of which we are speaking it was nothing but a consequence of the doubt and uncertainty which embarrassed the minds of men. Empiricism had overpowered and stifled metaphysical inquiry, aided by the influence of French manners and

† Introduction to the Architectonic Science, etc., *Riga*, 1771, 2 vols. 8vo.
† Cosmological Letters on the Formation of the World, etc. *Augsb.* 1771, 8vo. Correspondence of KANT and LAMBERT, in KANT's Miscell. Works.

[n] See BEAUSOBRE, Le Pyrrhonisme Raisonable, *Berl.* 1755, 8vo.

[o] Born at Winterthur, 1720; died a professor at Berlin, 1779.

J. G. SULZER Moral. Betrachtungen über die Werke der Natur, herausg. von SACK, *Berl.* 1741, 8vo. Vorübungen zur Erweckung der Aufmersamkeit und des Nachdenkens, *Berl.* 1777, 3 Th. 8vo. Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste, *Leipz.* 1771—74, 2 B. letzte; Ausg. *ebend.* 1792—94, 4 B. Verm Philos. Schriften, *Leipz.* 1773—85; III Aufl., 1800. Mit einer Biogr. Vorrede von v. Blankenburg, 2 B., 8vo. Particularly: über den Ursprung der angenehmen und unaugenehmen Empfindungen, *Leipz.* 1773, 8vo.

FORMEY Eloge de MR. SULZER, *Berl.* 1779, 8vo. H. C. HIRZEL an Gleim über SULZER, den Weltweisen, 2 Th., *Zurich.* 1780, 8vo. Lebensbeschreibung, von ihm selbst aufgesetzt, *Berl.* 1809, 8vo.

literature, which found a powerful patron in Frederic the Great[p]. Such a state of things gave birth to the system of *J. B. Bassedow*[q]; who nevertheless endeavoured to combine solidity of argument with popular utility; and proposed felicity, the sentiment of approbation, and analogy, as principles of Truth; at the same time that he admitted in certain cases the obligation of belief, as a species of probable knowledge, superior to the testimony of the senses. Then came the system of the Jewish philosopher *Moses Mendelssohn*[r], who endeavoured to unite elegance to perspicuity in his speculations on the principles of Taste and Psychology. Next, the Naturalism of *G. S. Steinbart*[s], and the Essays of *J. A. Eberhard*[t];

[p] On the philosophy of Frederic the Great consult Fülleborn's Collect. Fasc. VII.

[q] Born at Hamburgh, 1723; died, 1790.

Joh. Bernh. Basedow's Philalethie oder neue Aussichten in die Wahrheit und Religion der Vernunft bis in die Gränzen der Offenbarung, *Altona*, 1764, 2 Th. 8vo. Theoretisches System der gesunden Vernunft, *Altona*, 1765, 8vo. Prakt. Philos. für alle Stände, *Dessau*, 1777, 2 vols. 8vo. See Schlichtegroll's Nekrol, 1790, 2 vols.

[r] Born at Dessau, 1729: died, 1786.

Moses Mendelssohn Abh. über die Evidenz in den Metaph. WW. *Berl.* 1764, 4to.; II Aufl. 1786. Phædon oder über die Unsterblichk. der Seele, *Berl.* 1767, 8vo.; VI Aufl. herausg. von Dr. Friedländer, *Berlin*, 1821, 8vo. Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes, *Berl.* 1785; II Aufl. 1786, 2 B. 8vo. Briefe über die Empfindungen, *Berl.* 1755, 8vo. Philosophische Schriften, *Berl.* 1761; 3 Ausg. 1777; 2 B. 8vo. Kleine Philos. Schriften mit einer Skizze seines Lebens von Jenisch (herausg. von Müchler), *Berl.* 1789, 8vo.

Leben und Meinungen Mendelssohns nebst dem Geiste seiner Schriften, *Hamb.* 1787, 8vo.

[s] Born at Zülichau, 1729; died, 1809.

Gotthelf Sam. Steinbart's System der reinen Philosophie oder Glückseligkeitslehre des Christenthums, *Züllichau*, 1778; IV Aufl. 1794. Philos. Unterhaltung zur weitern Aufklärung der Gluckseligkeitslehre Heft I—III *Züllichau*, 1782—86, 8vo. Gemeinnutzige Anleitung zum regelmässigen Selbstdenken, III Aufl. 1793, 8vo.

[t] Born at Halberstadt, 1738; died a professor at Halle, 1809.

Jo. Aug. Eberhard Allgem. Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens, *Berl.* 1776—86, 8vo. Neue Apologie des Sokrates, *Berl.* 1772—88. Von dem Begriffe der Philos. und ihren Theilem, *Berl.* 1778, 8vo. Kurzer Abriss der Metaphysik, *Halle*, 1794, 8vo. Vorbereitung zur Natürlichen Theologie *Halle*, 1781, 8vo. Sittenlehre der Vernunft, *Berl.* 1781—86, 8vo. Theorie der Schönen Künste und Wissenschaften, *Halle*, 1783; III Aufl. 1790, 8vo

a dexterous inquirer, who had the merit of making an able attempt to revive the principles of Leibnitz, and distinguished himself in the *application* of philosophy. —*E. Platner*[u] also inclined to the ideas of Leibnitz, but with a more sceptical turn of mind and greater acuteness; and added some valuable essays on Anthropology and Physiology. The tendency to a system of mere Eudæmonism which had been remarked in Wolf's theory, betrayed itself in the modified form it assumed under the hands of Platner: according to whom happiness or well-being, is the end of all existence, and *good* is that which conduces to the happiness of individuals, and of all; Virtue being free-will directed towards the attainment of what is truly good.

Christian Garve[x] made morality consist in the fulfilment of those laws which are obligatory on mankind at large, in all their various relations: such are the several principles of Virtue—Propriety—Benevolence—and Order. The Revision of Philosophy, by *Chph. Meiners*[y], belongs

Handbuch der Æsthetik für gebildete Leser, 4 Th. *Halle*, 1803, sqq.; II Aufl. 1807, ff. 8vo. Geist des Urchristenthums, *Berl.* 1807, 8vo. Versuch einer Allgemeinen Deutschen Synonymik, 6 Th. *Halle*, 1795; II Aufl. 1820. Fortgesetzt von Maass (XI—XII B.) Vermischte Schriften, *Halle*, 1784, 8vo. Neueste vermischte Schriften, *Halle*, 1788, 8vo. Philosophisches Magazin, *Halle*, 1788—92; 4 B. 8vo. Philosophisches Archiv. 2 B. 1792—95, 8vo. See Nicolai, Gedächtnisschrift auf J. A. Eberhard, *Berl.* 1810, 8vo.

[u] Born at Leipsic, 1744; died there, professor of Medicine and Philosophy, 1818.

E. Platner Philosoph. Aphorismen, *Leipzig*, 1776—82, 2 Th. 8vo.: neue umgearbeitete Aufl. 1793, 1800. Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise, *Leipz.* 1772, 8vo. Neue Anthropologie 1 B. *Leipz.* 1790, 8vo. Gespräche über den Atheismus, *Leipz.* 1781, 8vo. Lehrbuch der Logik und Metaphysik, *Leipz.* 1795, 8vo. For his life and character see the memoir published by his son in the Literary Journal of Jena, No. 38, 1819.

[x] Born at Breslau, 1742; died, 1798.

Chr. Grave Abh. üb. d. Verbindung der Moral u. d. Politik, *Bresl.* 1768. Betrachtungen über die allgem. Grundsätze der Sittenlehre, *Bresl.* 1798, 8vo. Versuche über verschiedne Gegenstände der Moral, etc., II Aufl. 1821, 8vo. Ueber das Daseyn Gottes, *Bresl.* 1802.

[y] Born, 1747; died, 1810.

Chph. Meiners Revision der Philosophie, 1 Th. *Gött u. Gotha*, 1772, 8vo. Abriss der Psychologie, 1773. Grundriss der Seelenlehre, *Leipz.* 1786. Untersuchungen über die Denk- und Willenskräfte, *Götting.* 1806, 2 Th. 8vo.

to his period; and the controversy between *J. C. Lossius*[z], and the acute *J. N. Tetens*[a], on the question whether Truth be or be not *objective*. The former maintained it to be *subjective*, and derived the highest principle of Thought from certain vibrations of the nervous system. To these we must add the popular Manuals of *J. H. Feder*[b], and *J. A. H. Ulrich* (§ 355, note.)

Nevertheless, we may observe that the German nation did not altogether lose either its characteristic depth of research, or a regard for the sacred interests of Mankind. Of this the pious C. F. GELLERT[c] is a sufficient proof; whose writings and lectures equally contributed to preserve a sense of religion and moral duty among his contemporaries.

369. In the place of Metaphysics, in Germany as in

Verm. Philos. Schriften, *Leipz.* 1775—76, 3 Th. 8vo., with several other works on Psychology and Ethics.

[z] JOH. CHRIST. LOSSIUS Physische Ursachen des Wahren. *Gotha*, 1775, 8vo. Unterricht der gesunden Vernunft, *Gotha*, 1777, 2 Th. 8vo. Neues Philos. Allgem. Reallexicon, *Erf.* 1803—7, 4 B. 8vo.

[a] Born at Tetenbüll, 1736; died, 1805.

JOH. NIC. TETENS Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung, *Leipz.* 1776—77, 2 B. 8vo. Gedanken über einige Ursachen, warum in der Metaphysik nur wenige ausgemachte Wahrheiten sind. Bützow u. Wismar, 1760, 8vo. Ueber die allgem. speculative Philosophie, *Bützow*, 1775, 8vo. (anonym.)

[b] Born, 1740; died a privy-councillor of Justice at Hanover, 1821.

JOH. GE. HEINR. FEDER's Institutiones Log. et Metaph. *Fef.* 1777. Grundriss der Philos. WW. *Coburg*, 1767, und Glob. A. TITTEL's Erläuterungen dazu, 1785, 8vo. Grundsätze der Logik u. Metaphysik, *Götting.* 1794, 8vo. Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen, dessen Naturtriebe, Veränderungen, etc., *Götting. und Lemgo*, 1779—93, 4 Th. 8vo.; II Aufl. 1783, sqq. with several other works. Ueber das moral. Gefühl, *Copenh.* 1792, 8vo. J. G. H. FEDER's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze (Autobiographie, von seinem Sohn herausgegeben), *Leipzig*, 1825, 8vo.

[c] Born at Haynichen, 1715; died professor of moral philosophy at Leipsic, 1769.

CHR. FRCHGOTT GELLERT Discours sur la Nature, et l'étendue et l'Utilité de la Morale, *Berl.* 1764, 8vo. Moral. Vorlesungen, herausg. von Ad. Schlegel und Heyer, 2 B., *Leipz.* 1770, 8vo. CHR. GARVE Ammerkungen über Gellerts Moral, seine Schriften überh. und seinen Charakter, *Leipz.* 1770, 8vo. Gellerts sämmtl. Schriften, *Leipz.* 1769—70, 7 Th. 8vo.

Great Britain, a species of empirical Psychology had acquired astonishing credit and influence. *Tetens*, (mentioned in preceding section), particularly distinguished himself, by prosecuting the inquiries of Locke respecting the origin of knowledge, with great acuteness, and without any taint of materialism. He illustrated the operations of the faculties of the understanding; made it his object to substantiate the proofs of an *objective* Truth, and to refute the scepticism of Hume; and thus eventually fell into the same path which was pursued by Kant. He attracted, however, little attention in his day. We may here place the anthropological researches of *C. F. Irwing*[d], *J. H. Campe*[e], *Dietr. Tiedemann*[f], *Platner*, *Garve* (see preceding section), *C. Ph. Moritz*[g], *J. J. Engel*[h], *Fr. Joach. Eschenburg*[i], of the able critic *J. G. E. Lessing*[k],

[d] Born at Berlin, 1728; died, 1801.

Carl Franz v. Irwing Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen, *Berl.* 1778, 4 Th. 8vo.

[e] Born at Teersen in Brunswick, 1746; died, 1818.

Empfindungs- und Erkenntnisskraft der menschl, *Seele*, 1776, 8vo. Ueber Empfindung und Empfindelei, *Hamb*, 1779. Sammlung einiger Erziehungsschriften, *Hamb.* 1777, 2 Th. 8vo. Theophron, *Hamb.* 1783, *Braunschw*, 1790, u. öfter.

[f] Born, 1748; died a professor at Marburg, 1806.

Untersuchungen über d. Menschen, *Leipz.* 1777—78, 3 Th. 8vo. Handbuch der Psychologie, herausgegeben von Wachler, *Leipz.* 1804, 8vo.; Vgl. oben Litt. 26 S.

[g] Born at Hameln, 1757; died, 1793.

Aussichten zu einer Experimentalseelenlehre, 1782, 8vo. Magaz. zur Erfahrungsseelenlehre, 10 Th. 1793—95; und Selbstcharakteristik in Anton Reiser, 1785—90. Abh. über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen, *Braunschw.* 1788, 8vo. Grundlinien zu einer vollständ. Theorie der schönen Künste (besides several other works).

[h] Born at Parchim, 1741; died, 1802.

Besides several treatises on Æsthetics: der Philosoph für die Welt, *Leipz.* 1775—77, 2 Th. 8vo.; N. A. 1801, sqq.; and in his works, *Berl.* 1801, sqq. 6 B.

[i] Born at Hamburgh, 1743; died, 1820.

Entwurf einer Theorie und Litteratur des schönen Wissenschaften, *Berl.* 1783, 8vo. IV Aufl. 1817, 8vo.

[k] Born at Kamenz, 1729; died, 1781.

Various Essays on Æsthetics and Criticism, and: Die Erziehung d. Menschengeschlechts. Sämmtl. Schriften, *Berl.* 1771—91, 30 B. 8vo.

and the theologian *J. G. Von Herder*[l], a man of comprehensive mind, besides many other writers on Criticism and the Fine Arts, some of whom followed the principles promulgated in Great Britain (by Hutcheson, Gerard, Hume, Home, and Burke, etc.); while others adopted the French theories, (particularly that of Batteux, see § 365); and others again attempted paths of their own. The influence of Moral Philosophy became more perceptible; not only as affecting the sciences immediately connected with it, such as the Mathematics, Physics, Natural History, and Medicine; but as operating on certain subordinate branches of science up to that time neglected; such as *Education* (treated after Rousseau by *Basedow, Campe, Reswitz*); *the theory of Language* (by *Herder* after *Harris*[m] and *Monboddo*); and *The History of Mankind* (zealously investigated by *Meiners, Isaac Iselin*[n], and *Herder*. The last attacked the jejune system of pretended discovery prevalent in his time, seconded by his ingenious contemporary *J. G. Hamann*[o], as well as by *Jacobi* (of whom presently), and by *Matthias Claudius* (the messenger of Wandsbeck). Among these *C. Th. Ant. Maria Von Dalberg* also deserves a place[p].

[l] Born at Morungen, 1744; died at Weimar, 1803.

The author of various works on Phil. Hist. and the Fine Arts, particularly: Ideen zur Philos. der Gesch. der Menschheit; Preisschrift über den Ursprung der Sprache seit, 1772—89. Adrastea; Kalligone; Terpsichore, etc.

[m] Born at Salisbury, 1709; died, 1750.

[n] Born at Bâle, 1728; died, 1782.

Versuch über die Gesch. der Menschheit, 1764, 8vo.

[o] Born at Königsberg; died at Münster, 1788.

Hamann's Schriften herausg. von Fr. Roth, 1—8 B., *Berl.* 1821, 8vo. (reviewed by Hegel in the Jahrbücher der wiss. Kritik, 1829). For his correspondencewith Jacobi see the works of the latter. See also the Sibylline Leaves of the Magician of the North, published by D. Fr. Cramer, *Leipz.* 1819, 8vo.

[p] Elector, Arch-Chancellor, and then Grand-Duke of Franckfort, and subsequently Archbishop of Ratisbon: born, 1744; died, 1817.

Betrachtungen über das Universum, *Erf.* 1776, VII Aufl. 1821. Vom Verhältniss zwischen Moral und Staatskunst, *Erf.* 1786, 4to. Gedanken von

Retrospective.

370. A review of the progress of philosophy during the period we have been considering will convince us that it had gained more in the apparent extent than the real value of its dominion. It is true that the different branches of philosophical science had acquired a rich mine of fresh materials, and a new study, that of the theory of Taste, had been laid open: the *application* of Philosophy to particular subjects, (for instance those of education and the political sciences), had been enlarged, and the influence of Moral Philosophy had come to be recognised throughout the whole circle of human knowledge. On the other hand, little progress had been made in the improvement of a philosophical *Method*. The questions respecting the true character of Philosophy, its Form, and its End, were scarcely stirred at all: the conflicting opinions with regard to the origin of knowledge had not been reconciled; and notwithstanding the recourse which had been had to the different methods of Observation, Reflection, and Demonstration, the principles of their application had scarcely been discussed. Everywhere prevailed Incertitude, Doubt, and Dissension, respecting the most important questions; with a barren and superficial Dogmatism. The combatants on every side had laid aside their arms rather from indifference and disgust for intellectual speculation, than because any one predominant and satisfactory solution of the points at issue had established peace. The philosophical sciences stood in need of more accurate limitations and more completely scientific forms, in consequence of the want of *Principles;* which the reformation Psychology had pretended to effect was inadequate to supply [q].

der Bestimmung des moral. Werths, *Erf.* 1787, 4to. Grundsätze der Æsthetik *ebend.* 1791, 4to. Vom Bewusstseyn als allgem. Grunde der Weltweisheit *ebend.* 1793, 8vo. u. a.

[q] Revision der Philosophie (by Meiners). See above § 368, note.

371. In Practical philosophy also might be observed conflict between the opposite tendencies of Empiricism and Rationalism; in which the former had obviously obtained the advantage. The claims of the Intellect had not indeed been altogether rejected, but had seldom been fairly and freely discussed; the Understanding being perpetually confounded with *Reflection*, and treated as the handmaid of sensation; and not as an independent power and energy. Some inquirers (e. g. Geulinx and Richard Price) had detected the two grand defects of most systems of Morality then received: 1st. That they either set out with self-love as their principle, or terminated in it as their end; producing nothing but a series of maxims more or less subservient to the mere attainment of Happiness by the exercise of Prudence. 2ndly That they did not recognise the Intellect as the first legislating principle of free-agency.

No lasting reform was however brought about by these observations.

The Ethics of the day, accordingly, amounted to little more than a selection of what appeared to be the best results, on an Eclectic plan, and with views altogether *subjective* and personal; consisting in deductions from the principles of Self-love and Sympathy. Free-will—the first requisite of a sound system of Ethics—occasioned considerable perplexities to the supporters of such theories; since either they contemplated a free-will purely psychological, or laboured to solve the problem on metaphysical grounds, and thereby inclined to Determinism or maintained a blind and unprincipled free-agency against which theoretical reason revolted. In proportion as the disputants became more and more sensible of the difficulties belonging to this question, they were tempted to desert the prosecution of such inquiries altogether, and to adopt in their stead the easier task of rendering Philosophy *popular* and—*superficial*.

To this subject belong:

De Premontval Pensées sur la Liberté, *Berl.* 1754, 8v
Le Diogène de d'Alembert, ou Diogène décent. Pensées libr

sur l'Homme et sur les Principaux Objets des Connaissances de l'Homme. Nouv. ed. *Berl.* 1755, 12mo. Vues Philosophiques, *Berl.* 1757; 2 tom. 8vo. Du Hazard sous l'Empire de la Providence, *Berl.* 1755, 8vo.

Versuche einer Anleitung zu einer Sittenlehre für alle Menschen (von Schulz), *Berl.* 1783—87, 4 Th. 8vo.

Jo. Aug. Heinr. Ulrich Eleutheriologie, oder über Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit, *Jen.* 1788, 8vo.

SECOND PERIOD.

FROM KANT TO OUR OWN TIMES.

IMPROVEMENT EFFECTED IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY BY MEANS OF THE CRITICAL METHOD.

I. GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

A. *Critical Idealism of Kant.*

Memoirs, etc. of Kant:

Ludw. Ernst. Borowski Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Kants, *Königsb.* 1805, 8vo. Reinhold Bernard Jachmann Im. Kant, Geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund, *Königsb.* 1805, 8vo. C. A. Ch. Wasianski Im. Kant. in seinen letzten Lebensjahren, *Königbs.* 1804, 8vo. Biographie Im. Kant's, *Leipz.* 1804; 4 Th. 8vo. J. Ch. A. Groihmann dem Andenken Kant's, *Berl.* 1804, 8vo. Fr. Bouterweck, Im. Kant, ein Denkmal, *Hamb.* 1804, 8vo. F. Th. Rink Ansichten aus Kant's Leben, *Königsb.* 1805, 8vo. Kant's Gedächtnissfeier, *Königsb.* 1811, 8vo.

372. A reformation in Philosophy had now become necessary. It was effected by a philosopher of the first order, who had qualified himself to correct the principal defects of the former systems by a long and ardent, but secret study of all the branches of the subject. His appearance at that time was the more opportune, because already several men of talent (*Lessing, Winkelmann, Hamann, Herder, Göthe,* and others) had excited by their various compositions a great degree of intellectual activity, and created a capacity for the reception of new

ideas on Science and the Arts. *Emmanuel Kant* was born at Königsberg, the 22nd of April, 1724; became a professor in the same city, and died February 12th, 1804. He may be styled a second Socrates, having created a new philosophy, which, by investigating the origin and the limits of human knowledge[a], revived the spirit of research, extended it, taught it its present position, and directed it to the true path of Science, through the cultivation of Self-knowledge. For the accomplishment of this task he was qualified by uncommon talents, studiously cultivated, and enriched by extensive reading. His piety and virtue set bounds to an exclusive spirit of speculation, and imparted to his works the character of their author. A profound love of truth and a pure moral sentiment became the principles of his philosophy, to which he added the qualities of originality, solidity, and sagacity, in an eminent degree. The revolution which he was thus enabled to effect was astonishing. It is true that it was not brought about without many impediments, but its consequences have been immense, and the whole course of philosophy has been modified by its influence.

For the works of Kant see below, § 377.

373. His attention being awakened by the Scepticism of Hume (§ 362), he was led to remark the very different degree of certainty belonging to the deductions of Moral Philosophy and the conclusions of Mathematics; and to speculate upon the causes of this difference. Metaphysics of course claimed his regard; but he was led to believe, that as yet the very threshold of the science had not been passed. An examination of the different philosophical systems, and particularly of the jejune Dogmatism of Wolf, led him to question whether, antecedently to any attempt at Dogmatic philosophy, it might not be necessary to investigate the *possibility* of philo-

[a] Hence called the Critical method, or that of investigation and examination.

sophical knowledge, and he concluded that to this end an inquiry into the different sources of information and a critical examination of their origin and employment were necessary: in which respect he proposed to complete the task undertaken by Locke. He laid down in the first place that Moral Philosophy and Mathematics are, in their origin, *intellectual* sciences. Intellectual knowledge is distinguished from experimental by its qualities of *necessity* and *universality*. On the possibility of intellectual knowledge depends that of the philosophical sciences. These are either synthetic or analytic: the latter of which methods is dependent on the first. What then is the principle of synthetical *à priori* knowledge in contradistinction to experimental; which is founded on observation? The existence of *à priori* knowledge is deducible from the mathematics, as well as from the testimony of common sense; and it is with such knowledge that metaphysics are chiefly conversant. A science, therefore, which may investigate with strictness the possibility of such knowledge, and the principles of its employment and application, is necessary for the direction of the human mind, and of the highest practical utility. Kant pursued this course of inquiry, tracing a broad line of distinction between the provinces of Moral Philosophy and the Mathematics, and investigating more completely than had yet been done the faculty of knowledge. He remarked that synthetical *à priori* knowledge imparts a *formal* character to knowledge in general, and can only be grounded in laws affecting the Individual, and in the consciousness which he has of the harmony and unison of his faculties. He then proceeds to analyse the particulars of our knowledge, and discriminates between its elementary parts so often confounded in practice, with a view to ascertain the true nature of each species: the characteristics of necessity and universality which belong to *à priori* knowledge, being his leading principles.

374. The faculty of theoretical or speculative knowledge is composed of Sensibility and Understanding,—

Apprehensiveness and Spontaneousness. The *material* part of sensibility consists in the sensations which belong to it; the *formal* conditions are space and time. Space and Time have no reality except in our conception of them, but may be said to exist *à priori*, as *conditions* of our perceptions. The understanding combines, in the form of ideas and judgments, the materials supplied by the sensitive faculties. The laws according to which the understanding acts, independently of experience (or rather regulating experience), are the (four) categories. These, with the conditions of sensitive perception (viz. Space and Time), make up the *forms* and *elements* of pure Intellect. The forms of sensibility and intellect determine and define knowledge: they adapt themselves to the materials supplied by sensible experiment, and are independent in their own nature of the phenomena to to which they are applicable. The grand conclusion of the Critical system of Kant is this, that no object can be known to us except in proportion as it is apprehended by our perceptions, and definable by our faculties for knowledge; consequently, we know nothing *per se*, but only by means of its phenomena. In this consists his Critical Idealism, (being founded on a critical examination of the faculties of knowledge), or, as it is otherwise termed, his *transcendental* Idealism. In consequence of these distinctions, it follows that our knowledge of real objects must be acquired by experience; and that *à priori* knowledge contemplates only their *formal* conditions, or their *possibility*. It is only under such limitations that synthetical *à priori* knowledge is possible, and within these boundaries Metaphysics must be confined. Connected with the above is the acute distinction established by him between Thought and Knowledge[b], (the neglect of which has been a fertile source of error),—between the objects apprehended and our apprehensions of them; as well as the line drawn between Reason and Understanding, with reference to Logic and the Trans-

[b] Hence we are enabled completely to separate Logic from Metaphysics.

cendental theory. Speculative reason, considered as the art of ratiocination, labours to attain a perception of absolute unity, and to produce a connected system, by means of *Ideas*, which impart a *formal* character to the operations of the mind. Knowledge, on the other hand, is not attainable by the means of Ideas, since they have no proportionate object within the province of Experience; although Reason is perpetually labouring after a complete knowledge of God, the world, the immortality and free-agency of the soul; and although the whole artillery of Metaphysics has been constantly directed towards these points. True philosophical reason will not presume to make any *constructive* use of such Ideas, lest it should be betrayed into the labyrinth of *apparent* knowledge, and a maze of contradictions. This he proceeds to evince by a critical examination of the proofs adduced of the substantiality and immortality of the soul, —the termination and commencement of the world—(with the contrary suppositions),—the divisibility or indivisibility of substances—the necessity or contingency of causation and being, in the present world,—and the existence of God. Reason cannot *demonstrate* the existence of the objects of these ideas, which are imperceptible to the senses: nor, on the other hand, can it prove the contrary. All that is permitted to speculative reason is a *moderating* power in the employment of our ideas, for the ultimate extension of knowledge.

375. Reason, however, is not merely speculative, but also practical, having the effect of limiting our absolute Free-will by the ideas of Duty and Right. An examination of our ideas of Duty and of well-regulated Will (in which, by the common consent of mankind, consists the essence of moral worth), leads him to recognise the existence of certain *à priori* principles of a practical nature; which define not *what is*, but, *what ought to be*. Practical reason is *autonomic*—simply defining the formal character of the Will, and presupposing free-agency as a necessary condition. The Laws of Ethics are superior

to the empirical and determinable free-will which we enjoy in matters of practice, and assume an imperative character, occupying the chief place in Practical Philosophy. This categorical principle becomes an absolute law of universal obligation, giving to our conduct an ultimate end and spring of action; which is not to be considered as a passion or affection, but as a moral sense of respect for Law. Virtue, therefore, consists in obedience to the dictation of Duty, or the moral constraint imposed by the legislative power of Reason; or, in other words, in the submission of our impulses and inclinations to Reason. Morality is not Happiness, though it implies a rational title to it, and makes us worthy of being Happy. It is universal and necessary consistently with free-will. The ideas of Free-will, Immortality, and a Divinity, derive their certainty from the practical laws of Ethics. This certainty, however, is not the result of speculative science, but of a practical rational belief. By such a definition of the *Summum Bonum* and ultimate end of rational existence we are enabled to perceive with clearness the harmony which exists between the intellectual and sensual nature of man; between speculative and practical Reason.

Civil or juridical law is distinguished from moral, inasmuch as the former legislates only with respect to external actions, and provides for the freedom of all by limiting and defining that of individuals. The description of Right which results is of a Coercive character, and demands the protection of the State; which itself reposes on a contract as its foundation; being designed for the maintenance and preservation of the rights of all.

376. Speculative knowledge (founded on the idea of Nature), and Practical (founded on that of Free-agency), form two distinct hemispheres, as it were, of the same whole, and differ altogether in their principles. The faculty of *Judgment* interposes between these two powers and their objects—Nature and Free-will, (which are united by an inexplicable link in the mind of man); and specu-

lates on their mutual accordance. It does not add any thing to objective knowledge, but enables us to reflect on Nature as a Whole, by means of a peculiar principle, that of Proportionateness of the Means to the End; which is not objective but purely subjective. The Judgment therefore makes the particular subordinate to the universal; and operates partly by means of classification, partly by reflection. In the latter case, according to a principle of our nature which prompts us to employ with freedom the energies of the mind, we apply to external nature ideas derived from the understanding in the exercise of this freedom, being conscious of a species of intellectual satisfaction. In this manner we examine Nature with a view to the principles of formal Proportionateness; we discuss the principle of the pleasure derived from the Beautiful and the Sublime, and apply the same sort of *teleological*[a] scrutiny not only to the forms but also to the material and internal proportions of Nature. The principle by which we are guided in such observations is this: that there exists an internal proportion between the means and the end in organic nature, and although this principle does not immediately produce any direct result, it leads us to anticipate the conclusion of a final end impressed on all Nature by a Spiritual Being, imperceptible to our senses; which conjectural conviction is converted into certainty by Practical Knowledge. (*Physico-Ethico-Theology*, or *Teleology*).

377. Works of Kant. His grand enterprise was his Critical examination of our faculties of knowledge, on the principles of a Transcendental Philosophy, i. e. of a theory which deduces, from an examination of the faculties of the human mind, certain established principles as the conditions of its operations; giving to all these speculations a systematic form. Of this great design Kant has completed some parts, with his characteristic originality, acuteness, and depth of thought: for instance,

[a] *Teleology* denotes the consideration of final causes.

the Metaphysical system of Nature, in which he has shown himself the precursor of the Dynamic Philosophy, inasmuch as he maintains that Matter fills Space in virtue of impulsive forces (those of Expansion and Attraction). To this he added his Moral Metaphysics, or Theory of Right and Virtue; as well as separate dissertations on Religious Anthropology, Education, and other important subjects, which contain many admirable and profound observations.

Kant's earlier works are:

Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte, *Königsb.* 1746, 8vo. Principiorum Metaphysicor. nova dilucidatio, *ibid.* 1755, 4to. Betrachtungen über den Optimismus, *Königsb.* 1759, 4to. Monadologia Physica Spec. I, *ibid.* 1756, 4to. Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweish. einzuführen, *Königsb.* 1763, 8vo. Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes, *ebend.* 1763; zuletzt 1794, 8vo. Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier Syllog. Figuren, *ebend.* 1763; *Frankf. und Leipz.* 1797. Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, *Königsb.* 1764, 8vo.; *Riga*, 1771. Träume eines Geistersehers, *Riga*, 1766, 8vo.; 1769. Allgem. Naturgesch. und Theorie des Himmels, etc. IV Aufl. *Zeitz*, 1808, 8vo. De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis, *Regiomont.* 1770, 4to.; (a work in which he gives the first hint of the plan of his great Critical undertaking). The above, with several other treatises, are collected in Kant's Kleinen Schriften, *Königsb. u. Leipz.* 1797, III Bde. 8vo. Verm. Schriften, ächte und vollst. Ausg. (herausg. von Tieftrunk), *Halle*, 1799—1807, IV Bde. 8vo. Sammlung einiger bisher unbekannt gebliebenen Schriften von Im. Kant (herausg. von Rink), *Königsb.* 1800, 8vo.

His principal works are:

Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, *Riga*, 1781, VI Aufl.; *Leipz.* 1818, 8vo. Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, *Riga*, 1788; V Aufl. *Leipz.* 1818, 8vo. Kritik der Urtheilskraft, *Berl.* 1790; III Aufl. 1799, 8vo. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Mataphysik, etc., *Riga*, 1783, 8vo. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, *Riga*, 1785, 8vo.; IV Aufl. 1797. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, *Riga*, 1786, 8vo.; III Aufl. 1800. Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entebehrlich gemacht werden soll, *Königsb.* 1792, 8vo. Die Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft, *Königsb.* 1793, 8vo.; II verm. Aufl. 1794. Zum ewigen Frieden, ein Philosophischer Entwurf, *Königsb.* 1795, 1796, 8vo. Metaphysische Anfangs-

gründe der Rechtslehre, *Königsb.* 1799, 8vo. II Aufl. 1803, 8vo. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, *Königsb.* 1797, 8vo.; II Aufl. 1803. (Both are contained under the title of, Metaphysik der Sitten.) Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, *Königsb.* 1798; III Aufl. 1821, 8vo. Der Streit der Facultäten, *Königsb.* 1798, 8vo.

Works of others illustrative of the above:

† The Logic of Kant, a Manual for the Academical Classes, by G. B. JÄHSCHE, *Königsb.* 1800, 8vo. (published from the papers of the students). † Education, published by RINK, *ibid.* 1803, 8vo. † Lectures on Religious Philosophy, *Leips.* 1817, 8vo. (published from the papers of the students). † Lectures on Metaphysics, (published by the Editor of the Religious Philosophy, etc., PÖLITZ), *Erfurdt*, 1821, 8vo.

378. With regard to the general character of the Critical system of Kant, we may observe that it confined itself to a contemplation of the phenomena of Consciousness, and attempted to ascertain, by analysis, not of our ideas, but of the faculties of the soul, certain invariable and necessary principles of knowledge; proceeding to define their usage, and to form an estimate of them collectively, with reference to their *formal* character: in which investigation the distinctions and definitions of those faculties adopted by the school of Wolf, were presumed to be valid. It exalted the human mind, by making it the centre of its system; but at the same time confined and restricted it by means of the consequences deduced. It discouraged also the spirit of Dogmatical Speculation, and the ambition of demonstrating all things by means of mere intellectual ideas, making the faculties for acquiring knowledge the measure of things capable of being known, and assigning the pre-eminence to Practical Reason rather than to Speculative, in virtue of its end, viz. Wisdom; which is the highest that reason can aspire to; because to act virtuously is an universal and unlimited, but to acquire knowledge only a conditional duty. It proscribed Mysticism, and circumscribed the provinces of Science and Belief. It taught men to discriminate and appreciate the grounds, the tendency, the defects, and partial views, as well as the excellencies of other systems; at the same time that it

embodied a lively principle for awakening and strengthening the interest attaching to genuine philosophical research. It afforded to philosophy a firm and steady centre of action in the unchangeable nature of the human mind. In general, it may be observed that the theory of Kant *constructed* little; and rather tended to destroy the structures of an empty Dogmatism, and prepare, by means of self-knowledge, the way for a better state of philosophical science; seeking in Reason itself the principles on which to distinguish the several parts of philosophy.

On the other hand it has been urged against this system:

That it does not recognise the existence of Rational Ideas: because its author, without even examining into the claims of both, attributes to experience a preponderance over the opposite principle—making demonstration the sole evidence of knowledge, that it makes a distinction between speculative and practical reason, and that it dislocates, (as it were), by its subdivisions, the faculties of the human mind. To this must be added (it is objected) a certain *Formalism*, which betrays itself even in his practical system, and in consequence of which the student is led to regard things principally in a subjective point of view; that is, with a reference to the laws and forms of human action: from which to absolute Idealism is an easy step.

The following works contain criticism on Kant's theory:

D. Jenisch über den Grund und Werth der Entdeckungen des Hrn. Prof. Kant, *Berl.* 1790, 8vo. Joh. Neeb, über Kant's Verdienste um das Interesse der Philosophirenden Vernunft, II Aufl. *Frankf. a. M.* 1795, 8vo. Glo. Bj. Gerlach Philosophie, Gesetzgebung und Aesthetik in ihrem jetzigen Verhältniss zur sittlichen und ästhetischen Bildung der Deutschen, eine Preisschrift. *Posen*, 1804, 8vo. Flügge's Versuch einer Historisch kritischen Darstellung des Einflusses der Kantischen Philosophie auf Religion u. Theologie. 2 Thle. *Hannov.* 1796, 1798, 8vo. Tr. Ben. Agap. Leo Krito oder über den wohlthätigen Einfluss der kritischen Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1806, 8vo. Stäudlin's Abh. über den Werth der Krit. Phil. in s. Beitr. zur Phil. u. Gesch. der Rel. III, IV, V Th. *Gött.* 1797-98-99. See also, Bou-

TERWECK Imm. Kant; ein Denkmal. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER'S Appendix to his work, mentioned § 407, containing a Critique of Kant's theory. V. BUSSE Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft von Im. Kant in ihren Grunden widerlegt, *Dresd.* 1828.

Earliest Adversaries of Kant's System.

See (K. GLOB. HAUSIUS) Materialien zur Gesch. der Krit. Philosophie, nebst einer Histor. Einleitung zur Gesch. der Kant. Philos. III Sammlungen, *Leipz.* 1793, 2 Bde. 8vo.

C. L. REINHOLD über die bisherigen Schicksale der Kant. Philosophie, *Jena*, 1789, 8vo.

379. The first of Kant's great works produced, at its appearance, little sensation. When at last it began to attract attention, it excited a great sensation, and many questions with regard to its end and character. The very language in which it was couched, containing a set of phrases and terms entirely new, was an obstacle to its progress, and, no less than its contents, revolted the minds of most of the learned countrymen of its author. A great variety of mistakes were necessarily committed with respect to it. Some pronounced it superficial, and gave it credit for nothing more than an *appearance* of originality. Others, admitting it to be original, declared it to be dangerous and pernicious; inasmuch as it set forth a system of Idealism, which would annihilate the *objective reality* of Knowledge, destroy all rational belief in God and the immortality of the soul, and consequently was adverse to revealed religion. Several eminent men became in various ways adversaries to the new system, of whom we may particularise: *Mendelssohn*[b]; *Hamann*[c] and *Jacobi*

[b] M. MENDELSSOHN'S Morgenstunden. 2 Bd. *Berl.* 1785, 8vo.; (see § 368). Prüfung der Mendelssohnschen Morgenstunden, oder aller speculativen Beweise für das Daseyn Gottes, in Vorlesungen von L. H. JAKOB. Nebst einer Abhandl. von KANT, *Leipz.* 1786, 8vo.

[c] HAMANN: In his Letters to JACOBI—JACOBI'S Works, I u. IV B. JACOBI, über das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen, etc., in Reinhold's Beiträgen zur leichten Uebersicht, etc., III, 1.

(§ 398); *Eberhard*[d]; *Feder*[e] (§ 368); *Ad. Weishaupt*[f]; *J. F. Flatt*[g]; *G. A. Tittel*[h]; *S. Reimarus* (§ 367); *D. Tiedemann*[i] (§ 369); *Platner* (§ 368); *Garve*[k]; *Meiners*[l]; *G. E. Schulze* (§ 401); *J. C. Schwab*[m]; *Herder*[n]; *H. G. von Gerstenberg*[o]; *F. Baader*[p], and others[q].

[d] J. A. Eberhard: In the Philosophical Journals published by him: (see 368, note [t]).

[e] J. G. H. Feder, über Raum und Zeit zur Prünfung der Kant. Philosophie, *Götting.* 1787, 8vo. Philos. Biblioth. von Feder u. Meiners. 1 Bd. *Gött.* 1788, 8vo.

[f] Ad. Weishaupt, über die Gründe und Gewissheit der menschlichen Erkenntniss. Zur Prüfung der Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, *Nürnb.* 1788, 8vo. Ueber Materialismus u. Idealismus, ein Philosophisches Fragment, *Nürnb.* 1787; II Aufl. 1788, 8vo. Ueber die Kantischen Anschauungen und Erscheinungen, *ebend.* 1788, 8vo. Zweifel über die Kantischen Begriffe von Raum und Zeit, *ebend.* 1788, 8vo. He also wrote: Ueber Wahrheit und sittliche Vollkommenheit, *Regensb.* 3 Bde. 1793-97, 8vo. Schaumann and Born replied to him and to Feder.

[g] J. F. Flatt's Fragmentarische Beiträge zur Bestimmung u. Deduction des Begriffs und Grundsatzes der Causalität und zur Grundlegung der Natürl. Theologie, *Leipzig*, 1788, 8vo. See § 380, note. Also: Briefe über den Moral. Erkenntnissgrund der Religion in Beziehung auf die Kantische Philosophie, *Tübing.* 1789, 8vo.

[h] Glo. A. Tittel, Kantische Denkformen od. Kategorieen, *Frkf. a. M.*, 1788, 8vo. Ueber Hrn. Kant's Moralreform, *Frankf. und Leipz.* 1786, 8vo.

[i] Dietr. Tiedemann, Theätet, oder über das Menschliche Wissen, ein Beitrag zur Vernunftkritik, *Frankf. a. M.* 1794, 8vo.

In answer to this, J. Ch. F. Dietz Antitheätet, *Rost u. Leipz.* 1798, 8vo. D. Tiedemann's Idealistische Briefe, *Marb.* 1798, 8vo. Beantwortung derselben von Diez, *Gotha*, 1801, 8vo.; und eine Abh. Tiedemann's in den Hessischen Beiträgen, III St.

[k] Garve, in der Uebersetzung der Ethik des Aristoteles, 1 Bd. nebst einer Abh. über die verschiedenen Principe der Sittenlehre von Aristoteles bis auf Kant, *Bresl.* 1798, 8vo. On the other side: J. Chr. Fr. Dietz über Philosophie, Philosophische Streitigkeiten, Kriticismus und Wissenschaftslehre, nebst einer Prüfung der Garve'schen Beurtheilung des Kritischen Systems, *Gotha*, 1800, 8vo.

[l] See Meiners Allgemeine Geschichte der Ethik, *Götting.* 1800, 2 Thle. 8vo.

[m] J. C. Schwab, Vergleichung des Kantischen Moralprinzips mit dem Leibnitz-Wolfischen, *Berl.* 1800, 8vo. Ueber die Wahrheit der Kantischen Philosophie und die Wahrheitsliebe der A. L. Z. in Jena in Ansehung der Philosophie, *Berlin*, 1803, 8vo. He composed also: Von den Dunkeln Vorstellungen, etc., *Stuttg.* 1813, 8vo.

[n] Joh. Gottfr. Herder's Verstand u. Erfahrung, eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, *Leipz.* 1799, 2 Bde. 8vo. Kalligone, *Leipz.* 1800, 3 Thle. 8vo.

The system was also attacked by many violent and passionate declaimers, such as *Stattler*[r]; and in several of the universities the authorities forbade that it should be taught.

Commentators and Partisans of Kant's Critical System.

380. In spite of these inherent difficulties and external assaults, the Critical philosophy continued to gain ground in Germany; and began to exercise considerable influence over the character of the other sciences. Several men of talent declared in its favour; supporting it by writings intended either to defend or illustrate it, and rendering service not only to Kant, but to the cause of philosophy at large.

Among these we may enumerate *J. Schulz*[s]; *C. C. E. Schmid*[t]; *C. Leon. Reinhold*[u], (see below, § 382); *Solo-*

In answer to this: KIESEWETTER's Prüfung der Herderschen Metakritik, *Berl.* 1799, 2 Bd. 8vo.

[o] (H. W. VON GERSTENBERG), Die Theorie der Kategorieen entwickelt und erläntert, *Altona*, 1795, 8vo. Sendschreiben an CARL VON VILLERS das gemeinschaftl. Prinzip der Theor. und prakt. Philos. betreffend, *Altona*, 1821, 8vo. vgl. mit einem kleinen Aufsatz über URSACHE in dem Intellbl. der A. L. Z. St. 54, 1823.

[p] FR. BAADER, Absolute Blindheit der von Kant deducirten prakt. Vernunft an Fr. H. Jakobi, 1797. Beiträge zur Elementarphilosophie, ein Gegenstück zu Kant's met. Anfangsgr. der Naturw. *Hamb.* 1797, 8vo.

[q] See various treatises by BRASTBERGER, MAASS, BORNUTRÄGER, PEZOLDI, BREYER, etc.

[r] Antikant, *Munich*, 1788, 2 vols. 8vo.: and a work on the same subject by REUSS, *Würzburg*. 1789, 8vo., with this title: Soll Man auf Katholischen Universitäten Kant's Philosophi studiren?

[s] JOH. SCHULZ, Erläuterungen über des Hrn. Prof. Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, *Königsb.* 1785, 8vo. u. 1791. Desselben Prufung der Kantischen Kritik der reinen Vernunft. *ibid.* 1789—92; 2 Bde. 8vo.

[t] CARL CHR. EBRH. SCHMID, Kritik der reinen Vernnuit im Grundrisse. *Jena*, 1786, 8vo.; III Aufl. *Jen.* 1794. Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften, *Jena*, 1788, 8vo.; IV Aufl. 1798, 8vo.

[u] REINHOLD's Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie (see the German Mercury 1785—87), *Leipz.* 1790; 2 Bde. 8vo.

mon Maimon[x]; *C. H. Heydenreich*[y]; *J. Sigism. Beck*[z]; *Sam. Alb. Mellin*[a]; *Laz. Bendavid*[b]; *J. C. F. Dietz*[c]; *Fr. W. D.* and *Ch. G. Snell*[d]; *J. C. G. Schaumann*[e]; and many others[f]. These formed a numerous school of Kantists, which necessarily comprehended also a large number of disciples of inferior parts, and blindly devoted to the system of their master.

It cannot be denied that the rapid progress which the system soon began to make contributed greatly to awaken a new and vigorous spirit of research. Men of superior

[x] Sal Maimon's Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie, *Berl.* 1790, 8vo.

[y] Heydenreich's Originalideen über die interessantesten Gegenstäude der Philosophie, *Leipz.* 1793—96. 5 B. 8vo. See several other works by the same author, e. g. an Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, published at *Leips.* 1793, (in Germ.)

[z] See §. 382.

[a] G. S. A. Mellin's Marginalien und Register zu Kant's Kritik des Erkenntnissvermögens, *Jena*, 1794—95, 2 Th. 8vo. Kunstsprache der krit. Philos. alphabet. georduet, *Jena*, 1798, 8vo. *Anhang*, 1800, 8vo. (also: Marginalien u. Register zu Kant's met. Anfangsgr. der Rechtslehre.) Encyklopädisches Wörterbuch der krit. Philosophie, *Zullichau u. Leipz.* 1797—1803, 6 B. 8vo. etc.

[b] Laz. Bendavid's Vorlesungen über die Kritik der reinen Vern. *Wien*, 1795; II Aufl. 1802. Ueber die Kritik der Urtheilskraft, *ebend.* 1796. Vorles. über die Kritik der prakt. Vernunft, nebst einer Rede über den Zweck der krit. Philos. *ebend.* 1796, 8vo. Vorlesungen über die metaphys. Anfangsgründe der Naturwiss. *ebend.* 1798. Preisschr. über den Ursprung uns. Erkenntniss, *Berl.* 1802, 8vo. Versuch einer Rechtslehre, *Berl.* 1802.

[c] See the preceding §. He also wrote; Der Philosoph. u. die Philos. aus dem wahren Gesichtspuncte und mit Hinsicht auf die heut. Streitigkeiten, *Leipz.* 1802, 8vo. und: Ueber Wissen, Glauben, Mystik u. Skepticismus, *Lübeck*, 1809, 8vo.

[d] F. W. D. Snell, Darstellung u. Erläuterung der Kant. Kritik der Urtheilskr. *Maunh.* 1791—92, 2 Th. 8. Menon, oder Versuch in Gesprächen die vornehmsten Puncte aus der Kritik der prakt. Vern. zu erläutern, *ibid.* 1789, 8vo.; II Aufl. 1796, 8vo. Several manuals, e. g. Lehrb. f. d. ersten Unterr. in d. Philos. 2 Th. VII verb. Aufl. 1821; mit Ch. W. Snell, Handb. der Philos. für Liebhaber, *Giessen*, 1802, 8vo. mit C. Ch. E. Schmid das philos. Journal. *Giessen*, 1793—95, 5 B. 8vo.

[e] Schaumann, üb. d. transcendentale Aesthetik, ein krit. Versuch nebst e. Schreiben an Feder üb. d. transcend. Idealismus, *Leipz.* 1789, 8vo. (a work principally directed against the attacks of Feder).

[f] Such as Born, Abicht, Phiseldeck, Neeb, Jakob, Tieftrunk, Kiesewetter, Bouterweck, Krug, Fries, etc.

parts began to apply the principles it developed to the more accurate and systematic cultivation of the different departments of science, and especially to purposes of a more comprehensive study of Method. Logic was treated successfully by *S. Maimon*[g]; *Hoffbauer; Maas; Kiesewetter; Krug; Fries; etc.* Metaphysics by *Jakob*[h]; *Schmid;* and *Krug.* Ethics by *Schmid*[i]; *Jakob; Tief-*

[g] SAL. MAIMON, Versuch einer neuen Logik oder Theorie des Denkens, etc. *Berl.* 1794, 8vo. HOFFBAUER's Analytik der Urtheile und Schlüsse, *Halle,* 1792, 8vo. Anfangsgründe der Logik. *Halle,* 1794; II Aufl. mit einer psychologischen Vorbereitung vermehrt, *ebend.* 1810, 8vo. Ueber die Analysis in der Philosophie, nebst Abhandlungen verwandten Inhalts, *Halle,* 1810, 8vo. Versuch über die schwerste und leichteste Anwendung der Analysis in den philos. Wissenschaften, eine gekrönte Preisschrift mit Zusätzen, *Leipz.* 1810, 8vo. JAKOB's Grundriss der allgem. Logik und krit. Anfangsgrunde der allgem. Metaphysik, *Halle,* 1788, 8vo. IV Aufl. 1800, 8vo. MAASS, Grundr. der Logik, *Halle,* 1793, 8vo. IV verm. Aufl. 1823. C. CHR. EHR. SCHMID's Grundriss der Logik, *Jena,* 1797, 8vo. TIEFTRUNK's Grundriss der Logik, *Halle,* 1801, 8vo. Die Denklehre im reindeutschen Gewande u. s. w., nebst einigen Anfsätzen von Kant, *Halle, u. Leipz.* 1825, 8vo. Die angewandte Denklehre u. s. w. *ebend.* 1827, 8vo. KIESEWETTER's Grundriss einer allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen, begleitet mit einer weitern Auseinandersetzung, *Berl.* 1791 f. 2 Th.; II Aufl. 1802 u. 1806. Also: Logik zum Gebrauch für Schulen, *ebend.* 1797; and: Die wichtigsten Sätze der Vernunftlehre für Nichtstudirende, *Hamb.* 1806, 8vo. FR. W. D. SNELL erste Grundlinien d. Logik. III Aufl. *Giessen,* 1828, 8vo.

(On the other side): CARL CHR. FLATT, Fragmentarische Bemerkungen gegen den Kantischen u. Kiesewetterischen Grundriss der reinen allgem. Logik. *Tubing.* 1802, 8vo.

[h] JAKOB's Prüfung der Mendelsohnischen Morgenstunden, nebst einer Abh. von Kant. *Leipz.* 1786, 8vo. Beweis für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele a. d. Begriffe der Pflicht. *Zullichau,* 1790—94—1800, 8vo. Ueber den moralischen Beweis für das Daseyn Gottes, *Liebau,* 1791, 8vo; II verm. Aufl. 1798. CARL CHR. ERH. SCHMID's Grundriss der Metaphysik, *Jena,* 1799, 8vo. The works of KRUG and FRIES are mentioned below, §§ 404, 405.

[i] C. CHR. ERH. SCHMID's Versuch einer Moralphilosophie, *Jena,* 1790, 8vo. IV Aufl. 1802, 1803; 2 B. 8vo. Grundriss der Moralphilosophie, *Jena,* 1793; II Aufl. 1800, 8vo. Adiaphora, philos. theol. u. hist. untersucht. *Jena,* 1809, 8vo. KIESEWETTER, über den ersten Grundsatz der Moralphilosophie, nebst einer Abhandlung über die Freiheit von JAKOB, *Halle,* 1788; II Aufl. *Berl.* 1790—91, 2 Th. 8vo. JACOB's philosophische Sittenlehre, *Halle,* 1794, 8vo. Grundsätze der Weisheit und des menschl. Lebens, *Halle,* 1800, 8vo. Ueber das moral. Gefühl. *Halle,* 1788, 8vo. TIEFTRUNK's philos. Untersuchungen üb. d. Tugendlehre, *Halle,* 1798—1805, 2 B. 8vo. Grundriss d. Sittenlehre, *Halle,* 1803, 2 Th. (Tugend- und Rechtslehre), 8vo. HOFFBAUER's Unter-

trunk, Hoffbauer, Heydenreich, Stäudlin, Krug, Fries, Kunhardt, etc. The philosophical principles of Law and Right[k], by *Hufeland, Heydenreich, Buhle, Jakob,*

suchungen über die wichtigsten Gegenstände der Moralphilosophie, insbes. die Sittenlehre und Moraltheologie, 1 Th. *Dortm.* 1799, 8vo. Anfangsgründe der Moralphilosophie und insbes. d. Sittenlehre, nebst einer allgemeinen Gesch. derselben, *Halle*, 1798, 8vo. Heydenreich's Propädeutik der Moralphilosophie nach Grundsätzen der reinen Vernunft, *Leipz.* 1794. 3 Th. 8vo. Ueber Freiheit u. Determinismus u. ihre Vereinigung, *Erlang.* 1793, 8vo.; und mehrere Schriften zur populären Moral. K. F. Stäudlin Grundriss der Tugend u. Religionslehre, *Götting.* 1800, 8vo. Ge. Henrici Versuch über den ersten Grundsatz d. Sittenlehre. 1 Th. *Leipz.* 1799, 8vo. Leonh. Creuzer's skeptische Betrachtungen üb. die Freiheit des Willens, *Giessen*, 1793, 8vo.

[k] G. Hufeland Versuch über den Grundsatz des Naturrechts, *Leipz.* 1785, 8vo. Lehrsätze des Naturrechts, *Jena*, 1790; II Aufl. 1795, 8vo. Heydenreich System der Natur, nach krit. Prinzipien, *Leipz.* 1794—95, 2 Th. 8vo. Grundsätze des Natürl. Staatsrechts, nebst einem Anhang Staatsrechtl. Abhandlungen, *Leipz.* 1795, 2 Th. 8vo. Versuch über die Heiligkeit des Staats u. die Moralität der Revolutionen, *Leipz.* 1794, 8vo. Buhle Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, *Gött.* 1781, 8vo. Ideen zur Rechtsw., Moral u. Politik. 1 Samml. *Gött.* 1799, 8vo. He also wrote: Entwurf einer Transcendentalphilos. *Gött.* 1798, 8vo. Ueber Ursprung u. Leben des Menschengeschlechts u. das künftige Leben nach dem Tode, *Braunschw.* 1821, 8vo. K. Chr. E. Schmid's Grundriss des Naturrechts, Für Vorles, *Jena u. Leipz.* 1795, 8vo. Jakob's Philosoph. Rechtslehre, *Halle*, 1795; II Aufl. 1802, 8vo. Auszug, *ebend.* 1796, 8vo. Antimachiavell. *Halle*, 1794, u. 1796, 8vo. Maas über Recht u. Verbindlichkeiten, *Halle*, 1794, 8vo. Untersuchungen über die wichtigsten Gegenstände des Naturrechts, *Halle*, 1790, 8vo. Grundriss des Naturrechts, *Leipz.* 1808, 8vo. Hoffbauer's Naturrecht, aus dem Begriffe des Rechts entwickelt, *Halle*, 1793; III Aufl. 1804, 8vo. Untersuchungen über die wichtigsten Gegenstände des Naturrechts, *ebend.* 1793, 8vo. Allgem. Staatsrecht u. s. w. *Halle*, 1797, 8vo. Dass Allgem. Naturrecht u. die Moral in ihrer gegenseit. Abhängigkeit, etc., *Halle*, 1816, 8vo. Th. Schmalz Recht der Natur, 1 Th., *Königsb.* 1792; II Aufl. 1795, 8vo., 2 Th. Natürl. Staatsrecht, 1794; II Aufl. 1795. Das Natürl. Familien- und Kirchenrecht, *ebend.* 1795, 8vo. Erklärung der Rechte des Menschen u. Bürgers, etc., *ebend.* 1798, 8vo. Handbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, *ebend.* 1807, 8vo. P. J. Anselm Feuerbach's Kritik des Natürl. Rechts, *Altona*, 1796. 8vo. Ueber die einzig möglichen Beweisgründe gegen das Daseyn u. die Gültigkeit der Natürl. Rechte, *Leipz. u. Gera*, 1795, 8vo. Antihobbes, 1 Th. *Erf.* 1798, 8vo. K. Sal. Zachariä Anfangsgr. des Philos. Privatrechts, *Leipz.* 1804, 8vo. Anfangsgr. des Philos. Criminalrechts, *ebend.* 1805, 8vo. Vierzig Bücher vom Staate, 2 B. *Stuttg. u. Tüb.* 1820, 8vo. K. H. L. Pölitz: Die Staatswissenschaften im Lichte unserer Zeit, 4 B., *Leipz.* 1823, u. f. C. H. Gros Lehrbuch der Philos. Rechtswissenschaft. *Tübing.* 1802; III Aufl. 1815, 8vo. J. Chr. Gottl. Schaumann's wissenschaftl. Naturrecht, *Halle*, 1792, 8vo.

Maas, Hoffbauer, Schmalz, Feuerbach, Fries, Solom. Zacharie, Pölitz, Gros, etc. The question of Religion, considered as a part of Practical philosophy [l], was treated by *Heydenreich, Schmid, Jakob, Tieftrunk, Krug*, etc. The theory of the Fine Arts [m] was discussed by *Heydenreich, Heusinger*, and *Delbrück*, and the poet *Schiller*, (in his prose writings); whose free spirit soon shook off the shackles of the School-philosophy. Psychology [n] by

Kritische Abhandlungen zur Philos. Rechtslehre, *Halle*, 1795, 8vo. Versuch eines neuen Systems des Natürl. Rechts, *ebend.* 1796, 8vo. G. HENRICI Ideen zu einer wissenschaftl. Begründung der Rechtslehre oder über den Begriff u. die letzten Gründe des Rechts, etc., *Hannov.* 1809—10, 2 Th. 8vo.; II verm. Aufl. 1822, 8vo. J. A. BRÜCKNER Essai sur la Nature et l'Origine des Droits, *Lips.* 1810, 8vo.

[l] HEYDENREICH, Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der Natürl. Religion, *Leipz.* 1790—91, 2 B. 8vo. Grundsätze der moral. Gotteslehre, *Leipz.* 1793, 8vo. Briefe über den Atheismus, *ebend.* 1797, 8vo. See § 367. C. CHR. E. SCHMID's Philos. Dogmatik, *Jena*, 1796, 8vo. JAKOB's Allgemeine Religion, 1797, 8vo. s. oben. TIEFTRUNK's Versuch e neuen Theorie der Religionsphilosophie, *Leipz.* 1797, 8vo. HOFFBAUER's Untersuchungen über die wichtigsten Gegenstände der Natürl. Religion, *Halle*, 1795, 8vo. J. E. PARROW Grundriss der Vernunftreligion, *Berl.* 1790, 8vo. GEO. CHR. MÜLLER's Entwurf einer Philos. Religionslehre, 1 Th. *Halle*, 1797, 8vo. Many critiques on the Religious Philosophy of Kant appeared from the pens of RÄTZE, STORR, JACHMANN, G. E. SCHULZE, SCHELLING.

[m] HEYDENREICH's System der Æsthetik, I Th. (unfinished) *Leipz.* 1790, 8vo. Æsthet. Wörterbuch, 4 Th. *Leipz.* 1793, ff. J. H. GLIEB. HEUSINGER's Handbuch d. Æsthetik, *Gotha*, 1797, 2 B. 8vo. L. BENDAVID Beitr. zur Kritik des Geschmacks, *Wien*, 1797. Versuch einer Geschmackslehre, *Berl.* 1799, 8vo. FERD. DELBRÜCK das Schöne, *Berl.* 1800, 8vo. F. W. D. SNELL Versuch einer Æsthetik f. Liebhaber, II Aufl. *Giessen*, 1828.

[n] J. ITH, Anthropologie, 1794, 8vo. C. CHR. E. SCHMID's empirische Psychologie, 1 Th. *Jena*, 1791; II Aufl. 1796, 8vo. Psychlog. Magaz. seit, 1796; Anthropolog. Journal, 1803. JAKOB's Grundriss der Erfahrungsseelenlehre, *Halle*, 1791; IV Aufl. 1810, 8vo. Grundriss der emp. Psych. *Leipz.* 1814, and, Erläuterung des Grundrisses. *ebend.* HOFFBAUER's Naturlehre d. Seele, in Briefen, *Halle*, 1796, 8vo. Untersuchungen über die Krankheiten der Seele, *Halle*, 1802, 3 Th. 8vo. Psychologie in ihrer Hauptanwendung auf die Rechtspflege, *Halle*, 1808, 8vo. Der Grundriss vor s. Logik, u. besonders, *Halle*, II Aufl. 1810. KIESEWETTER's kurzer Abriss der Erfahrungsseelenlehre, *Berl.* 1806, 8vo.; II Aufl. 1814. Fassl. Dartsellung der Erfahrungsseelenlehre, *Hamb.* 1806, 8vo. F. W. D. SNELL empir. Psychol. *Giessen*, 1802; II Aufl. 1810. MAASS, s. oben s. 29. Litt. Versuch über die Leidenschaften, *Halle*, 1805—7, 2 B. 8vo. Versuche über die Gefühle, bes. über d. Affecten. 2 Th. *Halle u. Leipz.* 1811—12, 8vo.

Schmid, Jakob, Snell, etc. Education[o] by *Heusinger, Miemeyer, Schwartz,* etc.

All these authors, (most of them professors in the German Universities), contributed in a greater or less degree to illustrate or extend the system of their master. The most remote branches of philosophy were influenced by the central action and impulse which had been communicated by Kant: and even his adversaries ended by doing him justice. It is true that in France[p], and in England[q] his system could scarcely obtain a hearing, in spite of the zealous labours of some of its admirers; but in Holland[r], and the North of Europe, it had greater success.

[o] Joh. Heinr. Glieb. Heusinger's Versuch eines Lehrbuchs der Erziehungskunst, *Leipz.* 1795, 8vo. A. H. Niemeyer's Grundsätze der Erziehung, *Halle,* 1796, 8vo.; VI Aufl. 3 B. 1810, 8vo. Leitfaden der Pädadogik und Didaktik, *Halle,* 1803, 8vo. Friedr. Heinr. Car. Schwarz Lehrbuch d. Pädagogik und Didaktik, *Heidelb.* 1807—8. Erziehungslehre, *Leipz.* 1802—4, 3 B. 8vo. J. Lud. Ewald Vorlesungen iiber d. Erziehungslehre, 3 Th. *Manuh.* 1808, 8vo.

[p] Philosophie de Kant, ou Principes Fondamentaux de la Philosophie Transcendentale par Charles Villers, *Metz.* 1801, 2 vols. 8vo. See the Critical Journal of Schelling and Hegel, vol. I, No. 3, p. 6, sqq. Germ.

See also several essays in the Spectateur du Nord, *Hamburgh,* 1798-99.

Essai d'une Exposition succincte de la Critique de la Raison pure de Mr. Kant, par Mr. Kinker, traduit du Hollandois par J. le Fr. *Amsterd.* 1801, 8vo. De la Metaphysique de Kant, ou Observation sur un ouvrage intitulé: Essai d'une Exposition, etc. par le Citoyen Destutt-Tracy in the Mémoires de l'Instit. Nat. Scienc. Moral. T. IV.

Philosophie Critique Découverte par Kant fondée sur le dernier principe du savoir, par J. Hoehne, *Paris,* 1802, 8vo.

[q] Nitsch, General and Introductory View of Kant's Principles concerning Man, the World, and the Deity, *Lond.* 1696, 8vo.

The Principles of Critical Philosophy, selected from the works of Emm. Kant, and expounded by James Sig. Beck. Translated from the German, *Lond. and Edinb.* 1797, 8vo.

Willich's Elements of the Critical Philosophy, *Lond.* 1798, 8vo.

[r] Paul van Hemert, Beginsels der Kantiansche Wysgeerte, *Amstd.* 1796, 8vo. Magazyn voor de Critische Wysbegeerte en de Geschiedenis van dezelve, *Amsterd.* 1798, 8vo. Epistolæ ad Dan. Wyttenbachium, *Amsterd.* 1809, 8vo. (Dan. Wyttenbach, in answer to Hemert) *φιλομαθειας τα σποραδην*— Miscellaneæ Doctrinæ. lib. i, ii, *Amsterd.* 1809, 8vo.

J. Kinker, Essai d'une Introduction, etc. (see above).

F. H. Heumann, Principes Moraux de la Philosophie Critique Developpés et Appliqués à une Legislation externe fondée sur la Justice, la liberté, et l'égalité naturelle, *Amstd.* 1799, 8vo.

Van Bosch, Ethica Philosophiæ Criticæ.

We may consider as unavoidable consequences of the popularity it acquired, the number of abuses to which it gave birth, such as an unmeaning use of formularies, a blind devotion to one single system, and a contempt for all experimental knowledge.

B. *Philosophical Systems subsequent to that of Kant.*

381. The triumph of Critical philosophy was of short duration. It opposed too many factions, and counteracted too many views and pretensions to obtain an easy victory. The various misapprehensions to which it gave birth raised suspicions of the correctness of the principles it contained, as well as of the propriety of the method by which they were developed. Some asserted that the theory was sufficiently refuted by Common Sense, because it amounted to nothing more than a system of mere Idealism, and destroyed the very reality of all external nature. Others went only half as far in their objections, alleging that Kant had thrust out *real existence* by one door, to let it in by another. His system was judged to be incomplete in this respect also, that by subdividing the different mental principles of Knowledge[s], it placed them side by side, as co-ordinate with one another, instead of making them subordinate to one supreme principle (§ 378). Many of its opponents objected to it that instead of weakening the cause of Scepticism it contributed to fortify it: while some of its partisans brought discredit on their cause by misapplying its formularies, or by their extravagant expectations of its success[t]. Besides, the views developed, particularly the distinction established between Knowledge and Science, were too new to be at

[s] Such as the principles of Thought and Knowledge; a principle of Speculative Science, and a principle of Practical Reason.

[t] For instance; † A Preliminary Exposition of the Principles of a General System of ——— Posts ! ! ! *Götting.* 1801.

once generally adopted or apprehended, and too repugnant to the natural tendency to speculation, for the understanding at once to submit to their discipline. The consequence was, that the Critical system itself gave occasion to a variety of attempts, partly to re-establish the old dogmatical theories[u]: partly to exalt the new philosophy itself to the highest grade of Science, to constitute it a complete system of knowledge, (of which Kant had only pointed out the method), supposing it to have attained to the region of the Absolute and Perfect, in which Being and Science become identical, and all the contradictions of Reflection disappear. A variety of fresh systems made their appearance, by which man hoped to attain to a knowledge of the Absolute; some by the way of contemplation,—some by thought,—some by science,—others again by belief. It was natural that Scepticism also should revive in exact proportion as attemps at demonstrative science began to characterise the New Philosophy.

The consequence was that from this School itself proceeded fresh essays both of Dogmatism and Scepticism.

C. L. Reinhold.

See Reinhold's Life and Works, edited by E. Reinhold, *Jena*, 1825, 8vo.[x].

An Account of his Doctrines, etc.; by his pupil, E. Duboc, *Hamb.* 1828, 8vo. (Both in German).

382. The leader in these controversies was *C. L. Reinhold;* who was born at Vienna, 1758, and subsequently became a professor at Jena and Kiel; where he died, 1823.

Having by laborious study made himself thoroughly acquainted with the spirit of the Critical system, and

[u] For instance: the Empiricism of Selle, *Berlin*, 1788, 8vo. The Rationalism of Eberhard;—and the Eclecticism of Feder.

[x] Containing several letters of Kant and his contemporaries.

cultivated his own talent for analysis, he convinced himself that he had discovered in them a principle of perpetual harmony among men of inquisitive minds, and a panacea for the evils of mortality[y]. His hope being disappointed by the innumerable misapprehensions which prevailed with regard to it, he laboured to discover for it some internal evidence, in corroboration of the argumentative proof it possessed already. He believed himself to have detected such a principle by the observation, that although Kant had investigated fully the faculties for acquiring knowledge, he had not examined the perceptive and imaginative faculties, which are the ultimate source of all knowledge, and necessarily modify and define it. He also complained that the Critical system was not sufficiently scientific, and, in particular, wanted a common principle influencing all its parts, and a theory founded on such a principle, which might supply the elements of Logic, Metaphysics, and the Criticism of Reason. To this end he proposed the principle of *Consciousness*. In consciousness we may distinguish between two relative terms—the Object conceived—and the Subject which conceives: by investigating the nature of mental conception and its modifications of unity and multiplicity, Reinhold endeavoured to ascertain the laws and properties of Knowledge and Consciousness, as well as the results of a critical examination of the rational faculties. This theory[z] had the appearance of

[y] See the letters of Kant mentioned § 380, note [u].

[z] It was styled the Theory of the Faculties of mental Conception.

Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschl. Vorstellungsvermögens, *Prag. u. Jena*, 1789, 8vo.; u. 1795. Ueber die bisherigen Schicksale der Kant. Philosophie, *Jena*, 1789, 8vo. Ueber das Fundament des Philos. Wissens. *Jena*, 1791, 8vo. Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophie, I u. II B. *Jena*, 1790, 1794, 8vo. Auswahl vermischter Schriften, 2 Thle. *Jena*, 1796, 8vo. Preisschrift üb. die Frage: welche Fortschritte hat die Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolf gemacht (together with other prize compositions of SCHWAB and ABICHT), *Berlin*, 1796, 8vo. Verhandlungen über ein Einverständniss in den Grundsätzen der sittlichen Angelegenheit aus dem Gesichtspuncte des gemeinen und gesunden Verstandes, I B. *Lübeck*, 1798, 8vo.

giving to Critical Philosophy what it wanted in unity and harmony; at the same time that it seemed to render it more intelligible by reflecting a light upon its principles as well as its consequences. It was assailed, however, at the same time by Dogmatic and Sceptical antagonists, (*Flatt*, *Heydenreich*, *Beck*, etc. [a]), but particularly by the author of *Ænesidemus* [b]. In consequence of these attacks, Reinhold himself became sceptical as to the validity of his own system, which he endeavoured to improve, partly by modifying the terms he had employed, and partly by strengthening its weak points. He ended, however, by renouncing it altogether, and adopted first the theory of *Fichte* [c], and afterwards that of *Bardili* [d]. This genuine lover of Truth turned, in his latter days, his attention to the critical examination of Language, as the source of all the misunderstandings which have arisen in Philosophy (conducting his researches with an especial regard to

[a] See the following section.

[b] (Gottlob Ernst. Schulze), Ænesidemus, oder über die Fundamente der von dem Hrn. Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, nebst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmaassungen der Vernunftkritik, (*Helmst.*), 1792, 8vo.

In reply to Ænesidemus: J. H. Abicht's Hermias, oder Auflösung der die gültige Elementarphilos. betreffenden Ænesidemischen Zweifel, *Erlang.* 1794, 8vo. J. C. C. Visbeck's Hauptmomente der Reinholdischen Elementarphilos. in Beziehung auf die Einwendungen des Ænesidemus, *Leipz.* 1794, 8vo. Darstellung der Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe, nebst dem Versuche einer Widerlegung der Hauptmomente der Einwendungen des Ænesidemus gegen die Reinholdische Elementarphilos, *Frkf. am M.* 1795, 8vo. (by Beck.)

In reply to Reinhold's theory: Einzig möglicher Standpunct, von welchem die krit. Philosophie beurtheilt werden soll. *Riga*, 1796, 8vo.

Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling von Jac. Fries, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo.

[c] Sendschreiben an Lavater u. Fichte über den Glauben an Gott, *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo. Ueber die Paradoxieen der neusten Philos., *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo.

[d] Beiträge zur leichten Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philos. beim Anfange des 19, Jahrh. *Hamburg.* 1801—3, 3 Hefte, 8vo. More recently: Anleitung zur Kenntniss u. Beurtheilung der Philos. in ihren sämmtl. Lehrgebäuden, *Wien.* 1805, 8vo. (Anonym:) Versuch einer Auflösung der etc. Aufgabe, die Natur der Analysis und der analyt. Methode in der Philos. genau anzugeben und zu untersuchen, etc., *Münch.* 1805, 8vo.

Bardili's u. K. Lh. Reinhold's Briefwechsel über das Wesen der Philos. und das Unwesen der Speculation, herausg. v. Reinhold, *Münch.* 1804, 8vo.

cases of Synonymy), with the hope of effecting that harmony among philosophical inquirers which was constantly his object. He endeavoured to elucidate the equivocal expressions and inconsistencies of the customary formal Logic, which he maintained to be the essential causes of the reproach so long incurred by Moral Philosophy, that it was incompetent to make good its pretensions to the character of a Science[e]. He endeavoured also, by a new theory of the faculties of human knowledge on scientific principles[f], to bring to an end the inquiries he had started in his former attempt.

His son, *E. Reinhold* (professor of Moral Philosophy at Jena), follows the steps of his father in his inquiries respecting the relations and connection between Logic and Language[g].

383. *J. Sigismund Beck* (first professor at Halle, afterwards at Rostock), an acute disciple of Kant, endeavoured to recommend the Critical System by an abridgment of it, and by making the Critical point of view the point of view also of all original mental conception: but his ideas were confused and his method bad, and he injured the cause which he sought to support, by drawing his conclusions without any previous analysis of the facul-

[e] Anfangsgründe der Erkenntniss der Wahrheit in einer Fibel, *Kiel*, 1808, 8vo. Rüge einer merkwürdigen Sprachverwirrung unter den Weltweisen, *Weimar*, 1809, 8vo. Grundlegung einer Synonymik für den Allgem. Sprachgebrauch in den Philos. Wissenschaften, *Kiel*, 1812, 8vo. Das menschl. Erkenntnissvermögen aus dem Gesichtspuncte des durch die Wortsprache vermittelten Zusammenhangs zwischen der Sinnlichkeit und dem Denkvermögen, *ebend.* 1816, 8vo.

[f] Die alte Frage: Was ist die Wahrheit bei der erneuerten Streitigkeiten über die göttl. Offenbarung und die menschl. Vernunft in nähere Erwägung gezogen, *Altona*, 1820, 8vo. (See particularly the concluding bibliography § 164).

(On the other side:) Was ist Wahrheit? Eine Abhandl. veranl. durch die Frage des, etc., Reinhold, von dem Grafen H. W. A. von Kalkreuth, *Breslau*, 1821, 8vo.

[g] ERN. REINHOLD, Versuch eider Begründung und neuern Darstellung der log. Formen, *Leipz.* 1819, 8vo. He also wrote: Grundzüge eines Systems der Erkenntnisslehre und Denklehre, *Schleswig*, 1822, 8vo.

ties for acquiring knowledge, on which they were founded. He also prepared the way for the most absolute transcendental Idealism, by making every thing depend on the understanding; deriving our very ideas of Space and Time directly from that and from original mental conception, and abolishing the broad distinction which subsists between Contemplation and Thought.

Jak. Sigism. Beck erläuternder Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften des Prof. Kant. *Riga*, 1793-94, I und II B. Vol. III directed against Reinhold with this title: Einzig möglicher Standpunct, aus welchem die kritische Philosophie beurtheilt werden muss. *Riga*, 1796, II Bde. 8vo. Grundriss der kritischen Philosophie, *Halle*, 1796, 8vo. Propädeutik zu jedem wissensch. Studio, *ebend.* 1796. Commentar über Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten, I Th. 1798, 8vo. Beck subsequently put forth: Grundsätze d. Gesetzgebung, 1806, em Lehrbuch der Logik. *Rost. u. Schwerin*, 1820, 8vo.; and Lehrb. des Naturrechts, *Jen.* 1820, 8vo.

Fichte's Scientific Theory.

For the bibliography see below, § 389.

384. The philosophical labours of *J. G. Fichte* attracted far greater attention.

He was born May 19, 1762, at Rammenau, in the Haute-Lusace, and, after having studied at the School of Pforta, and at the universities of Jena and Leipsic, passed several years in Switzerland and Prussia, and in 1793, became professor of Moral Philosophy at Jena: resigned his office in 1799, and retired to Berlin: in 1805 filled a professorial chair at Erlangen, and afterwards in the university of Berlin; where he died, 1814. Fichte made it his object to constitute the Critical philosophy a science, founded on the most exact principles [h], with the hope of precluding all future errors and misapprehensions, and of annihilating Scepticism; the cause of which was defended, among others, by *Schulze* and *Sol. Mai-*

[h] † Idea of the Scientific Theory: Pref. p. 5. † General Principles of the Scientific Theory, p. 12.

mon. Encouraged by the success which his "Essay towards a Criticism of Revelation in General," obtained [i], and by the example of Reinhold's theory of the perceptive faculties, he gave full scope to his original and independent genius, which, with a firmness approaching obstinacy, led him constantly to maintain and boldly to profess the conclusions to which he had once arrived. His object was to concoct a system which might illustrate by a single principle, the material and formal properties of all science; might establish the unity of plan which the Critical system had failed to maintain, and solve that most difficult of all problems regarding the connection between our conceptions and their objects. Such was the origin of his Scientific Theory[k], which supposes that neither Consciousness nor the objects to which it refers, —neither the material nor formal parts of knowledge,— are to be considered as *data;* but are the results of an operation of *Ego*, and are collected by means of Reflection. Fichte does not, like Kant, begin by an analysis of our faculties for acquiring knowledge,—of practical reason and judgment; nor yet, as Reinhold had done, by assuming a primitive *fact*,—that of Consciousness; but supposes an original act of the subject (*Ego*), from which he derives the very construction of Consciousness itself.

The method he pursues is as follows. He begins by investigating the proper meaning of the term *Science.* It is a system of Knowledge based on a higher principle, which imparts a determinate value to Knowledge itself. The Theory of Science has for its object to demonstrate the possibility and validity of Science, the solidity of the principles on which it is founded, and consequently the connection and coherence of all human knowledge. Inasmuch as this Theory or Doctrine of Science is the highest of all Scientific Systems it must be dependent on a peculiar principle, not deducible from that or any other science. The Theory of Science is independent of all

[i] *Königsb.* 1792 : second edition 1793.
[k] *Wissenschaftslehre.*

others,—self-demonstrated, and *is because it is.* The Theory of Science implies also a System connected with it; and, contrariwise, the fact of a System implies that of a Theory, and of a first and absolute principle; the circle of argumentation being complete and inevitable. Such a Theory of Science is what we term Moral Philosophy, which has for its object the necessary laws of human action. When the energies of our minds have been determined to any particular pursuit, (such as Logic, Geometry, etc.), they become the objects of a Special Science; the determination to such particular pursuits being a contingent direction imparted to free-action, and consequently incomplete. On the other hand the Theory of Science is complete in itself, and forms a perfect whole. The objects it contemplates are, agreeably to what has been stated, the original operations of the human mind, which take place according to a certain determinate method and form. These become the objects of Consciousness by means of the faculty of Reflection, which analyses all objects, and abstracts from them whatever is not Consciousness. In this way we attain to Absolute Unity, which comprehends all Sciences and their principles; in other words, to pure *Ego.* Reflection and Abstraction are subject to certain laws of Logic, which are elementary parts of the Theory or Doctrine of Science.

385. First principle, A = A. X represents the systematic dependency of the whole. A and X being supposed to exist in *Ego* may be signified by this formulary, *Ego sum Ego.* This is the self-evident principle of Moral Philosophy and Knowledge in general; expressing the necessary form and substance of Consciousness. In virtue of this principle we form judgments; to judge being an act and operation of *Ego. Ego* then establishes, absolutely and independently, its own existence; being at once the agent and the result of the action: in which combination consists the essence of Consciousness. The first operation of *Ego* is that of Reflection on itself, which is occasioned by an impediment opposed to its

hitherto unrestrained energies. *Ego* places itself in the position of the subject, inasmuch as it opposes itself as subject to the obstacle contemplated. The *second* principle (involved in the former), is this—that *Ego* is not *Non-Ego*. There remains yet a *third* principle, conditional as far as relates to its form; but not as respects its value. To exemplify this, an action of *Ego* is required, which may illustrate the opposition of *Ego* and *Non-Ego* in *Ego*, without destroying *Ego*. Reality and Negation can be associated only by means of limitations. Limitation then is the third principle we were in search of. Limitation again leads us on to Divisibility. Every thing divisible is a *quantity*. Consequently in *Ego* there must exist a divisible quantity, and therefore *Ego* contains something which may be supposed to exist or not to exist without detracting from the real existence of *Ego*. Hence we arrive at the distinction of a separable and an absolute *Ego*. *Ego* implies the opposition of a divisible *Non-Ego* to the divisible *Ego*. Both of them have their existence in absolute *Ego*, being respectively determinable by a reference to that. Hence are derived the two following propositions: 1. *Ego* implies a limitation of its extent by means of *Non-Ego*, which circumscribes its absolute and otherwise unlimited influence. 2. In like manner *Ego* determines and defines *Non-Ego*. The real existence of the one circumscribes that of the other. On this point turn all the disputes between the Nominalists and Realists; and it is by a reference to this that they must be adjusted. The grand problem which speculative philosophy would endeavour to solve, is the accomplishment of such a reconciliation, and a satisfactory explanation of the connection between our conceptions and the objects to which they refer. The first of the two propositions above stated is necessary to be admitted, because without the opposition we have described there would be no such thing as Consciousness—without an *object* there could be no *subject*. *Ego* cannot be said to exist except as modified by *Non-Ego*. But *vice versâ*, without a subject there can be no object: *Ego* must also

be admitted to exist as determining *Non-Ego:* The one fact implying a passion,—the other an action of *Ego.* Our conception of external objects, as external, is an act of *Ego,* whereby it transfers to *Non-Ego* a real existence abstracted from itself. By such an operation of the mind *Non-Ego* assumes the character of something real as respects *Ego,* inasmuch as *Ego* transfers to it a portion of its own reality. Allowing that external objects impress the Thinking Subject, yet this is nothing more than the opposition of those objects as *Non-Ego* to our own *Ego* (limiting thereby the latter); the agent continuing to be the Thinking Subject and not the external Objects. From what has been stated, may be deduced: 1st. The reciprocity existing between *Ego* and *Non-Ego.* The action and passion of *Ego* are one and the same thing, as relates to *Non-Ego.* 2ndly. The operations of *Ego* tend to show that the *ideal* and *real* principles, which have been adopted to explain the connection between the mind and external objects, are identical. The explanation is to be sought in the fact that we contemplate *Ego* as active, and *Non-Ego* as passive; or *vice versâ.* By such an hypothesis the discordant claims of the Realists and Nominalists are reconciled, and the true theory of philosophical science developed.

From such principles the Transcendental theory of the faculty of mental perception infers the following conclusions. 1. Mental perception can only take place in virtue of a reciprocal action existing between *Ego* and *Non-Ego.* 2. The influence of *Ego* on *Non-Ego* is opposed to that of *Non-Ego* on *Ego.* In such cases *Ego* balances, as it were, between two contrary influences. Such hesitation is the effect of the imagination, which equally represents the passive and active operations of *Ego;* or, in other words, conveys them to the Consciousness. 3. Such a state of hesitation implies the act of contemplating, in which it is difficult to separate the contemplating Subject from the Object contemplated. It is not Reflection (the tendency of which is inwards), but activity directed towards external objects,—Production. 4. From the fa-

culty for contemplating results Contemplation, properly so called, which is the effect of the absolute spontaneousness of Reason,—i. e. of the *Understanding*. 5. Judgment, in the next place, weighs the objects presented to it by the understanding, and defines their mutual relations. 6. The contemplation of the absolute spontaneousness of *Ego* affords the apprehension of Reason, and the basis of all Science.

Practical Application of the Scientific Theory.

386. Two facts have been up to this point required as postulates to support the above system: the reciprocal action of *Ego* and *Non-Ego;* and the occurrence of an obstacle to *Ego*, which restricts its hitherto unlimited energies, and gives birth to *Non-Ego*. Now as the existence of *Ego* itself (involving that of *Non-Ego*) is dependent on this very circumstance, the whole system would fall for want of a foundation, if we could not deduce from *Ego* itself the principle of such an obstacle. This can be effected only by practical not by theoretical philosophy. The Scientific Theory in its practical application contemplates absolute practical *Ego*, which, by defining *Non-Ego*, becomes the principle of the obstacle alluded to, and of the limitation of the activity of *Ego*. Such an *Ego* is free, unlimited, and independent; the only true Reality; while on the other hand *Ego*, considered as Intelligence determined by *Non-Ego*, is finite and limited. In virtue of its unlimited activity *Ego* commences by circumscribing itself. This it does as a determining faculty, which implies the existence of something else determinable by it. Consequently, *Ego* possesses by implication the power of determining that which is determinable, in other words, of determining *Non-Ego;* which is *objective* activity, and the result of pure Activity. Absolute *Ego* posseses an unlimited activity, and a perpetual tendency to become the cause of something else. With such an impulse *Ego* commences an unlimited career, but

without attaining its object or becoming a Cause. In consequence of not accomplishing this end its energies are repulsed and reflected upon itself (Reflection). In virtue of its inherent activity and its inability to attain the end first proposed, *Ego* now opposes a counter-movement to its first impulse. Hence arises the obstacle alluded to, or *Non-Ego*. *Non-Ego* being once established, *Ego* assumes with reference to it the characteristics of practical, definitive, and causal. *Non-Ego* also re-acts on *Ego*, determining to a certain extent *Ego*, and opposing a counterpoise to its influence. In this manner *Non-Ego* also becomes a cause with reference to *Ego*[1]. It is thus we arrive at the reciprocal opposition existing between *Ego* and the external World; the former in one respect assuming the character of something connected with, and dependent on, the World, (considered as Intelligence), but in another, (as Practical), continuing free and independent of the same. In this manner, by establishing the existence of *Ego*, we establish that of the World, and by establishing the existence of the external World we establish that of *Ego*. Consequently, the World can possess reality only for an *Ego*, in an *Ego*, and by an *Ego*. The leading proposition of the theory is this: that *Ego* is absolute Activity: that all which exists out of *Ego* is produced by *Ego* by means of *position*, *opposition*, etc. *Ego* is the *subject-object*, and as such the basis of the Transcendental Idealism.

On certain Branches of Philosophy treated by Fichte.

387. The author of the Scientific Theory attempted to re-model on its principles some of the philosophical sciences, such as Ethics and Natural Law. His disquisitions respecting both contain many original and striking ideas by the side of an equal number of paradox-

[1] The perception of the limits of the activity of *Ego* is what we denominate Sensation.

ical imaginations, with an appearance of logical deduction which is fallacious and unreal, resting on no solid basis, although managed with great ability. *Ethics.* Having by his Idealism annihilated the objective reality of the sensible world, and left nothing in its place but a system of mere Images, he proceeds to establish by means of *Conscience*, a belief in the existence of a sensible world, intelligible and independent of the former; and to demonstrate the possibility of referring our actions to an attainable end. He sets out with the idea of free-will, that is, of unrestrained independent free-agency, which is the tendency of *Ego*, and on which the idea of independence is founded. Consequently, the principle of practical Morality is the necessary conviction of Intelligence, that its freedom must be defined by the notion of complete free-agency, or, in common language, that Conscience must be obeyed without limitation[m]. Such a conviction is the principle of Duty. Virtue consists in a perfect conformity and unison with self. Natural Law and Right, which Fichte was the first to treat as independent of Moral Right, instructs us as to the relations, in respect of Right, and the reciprocal actions of free-agents, and deduces them from self-consciousness, of which they are necessary conditions. Man cannot conceive himself to be a rational animal except inasmuch as he attributes to himself a power of Causality; nor can he suppose himself possessed of this, without extending the same to other beings, to all appearance like himself. Consequently, he conceives himself to be placed in certain relations of Right with regard to the latter, which induce him to regard his personal liberty as circumscribed by that of others. Fichte denies the existence of an Original Right, regarding it as a fiction created to meet the

[m] In his Anweisung zum seligen Leben, § 133, sqq., this view of morality is made superior to that presented by the principle of positive and imperative Legislation, at the same time that Fichte makes it subordinate to those of Religion and Science. According to his theory the only true life is the life in God, which gives birth to a higher principle of morality, lays open to us a new world, and creates it.

exigencies of Science. All Right has reference to some society or other, and derives its very existence from such a state. Rational beings are consequently intended to become at once members of society. A state is the realisation of Right as contemplated by Reason.—In his later account of political Right, Fichte chose to consider the realisation of the Kingdom of God upon earth as the true image of a state based on the principles of Reason; in other words a Theocracy, founded on the revelation of God in a human shape. It may be observed in general that his leading maxim is to make every thing subordinate to the idea of Reason: and on this principle he founded his plan for an universal national system of education, and a permanent school or college of learned men.

The *Religious philosophy* of Fichte has also attracted great attention. He represents the Deity as the immediate principle of morality, an idea to which *Ego* attains in consequence of feeling itself restricted in the exercise of its free-agency by the ideas of obligation. *Ego* labours to realise this idea of duty, and consequently to recognise a moral creation in the midst of the world without, which it has itself produced: in this manner it approximates the Deity, and attains to the life which proceeds from God. In this moral World Felicity is the result of moral worth. This felicity is not to be confounded with Happiness; which does not, and cannot exist: a doctrine which prohibits all reference to the latter as a final end. It is not necessary to think of the Deity as something distinct from the Moral World just described, notwithstanding our proneness to conceive of Him as a separate being, and the author of that creation. 1st. Because we cannot attribute to the Divinity the qualities of Intelligence or Personality, without making Him a finite being, like to ourselves. 2ndly. It is a species of profanation to conceive of the Deity as a separate essence, since such an idea implies the existence of a *sensible* being limited by Space and Time. 3rdly. We cannot impute to Him even existence without confound-

ing him with sensible natures. 4thly. No satisfactory explanation has yet been given of the manner in which the creation of the world could be operated by God. 5thly. The idea and expectation of Happiness is a delusion, and when we form our notions of the Deity in accordance with such imaginations, we do but worship the idol of our own passions—the Prince of this World.

Such extravagant or paradoxical rhapsodies[n] naturally procured for their author the reputation of Atheism, and drew upon him some persecutions not altogether undeserved; notwithstanding the display which he made of a profound sentiment of moral duty. He lived to renounce in some degree his heresies (see § 389)[°].

Remarks on the Scientific Theory at large.

388. The system of Fichte is distinguished by a great appearance of logical accuracy and deduction. It solves many difficulties, but at the same time gives occasion to many new ones, and was exposed to the following objections. By the Kantists it was urged that 1st. Fichte had proposed for solution a grand philosophical problem, without previously inquiring whether it was capable of being solved. He pretends to explain every thing, but attempts this only by means of a seeming transcendental deduction, and is constantly driven back to gratuitous assertions and cyclical arguments. 2ndly. The principles laid down are those of Logic, which can never enable us to attain to an accurate knowledge of the nature and properties of any subject or object. It was farther urged

[n] See the work on the principle of our belief in a Divine Providence, mentioned in § 389 (notes). In his work on the Destiny of Man, p. 287, Fichte assumes the character of a mystical theist.

[° It is painful to be the instrument of putting on record so much of nonsense and so much of blasphemy as is contained in the pretended philosophy of Fichte: the statement, however, will not be without its good, if the reader be led to reflect on the monstrous absurdities which men will believe at the suggestion of their own fancies, who have rejected the plain evidences of Christianity. *Transl.*]

that these abstract elements had been artfully invested by him with the semblance of realities, particularly in the case of Principle the first, by the substitution of *Ego* for the Indeterminate Object. The non-Kantists objected: 1st. That this system converts *Ego* into an absolute and independent essence, annihilating the existence of external Nature, its independent reality, and its conformity to the laws of Reason. 2ndly. It is inconsistent with itself. *Ego* at first is represented as nothing but infinite activity, opposing to itself as a limitation *Non-Ego*, and thereby producing all things—space included. But in the first place; what is it which compels *Ego*, as yet unlimited and unrestrained, to circumscribe itself by the position of *Non-Ego?*—"Because otherwise it could not attain to a knowledge of objects." But what necessity can be shown for its aiming at the knowledge of objects, being itself infinite and unlimited? The pretended principle of the Activity of *Ego*, in virtue of which it establishes an *objective* world, is a primordial fact, of which we have no evidence from experience, and which can only be ascertained by intellectual contemplation, and is therefore a *postulate* arbitrarily, and, as it were, surreptitiously assumed for the purposes of the theory. Fichte confounds the operations of transcendental imagination in the construction of geometrical figures with the creation of determinate objects, without stopping to explain how the multiplicity of external objects and their various properties can possibly be effected by the construction of Form in Space. The postulate of an obstacle encountered by the infinite activity of *Ego*, which throws it back upon itself, and creates a consciousness of the necessity attaching to certain mental perceptions, is not to be accounted for either by the nature of *Ego* or *Non-Ego*. In short, instead of one mystery, this theory would establish another still more incomprehensible, all the time pretending to explain the former by the latter, and ending with an admission that its own principle of explanation is incomprehensible. Accordingly, in the most recent statement of his theory, the author is compelled to assert, (in

order to account for the feeling of *necessity* attached to certain mental perceptions, arising from their relation to an object), that *Ego* is restricted in the exercise of its energies by certain determinate limits, although he had described it as Infinite Activity and Independent Action. These limits or restrictions he is pleased to call incomprehensible and inexplicable, which nevertheless were precisely the object at which his Scientific Theory of Philosophy was levelled. His Idealism, therefore, is an example of speculation carried to the most extravagant excess, and ending in the destruction of itself; after having first annihilated all science and free-agency.

Compare this transcendental Idealism with the supernatural Idealism of Berkeley, and the Realism of Spinoza.

389. Fichte himself endeavoured to accommodate his theory to the opinions of others by subjecting it to various modifications[p], particularly with reference to the

[p] FICHTE's Works. On the Theory of Science at large: Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, *Weimar*, 1794, 8vo. Zweite verb. u. verm. Aufl. *Jena*, 1798, 8vo. Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, *Weimar*, 1794, 8vo.; II Aufl. 1802, 8vo. Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, *Jena u. Leipzig*, 1795, 8vo.; II verb. Aufl. *ebend.* 1802. Grundlage, etc., u. Grundriss, neue unveränderte Aufl. *Tüb.* 1802. Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, und zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (in dem Philosophischen Journal, herausgeg. von Niethammer u. Fichte, 1797. St. I. S. 1 f., St. IV. S. 310, S. V. S. 1 f. und VI). Antwortschreiben an K. L. REINHOLD anf dessen Beitr. zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange des 19 Jahrhunderts, *Tüb.* 1801, 8vo. Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publicum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie, etc., *Berl.* 1801, 8vo. Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinsten Umrisse dargestellt, *Berlin*, 1810, 8vo. Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Vorlesungen gehalten, etc., zu *Berlin*, 1810-11; *Stuttg. u. Tüb.* 1817, 8vo.

On Religious Philosophy in particular: Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (anonym.) II verm. u. verb. Aufl. *Königsb.* 1793, 8vo. Ueber den Grund unsers Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung (Philosoph. Journal, VIII B. (1798) 1 St. FR. K. FORBERG's Entwickelung des Begriffs der Religion. Ebendaselbst.). Appellation an das Publicum über die ihm beigemessenen atheistischen Æusserungen, *Jena u. Leipz.* 1799, 8vo. Der Herausgeber des Philosophischen Journals gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, *Jena*, 1799, 8vo. (FORBERG's Apologie seines

agreement he pretended to have established between it and the Critical method; as also with regard to the means of detecting in Consciousness the original activity of *Ego*. At first he attempted this on the principles of Thought, but subsequently had recourse to Intellectual Contemplation; (in his *Sonnenklarer Bericht*, mentioned below). The most remarkable difference however between the earlier and later editions of the Theory of Science, is this: that the first was composed on the principles of Idealism, the latter on those of Realism. The former sets out with asserting the unlimited and independent activity of *Ego;* the latter by maintaining the absolute existence of the Deity, as the only true reality—the only pure and self-existing life—of whom the world and consciousness are but the image and impress; treating objective nature as nothing more than a limitation of Divine Life. The philosophical system of Schelling appears to have contributed no less than the species of religious sentiment still retained by Fichte to effect this change.

The Scientific Theory excited a prodigious deal of attention and gained a great number of partisans, among others: *F. K. Forberg*, (see the catalogue of Fichte's works, No. *2*); *F. J. Niethammer*, (born 1766); *K. L. Reinhold*, (see § 382); *Schelling*, (see following §); *J. B. Schad* (§ 395), afterwards a disciple of Schelling; *Abicht* (§ 396); *Mehmel*, and others [q].

augeblichen Atheismus, *Gotha*, 1799, 8vo.). Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder auch die Religionslehre, etc., *Berl.* 1806, 8vo.

Ethical and other writings: Vorlesungen uber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, *Jena*, 1794, 8vo. System der Sittenlehre, *Jena u. Leipz.* 1798, 8vo. Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die Französische Revolution, 1793, 8vo. Grundlage des Naturrechts, *Jena*, 1796, 1797, II Thle. 8vo. Ueber die Bestimmung des Menschen, *Berlin*, 1800, 8vo. Der geschlossene Handelsstaat. Ein Philos. Entwurf als Anhang zur Rechtsl. *Tübing.* 1800, 8vo. Vorlesungen über das Wesen des Gelehrten, *Berl.* 1806, 8vo. Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, *Berlin*, 1806, 8vo. Reden an die Deutsche Nation, *Berl.* 1808, 8vo. Die Vorlesungen üb. den Begriff des wahrhaften Kriegs. *ebend.* 1813, 8vo. Die Staatslehre od. üb. das Verhältn. des Urstaats zum Vernunftreiche in Vorträgen, etc., aus dem Nachlasse herausgeg, *Berl.* 1820, 8vo.

[q] Works illustrative of those of Fichte: Philosophisches Journal heraus-

It also encountered many sturdy antagonists and severe critics, especially among the Kantists[r]. The end of it has been the same with that of all other exclusive theories, and in spite of its imposing tone of authority, which would elevate speculation at the expense of experimental knowledge (which it affects to contemn), it has failed to acquire an ascendency in matters of philosophy. At the same time, it must be confessed that in its day it had

gegeben von NIETHAMMER, *Neustrel u. Jena*, 1795-96, IV B.; mit FICHTE, 1797—1800, V—X B.

FR. W. JOS. SCHELLING, Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre in dem Philos. Journal von Fichte und Nieth. 1796, u. 1797; and in Schelling's Philos. Schriften, I B.

JOH. BAPT. SCHAD, Grundriss der Wissenschaftslehre, *Jena*, 1800, 8vo. Gemeinfassliche Darstellung des Fichteschen Systemes und der daraus hervorgehenden Religionstheorie, *Erfurt*, 1799—1801, III B. 8vo. Geist der Philosophie unserer Zeit, *Jena*, 1800, 8vo. Absolute Harmonie des Fichteschen Systems mit der Religion, *Erf.* 1802, 8vo. Transcendentale Logik, *Jena*, 1801, 8vo.

G. E. A. MEHMEL, Lehrbuch der Sittenlehre, *Erl.* 1811. Reine Rechtslehre, *ebend.* 1815, 8vo. At an earlier date: Versuch einer vollst. analyt. *Denklehre*, 1803, und über das Verhältniss der Philos. zur Religion, 1805, 8vo. u. a.

[r] Criticisms of Fichte's theory: Stimme eines Arktikers über Fichte und sein Verfahren gegen die Kantianer (von K. THDR. RINK), 1799, 8vo.

Vom Verhältniss des Idealismus zur Religion, oder: ist die neueste Philosophie auf dem Wege zum Atheismus? 1799, 8vo.

Freimüthige Gedanken über Fichte's Appellation gegen die Anklage des Atheismus und deren Veranlassung, *Gotha*, 1799, 8vo.

J. H. GLI. HEUSINGER, Uber das Idealistisch-Atheistische System der Hrn. Prof. Fichte, *Dresden u. Gotha*, 1799, 8vo.

K. L. REINHOLD, Sendschreiben an Lavater und Fichte über den Glauben an Gott, *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo.

F. H. JACOBI an Fichte, *Hamb.* 1799, 8vo.

W. TRAUGOTT KRUG, Briefe über die Wissenschaftslehre, *Leipz.* 1800, 8vo.

GOTTLOB CHR. FR. FISCHHABER, Über das Princip und die Hauptprobleme des Fichteschen Systems, nebst einem Entwurfe zu einer neuen Auflösung derselben, *Carlsruhe*, 1801, 8vo.

C. CHR. EHR. SCHMID's Ausfuhrliche Kritik des Buchs: die Bestimmung des Menschen, in SCHMID's Aufsätzen Philosophischen und Theologischen Inhalts, *Jena*, 1802, 8vo.

CH. F. BÖHME, Commentar über und gegen den ersten Grundsatz der W. L., *Altenb.* 1802, 8vo.

JAC. FRIES, Reinhold, Fichte, und Schelling, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo.

FR. WILH. JOS. SCHELLING, Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre, *Tübing.* 1806, 8vo.

great influence over the minds of Fichte's contemporaries, and by the sort of eloquence which characterised his compositions, has promoted in many men a strong tendency to supra-sensual pursuits and investigations.

Schelling's Theory of Absolute Identity.

390. Fichte had attempted to construct a system of knowledge on the principles of Idealism, in respect both of Form and Matter; but Schelling carried Speculation a step farther, and instead of *Ego*, the Subject-Object, placed at the head of his system the Absolute Itself, and proposed to solve on philosophical principles the highest problem which Reason can contemplate—the nature of Absolute Being, and the manner in which all finite beings are derived from It. *F. W. J. von Schelling*[s] is unquestionably an original thinker, superior to Fichte for the vivacity of his imagination,—the poetical character of his genius,—and the extent of his acquirements; more particularly in the history of ancient philosophy, in antiquities, and natural history. Having studied at Tübingen the systems of Kant, Reinhold, and Ænesidemus (Schulze), he accused the former of failing to deduce his conclusions from the first axioms of Science, and desiderated a common principle which might embrace alike the Speculative and Practical departments of knowledge[t]: objecting also to the use made of what was called the Moral Proof[u]. Fichte's theory made a strong impression on his youthful and ardent temper, more inclined to adopt with readiness the imagination of the infinite and creative activity of the human mind, than disposed to a painful

[s] An Aulic councillor, and at the present time a professor at Munich; born at Leonberg in Wurtemberg, Jan. 27, 1775.

[t] With these views he composed his first work: Uber die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philos. überhaupt, *Tübing.* 1795; and, Vom Ich als princip der Philos., oder über das Unbedingte im Menschlichen Wissen., *ibid.* 1805, 8vo, (see his Philos. Works, Vol. I).

[u] See his † Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism; first published in the Journal of Niethammer, 1796, and since incorporated in his works.

examination of the forms and laws by which that activity is circumscribed. With such views the young scholar resorted to Jena, where he formed a close intimacy with Fichte, and defended his theory against the partisans or the adversaries of Kant; without, however, adopting all its Dogmata. Gradually he dissented more and more from the system of his master, in proportion as he became more and more sensible of its defects.

391. Fichte had deduced all his system from the operations of *Ego* in what may be termed a *progressive* method; but without offering any proof for his leading assertion that the Subjective produces and creates the Objective; the latter never producing the Subjective. This process may be reversed and the argument conducted from Objective Nature to *Ego;* and if a due reference be not made to the Critical system the one method is no less admissible than the other. Spinoza had already produced a system of Dogmatism carried to the highest possible point, and ending in an objective Realism; and by such considerations Schelling was led to form the idea of two opposite and parallel philosophical Sciences —the *Transcendental Philosophy,* and the *Philosophy of Nature,* to the special treatment of which, especially the latter, he devoted various works. The former begins with the consideration of *Ego,* and derives from that the Objective, the Multifarious, the Necessary,—in short—the system of Nature. The latter sets out with the contemplation of Nature, and deduces therefrom *Ego,* the Unrestricted, and the Simple. The tendency of both is to illustrate by their mutual relations the powers of Nature and the Soul, considered as identical.

The principle which they have in common is this; The laws of Nature must exist within us as the laws of Consciousness; and *vice versâ* the laws of Consciousness are found to exist in objective Nature as the laws of Nature. It is to be observed, however, that the *first* of these two Sciences cannot investigate to the end the inexhaustible variety of external Nature; nor can the

second attain to a perception of the Simple and Absolute. It is impossible to explain to ourselves how out of Unity arises Multiplicity, and out of Multiplicity—Unity; (the last combining the twofold characters of Unity and Multiplicity). In this manner Schelling founded his system on the *Original Identity* of that which knows and that which is known, and was led to conclude the absolute identity of the Subjective and Objective, or the Indifference of the Differing; in which consists the essence of the Absolute:—that is, the Deity. The Absolute is recognised by an *absolute* act of cognition, in which the Subjective and Objective concur: in other words, by Intellectual Contemplation. Consequently Schelling opposes Absolute Cognition or Knowledge, obtained through the medium of the Ideas, to inferior or secondary knowledge, the result of Reflection by means of ordinary conceptions. The last description of knowledge is directed to things conditional, individual, and divisible, which are associated by a process of the understanding. The former contemplates the Absolute, which is independent and unconditional, and is apprehended by means of the Ideas. This is Science properly so called, and develops itself, (agreeable to its nature), as Unity, in an organic whole, in which the Subjective and Objective are indivisible and identical: a divine Science, embracing the highest sphere of Nature;—the only Science worthy of our serious regard, or of the name of Philosophy.

In this manner the system of Schelling proposes to attain to a knowledge of the essences and forms of all things, by means of the intellectual Ideas, and asserts that *to be* and *to know* are identical: (whence its appellation of the System of Absolute Identity—*Identitätslehre*). It is a transcendental and, according to Schelling, absolute system of Idealism, which would derive all knowledge not from the partial principle of *Ego*, but from one still higher—The Absolute; comprehending not only *Ego* but Nature also. It proposes to attain to a knowledge of the latter by means of the Ideas[x], and labours

[x] The Philosophy of Nature, or the Construction of Nature *à priori*.

to establish a perpetual parallelism or analogy between the laws of Nature and those of Intelligence.

392. The Absolute is neither infinite nor finite; neither to know nor to be; neither Subject nor Object; but that wherein all opposition of Subject and Object,—Knowledge and Existence,—Spirit and Inert Nature,—Ideal and Real,—together with all other differences and distinctions are absorbed and disappear, leaving an indissoluble and equal union of Knowledge and Existence. This Absolute Identity of Ideal and Real, and Absolute Indifference of the Differing (of Unity and Plurality), is the Unity which comprehends the Universe[y]. Absolute Identity *exists*, and out of its limits nothing really exists, and consequently nothing is finite which exists *per se*. All that *is* is Absolute Identity or a development of its essence. This development takes place in conformity with certain correlative Oppositions of terms, which are derived from Absolute Identity as the *poles* or *sides* of the same object, with a preponderance to the Ideal or Real; and become identified by the law of *Totality;* the principle of their development being that of *Identity in Triplicity*. Such development is sometimes styled a division of the Absolute; sometimes a spontaneous revelation of the same; sometimes a falling-off of the Ideas from the Deity. By such a revelation Absolute Knowledge is made possible to us; Reason itself (as far as it is Absolute) being the identification of the Ideal and Real. The characteristic *form* of The Absolute is absolute knowledge, in which Identity and Unity assume the character of Duality, (A = A). The leading propositions of this theory consequently are: 1. That there exists but *one* identical nature; and that merely a quantitive (not a qualitive) difference exists between objects, *quoad essentiam*, resulting from the preponderance of the Objective or Subjective,—the Ideal or Real. The Finite has only an apparent existence, inasmuch as

[y] See Considerations on various Philosophical Principles, and particularly that of Schelling, in Fischhaber's Archis. f. Philos. I Heft.

it is the product of merely relative Reflection. 2. The One Absolute Nature reveals Itself in the eternal generation of existing things, which on their part constitute the *forms* of the first. Consequently each individual being is a revelation of Absolute Being, in a determinate form. Nothing can exist which does not participate in the Divine Being. Consequently the Natural world is not *dead*, but animated and divine, no less than the Ideal. 3. This revelation of the Absolute takes place in conformity with certain correlative Oppositions which characterise different gradations of development, with a preponderance of the Real or the Ideal; and which consequently are nothing more than so many expressions of Absolute Identity. Science investigates these Oppositions and presents a picture of the Universe, by deducing the Ideas of objects from the original contemplation of The Absolute, on the principle of Identity in Triplicity, (called by Schelling the process of Construction), in conformity with the creative process observable in Nature itself. This Ideal construction is what we call Philosophy, (the Science of Ideas); the highest effort of which is the perception of a *relative form* amid the multifariousness of external Nature, and the recognition, in this relative form, of *Absolute Identity*.

The scheme of such *Construction* is as follows:

I. The Absolute—The Universe in its original form—The Deity: manifested in

II. Nature, (the Absolute in its secondary form),

As Relative and Real,————As Relative and Ideal;

According to the following gradations:

Weight—Matter	Truth—Science
Light—Motion	Goodness—Religion
Organic Structure—Life	Beauty—Art.

Above these gradations, (technically named by Schelling *Potenzen*), and independent of them, are arranged:

Man (as a Microcosm)	The State
The System of the World (the external Universe)	History.

393. Schelling believed himself to have discovered in the Ideas the essence of all things and their necessary forms; following the process of Intellectual Contemplation. He affected to amend the system of Kant, who had only recognised the existence of a knowledge of the phenomenal world, and allowed nothing more than belief for things existing *per se;* and thought he had refuted Fichte, who represents *Ego* as the only true Being, and all Nature as a dead and lifeless non-existence, incapable of any other characteristics than those belonging to a negation or limitation of *Ego.* Feeling confident that he had originated an ideal construction of the universe, not as it appears to us but as it really exists, he unfolded his views with great ability, without conforming himself to the subdivisions of Philosophy usually observed, and made a skilful use of his acquaintance with the theories of Plato, Bruno, and Spinoza. After having published several statements of his theory at large, he applied himself especially to one branch of it,—the application of its principles to real existence or the Philosophy of Nature, considered as the living principle which produces all things by subdivision of itself, according to the law of Duality. Of the Ideal Department of his system he treated only some separate questions, in his later writings on Free-will and the origin of Evil, the Nature of God, etc. etc.[z]. On the subject of *Morals* he delivers himself as follows: The knowledge of God is the first principle of all Morality. The existence of God necessarily implies that of a moral world. Virtue is a state of the soul in which it conforms itself not to an external law, but an internal necessity of its own nature. Morality is also Happiness. Happiness is not an accidental consequence of Virtue, but Virtue itself. The essence of Morality is the tendency of the soul to unite itself to God as the centre of all things. Social life, regulated according to the Divine Example with reference to Morality and

[z] In his, Philosophy and Religion, in his Essay on Free-will, in the Letter to Eschenmayer with reference to this treatise, and (*en passant*) in his controversies with Fichte and Jacobi.

Religion—Art and Science—is what we denominate a community, or the *State*. It is a harmony of necessity and free-will, with an external organisation. History, as a whole, is a revelation of the Deity, progressively developed. In his treatise on Free-will, Schelling went on to make a distinction between the Deity (simply so considered, or the Absolute), and the Deity *as existing*, or *revealing himself*, proceeding from a principle of existence contained in the Deity, (Nature in the Godhead), and thus attaining the condition of a complete essence, and assuming the character of personality, (*Deus implicitus explicitus*—see the following section). Every production of Nature contains in itself a double principle, viz. an obscure and a luminous one, which, to a certain extent, are identical. In mankind these constitute personality, the result of spirit and will, which have the power of separating themselves from the Universal Will which sways all Nature, by virtue of individual free-will. The consequence of this opposition of Individual to Universal Will, is the origin of evil; which becomes real only by virtue of such opposition. Schelling has treated the subject of Beauty merely with a reference to Art, defining it to be the Infinite represented in a finite shape, and describing Art as a representation of the Ideas, and a revelation of God to the human mind. This theory must be regarded as incomplete, (according to Schelling's own confession, Phil. Schr. 1 B.); its scientific development, as a whole, being conveyed to us only in a brief fragment[a].

[a] In the, Zeitschr. f. spec. Phys. 2 B. 2 Heft. s. 114, sqq.

His works (besides those already mentioned § 390). Ideen zu einer Philosophie d. Natur, als Einleit. in das Stud. dieser W. 1 Th. *Leipz.* 1797, 8vo. Zweite durchaus verb. u. verm. Aufl. *Landshut*, 1803. Von der Weltseele; eine Hypothese der höhern Physik zur Erklärung des allgem. Organismus, nebst. einer Abhandl. über das Verhältniss des Idealen u. Realen in der Natur, oder Entwickelung der ersten Grundsätze der Naturphilosophie an den Principien der Schwere und des Lichts, *Hamb.* 1798, 8vo.; III Aufl. 1809. The last treatise printed separately, *Hamb.* 1806, and *Landshut*, 1807. Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, *Jena*, 1799, 8vo. Einleitung zu seinem Entwurfe eines Systems der Naturphil., oder über den Begriff der

Observations on the above System.

394. The theory of Schelling is remarkable for the originality of the views it contains, the magnitude of the problems it would solve, the consistency of its plan, and the vast circle of its application. It binds together by one single Idea all the essences of Nature, removing the limits which had been assigned by Kant to the dominion of Science, and asserting the possibility not only of a subjective apprehension, but of an objective and scientific knowledge—of a certain and determinate perception of God and Divine things, by virtue of the identity between the human mind and the essence of all Being. It embraces the whole circle of philosophical speculation, removing, as it does, the distinction between empirical and rational knowledge; and its principles are made applicable to all the sciences. It has the appearance however of being, 1st. As relates to Practical Science, very confined and embarrassed; nor can we discover how, in such a system of Absolute Identity, there can be room for

specul. Physik, etc., *ebend.* 1799, 8vo. System des transcendentalen Idealismus, *Tüb.* 1800, 8vo. Zeitschrift für die speculative Physik. 1 u. 2 B. *Jena.* 1800—3, 8vo. Neue Zeitschrift u. s. w. *Tüb.* 1803. Krit. Journal der Phil. herausg. von SCHELLING u. HEGEL, 2 B. *Tüb.* 1802—3, 8vo. BRUNO oder über das göttl. u. Natürl. Princip. der Dinge. Ein Gespräch, *Berl.* 1802, 8vo. II Aufl. Vorlesungen über die Methode des akad. Studiums, *Stuttg. u. Tüb.* 1803, 8vo. II unveränd. Aufl. 1813. Philosophie und Religion, *Tüb.* 1804. Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre, *Tüb.* 1806, 8vo. Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft (darin Aphorismen zur Einl. in die Naturphilos. 1 B. I Heft.) *Tüb.* 1806. Philosophische Schriften, 1 B. *Landshut,* 1809, 8vo.; (containing also his Rede über das Verhältniss der bildenden Künste zu der Natur, 1807, gehalten, und die Abhandlung: Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschl. Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängengen Gegenstände.) SCHELLING's Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen des HRN. F. H. JACOBI und der ihm in derselben gemachten Beschuldigung eines absichtlich täuschenden, Lüge redenden Atheismus. *Tüb.* 1812, 8vo. Allgemeine Zeitschrift von und für Deutsche, III Hefte; (containing Schelling's answer to a writing of ESCHENMAYER, über die Abh. von der Freiheit.) Uber die Gottheiten von Samothrace, *Stuttg. u. Tüb.* 1815, 8vo.

practical necessity, or, in other words, the obligation of duty[b]. The theory is characterised by a blind sort of *Natural Necessity* and Determinism:—God reveals himself of *necessity*:—All History, and all the mutations of the world are but the modifications of his essence[c]. 2ndly. Independently of this partial view of Nature, the system is deficient in the solidity of its principles. It is not shown in what manner the human mind can elevate itself to the intellectual contemplation described: the principles, therefore, laid down, are mere suppositions. *Thought* without a *Thinking Subject* is nothing better than an abstract idea:—Absolute Identity is inconceivable independent of Relative Identity. Without the latter, the former is reduced to a mere non-entity. It cannot be shown that Absolute Identity constitutes the essence of all beings: Objective Reality depends upon a confusion of the nature of Thought with the essence of external objects. To pretend that a pure abstraction like this is *real*, and constitutes the essence of all things, is a mere unfounded hypothesis, the proof advanced by Schelling being altogether untenable[d]: to support which he has recourse to a mere jumble of words, ("Identity of Identity and Non-Identity"),—to contradiction—("The bond of Unity and Plurality—the Copula,—The Absolute in the Absolute,—The Divine in the Divine, etc."), and to a multitude of vague and indefinite terms. 3rdly. This theory has only the *appearance* of a scientific system. The attempt to deduce the Finite from the Infinite and Absolute, and the Particular from the Universal, by means of a real demonstration, (construction), has proved abortive[e]. The author maintains that a Finite and Infinite, a Real and Ideal have co-existed from the beginning of things in an indissoluble union:

[b] See SCHELLING, Philos. und Relig. s. 53 u. f. Philos. Schriften, s. 413 u. f.

[c] Darst. des wahr. Verh. s. 66.

[d] Zeitschr. § 7. Darst. der Verh. s. 50.

[e] See Zeitschrift für specul. Physik. 2 B. II Hft. s. 18; Bruno, s. 81—131; Philos. u. Rel. s. 35.

but anon he is obliged to suppose a separation between them, by virtue of his hypothesis of Absolute Identity. The same is the case with regard to self-revelation. The only answer he affords to the question, Why the Deity should reveal himself?—is a simple assertion that so it *must* be[f]. Occasionally he has recourse to Plato's mythical hypothesis of a Fall of the Ideas from the Absolute[g]; concerning which it may be queried how any thing can fall from the Absolute, which by hypothesis embraces and contains all things? Occasionally he labours to demonstrate that nothing exists besides Unity, the Copula, and the Absolute[h]: whence then are derived finite knowledge having reference to Space and Time; and the Categories? All that gives to his argument the appearance of successful demonstration is, that he has substituted for the vague idea of the Absolute certain fictions of the Imagination, and notions borrowed from experience. 4thly. Can any one presume to believe that the inscrutable nature of the Godhead is contained in the idea of Absolute Identity? His Natural Philosophy conveys to us no knowledge of God, and the little it reveals appears opposed to Religion[i]. It becomes a system of Pantheism by identifying the Deity with Nature[k], and makes the Deity himself subject to superior laws, supposing him obliged to reveal himself, and making the Divinity as Intelligence proceed, within the compass of Time, from non-intelligent principles—Nature in the Deity and Chaos. The Deity is supposed to render passive a certain portion of his nature with which before he energised, and to enable us to conceive of him as a personal being, we are obliged to suppose the existence in him of Nature as a negative essence[l]. God is represented not only as a Divine Being, but as Life. Now

[f] As a fact morally necessary: Abh. von du Freih. s. 492.

[g] Relig. u. Philos. s. 35.

[h] Darst. s. 62.

[i] See the close of the following section.

[k] Schelling has endeavoured to repel this charge: Philos. u. Relig. s. 52. Schr. s. 402 ff.

[l] Pages 96, 97.

life pre-supposes a certain destiny, and implies passive affections and a gradual development; and to such limitations we are taught to believe that the Deity has voluntarily submitted himself[m]. The whole theory is nothing better than an ingenious fiction, which, by offering the appearance of a solution of all difficulties, and by its pretended Construction of Nature, proved generally attractive; as well as by removing all idea of Constraint or Moral Obligation,—by suggesting a variety of new ideas,—and by appearing to throw open a wide perspective to the views of Science. As for the *manner* of Schelling, we are called upon to remark, besides the faults of a vague and indeterminate mode of expression already noticed, the employment of certain mythical and metaphorical terms, after the manner of Plato, which increase the difficulties belonging to his system[n].

Partisans and Adversaries of the System of Schelling.

395. The enthusiasm which this system excited may be explained by a reference to the character of the theory itself, and of the times in which it appeared. A considerable school of disciples was formed among the moral philosophers, theologians, philologists, physicians, and naturalists of the day; who professed to investigate anew their several sciences on the principles of the system of Absolute Identity, and aspired to complete that system by fresh discoveries. The views of Schelling had a more especial influence on the sciences of Natural History, Mythology, History, and the Theory of Taste. The two *Schlegels* at one time contributed to extend its reputation by their labours in the last department. Others of this school were less commendable; and a dizzy spirit of exaggeration seemed to possess its professors, which led

[m] Abh. über die Freih. s. 493, phil. Schr.

[n] [The grave remarks of the author on this absurd theory might perhaps have been worthily replaced by the pithy criticism of Mr. Burchell, apud the Vicar of Wakefield, as applied to other absurdities, videlicet—*Fudge*—*Fudge*—*Fudge*. TRANSL.]

them to accept as the highest efforts of wisdom the most extravagant and fantastical conceptions, and, by allying itself to superstition and enthusiasm, seemed to restore the days of Neoplatonism.

To this school belonged the Naturalists *H. Steffens*[o], *J. Görres*[p], *the Chevalier F. von Baader*[q], *L. Oken*[r], *J. P. V. Troxler*[s], *K. J. Windischmann*[t], *G. H. Schu-*

[o] Born at Stavanger in Norway, 1773 : a professor at Breslaw.

H. STEFFENS, Grundzüge der philos. Naturwissenschaft. *Berl.* 1806, 8vo., with his other treatises on the Natural Sciences—Ueber die Idee der Universitäten, *Berl.* 1809, 8vo. Caricaturen des Heiligsten, *Leipz.* 1819—21, 2 B. u. a. Anthropologie, *Bresl.* 1822, 2 B. Von der falschen Theologie und dem wahren Glauben, *Bresl.* 1824, 8vo.

[p] Professor at Munich.

GÖRRES, Aphorismen über die Kunst, etc., *Coblenz*, 1804, 8vo. Aphorismen über Organomie, *ebend.* 1804, u. *Frcf.* 1803, 1 Th. Exposition der Physiologie *Cobl.* 1805. Glauben und Wissen. *Münch*, 1805. Mythengeschichte, etc.

[q] Of the university of Munich.

FR. BAADER, Beiträge zur Elementarphysiologie, *Hamb.* 1797, 8vo. Ueber das Pythagor. Quadrat in der Natur od. die 4 Weltgegenden. *Tüb.* 1799, u. a. kl. Schriften in den Beiträgen zur dynam. Physik. *Berl.* 1809. Später: Begründung der Ethik durch die Physik. *Münch.* 1813. Ueber den Blitz als Vater des Lichts an H. Jung, 1815. Abhandlungen über die Extase; Analogie des Erkenntnis- und des Zeugungsvermögens; Ueber die Freiheit der Intelligenz. Eine Rede. Munch. Ueber die Vierzahl des Lebens, *Berl.* 1819, 8vo. Sätze aus der Bildungs- und Begründungslehre des Lebens. *Berl.* 1820, 8vo. Fermenta cognitionis, I—III Heft. *Berl.* 1822—23. (The first treats of the origin of good and evil in men). Ueber die Vierzahl des Lebens, *Berl.* 1819, 8vo. Proben religiöser Philosophie älterer Zeit, *Leipz.* 1825, 8vo. Vorlesungen üb. rel. Philos. im Gegensatz der irreligiösen älterer und neuerer Zeit, *Munch.* 1827, 8vo.

[r] Professor at Munich.

L. OKEN's Uebersicht des Grundrisses des Systems der Naturphilosophie und der damit entstehenden Theorie der Sinne, *Fcf. a. M.* (1802,) 8vo. Abriss des Systems der Biologie, *Gött.* 1805. Ueber die Zeugung, *Bamb.* 1805. Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie, *Jena*, 1809, sqq. 3 B. 8vo. N. Aufl. 1829. Lehrbuch d. Naturgeschichte, 1 u. 3 Th., *Leipz.* 1813, u. Isis.

[s] A Swiss physician.

TROXLER's Versuche in der organ. Physik. *Jena*, 1804, 8vo. Ueber das Leben und sein Problem, *Gött.* 1807. Elemente der Biosophie, *Leipz.* 1808, (in dieser Schrift nähert er sich mehr Jacobi); und Blicke in das Wesen des Menschen, *Aarau*, 1812, 8vo. Philosophische Rechtslehre der Natur u. des Gesetzes, etc., *Zürich*, 1820, 8vo. Naturlehre des menschl. Erhennens od. Metaphysik. *Aarau*, 1828, 8vo.

[t] A professor at Bonn.

K. J. WINDISCHMANN's Ideen zur Physik, 1 B. *Würzb. u. Bamb.* 1805, 8vo. Vergl. Darstellung des Begriffs der Physik in Schellings neuer Zeitschr. für

bert[u], *F. J. Schelvers*[x], (all of whom, with the exception of Oken, inclined to the principle of Faith), *K. E. Schelling*[y], *P. F. von Walther*[z], *J. Weber*[a], *W. Nasse*[b], *D. G. Kieser*, *Blasche*[c], etc. To these must be added the moral philosophers *F. Ast*[d], *K. W. F. Solger*[e], (possessing more originality than the rest); *E. A. Eschenmayer* and *J. J. Wagner*[f], (the two last eventually be-

spec. Phys. 1 B. I Heft. 1802. Ueber die Selbstvernichtung der Zeit, *Heidelb.* 1807, u. a.

[u] A professor at Munich.

Schubert's Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft. *Dresd.* 1808, 8vo.; Neue Aufl. 1817. Ahndungen einer allg. Geschichte des Lebens, *Leipz.* 3 Th. 1806—20, 8vo. Symbolik des Traums, etc. *Bamb.* 1814; II Aufl. 1821. Altes und Neues aus dem Gebiet der innern Seelenkunde, *Leipz*, 1816, 8vo. Die Urwelt und die Fixsterne, *Dresd.* 1822, 8vo.

[x] A professor at Heidelberg.

Schelvers, Elementarlehre der organ. Natur. 1 Th. Organomie, *Gött.* 1800. Philosophie der Medicin, *Frcf.* 1809, 8vo. Ueber das Geheimniss des Lebens 1814, 8vo. Von den sieben Formen des Lebens, *Frcf. a. M.* 1817, 8vo.

[y] K. E. Schelling, über das Leben und seine Erscheinung, *Landshut*, 1806, 8vo.

[z] Walther, über Geburt, Daseyn u. Tod. *Nürnb.* 1807. Ueber den Egoismus in der Natur. *ebend.* 1807, u. a. S. Physiologie des Menschen, etc. *Landshut*, 1807—8, 8vo.

[a] Weber's Metaphysik des Sinnl. u. Uebersinnl. *Lands.* 1801, 8vo. Lehrb. der Naturwissenschaft, *Landshut*, 1803—4. Philos., Rel. u. Christenthum im Bunde, *München*, 1808—11, VII Hfte. Wissenschaft der materiellen Natur oder Dynamik der Materie, *München*, 1821, u. a.

[b] Nasse, über Naturphilosophie, *Freyberg*, 1809, 8vo. Zeitschrift für psych. Ærzte, *Leipz.* seit 1818.

[c] Vgl. Blasche, über das Wichtigste, was in der Naturphilos. seit 1801 ist geleistet worden in der Zeitschr. Jsis, herausgeg. von Oken, IX *St. Jahrg.* 1819. Dessen Vertheidigung des Naturphil. Systems in der Jsis, 1826; V Heft gegen die Einwürfe im Hermes XXIV (von Bachmann). In Schellingscher Ansicht ist auch dessen Theodicee, unter d. Titel: das Böse im Einklange mit der Weltordnung, *Leipz.* 1827, 8vo., abgefasst.

[d] Ast's Grundlinien der Philosophie, *Landshut.* 1807; N. A. 1809. System der Kunstlehre oder Lehr- u. Handbuch der Æsthetik, etc., *Leipz.* 1805, II Aufl. Grundriss der Æsthetik, *Landshut*, 1807, u. Auszug: Grundlinien der Æsthetik, *ebend.* 1813, 8vo. Gesch. der Philos. s. S. 23.

[e] Solger, Philos. Gespräche. Erste Sammlung, *Berl.* 1817, 8vo. Erwin, Vier Gespräche über das Schöne und die Kunst, *Berl.* 1815, II Thle. 8vo. Nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel. Herausg. von L. Tieck u. Fr. v. Raumer, *Leipz.* 1826, II B. 8vo.

[f] Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo. Von der Natur der Dinge, *Leipz.* 1803, 8vo. System der Idealphilosophie, *Leipz.* 1804, 8vo. His other works will be mentioned below, § 406.

came opposed to Schelling); and *Hegel*[g] (§ 407), who as well as *Krause* seceded in the end from the tenets of his master. The doctrines of Schelling were expressly taught by *J. B. Schad*[h] (§ 389); *G. M. Klein*[i] (the most faithful expositor of the system); and reduced to a course of philosophy by *Ign. Thanner*[k], and *Th. A. Rixner*[l]. By *Zimmer*[m] and *Buchner*[n] the theory was applied to the principles of Religion and Ethics; and by *Bachmann*[o] and *Nüsslein*[p] to Æsthetics. The former of these ended by adopting other opinions.

[g] See his, Differenz des Fichteschen u. Schellingischen Systems in Beziehung auf Reinhold's Beiträge, etc., *Jena*, 1801, 8vo.; and the Critical Journal published conjointly with Schelling.

[h] System der Natur- u. Transcendentalphilosophie in Verbindung dargestellt, *Landsh.* 1803-4, II Thle. 8vo. Seine nachher angekündigten: Institutiones Philosophiæ Universæ, etc., scripsit JO. SCHAD, P. I. Logicam complectens, *Charkow*, 1812. Institutiones Juris Nat., *ibid.* 1814, 8vo.

[i] A professor at Würzburg. KLEIN, Beiträge zum Studium der Philosophie als Wissenschaft des All. Nebst einer vollst. u. fassl. Darstellung ihrer Hauptmomente, *Würzb.* 1805, 8vo. Verstandeslehre, *Bamb.* 1810. Versuch, die Ethik als Wissenschaft zu begründen, etc., *Rudolst.* 1811. Darstellung der Philos. Religions- und Sittenlehre, *Bamb. u. Würzb.* 1818, 8vo.

[k] A professor at Salzburg. THANNER's Versuch einer möglichst fasslichen Darstellung der absoluten Identitätslehre, etc., *München*, 1810, 8vo. Handbuch der Vorbereitung u. Einl. zum selbstst. wissenschaftl. Stud. bes. der Philosophie. Erster formaler Theil: die Denklehre, *München*, 1807. Zweiter mat. Th.: die Metaphysik, 1808, 8vo. Ferner: Lehrbuch der Theoret. Philos. nach den Grundsätzen der absoluten Identitätslehre f. akad. Vorles. I. Th. Logik.; II Th. Metaphysik (auch mit dem Titel: Logische, Metaphys. Aphorismen, etc.), *Salzb.* 1811-12, 8vo. Lehr- und Handbuch der Prakt. Philos. für Akad. Vorles. I Th. Allgem. Prakt. Philos. u. Naturrecht, *ebend.* 1811, 8vo.

[l] A professor at Amberg. RIXNER, Aphorismen aus der Philos. als Leitfaden, *Landsh.* 1809, 8vo. umgearbeitet: Aphorismen der gesammten Philos. zum Gebr. seiner Vorles. III Bdchen, *Sulzbach*, 1818, ff. 8vo.

[m] ZIMMER's Philos. Religionslehre, I Th. Lehre von der Idee des Absoluten, *Landshut*, 1805, 8vo. Philos. Untersuchung über den Allg. Verfall des menschl. Geschlechts, *ebend.* 1809, 8vo.

[n] BUCHNER, Uber Erkenntniss und Philos., *Landshut*, 1806. Grundsätze der Ethik., 1808, 8vo. Das Wesen der Religion, *Dillingen*, 1805, 8vo. Zweite Aufl., *Landsh.*, 1809.

[o] A professor at Jena. BACHMANN: Die Kunstwissenschaft in ihrem allg. Umrisse dargestellt f. akad. Vorles. *Jena*, 1811, 8vo. Ueber Philos. u. Kunst. *Jena u. Leipz.* 1812, 8vo.; (see bibl. §§ 1, 41). Von Verwandtschaft der Physik u. Psychol. Preisschrift. *Utrecht u. Leipz.* 1821. System der Logik. *Leipz.* 1829, 8vo.

Among the *adversaries* of the system were several distinguished partisans of the theory of Kant, as well as the authors of certain new doctrines; such as *Herbart*, *Bouterwek*, and *Jacobi*, whom we shall have occasion to mention below. The opinions of Schelling were especially attacked by the theologians; who appear, however, occasionally to have understood them but imperfectly. Others, (for instance *Daub*), endeavoured to reconcile them with Religion.

Other Systems.

396. *Fr. Bouterwek*[q], an acute reasoner who had originally embraced and even given a new exposition of the theory of Kant, abjured the tenets of his master from a conviction that they were not proof against Scepticism, and professed himself dissatisfied with the partial character of Fichte's system. He maintained that Science demands the recognition of something Absolute, without which no knowledge nor even thought is possible, inasmuch as something real,—a Being,—the Absolute,—is pre-supposed in all demonstration. Accordingly he proceeded to demonstrate the inefficacy of former philosophical systems, alleging that they had attempted the discovery of Truth only by means of mental ideas and certain formularies, without ever arriving at real and animated Science. His leading principles were, that all Thought and Sensation are founded on some real ground, —the Absolute; which itself is dependent on nothing else. Such an essence is not discoverable by *Thought*, inasmuch as Thought pre-supposes its existence, as something superior to itself. Consequently, we are driven to conclude either that all Being is imaginary and all Thought without foundation, or that there exists an *ab-*

[p] Nüsslein's Lehrb. der Kunstwissenschaft, *Landshut*, 1819, 8vo. Grundlinien der allg. Psychologie, etc., *Mainz*. 1821, 8vo. d. Logik. *Bamb*. 1824, 8vo.

[q] Born 1766; died a professor at Göttingen, 1828.

solute faculty of knowledge, which neither *feels* nor *thinks*, constituting the fundamental principle of Reason itself, and by virtue of which all Being is demonstrable. Subsequently Bouterwek retracted this doctrine, and adopted a new universal theory of Truth and Science, leading to a moderate system of Transcendental Rationalism, by means of the principle of the *Confidence of Reason in itself*. He defined the end of philosophy to be the solution of the enigma of nature and man, by distinguishing between the appearances and the realities of objects, as far as is attainable by unassisted human reason. This must be effected by a system of demonstration, to which empirical psychology and Logic (in the popular sense of the term), can contribute only the premises. This theory, like that of Jacobi (§ 398), supposes all merely logical thought to be *mediate*. All *immediate* knowledge (without which all *discursive* notions assume the character of *mediate*, and consequently become nugatory), is dependent on the original connection existing between the powers of Thought and the Internal Sense in the *Virtuality* of Spiritual life:—in the unity of the active properties of our nature, whether subjective or objective. Reason has confidence in herself in as far as she is *pure* Reason, and has confidence in truth as far she recognises therein (by virtue of the connection just mentioned) her own independent energy; and discovers in this energy the germ of ideas, by means of which she can elevate herself above sensible impressions to the discussion of the original principle of all Existence and Thought, the idea of The Absolute. Consequently Truth, in the metaphysical sense of the word, (or the agreement of our conceptions with the *insensible* essences of things, and their necessary connection with the first principle of all Thought and Existence),—can be apprehended by reason *immediately*. Metaphysics (in connection with which comes Religious Philosophy founded on religious sentiment), completes the scientific development of this idea by instructing us *how far* a knowledge of the nature of things is possible to the human mind. Philo-

sophical Ethics and Natural Law are connected with the theoretical department of Philosophy by means of Universal Practical Philosophy.

The subject of Natural Right forms a special chapter in philosophical Ethics, in which Right is treated as a reasonable title, in virtue of which man, as a moral being, lays claims to all the external conditions appertaining to him, in all things relating to virtue and justice.

Bouterwek also laboured to establish a system of Æsthetics, on psychological principles, and independent, to a certain extent, of Moral Philosophy.

Fr. Bouterwek, Aphorismen, den Freunden der Vernunftkritik nach Kant's Lehre vorgelegt, *Gött.* 1793, 8vo. Paulus Septimius, oder die letzten Geheimnisse des Eleusm. Priesters. (Philos. Roman), *Halle*, 1795, II Thle. 8vo. Idee einer allgemeinen Apodiktik, etc. *Gött.* 1799, II Th. 8vo. Anfangsgründe der speculativen Philosophie, *Gött.* 1800, 8vo. Die Epochen der Vernunft nach der Idee der Apodiktik, *Gött.* 1802, 8vo. Anleitung zur Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, *Gött.* 1803, 8vo. Neues Museum der Philosophie und Literatur herausgegeben von Fr. Bouterwek, *Gött.* 1803. Æsthetik, *Leipz.* 1806, II Th.; III Aufl. 1824, 8vo. Ideen zur Metaphysik des Schönen. In vier Abhandl. *ebend.* 1807, 8vo. Praktische Aphorismen; Grundsätze zu einem neuen Systeme der moral. Wissenschaften, *Leipz.* 1808. Lehrbuch der philos. Vorkenntnisse (Allgemeine Einl., Psychologie und Logik enthaltend; sollte an die Stelle der angeführten Anfangsgründe treten.) *Gött.* 1810, 8vo.; II Ausg. 1820, 8vo. Lehrb. der Philos. Wissenschaften nach einem neuen Systeme entworfen, II Thle. *Gött.* 1813, 8vo. II verm. u. verb. Aufl. *ebend.* 1810, 8vo.; (the part relating to religious philosophy being entirely re-written). Religion der Vernunft, etc., *ebend.* 1824, 8vo.

397. *C. G. Bardili*[r] endeavoured to make The Absolute the basis of a system on a new principle. He believed himself to have detected such an one in Thought, and sought to constitute Logic the source of real knowledge; elevating it to the rank of Metaphysics. Hobbes, and the physician Leidenfrost (in his Confessio, 1793), had already represented Thought as *calculation*, but Bardili was the first to imagine that he could discover

[r] Born at Blaubeuern, 1761; died at Stuttgard, 1808.

in Thought *per se* (contemplated under its *formal* character), a real existence; nay, even the essence of the Deity. The nature of Thought is such, that while it continues always the same it is capable of infinite repetition and multiplication. It is A *quatenus* A, in A:—*Identity*. Thought *quatenus* Thought is neither Subject nor Object, nor the relation of the one to the other; but their common elementary principle, in which the conceptions and judgments of the mind have their origin, being at the same time an *infinitivus determinans* and a *determinatum*. This principle of Thought, however, *determines* nothing until applied to something else, that is, to Matter; which is a necessary postulate of the system. The characteristics of Thought quatenus Thought, are Unity in Plurality:—Identity. The characteristics of Matter are Diversity and Multiplicity. Thought, the First and Absolute principle, is not determined by Matter, but *vice versâ* the last by it. The application of Thought to Matter produces: 1. Something real apprehended by the mind (B—Reality). 2. A mere conception of the mind (B—Possibility). The agreement of Thought with Matter constitutes Reality, which is only a more express determination of the Possible.

In many respects this obscure and fanciful system approached the theory of Leibnitz, representing the Deity as the *Monas Monadum*, or pure *Possibility*, which multiplies itself in all individual objects, and determines all thought, —the ultimate source of all truth, and consequently the fundamental principle of all Logic. Bardili styled his performance the Primary Logic, and announced its pretensions with considerable arrogance, but without much success[s]. The system of Rational Realism it was de-

[s] BARDILI's Grundriss der ersten Logik, gereinigt von den Irrthümern der bisher. Logik, besonders der Kantischen, *Stuttg.* 1800, 8vo. Philosophische Elementarlehre. I Heft. *Landsh.* 1802; II Heft. 1806, 8vo. Beiträge zur Beurtheilung des gegenwärtigen Zustandes der Vernunftlehre, *Landsh.* 1803, 8vo.

At an earlier period Bardili had distinguished himself as an acute thinker by his: Epochen der vorzüglichsten Philosophischen Begriffe, I Th. *Halle,*

signed to support was no less unsuccessful, notwithstanding the subtile analysis of Reinhold (§ 382). About the same time many similar essays appeared, for the most part distinguished by little else but their obscurity and extravagance. Of this number was the *Archimetria* of the ingenious Swede, *Th. Thorild*[t], which refers every thing to the theory of Magnitudes, containing many eccentric ideas, afterwards developed by others; and the *Epicritique* of *F. Berg*[u], who assumes as the key to the nature of all Reality,—"Logical Will;" and lastly, the "Altogether Practical Philosophy," of *Rückert* and *Weiss*[x] (§ 399). The labours of *J. H. Abicht*[y] are not more deserving of specification; consisting in a compilation of the works of others, in which nothing but the phraseology is his own.

PHILOSOPHY OF SENTIMENT AND BELIEF.

Jacobi's Theory of Belief.

398. A friend of Hamann (§ 369), *F. H. Jacobi*[z], advanced a theory totally at variance with the Critical and

1788, 8vo. Sophylus oder Sittlichkeit u. Natur, als Fundament der Weltweisheit, *ebend.* 1794. Allgemeine praktische Philosophie, *ebend.* 1795. Ueber die Gesetze der Ideenassociation, *ebend.* 1796, u. über den Ursprung des Begriffs von der Willensfreiheit (gegen Forberg), *Stuttg.* 1796. Briefe über den Ursprung der Metaphysik (anonym.), *Altona*, 1798, 8vo.

[t] Died a professor at Greifswald, 1808. Maximum sive Archimetria, *Berol.* 1799, 8vo. His "Philosophisches Glaubensbekenntniss," appears to have been suppressed by authority.

[u] Berg, Epikritik der Philosophie, *Arnstadt. u. Rudolst*, 1805.

[x] Jos. Rückert, Der Realismus, oder Grundzüge zu einer durchaus praktischen Philos., *Leipz.* 1801. Chr. Weiss, Winke über eine durchaus prakt. Philos., *ebend.* 1801. Lehrbuch der Logik. *ebend.* 1801, 8vo.

[y] Abicht's Revidirende Kritik der Speculativen Vernunft. *Altenb.* 1799—1801, II Th. 8vo. System der Elementarphilosophie, oder verständige Naturlehre des Erkenntniss- Gefühls u. d. Willenskraft, *Erlang.* 1798, 8vo. Psychol. Anthropol. I Abth., *Erl.* 1801. Encyklopädie der Philos., *Frkf.* 1804, 8vo. Verbesserte Logik, oder Wahrheitswissenschaft, *Fürth.* 1802, 8vo.

[z] Born at Düsseldorf, 1743; became in 1804 president of the Academy of Munich, and died 1819.

Dogmatical systems which then divided the philosophical world, and allied to the most exalted mysticism. He possessed an enlightened and religious mind, with considerable powers of expression and a sincere hatred of the empty formularies of system-makers. The last principle he carried so far as almost to show himself an enemy of philosophical reason itself, from a conviction that a consistent dogmatical theory, like that of Spinoza, which admitted no truth without demonstration, could conduct only to Determinism and Pantheism; while the Critical theory, by its prejudice in favour of demonstrative and mediate knowledge, was led to reject all perception of *insensible* objects, without being able to establish their reality by means of practical rational belief. He was thus led to found all philosophical knowledge on Belief; which he describes as an instinct of reason,—a sort of knowledge produced by an immediate sensation of the mind,—a direct recognition without proof of the True and *Insensible;* drawing at the same time a deep distinction between such Belief and that which is *positive*. The external world is revealed to us by means of the senses; but objects imperceptible to the senses, such as the Deity, —Providence,—Free-will,—Immortality,—and Morality are revealed to us by an *internal sense*, the organ of Truth; which assumes the title of reason as being the faculty adapted for the apprehension of Truth. This twofold revelation (of the material and the immaterial worlds), awakens man to self-consciousness, with a perception of his superiority to external Nature, or a sense of Free-will[a]. In the same manner Jacobi would found the principles of Morality on Sensation. Reason, as the faculty of the Ideas, which reveal themselves to the Internal Sense, supplies philosophy with its materials: the Understanding, or the faculty of Logical ideas, gives these a form. It is thus that he has expressed himself in his later works. He admits the great merit of Kant

[a] J. G. REICHE, Rationis, qua Fr. H. Jacobi e libertatis notione dei existentiam evincit, expositio et censura, P. I. *Götting*. 1821, 8vo.

in destroying the vain labours of theorists, and establishing a pure system of practical philosophy, but differs from him by asserting that not only practical but also theoretical ideas, relative to real but insensible objects, are immediate; and alleges that the Critical system annihilates not only rational apprehension but sensible perception. At the same time he maintains the impossibility of any true philosophical Science. Jacobi at first expressed himself somewhat obscurely on this principle of an internal revelation and consequent belief, the corner-stone of his system. In consequence of this obscurity arose a multitude of objections and misapprehensions, which were also provoked by his neglecting to discriminate accurately between Reason and Understanding; and by the opposition between his Theistical theory of Belief and Sensation and the systems of his contemporaries; as well as the want of systematic arrangement it betrayed. His countrymen however have not neglected to appreciate the indirect services which he has rendered to the cause of philosophy.

For Jacobi's writings on Spinoza, and in answer to Mendelssohn, see above, § 329 (bibl.).

Among his works were:

David Hume, über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, *Breslau*, 1787, 8vo.; *Ulm*, 1795. Von den göttlichen Dingen, *Leipz.* 1811, 8vo. Sämmtliche Werke (containing also his celebrated philosophical romances), VI B. *Leipz.* 1812—1825, 8vo.

On Jacobi consult Schlegel's Charakteristiken und Kritiken, I B.

Further development of the Theory of Sentiment.

399. The system of Jacobi found many adherents among men of minds similarly constituted; but the want of precision observable in his distinctions respecting Understanding and Reason, appears to have given occasion to a sort of schism among his followers. One party looked upon the Ideas as a sort of revelation of the Di-

vine Nature, appropriate to Reason alone; alleging that the conceptions of the Understanding are incapable of leading us to an apprehension of the Ideas. They add that Belief precedes and comes before all knowledge. Another party attached more importance to the conceptions of the Understanding, and supposed philosophical science to be founded on the union of Reason and Understanding: its material and elementary part being derived from the former, and its formal characters from the last. Jacobi himself, at the close of his life, inclined to this opinion: the former was held by F. Köppen, an ingenious author and able expositor of the system he had adopted. *J. Salat* adhered to the latter.

The leading principle in the system of Köppen was that of Liberty, which he considers as a creative power, incomprehensible to the Understanding, the foundation of all existence, in short, *Being*, properly so called. Reason is the faculty by which it is apprehended. Necessity is a state of things established by Liberty.

The mode of reasoning adopted by Köppen would lead us to conclude the impossibility of any true philosophical knowledge. His writings, like those of Jacobi (whatever may be thought of his theory), have the merit of originality, and have been useful by opposing a new theory to the authority of the Dogmatists.

Weiller[b], a friend of Jacobi, and *Weiss*[c] distinguished for his psychological researches, belong to this class.

Among the writings of Köppen were:

Uber Offenbarung in Beziehung auf Kant und Ficht. Philosophie, *Hamb.* 1797; second edition, 1804. Darstellung des Wesens der Philos., *Nürnb.* 1810. Uber den Zweck der Philosophie, *München*, 1807, 8vo. Verm. Schriften, 1806, etc., etc.

[b] WEILLER (of Münich), see §§ 37 and 395. Uber die gegenw. und Künft. Menschheit. *Münch. und Papau.* 1799. Anleit. zur freien Ansicht der Philos., *Münch.* 1804, 8vo. Verstand und Vernunft. *ibid.* 1806, 8vo. Grundlegung zur Psychologie, *ibid.* 1817, 8vo. etc.

[c] WEISS, Vom lebendigen Gott. und wie der Mensch zu ihm gelange, *Leipz.* 1812, 8vo.

Other Disciples of the same School.

400. *J. Salat*, professor of Moral Philosophy at Landshut, made an *internal revelation* of the Divine Nature the foundation of his philosophical system. *F. A. Ancillon*[d] and *C. A. Clodius*[e] held in part the opinions of Jacobi, without properly belonging to his school.

Among the works of Salat were:

Uber den Geist der Philos. mit krit. Blicken, etc., *Münch.* 1803, 8vo. Vernunft und Verstand., *Tüb.* 1808, II Thle. 8vo. Die Moralphilosophie, *Landsh.* 1810, 8vo.; third edition improved, *Landsh.* 1813-14, 2 vols. Socrates oder über den neusten Gegensatz Zwischen Christenthum und Philos., *Sulzbach*, 1820, 8vo., etc., etc. An answer to the last appeared under the title of Uber die Kunst Wort' und Nebel zu machen. Ein Supplement zu den Philos. Schriften, insbes. zu dem Socrates des Hrn. Salat, *Amberg*, 1821.

Antidogmatism of Schulze.

401. *G. E. Schulze* had exposed in his Ænesidemus the weak parts of the system of Reinhold (§ *382*): he subsequently conceived a system of Scepticism which he qualified by a new appellation, that of Antidogmatism. He has more than once altered his views and definitions, and his latest opinions approximate in some respects those of Jacobi.

His works were:

Einige Bemerkungen über Kant's Philos. Religionslehre, *Kiel*, 1795, 8vo. Ueber den höchsten Zweck des Studiums d. Philos., *Leipz.* 1789, 8vo. Grundriss der Philos. Wissenschaften, 1788—90, II B. 8vo. Ænesidem (see § 382), Kritik der Theoretischen Philosophie, *Hamb.* 1801, II B. 8vo. Die Hauptmomente der Skeptischen Denkart über die menschliche Erkennt-

[d] Ancillon Mélanges, De Literature et de Philosophie, *Paris*, 1809, 2 voll. 8vo. Ueber Souveränität u. Staatsverfassungen, *Berl.* 1815, 8. Ueber die Staatswissenschaft, *ebend.* 1820, 8vo. Ueber Glauben u. Wissen in der Philosophie, *ebend.* 1824. Ueber Vermittlung der Extreme, *ebend.* 1828, 8vo.

[e] Clodius, Grundriss der Allgem. Religionslehre, *Leipz.* 1818, 8vo. Von Gott. in d. Natur, in d. Menschengeschiche u. im Bewusstseyn, II Thle. *Leipz.* 1818-19, 8vo.; III Th. oder II Theiles II Abth. 1820, 8vo.

niss; in Bouterwek's Museum, III B. II Heft. Grundsätze der Allgemeinen Logik, *Helmst.* 1802, IV verb. Aufl. 1822. Leitfaden der Entwickelung, etc.

Herbart.

402. *J. F. Herbart*, a professor at Königsberg, laboured to recal philosophy from the pursuit of psychological investigations, and proposed a system of Metaphysics which in some respects resembled that of the Eleatæ.

Stiedenroth[f] adopted certain of his opinions respecting the faculties of the soul.

Philosophical works of Herbart:

Ub. Philos. Studium, *Gött.* 1807, 8vo. Allgemeine prakt. Philosophie, *Gött.* 1808, 8vo. Hauptpuncte der Metaphysik, *Gött.* 1808, 8vo. Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der specul. Psychologie, im Königsb. Archiv. fur Philosophie, *Königsb.* 1811-12. Bemerkungen ub. d. ersten Ursachen, welche das Einverständniss ub. d. ersten Gründe der prakt. Philos. erschweren, eine Abhandl. in den nachgelassenen philos. Shcriften von Chr. Jac. Kraus, *Königsb.* 1812, 8vo. Theoriæ de attractione Elementorum Principia Metaphysica, sect. I, II, *Regiom.* 1812, 8vo. Lehrbuch z. Einleitung in die Philosophie, *Königsb.* 1813, 8vo.; II sehr verm. Ausg. *ebend.* 1821. Lehrb. zur Psychologie, *Königsb. u. Leipz.* 1816. Ueber das Böse, *Königsb.* 1819, 8vo. De attentionis mensura causisque primariis. Psychologiæ Principia Statica et Mechanica exemplo illustraturus, etc., *Regiom.* 1822, 4to. Ueber die Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden, *Königsb.* 1822, 8vo. Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegründet auf Erfahrung u. Mathematik, II Thle., *ebend.* 1824, f. Allgemeine Metaphysik nebst den Anfängen d. Philos. Naturlehre. Erster Histor. krit. Theil. *Königsb.* 1828.

Schleiermacher.

403. *F. Schleiermacher*[g], a well-known theologian, employed himself in perfecting, with some originality, the

[f] ERNST. STIEDENROTH, Theorie des Wissens mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Skepticismus, etc., *Gött.* 1819, 8vo. Psychologie zur Erklär. d. Seelenerscheinungen, II Thle. *Königsb.* 1824-25.

[g] Professor of Theology at Berlin. Born at Breslaw, 1768.

departments of Moral Philosophy which bear upon the subjects of Ethics and Religion. In his works thus intended to combine philosophy with religion it will be thought by many that religion has lost much, without any thing being gained by philosophy. Schleiermacher has also distinguished himself by his *Kritik der Moral*[h], and by some investigations relative to the History of Philosophy. His translation of Plato, enriched with introductory observations on each Dialogue, has been already noticed (§ 129, bibl.).

His philosophical works were:

Schleiermacher, Uber die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (at first anonym.), *Berl.* 1799; III verm. Ausg. 1821, 8vo. Monologen; eine Neujahrsgabe, III Ausg. *Berl.* 1822, 8vo.

Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der ev. Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, II B., *Berl.* 1821, 8vo.; II Ausg.

Systems allied to the Critical School.

404. Two disciples of this school have distinguished themselves by their endeavours to illustrate and extend its doctrines: *Krug*[i], by proposing them under the form of a new system which he denominates a *Transcendental Synthetism;* and *Fries,* by an attempt to render more complete the investigations of Kant by means of a new Criticism of Pure Reason. The system of Krug contains a new arrangement of the Metaphysical world, and appears to add little to that of Kant, except a superior degree of obscurity.

Several of Krug's works have been already quoted, to which may be added:

Entwurf eines neuen Organons der Philosophie, *Meissen,* 1801, 8vo. Ueber die Methoden des Philosophirens u. die Systeme der Philosophie, *ebend.* 1802, 8vo. Fundamentalphilosophie,

[h] Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherig. Sittenlehre, *Berl.* 1803, 8vo.; (second edition?)

[i] W. Tr. Krug, born 1770; a professor at Leipsic.

Züllich. u. Freyst. 1803; III verb. Aufl. 1828, (his chef-d'œuvre). System der Theoretischen Philosophie, (I Th. Denklehre. II Erkenntnisslehre oder Metaphysik. III Geschmackslehre oder Æsthetik.), *Königsb.* 1806—10; III verb. Aufl. 1825, III Th. System der prakt. Philos. (I Rechtslehre. II Tugendlehre. III Religionslehre), *ebend.* 1817—19, (to be had also separately).

Handbuch der Philosophie, third edition, 1828.

Fries.

405. *J. Fr. Fries* (born 1773, a professor at Jena), attempted an improvement of Moral Philosophy by means of *Philosophical Anthropology*, founding his system, as Kant had done, on investigations respecting the faculties of the human mind. He approached the opinions of Jacobi in those points on which he departed from the doctrines of Kant, of whose system he principally admired the practical department. His anthropological theories of Logic, Practical Philosophy, Ethics, and Religious Philosophy, contain many original ideas, too often expressed with little precision or regard to order.

His opinions were adopted and systematised by *F. Calker*[k], with the addition of a new phraseology; and were applied to theology by *De Wette*, a professor at Basle.

Among the writings of Fries were, (besides some controversial works already referred to, § 389):

System der Philosophie als evidente Wissenschaft, *Leipz*, 1804, 8vo. Philosophische Rechtslehre u. Kritik aller posit. Gesetzgebung, *Jena*, 1804, 8vo. Wissen, Glauben u. Ahnung., *Jen.* 1805. Neue Kritik der Vernunft, *Heidelb.* 1807, III B. 8vo.; II Aufl. 1828. System der Logik, *ebend.* 1811: II Aufl. 1819, 8vo. Allgem. staatsrechtl, *Ansichten*, 1816, 8vo. Vertheidi-

[k] A professor at Bonn, published: Urgesetzlehre des Wahren, Guten u. Schönen, *Berl.* 1820, 8vo. Propädeutik der Philos. I Heft: Methodologie der Philos. *Bonn*, 1821, II Heft: System der Philos. in tabellarischer Uebersicht, *ebend.* 1820, 4to. Ueber die Bedeutung der Philos., *Berl.* 1818, 8vo. Denklehre od. Logik u. Dialektik, nebst e. Abrisse der Gesch. ders, *Bonn*, 1822, 8vo.

gung meiner Lehre von der Sinnesanschauung gegen die Angriffe des Hrn. Dr. Ernst. Reinhold, *Jena*, 1819, 8vo. Handbuch der allg. Ethik u. Philos. Moral. *ebend.* 1818, 8vo. Handbuch der psychol. Anthropologie, etc. II B., *Jena*, 1820-21, 8vo. Die Mathem. Naturphilos. nach Philos. Methode bearbeitet. Ein Versuch, etc., *Heidelb.* 1822, 8vo. Julius u. Evagoras od. d. Schönheit der Seele; ein Philos. Roman. II B., *ebend.* 1822. Die Lehren der Liebe, des Glaubens u. d. Hoffnung oder Hauptsätze der Tugendlehre u. Glaubenslehre, *ebend.* 1823, 8vo. Polem. Schriften. I Th., *Halle*, 1824, 8vo. System der Metaphysik. Ein Handbuch für Lehrer u. zum Selbstgebrauch, *Heidelb.* 1824, 8vo.

Systems originating in the Theory of Identity.

406. *C. A. Eschenmayer* (a professor at Tübingen), proposed a system more mystical still than that of Schelling, to which on many points it was opposed; as was also the *Mathematical Philosophy* of J. Wagner (a professor at Wurzburg), who in some respects approached the reveries of Lulli and Bruno. *F. Krauze* (formerly a professor at Jena), in various publications, for the most part unfinished, has proposed some original ideas, differing from those of Schelling principally as relates to the nature of the Godhead. To these opinions he has added a new arrangement of the subject-matter of Moral Philosophy in general.

Eschenmayer's principal works:

Die Philosophie in ihrem Ubergange zur Nichtphilosophie, *Erlang.* 1803. Einleitung in die Natur und Geschichte, *Erl.* 1806, 8vo. Psychologie in drei Theilen, als empirische, reine u. angewandte, *Stuttg. u. Tüb.* 1817, 8vo.; II Aufl. 1822, *ebend.* Religionsphilosophie, I Th. Rationalismus, *Tüb.* 1818; II Th. Mysticismus, *ebend.* 1822; III Th. Supernaturalismus od. d. Lehre von der Offenbarung des A. u. N. T. 1824, 8vo. System der Moralphilosophie, *Stuttg. u. Tüb.* 1818. Normalrecht (Naturrecht.) II Th. *ebend.* 1819, 8vo.

Wagner: System der Idealphilosophie u. a. s. oben S. 523, not. q. Programm. über das Wesen der Philosophie, *Bamb.* 1804, 8vo. Journal f. W. u. Kunst. I Heft., *Leipz.* 1805. Von der Philos. u. Medizin, *Würzb.* 1805. Theodicée, *Bamb.* 1810, 8vo. Grundriss der Staatswissensch. u. Politik. *Leipz.* 1805, 8vo. Mathematische Philos., *Erl.* 1811.

Krause: Diss. de Philosophiæ et Matheseos notione et earum

intima conjunctione, *Jena*, 1802. System der Sittenlehre I Band, Wissenschaftl. Begründung der Sittenlehre, *Leipz.* 1810, (unfinished). Das Urbild der Menschheit, *Dresd.* 1811; II Aufl. 1819, 8vo. Tagblatt des Menschheitlebens, *ebend.* 1811, 4to. Oratio de scientia humana, *Berol.* 1814, 8vo. Abriss des Systems der Philos. I Abth., *Gött.* 1825, 8vo. Abriss des Systems der Logik. II Ausg. *ebend.* 1828. Abriss des Systems der Rechtsphilos. *ebend.* 1828. Vorlesungen über das System der Philos., *ebend.* 8vo.

Most recent Philosophical Systems.

407. It will be sufficient to enumerate here the most recent German metaphysicians, with their principal works.

G. W. F. Hegel[l] (a professor at Berlin), whose system is one of Absolute Idealism; *F. C. Weise*[m]; *W. Kern*[n]; *J. von Sinclair*[o]; *K. L. Vorpahl*[p]; *A. Kayssler*[q] (died 1822); and *D. T. A. Suabedissen*[r]; to whom must be added the names of *Grävell*, *Linkmaier*, *Schopenhauer*, *Von Berger*, *Tieftrunk* (of whom above, § 380), *Beneke*, *Keyserlingk*, *Gerlach*, *Sigwart*, *Hillebrand*, etc.[s].

[l] HEGEL's System der Wissenschaft. Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes, *Bamb. u. Würzb.* 1807, 8vo. Wissenschaft der Logik, I u. II B. die objective, III B. die subjective (mit bes. Titel: Wiss. der subj. Logik oder die Lehre von Begriff) enthaltend, *Nürnb.* 1812—16, 8vo. Encyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, etc., *Heidelb.* 1817, 8vo.; II Ausg. 1827. Grundlinien der Philos. des Rechts (oder Naturrecht und Staatswiss. im Grundrisse), *Berl.* 1821, 8vo.; (see also § 395).

[m] WEISE, die Architektontik aller menschlichen Erkenntnisse nach ihren neuen Fundamenten, zu Gewinnung des Friedens in der Philos., *Heidelb.* 1812, fol.; III vollendete A. *Heidelb.* 1815, fol.

[n] KERN's Katharonoologie, oder: Wie ist Reinmathematik möglich? *Gött.* (1812), 8vo.

[o] SINCLAIR's Wahrheit u. Gewissheit, *Frcft.* 1811; III B. Versuch einer durch Metaphysik bedingten Physik., *Frcft.* 1813, 8vo.

[p] VORPAHL's Versuche für die Vervollkommung der Philos. Erster, zweiter u. dritter Vers., *Berl.* 1811; und, Philosophie oder Grundriss eines dynam. Lehrgebäudes derselben, *Berl.* 1818, 8vo.

[q] KAYSSLER's Grundsätze der theoret. u. prakt. Philosophie, als Leitfaden zu Vorles. *Breslau u. Halle*, 1812, 8vo.

[r] SUABEDISSEN's Betrachtung des Menschen, I u. II Bd. Betrachtung des geistigen Lebens des Menschen, *Cassel*, 1815, III B.

[s] GRÄVELL: Der Mensch. Eine Untersuchung für gebildete Leser, *Berl.*

On the subject (connected with philosophical speculations) of Reason as applied to Revealed Religion, and of free-will as influenced by Divine Grace, it may be sufficient to refer to the publications of *Kähler*, *Schleiermacher*, *De Witte*, and *Bockshammer*[t].

Philosophical Writers of Great Britain.

408. In Great Britain the principles of Locke have continued to preserve their influence, modified by the particular views of each of his disciples. Among the most eminent of these were *T. Brown*[u], and *Dugald*

1815; III Aufl. 1819, 8vo. Der Bürger, eine weitere Untersuchung üb. d. Menschen, *ebend.* 1822. Der Werth der Mystik. Nachtrag zu Ewalds Briefen, etc. *Leipz.* 1822, 8vo. Der Regent, etc., II Thle., *Stuttg.* 1823.

Linkmaier Lehrgebäude der allgem. Wahrheit nach der gesunden Vern., I Thl. Ontol. u. Kosmol., II Aufl., *Bielefeld*, 1821; II Thl., *Anthropol.* 1823.

Schopenhauer: die Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung: vier Bücher, nebst einem Anhange, der die Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie enthält, *Leipz.* 1819, 8vo.

Von Berger's Allgemeine Grundzüge der Wissenschaft, *Altona*, 1817—1827, 8vo. (I Th. Analyse des Erkenntnissvermögens. II Thl. zur Philos. Naturkentniss. III Thl. Anthropologie, 8. IV Th. prakt. Philos.)

Beneke's Erfahrungsseelenlehre, als Grundlage alles Wissens in ihren Hauptzügen dargestellt, *Berl.* 1820, 8vo. Erkenntnisslehre nach dem Bewusstseyn der reinen Vernunft in ihren Grundzügen dargelegt, *Jena*, 1820, 8vo. De veris Philos. initiis, 1820, 8vo. Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, e. Gegenst. zu Kant's Grundl. der Metaph. d. S. mit e. Anh. üb. d. Wesen. u. d. Erkenntnissgränzen der Vern. *Berl. u. Posen*, 1822.

Keyserlingk, Entwurf einer vollst. Theorie der Anschauungsphilos. *Heidelb.* 1822, 8vo.

Gerlach, Grundriss der Fundamentalphilos. *Halle*, 1816, der Logik, *ebend.* 1817; II verb. Aufl. 1823; der Metaphysik, *ebend.* 1817; der Religionslehre, *ebend.* 1818, 8vo.

Sigwart, Handb. der theor. Philos., *Tüb.* 1820.

Hillebrand, Propädeutik der Philos. (I Abth. Encyklopädie. II S.) *Hdelb.* 1819. Grundriss d. Logik u. Phil. Vorkenntnisslehre, *ebend.* 1820, 8vo. Die Anthropologie als Wissenschaft. III Thle. *Mainz*, 1822-23, 8vo.

[t] Ludw. Aug. Kähler's Supernaturalismus u. Rationalismus in ihrem Urspr., etc., *Leipz.* 1818. Die Abhandlungen Schleiermacher's u. d. Wette's üb. d. Lehre von der Erwählung, etc. in d. theol. Zeitschr. derselb. I u. II Heft., *Berl.* 1819-20. Gust. Ferd. Bockshammer die Freiheit des m. Willens, *Stuttg.* 1821, 8vo; and, Offenbarung u. Theologie, *ebend.* 1822.

[u] Brown, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind.

Stewart[x], recently dead, who assumes as the foundation of his Philosophy of the Human Mind, the phenomena of Consciousness. Speculative Philosophy has been altogether neglected by the English, and Practical treated principally with a reference to general Politics[y].

The very name of Philosophy has received among them a private and improper signification, being applied to Political investigations, or to researches in Natural History. Their national pride has at all times inclined them to concern themselves little about the philosophical pursuits of other nations, and, with few exceptions, they have attempted nothing by the path of abstruse and painful research. In consequence, they continue to know little of the labours of the philosophers of Germany, and are very imperfectly acquainted even with the system of Kant[z].

Philosophers of France, Italy, and other countries.

M. PH. DAMIRON, Essai sur l'Hist. de la Philos. en France en XIX siècle. *Paris*, II ed. 1828, 8vo.

409. The superficial philosophy of France preserved, from the time of Condillac, a constant direction towards Empiricism, which the ingenious theosophist and mystic *St. Martin*[a], the disciple of *J. Böhm* and of *Martinez*

[x] DUGALD STEWART, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, second edition, *Edinb.* 1816, 8vo.; (the Supplement to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* contains a valuable review, written by him, of the progress of Metaphysical and Political Science). Philosophical Essays, second edition, *Edinb.* 1816.

[y] For instance: JOHN CRAIG, Elements of Political Science, *Edinb.* 1814, 3 vols. 8vo. JEREM. BENTHAM, various political publications.

[z] See, however, WIRGMAN, Principles of the Kantesian or Transcendental Philosophy, etc., *Lond.* 1824; and, An Entire New, Complete, and Permanent Science of Philosophy, founded on Kant's Critice of Pure Reason, *ibid.* 1824, 8vo. See also the works of NITSCH and WILLICH, mentioned § 380, note.

[a] LOUIS CLAUDE SAINT-MARTIN, born at Amboise 1743, died 1804. Des Erreurs et de la Vérité, *Lyon*, 1775, 8vo. Tableau Naturel des Rapports qui existent entre Dieu, l'Homme, et l'Univers, 1782, 2 vols. 8vo. De l'Esprit des Choses, 1800, 2 vols. 8vo. etc.

Pasqualis, in vain endeavoured to counteract. The system of Gall and Spurzeim found a more easy acceptance. Of the metaphysicians of this period we may enumerate *Degerando*[b], *St. Pierre*[c], *Rapin*[d], *Cabanis*[e], and the *Comte Destutt de Tracy*, celebrated for his system of Ideology[f]. To these may be added *Laromiguière*[g], *Azaïs*[h], *Garat*, *Volney*, *Fabre D'Olivet*, and *Chateaubriand;* while to another school which opposed the principles of theology to those of materialism, belonged the *Comte J. Demaistre*, *De la Mennais*, *Bonald*, etc.

The Kantian system had been made known to his countrymen by *C. Villers*, (§ 380, note[p]), and excited a degree of attention which from feeble beginnings has gradually acquired more and more strength under the patronage of the celebrated translator of Plato, and editor of Proclus, *Victor Cousin*[i]; whose researches set out with the "Interrogation meditative de la Conscience." To the same party belong *Berard*, *Virey*, *Maine de Biran*, *Roger Collard*, *Jouffroy Keratry*, *B. Massias*[k], *Droz*[l], and the Swiss philosopher *Bonstet-*

[b] Degerando, Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de la Philosophie; (see § 37, note [d]).

[c] J. B. H. de Saint-Pierre, Etudes de la Nature, *Paris*, 1784; and, Harmonies de la Nature, *Paris*, 1815. Œuvres, *Paris*, 1820, 16 vols. 8vo.

[d] Rapin, Pensées sur la Nature de l'Esprit, 1793, 8vo.

[e] P. J. G. Cabanis, Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme, *Paris*, 1802, 8vo.

[f] Destutt de Tracy, Elémens d'Idéologie, *Paris*, 1801—1804, 2 vols. 8vo.; fourth edition, 1824. He also wrote a commentary on the work of Montesquieu, *Paris*, 1819, 8vo.

[g] Laromiguière, Leçons de Philosophie, ou Essai sur les Facultés de l'âme, *Paris*, 1815-18; second edition, 1820, 2 vols. 8vo.

[h] Azaïs, Cours de Philosophie Générale, ou Explication Simple et Graduelle de tous les Faits de l'Ordre Physique, de l'Ordre Physiologique, de l'Ordre Intellectuel, Moral, et Politique, *Paris*, 1824, 8 vols. 8vo.

[i] Cousin, Fragmens Philosophiques, *Paris*, 1826.

[k] Massias, Rapport de la Nature a l'Homme et de l'Homme à la Nature, ou Essai sur l'Instinct, Intelligence, et la Vie, tom. I—IV. *Paris*, 1821—22. Principe de Litterature, de Philosophie, de Politique, et de Morale, tom. I, *Paris*, 1826, 8vo.

[l] Droz, de la Philos. Morale, ou des différents Systèmes sur la Science de la Vie, *Paris*, 1823, 8vo.

ten[m]. In the department of Natural Science *Joyaud* and *Alix* have distinguished themselves by treatises on the elementary principles of Nature[n].

Since the days of *G. B. Vico*[o] and his contemporary *A. Genovese*[p], the *Italians* have produced little that is original in philosophy[q], and contented themselves with the cultivation of certain particular departments of it as applied to practical purposes; e. g. *G. Filangieri*[r] and the *Marchese di Beccaria*[s], who wrote on the subject of Legislation. Others contented themselves with adopting the views of foreigners[t]. Of late they have become better acquainted with the system of Kant and the labours of the German philosophers, and particularly on the subject of Æsthetics[u].

[m] CH. VICT. DE BONSTETTEN, Etudes de l'Homme, ou Recherches sur les Facultes de Sentir et de Penser: he had before published Recherches sur la Nature et les Loix de l'Imagination, 2 vols. *Genev.* 1807.

[n] CL. JOYAUD, Principes Naturels ou Notions Générales et Particulières des Forces vivantes Primordiales, etc., 4 vols. 8vo. J. A. FR. ALIX, Nov. Système de l'Univers. A Germ. trans. *Francf.* 1817, 8vo.

[o] J. B. VICO, born at Naples, 1660; died 1744.

De Antiquisimâ Italorum Sapientiâ lib. iii. *Neapol.* 1710, 12mo. An Italian Translation of his Metaphysics by MONTI, *Milan*, 1816. De uno universi Juris Principio et fine uno, *Neapol.* 1720, 4to. Liber alter qui est de Constantiâ Jurisprudentis, *ibid.* 1721. His principal work was: Principi della Scienza nuova d'Intorno alla Commune natura delle Nazioni, *Nap.* 1725, second edition, 1730; third, entirely remodelled, *Nap.* 1744, 8vo., and following years: the seventh edition by GALOTTI, (*Nap.* 1817,) is a reprint of the first.

[p] Born, 1712; died 1769.

[q] The following works have however appeared:

ERMENEGILDO PINO, Protologia analysin Scientiæ sistens ratione primâ exhibitam, vol. I—III, *Mediol*, 1803, 8vo:

CÆSARIS BALDINOTTI Tentaminum Metaphysicorum, lib. III, *Patav.* 1817, 8vo.

[r] GAETANO FILANGIERI, born at Naples, 1752; died 1788. La Scienza della Legislazione, 8 vols. *Nap.* 1780, 8vo. (various editions).

[s] CÆSARE BONESADO, marchese di Beccaria, died 1793: Dei delitti et delle pene, *Nap.* 1764, 8vo.

[t] The Ideology of Destutt de Tracy has been translated (*Milan*, 1817): See also a Collezione di Classici, *Pavia*, 1819—22.

[u] SACCHI, of Pavia, has translated the works of Kant; and PASQUALI GALAPPI has published Saggio Filosofico sulla Critica della Conoscenza, *Napoli*, 1819, 8vo.; and Elementi de Filosofia, V tomi, *Messina*, 1821—27,

The work of *Appiano Buonafede* on the History of Philosophy has been already mentioned (§ 37, *d.*).

In Holland, Sweden[x], and Denmark, we meet occasionally with instances of a capacity for philosophical pursuits, but rarely with traces of the originality of the German school. Among the Dutch the system of Kant found, as we have had occasion to show (§ 380) many supporters. Political circumstances, no less than the dissensions existing in the school of that philosopher, appear to have impeded its progress in that country. Among those who cultivated German philosophy and adopted one or other of its systems, may be enumerated *Van Hemert*, *D. Wyttenbach*, and *F. Hemsterhuis*[y].

The other continental nations of Eastern Europe have become acquainted with German philosophy, principally in consequence of the residence of their youth at the universities of that country[z]. A knowledge of the same appears by this time to have penetrated even to the Brazils[a].

8vo. On Æsthetics: Giov. B. Talia, Saggio di Estetica. *Venezia*, 1822, 8vo. To which may be added a translation of A. W. Schlegel's Lectures on the Drama, by Geminiani.

[x] Prof. Sam. Grabbe, Animadversiones in Constructionem Materiæ Schellingianam, part I, *Upsal.* 1818, 4to. Prof. Nic. Fr. Biberg, Notionum Ethicarum, quas formales dicunt, dialexis critica, P. I, *Upsal.* 1823, 4to.

[y] D. Wyttenbach, died 1820. See § 380, notes, towards the end. He also wrote Præcepta Philosophiæ Logicæ, (applied to the Classics), edited by Eberhard, *Halle*, 1784, and *Maas*, 1820, 8vo.

F. Hemsterhuis, born 1720; died 1790. Sophyle, ou de la Philosophie. —Aristée, ou de la Divinité. See his Philosophical Works, *Paris*, 1792, 8vo. (French); second edition, *ibid.* 1809, 2 vols. 8vo.

[z] Sigism. Carlowsky, Logic, *Kaschau*, 1819.

Joh. Rozgony, Aphorismi Psychologiæ Rationalis perpetuâ Philosophiæ Criticæ ratione habitâ, *St. Patak.* 1819, 8vo.

J. E. Jankowsky, (a professor at Cracow), Logic, (in Polish), 1822. For the philosophical labours of the Poles see the Gött. gel. Anz. St. 205, 1822.

J. Goluchowsky (a partisan of Schelling's theory) Die Philosophie in ihrem Verhältniss zu dem Leben ganzer Völker, etc., *Erlang.* 1822, 8vo.

See (Russia) Essais Philosophiques sur l'Homme, ses Principaux Rapports et sa Destinée, etc., par L. H. de Jacob, *Halle*, 1818, 2 vols. nouv. édit. augmentée, *Pétersbourg*, 1822.

[a] The Critical Philosophy is now taught there in the college of St. Paul's. See Zschocke's wöchentl. Unterhaltungsblätter, *Aarau*, 1824, St. 3.

Conclusion.

410. The vast variety of contradictory attempts destructive of each other, to which the spirit of philosophical research has in modern times given birth, may appear to throw suspicion on the cause itself, and to discourage the very idea of the possibility of a satisfactory solution of the problems proposed, by the discovery of a theory of knowledge, based on firm and immutable principles. The Critical system itself has failed to check, as it undertook to do, the daring flight of Speculation, or to disarm Scepticism; and has had the effect of affording them renewed strength and more lofty pretensions. Nevertheless these discordant essays ought to inspire us with the hope that sooner or later Reason will attain to complete self-knowledge; that she will be enabled to detect, by gradual advances, the true method of philosophical research, and be taught by the experience of past ages to avoid the shoals and rocks on which so many adventurous thinkers have been stranded.

Possibly a time may come when those very modes of thinking which now appear to us deviations from the true path, may be discovered to have been nothing but the necessary steps of Reason in her gradual progress to true cultivation and genuine wisdom.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

FOR

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

FROM THE TIME OF THALES.

B. C.	*Rome*	Olymp.	
640	114	35,1	Thales born, ac. to Apollodorus.
630	116	35,3	Solon born.
629	125	38	Thales born, ac to Meiners.
611	143	42,2	Anaximander born.
608	146	43,1	Pythagoras born, ac. to Larcher.
598	156	45,3	Solon published his laws. Pherecydes born about the same time.
597	157	45,4	Thales foretold an eclipse.
584	170	49	Pythagoras born, ac. to Meiners.
561	193	55,1	Solon died.
557	197	56	Anaximenes flourished.
548	206	58,1	Thales died.
547	207	58,2	Anaximander died.
543	211	57,2	Thales died, ac. to some. Pherecydes died.
540	214	60	Pythagoras founded a school at Croto.
536	218	61	Xenophanes settled at Elea.
504	250	69	Pythagoras died. Parmenides flourished, ac. to some.
500	254	70,1	Anaxagoras and Philolaus born. Heraclitus and Leucippus flourished. Anaximenes died.
496	258	71,1	Ocellus Lucanus flourished.
494	260	71,3	Democritus born.
490	264	72,3	Battle of Marathon.
489	265	72,4	Pythagoras died, ac. to some.
480	274	75,1	Battle of Salamis.
472	282	77	Diogenes of Apollonia flourished.
470	284	77,3	Democritus born, ac. to Thrasyllus.
469	285	77,4	Socrates born. Parmenides flourished.
460	284	80	Parmenides came from Elea to Athens with Zeno. Democritus born, ac. to Apollodorus. Empedocles flourished, ac. to some.

B. C.	Rome	Olymp.	
456	298	81	Anaxagoras repaired to Athens.
450	304	82,3	Xenophon born.
444	310	84	Melissus.
			Gorgias wrote his treatise Περὶ Φύσεως.
442	312	86	Protagoras and Prodicus flourished.
432	322	87,1	Beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
431	323	87,2	Anaxagoras accused.
430	324	87,3	Plato born, ac. to Corsini.
429	325	87,4	Plato born, ac. to Dodwell. Pericles died.
428	326	88,1	Anaxagoras died.
427	327	88,2	Gorgias sent ambassador to Athens. Diagoras flourished.
414	340	91,3	Diogenes of Sinope born.
407	347	93,2	Democritus died, ac to Eusebius.
404	350	94,1	Close of the Peloponnesian war.
400	354	95,1	Socrates died; his disciples retired to Megara. Euclid and Archytas flourished.
389	365	97,4	Plato's first voyage to Syracuse.
384	370	99,1	Aristotle born. Pyrrho born.
380	374	100	Antisthenes and Aristippus flourished.
		102	Aristotle repaired to Athens.
			Eudoxus flourished.
364	390	104,1	Plato's second voyage to Syracuse.
361	393	104,4	Plato's third voyage to Syracuse.
360	394	105	Xenophon died.
356	398	106	Alexander born.
348	406	108,1	Plato died; Speusippus succeeded him.
343	411	109,2	Aristotle became preceptor to Alexander.
340	414	110,1	Diogenes and Crates (the Cynics) Pyrrho and Anaxarchus flourished. Zeno of Cittium born.
339	415	110,2	Speusippus died. Xenocrates began to teach.
337	417	110,4	Battle of Chæronea. Epicurus born.
336	418	111,1	Philip, king of Macedon, died.
335	419	111,2	Aristotle opened his school at the Lycæum.
324	430	114,1	Diogenes the Cynic died.
323	431	114,2	Alexander the Great died. Ptolemey, the son of Lagus, succeeded him in Egypt.
322	432	114,3	Aristotle died; Theophrastus succeeded him.
320	434	115	Demetrius Phalereus, and Dicæarchus of Messana flourished.
316	438	116,1	Arcesilaus born, (or later).
314	440	116,3	Xenocrates died; Polemo succeeded him.
313	441	116,4	Theophrastus became celebrated. Crates.
305	449	118,3	Epicurus opened his school at Athens.
300	454	120,1	Stilpo and Theodorus, the atheist, flourished. Zeno founded a school at Athens. Diodorus and Philo.

B. C.	*Rome*	Olymp.	
288	466	123,1	Pyrrho died.
286	468	123,3	Theophrastus died. Pyrrho died about the same time; succeeded by Strato.
285	469	123,4	Ptolemæus Philadelphi became king of Egypt.
280	474	125,1	Chrysippus born.
272	482	126,4	Timon flourished.
270	484	127,2	Epicurus died.
269	485	127,3	Strato died; succeeded by Lyco.
264	490	128,3	Zeno, the Stoic, died (or later); succeeded by Cleanthes.
260	494	130	Persæus.—Aristo of Chios.—Herillus flourished.
241	513	134,1	Arcesilaus died (or later).
217	537	141,3	Carneades born.
212	542	143	Zeno of Tarsus flourished.
208	546	144	Chrysippus died, ac. to Menage. Diogenes of Babylon.
185	569	148,4	Panætius born (ac. to some later).
155	599	156,3	Embassy from the Athenians to Rome. (Critolaus, Carneades the Stoic, and Diogenes of Babylon).
146	608	158,3	Greece and Carthage subjected to Rome. Antipater of Tarsus.
142	612	159,3	Macedon became a Roman province.
135	619	161,2	Posidonius born.
129	625	162,4	Carneades died; succeeded by Clitomachus.
115	639		Panætius accompanied Scipio Africanus to Alexandria.
107 or 106	647	167,2	Cicero born.
		170	Clitomachus died; succeeded by Philo. Posidonius flourished.
84	666	171,1	Sylla took Athens. Philo retired to Rome. Antiochus.
86	667	171,2	Lucretius born (ac. to others earlier). Posidonius died.
69	685	178	Antiochus died.
63	691	172,2	Judæa became a Roman province.
50		182,2	Posidonius died; succeeded by Jason. Lucretius died.
48		183,1	Cratippus, the Peripatetic, flourished.
44 or 43	711	184,2	Cicero died.
30	724	187,3	Egypt became a Roman province.
27	727	188,2	Augustus became Emperor. Philo, the Jew, born.

A. C.	Roman Emperors.	
1	Augustus.	Birth of OUR LORD.
3		Seneca the philosopher born.
		Sextius the Pythagorean.
		Nicolaus of Damascus, and Xenarchus flourished.
		Athenodorus the Stoic.
14	Tiberius.	
15		Sotion.
33		Crucifixion of OUR SAVIOUR.
34		Philo the Jew flourished.
37	Caligula.	Flav. Josephus born.
41	Claudius.	
50		Plutarch of Chæronea born.
54	Nero.	
65		Seneca died.
66		Cornutus and Musonius exiled.
69	Gal. Otho. Vitellius.	Apollonius of Tyana flourished.
79	Titus.	
81		Musonius Rufus recalled from exile.
82	Domitian.	Domitian banished the philosophers and
89		mathematicians from Rome.
		Justin Martyr born.
		Epictetus flourished.
90		Apollonius of Tyana died.
95		
97	Nerva.	Plutarch flourished.
99	Trajan.	Tacitus.
		Gnostics.
118	Adrian.	Secundus of Athens. Plutarch died.
120		
122		Euphrates the Stoic died.
131		Galen born. Favorinus. Basilides the Gnostic.
134		Arrian flourished.
138		Akibha the Rabbin died.
139	Antoninus Pius.	Calv. Taurus. Apollonius the Stoic.
		Basilides the Stoic.
160		Apuleius.
161	M. Aurelius Antoninus.	Alcinous. Numenius.
165		Peregrinus the Cynic, and Justin Martyr died.
		Lucian.
170		Athenagoras and Tatianus. Atticus the Platonist.
		Bardesanes.

A. C.	Roman Emperors.	
180	Commodus.	Maximus of Tyre. Death of Antoninus. Irenæus. Juda the Rabbi. The Talmud.
185		Origen born.
193	Pertinax. Julianus. Sept. Severus.	Ammonius Saccas founded a school. Clemens of Alexandria. Alexander of Aphrodisias. Galen died.
200		Plotinus born. Philostratus.
205		
212	Caracalla.	Clemens of Alexandria died.
218	Macrinus.	Tertullian died.
220	Antoninus Heliogabalus.	
222	Alex. Severus.	
232		Plotinus became a disciple of Ammonius.
233		Porphyrius born.
235	Maximinus.	
238	Gordian.	Ulpianus.
239	Gordian the son.	
242		Plotinus travelled into Persia.
243		Plotinus came to Rome.
244	Philip.	
246		Amelius became a disciple of Plotinus.
253	Trajanus Decius.	
252	Trebonianus. Gallus and Vibius Hostilianus.	
252		Longinus flourished.
253	Æmilius Valerianus.	Origen died.
269	Flavius Claudius.	
270	Aurelian.	Plotinus died.
275		Longinus put to death.
276	Flavius Tacitus.	
277	Aurel. Probus	Manichæans.
282	Aurelius Carus.	
284	Diocletian.	Arnobius.
304	Constantine and Maximianus.	Porphyrius died.
306	Constantine the Great.	
321	Constantine converted to Christianity.	Jamblichus flourished.
326		Arnobius died.
330		Lactantius died.

A. C.	Roman Emperors.	
333		Jamblichus died. Themistius.
337	Constantius and Constans.	
340		Eusebius bishop of Cæsarea died.
354		Augustine born.
355		Themistius taught at Constantinople.
360	Julian.	Sallustius.
363	Jovianus.	
364	Valentinianus and Valens.	
379	Theodosius the Great.	Eunapius.
380		Nemesius flourished.
384		St. Jerome fl.
391		Gregorius of Nazianzus died.
394		Gregorius of Nyssa.
395	Arcadius and Honorius.	The Roman empire divided.
398		St. Ambrosius died.
400		Nemesius died.
401		Plutarch the son of Nestorius flourished.
	Greek Emperors.	
402	Arcadius.	
408	Theodosius II.	
409		Macrobius,—Pelagius.
410		Synesius.
412		Proclus born.
415		Death of Hypatia.
418		Pelagius condemned.
430		St. Augustine, and Plutarch the son of Nestorius, died.
434		Syrianus flourished.
450	Marcianus.	Hierocles and Olympiodorus flourished. Syrianus died.
457	Leo I.	
470		Claudianus Mamertinus flourished. Boethius born.
474	Leo II. Zeno Isauricus.	Marcianus Capella flourished.
476	*End of the Western Empire.*	
480		Salvianus.—Cassiodorus born.
485		Proclus died.—Ammonius the son of Hermias.—Hierocles.
487		Æneas of Gaza flourished.
490		Marinus died.

A. C.	Greek Emperors.	
491	Anastasius.	Marinus succeeded by Isidorus.
518	Justin I.	
526		Boethius beheaded.
527	Justinian.	
529		The Schools of philosophy closed at Athens.
533		Philoponus flourished.
539		Cassiodorus retired to a convent.
549		Damascius and Simplicius flourished.
563	Justinian II.	
575	Tiberius II.	Cassiodorus died.
582	Mauritius.	
602	Phocas.	
604		Gregory the Great died.
610	Heraclius.	
622		Flight of Mahomet.
636		Isidorus of Seville died.
641	Constantine III. and IV. Constans II.	
668	Constantine V.	
673		The Venerable Bede born.
685	Justinus II.	
694	Leontius.	
698	Tiberius III.	
711	Philippicus.	
713	Anastasius II.	
716	Theodosius III.	
717	Leo III. Isauricus.	
735		Bede died.
736		Alcuin born.
741	Constant. VI.	
753	Almanzour the Calif.	
754		John of Damascus died.
776		Rhabanus Maurus born.
796	Irene.	
	Emperors of Germany.	
800	Charlemagne.	
	Haroun al Raschid.	Alkendi flourished.
804		Alcuin died.
814	Louis the Pious.	
840	Lothaire.	

A. C.	German Emperors.	
855	Louis II.	
856		Rhabanus died.
875	Charles the Bald.	J. Scot Erigena came to France.
877	Louis III.	
879		Alfred the Great.
880	Charles the Fat.	
886		Erigena died.
887	Arnolphe.	
891		Photius died.
899	Louis IV.	
912	Conrad.	
919	Henry the Fowler.	
937	Otho the Great.	
954		Alfarabi died.
974	Otho II.	
980		Avicenna born.
987	Otho III.	
999		Gerbert, Sylvester II Pope.
1002	Henry II.	
1003		Sylvester II, died.
1020		Mich. Const. Psellus born.
1025	Conrad II.	
1034		Anselm born.
1036		Avicenna died.
1039	Henry III.	
1042		Lanfranc entered the convent of Bec.
1055		Hildebert of Lavardin born.
1056	Henry IV.	
1060		Anselm became prior of Bec.
1072		P. Damianus died. Algazel born.
1079		Abelard born.
1080		Berengarius of Tours died.
1089		Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury, died.
1091		Bernard of Clairvaux died.
1092		Roscellin found guilty of heresy at Soissons.
1096		Hugues of St. Victor born.
1100		Psellus died (later ac. to some). Eustrachius of Nicæa.
1107	Henry V.	
1109		Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, died. Alghazali d. at Bagdad (ac. to Hammer).
1114		Alanus of Ryssel born.
1117		Anselm of Laon died.
1118		Abelard taught at Paris.
1120		Abelard became a monk of St. Denis. William of Champeaux, bp. of Châlons, d.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1126	Lothaire.	
1127		Algazel died at Bagdad.
1134		Hildebert died.
1138	Conrad III.	
1139		Moses Maimonides born.
1140		Hugo of St. Victor died.
1141		Gilbertus Porretanus became bishop of Poictiers.
1142		Abelard died.
1146		Assembly of ecclesiastics at Paris and Rheims to oppose Gilbertus Porretanus.
1150		Lombardus wrote his Sentences.
		Will. of Conches died. Rob. Pulleyn died.
1153	Fred. Barbarossa.	Bernard of Clairvaux died.
1154		Gilbertus Porretanus died.
1164		Peter Lombardus and Hugo of Amiens died.
1173		Richard of St. Victor and Robert of Melun died.
1180		John of Salisbury died. Walter of St. Victor.
1190	Henry VI.	Thophail died.
1193		Albert the Great born, according to some.
1198	Otho IV.	
1203		Alanus of Ryssel died.
1205		Moses Maimonides and Peter of Poictiers died.
		Albert the Great born, according to others.
1206		Peter of Poictiers and Averroes died.
1209		David of Dinant, Amalric of Chartres died.
1214		Roger Bacon born.
1217		Averroes died, according to others.
		Mich. Scot at Toledo.
1218	Frederic II.	
1221		Bonaventura born.
1224		Thomas Aquinas born.
1234		Raymond Lulli born.
1236		Albert the Great, doctor of theology at Paris.
1245		Alexander of Hales died.
1247		Thomas Aquinas went to Paris. Ægidius Colonna born.
1248		Will. of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, died.
		Thomas Aquinas began to lecture on Lombardus.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1250		Peter of Abano born.
1251	Conrad IV.	
1252		Foundation of the Sorbonne.
1253		Robert Grosseteste died.
1254		Niceph. Blemmydes flourished.
1256		Thom. Aquinas became Doctor of theology.
1264		Vincent of Beauvais died.
1273	Rodolphus I.	
1274		Thomas Aquinas died. Bonaventura died.
1275		J. Duns Scotus and Walter Burleigh born.
1277		John XXI. (Petr. Hispanus) died.
1280	Adolphus of Nassau.	Albert the Great died.
1292		Roger Bacon died, according to Wood.
1293	Albert I.	Henry of Ghent died.
1294		Roger Bacon died, according to some.
1300		Richard of Middleton died.
1308	Henry VII.	J. Duns Scotus died.
1310		Georgius Pachymeres died about this time.
1314	Louis V.	
1315		Raymond Lulli died.
		Franc. Mayron introduced disputes in the Sorbonne.
1316		Ægidius Colonna died.
		Peter of Abano died.
1322		Occam resisted the Pope.
1323		Hervay (Hervæus Natalis) died.
1325		Franc. Mayron died.
1330		Occam sought the protection of the emperor Louis.
1332		Will. Durand of Saint Pourçain, died.
		Theodorus Metochyta died.
1337		Walter Burleigh died.
1343		Occam died.
1346	Charles IV.	
1347		Occam died, according to others.
1349		Thomas of Bradwardine and Robert Holcot died.
1350		Peter D'Ailly born.
1357		Thomas of Strasbourg died.
1358		J. Buridan still alive.
		Gregory of Rimini died.
1361		J. Tauler died.
1363		J. Gerson born.
1374		Petrarch died.
1379	Wenceslaus.	

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1382		Nic. Oramus, or Oresmius died.
1388		Thomas a Kempis born.
1395		Bessarion and George of Trebisond born.
1396		Marsilius of Inghen died.
1397		Henry of Hesse died.
1400	Robert.	
1401		Nicolas Cusanus born.
1408		Laur. Valla died.
1410	Sigismund.	Mathæus of Cracow died.
1415		Emmanuel Chrysoloras died.
1419		J. Wessel Gansfort born.
1425		Peter D'Ailly died.
1429		J. Gerson died.
1430		Theodorus Gaza arrived in Italy.
1435		Marsilius Ficinus born.
1436		Raymond De Sabunde taught at Toulouse.
1438	Albert II.	Georg. Gemisth. Pletho and Bessarion repaired to Florence.
1440	Frederic III.	Invention of Printing. Foundation of the Platonic Academy at Florence.
		Nicolas De Clemange died.
1443		Rodolphus Agricola born.
1453	Taking of Constantinople.	
1455		Nicolas V. died. Reuchlin born.
1457		Laur. Valla died.
1462		P. Pomponatius born.
1463		John Picus of Mirandula born.
1464		Geo. Scholarius Gennadius and Nicolas Cusanus died.
		Cosmo De' Medici and Pius II. died.
1467		Erasmus born.
1471		Thomas a Kempis died.
1472		Bessarion died.
1473		Persecution of the Nominalists at Paris.
		Augustinus Niphus born.
1478		Theodorus Gaza died.
1480		Thomas More born.
1481		Franc. Philelphus died.
1483		Paulus Jovius born.
1484		Jul. Cæs. Scaliger born.
1485		Rodolphus Agricola died.
1486		J. Argyropulus and George of Trebisond died, ac. to some.
		Agrippa of Nettesheim born.
1489		J. Wessel died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1492		Lorenzo De' Medici died. Louis Vives b.
1493	Maximil. I.	Discovery of America.
		Hermolaus Barbarus died. Theophrastus Paracelsus born.
1494		J. Picus of Mirandula and Angelus Politianus died.
1495		Gabr. Biel died.
1497		Melancthon born.
1499		Marsilius Ficinus died.
1500		Dominicus of Flanders died.
1501		Jerome Cardan born.
1508		Bernardinus Telesius born.
1509		Andr. Cæsalpinus born.
1512		Alex. Achillinus died.
1515		Petrus Ramus born. Macchiavelli fl.
1517	Beginning of the Reformation.	
1520	Charles V.	Fr. Piccolomini born.
1522		J. Reuchlin died.
1525		P. Pomponatius died. Fr. Zorzi fl.
1527		Nic. Macchiavelli died.
1529		Fr. Patritius born.
1532		Ant. Zimara died. Jac. Zabarella born.
1533		J. Fr. Picus of Mirandula killed.
		Nic. Leonicus died. Val. Weigel and Montaigne born.
1535		H. Cornel. Agrippa died. Sir T. More beheaded.
1536		Erasmus died. Fr. Zorzi died.
1537		Jac. Faber died.
1540		Marius Nizolius and L. Vives died. Institution of the Jesuits.
1541		Theophr. Paracelsus died. Charron born.
1542		Gasp. Contarini died.
1543		Copernicus died.
1546		Augustinus Niphus died.
1547		Jac. Sadoletus died. Nic. Taurellus and Justin Lipsius born.
1552		Paulus Jovius d. Cæs. Cremoninus b.
1553		Sim. Porta died.
1555	Ferdinand I.	
1560		Phil. Melancthon died.
1561		Franc. Bacon born.
1562		Ant. Talæus died. Fr. Sanchez born.
1564	Maximil. II.	
1568		Thomas Campanella born.
1569		

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1572		P. Ramus died. Dan. Sennert born. J. Sepulveda died.
1574		Robert Fludd born.
1575		Jac. Bœhm born.
1576	Rodolph II.	Jer. Cardan died.
1577		J. B. Van Helmont born.
1578		Berigard born. Alex. Piccolomini died.
1580		Giordano Bruno quitted Italy.
1581		Herbert of Cherbury born.
1583		Grotius born.
1586		Jac. Schegk died. Luc. Vanini and Le Vayer born.
1588		Bernardus Telesius b. Th. Hobbes b. Val. Weigel died.
1589		Jac. Zabarella died.
1592		Mich. De Montaigne died. Gassendi and Comenius born.
1596		R. Descartes born. J. Bodin died.
1597		Fr. Patritius died.
1600		Giord. Bruno burnt.
1603		P. Charron and And. Cæsalpinus died.
1604		Fr. Piccolomini died.
1606		Nic. Taurellus and Just. Lipsius died.
1614	Matthias.	Mart. Schoock born. Fr. Suarez died. Fr. Merc. Van Helmont born.
1619	Ferdinand II.	L. Vanini burnt.
1621		J. Barclay died.
1623		Blaise Pascal born.
1624		Jac. Bœhm died.
1625		Clauberg, Geulinx, and Wittich born.
1626		Fr. Bacon died.
1628		Rud. Goclenius died.
1630		Huet born. Cæs. Cremoninus died.
1632		Fr. Sanchez died. Benedict Spinoza, J. Locke, Silv. Regis, Sam. Pufendorf, and Rich. Cumberland born.
1634		B. Becker born.
1637	Ferdinand III.	Dan. Sennert and Rob. Fludd died.
1638		Nic. Malebranche born.
1639		Th. Campanella died.
1642		Galileo died. Newton born.
1644		J. Bapt. Van Helmont died.
1645		Grotius died.
1646		Leibnitz and Poiret born.
1647		Bayle born.
1648		Herbert of Cherbury and Mersenne died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1649		Scioppius died.
1650		Descartes died.
1651		William of Tschirnhausen born.
1654		J. Selden died.
1655		Gassendi died. Chr. Thomasius born.
1657	Leopold I.	
1659		Adr. Heerebord died. Wollaston born.
1662		Blaise Pascal died.
1663		Berigard died.
1665		J. Clauberg and Mart. Schoock died.
1666		J. De Silhon died.
1669		Geulinx and J. Coccejus died.
1670		Sorbière died.
1671		Comenius died. Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury born.
1672		Le Vayer died.
1675		Sam. Clarke born.
1676		M. Von Kronland and Voetius died.
1677		Ben. Spinoza died. Th. Gale, Fr. Glisson, and Harrington died.
1679		Chr. Wolf born. Jer. Hirnhaym and Hobbes died.
1680		Jos. Glanville and La Rochefoucauld died.
1684		Berkeley born. Jac. Thomasius died.
1685		Lamb. Velthuysen died.
1687		Henr. More and Wittich died.
1688		Cudworth and Parker died.
1694		Ant. Arnault and Sam. Pufendorf died. Fr. Hutcheson and Voltaire born.
1695		Nicole died.
1698		Balthas. Becker and J. Pordage died.
1699		Fr. Merc. Van Helmont died.
1704		J. Locke and Bossuet died.
1705	Joseph I.	J. Ray died.
1706		Bayle died.
1707		Silv. Regis died.
1708		Tschirnhausen and Jacquelot died.
1711		Hume born.
1712		Crusius and Rousseau born.
1713	Charles VI.	Ant. Earl of Shaftesbury died.
1715		Malebranche died. Condillac and Helvetius born. Gellert born.
1716		Leibnitz died.
1718		M. Aug. Fardella died.
1719		P. Poiret and Rich. Cumberland died.
1720		Bonnet born.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1721		Huet died.
1722		Boulainvilliers died.
1723		Ad. Smith born.
1724		Wollaston died. Kant born.
1727		Newton died.
1728		Chr. Thomasius and Thümmig died.
1729		Sam. Clarke, Collins, Gundling, and Fr. Buddeus died.
		And. Rüdiger died.
1731		J. Priestley born. Mandeville died.
1733		W. Derham died.
1735		Le Clerc died.
1736	Charles VII.	
1740	Frederic II. King of Prussia.	
1742		Garve born.
1743		Jacobi born.
1744		Baptist Vico and Joachim Lange died. Platner born.
1745	Francis I.	
1747		Fr. Hutcheson died.
1748		De Crouzaz and Bourlamaqui died.
1750		Bilfinger died.
1751		La Mettrie died.
1752		Hansch died.
1754		Berkeley and Christ. Wolf died.
1755		Montesquieu died.
1756		
1757		David Hartley died.
1758		Ch. Reinhold born.
1759		Maupertuis died.
1762		Alex. Baumgarten died. Fichte born.
1765	Joseph II.	Herm. Sam. Reimarus died.
1766		Thomas Abbt and Gottsched died.
1769		Gellert died.
1770		Winckler, D'Argens, and Formey died.
1771		Helvetius died.
1772		J. Ulr. Cramer died.
1774		Quesnay died.
1775		Crusius and Walch died. Schelling born.
1776		Hume died.
1777		Meier and Lambert died.
1778		Voltaire and Rousseau died.
1779		Sulzer died.
1780		Condillac and Batteux died.
1781		Ernesti and Lessing died.
1782		Henry Home and Iselin died.

A. C.	German Emperors.	
1783		D'Alembert died.
1784		Diderot died.
1785		Baumeister and De Mably died.
1786		Mendelssohn died.
1788		Hamann and Filangieri died.
1789	French Revolution.	
1790	Leopold II.	A. Smith, F. Hemsterhuys and Basedow d.
1791		Rich. Price, Daries, and Nettelbladt died.
1792	Francis II.	
1793		Bonnet, Moritz, and Beccaria died.
1796		Th. Reid died.
1798		Garve died.
1800		Sol. Maimon died.
1801		Heidenreich and Irving died.
1802		Engel died.
1803		J. Beattie and Herder died.
1804		Kant, Jos. Priestley, and Saint-Martin d.
1806		Tiedemann died.
1808		Bardili died.
1809		J. A. Eberhard, Steinbart, and Thos. Payne died.
1812		K. Chr. E. Schmid died.
1813		Jo. A. H. Ulrich died.
1814		Fichte died.
1816		Ferguson died.
1817		De Dalberg died.
1818		Platner and Campe died.
1819		Jacobi and Solger died.
1820		Wyttenbach and Klein died.
1821		Feder and Buhle died.
1822		Eschenmayer died.
1823		Reinhold and Maass died.
1828		D. Stewart and Bouterwek died.

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